ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/25/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, November 24, 1986 11:37PM
Volume 7, Issue 70
Today's Topics:
Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty: Part II (18 Kchars)
papers appearing in ARMS-D
anti-tank weapons
Re: RFP: A Star Wars Game
Government
SDI is research
spending research money
SDI "pilot plant" test
Administrivia
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1986 13:49 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty: Part II (18 Kchars)
Enclosed is Part II of a draft of a paper called "Qualitative Arms
Control and the ABM Treaty". As a draft, please do not cite or quote
it in any other forum. Comments are solicited, and will be most
useful by 12/15.
Qualitative Arms Control and the ABM Treaty: Part II
Copyright (c) Herbert Lin, November 1986
All Rights Reserved
3 A First Example: General Principles of The ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty of 1972 is an agreement in which each party agrees
to forego the defense of its territory against strategic ballistic
missiles. To support this goal, the Treaty limits ABM systems in
quantity (e.g., 100 interceptors), in basing mode (only fixed,
land-based systems), and to certain agreed deployment areas (one site
plus test ranges), and imposes limits on the development, testing, and
deployment of ABM technology. For example, Article VI(a) forbids each
side from testing non-ABM missiles, launchers, and radars "in an ABM
mode".
The meaning of the phrase "test in an ABM mode" was clarified in an
Agreed Statement in 1978, which defined such a test as one involving
"objects whose flight trajectory is comparable to that of a strategic
ballistic missile or its elements while the object is involved in
testing."[8] However, since neither the ABM Treaty nor the the SALT I
Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons that accompanied the
ABM Treaty defined a "strategic ballistic missile" by reference to a
set of performance criteria, some ambiguity remains over what
constitutes a "test in an ABM mode". For example, the Soviet SA-X-12
interceptor missile has been tested against "tactical" ballistic
missiles.[9] However, extrapolations from these tests have led to
allegations that the SA-X-12 also has some capability to intercept
longer-range theater ballistic missiles such as the Pershing II or
strategic missiles such as the Poseidon or Minuteman II; indeed, the
current Administration comes close to suggesting that the SA-X-12
violates the ABM Treaty.[10]
If the two sides wish to resolve such ambiguities, they could agree
on a set of parameters that would define more precisely a "test in an
ABM mode". Specifically, a "test in an ABM mode" involves the test of
a weapon or a sensor that involves a target which resembles a
strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory; the
speed and altitude of the target are two parameters that can
reasonably characterize a test in an ABM mode.[11]
Figure 1 illustrates that a threshold of 3 km/sec in speed can
distinguish reasonably well between strategic ballistic missiles and
tactical ballistic missiles at high altitude; satellites present a
difficulty that will be addressed shortly. However, at low altitudes,
these distinctions are much less clear. Thus, it is only above a
certain altitude threshold (60 km is illustrated in Figure 1) that
activities could reasonably be restricted.
Consequently, a test in an ABM mode could be defined as one
involving a target with a speed or altitude above these values at any
point in their trajectory.[12]
Such an agreement would forbid certain tests of weapons against
satellites. This would be a logical complement to a ban on
high-altitude testing in an ABM mode. The primary difference between
satellite and missile targets is that the trajectory of a satellite is
known with high precision long in advance of the intercept due to its
great regularity, whereas the trajectory of a ballistic missile
becomes known only minutes before intercept. Thus, if an ASAT weapon
is given trajectory data on its target only minutes before intercept,
the ASAT could be operated in an environment that would strongly
resemble a system tested in an ABM mode against a re-entry vehicle in
mid-course.
On the other hand, the American ASAT program has been justified on
the military grounds that it would protect U.S. carrier battle groups
from Soviet space surveillance and deter the Soviets attacking
valuable U.S. satellites. The U.S. might decide that it would prefer
to be able to threaten Soviet satellites than to reduce the threat to
U.S. satellites and additionally to strengthen the ban on ABM
defenses. In this case, it would not agree to an ASAT ban, and each
side would simply accept the ambiguity caused by ASAT weapons pressing
on ABM Treaty limits.
If the two sides wished to possess a minimal ASAT capability, they
could agree on a "grandfather" clause that allowed each side to
continue testing and developing their existing ASAT systems despite
the provisions of any new definition of "testing in an ABM mode". In
addition, the threshold values proposed above could be modified to
permit certain types of ABM technology. For example, if the two sides
wished strongly to continue work on low endo-atmospheric terminal
defense and boost-phase intercepts, they might modify the proposed
definition so that any test regardless of speed but below a certain
altitude was not considered a "test in an ABM mode". The dashed
boundary in Figure 2 illustrates this modification graphically.
The verifiability of such an agreement is facilitated when the
parameters involved are physical quantities that can be directly
observed, rather than quantities whose values must be inferred from
observations. The parameters proposed in this instance -- the speed
and altitude of a target as functions of time -- are physical
quantities that are directly observable. By contrast, the yield of an
underground nuclear explosion is not directly measurable; rather,
estimates of yield are based on seismic measurements that must be
calibrated using certain procedures whose accuracy is subject to
endless debate and argument. Even harder to assess with confidence
would be weapon capabilities based on intangibles such as computer
software. For example, the same interceptor missile might or might
not be ABM-capable depending on the particular computer software
controlling its flight path. However, software cannot be inspected by
national technical means, and even on-site inspection of software
could not eliminate the possibility that different software could
replace the inspected software.
In addition, it must be possible to measure the parameters with an
accuracy sufficient to distinguish between the performance that
characterizes the forbidden military capability from allowed
capabilities. In this case, the speed and altitude of a target can be
measured with high accuracy. Thus, if national technical means (NTM)
could track the speed of a target within 10% of its true value, and
the Soviets conducted a test in which a target's speed were measured
at 2.9 km/sec, there would be no significant technical consequence if
the speed of the target were in fact 3.2 km/sec, even though such a
speed would technically exceed the agreed limits. However, if
national technical means were capable of tracking the speed of a
target only within a factor of two of its true value, the approach
proposed would not be viable, since tests conducted at target speeds
of 5.8 km/sec would have significant technical consequences.
As importantly, the 3.0 km/sec threshold is low enough that a
missile tested only to this threshold could not be assumed with
confidence to be capable of performing intercepts against targets
traveling at 5 km/sec.
The parties could also agree that activity near the threshold could
constitute prima facie cause for concern but not necessarily evidence
for violation, and that an explanation of the activity provoking
concern could be required without resort to specific charges about
violation. Such an approach would help to reduce disputes about the
significance of a borderline activity.
4 A Second Example: ABM Treaty Specifics
The previous section described an approach to the strengthening of
the ABM Treaty based on a comprehensive approach that would cut across
weapon technologies. An alternative approach could focus on a
specific weapon technology and individualized parameters relevant to
that technology. For example, interceptor missiles and lasers are two
weapons that are currently under consideration for ABM applications.
4.1 Interceptor Missiles
The capability of an interceptor missile is indicated by its
kinematic profile: its altitude, range, speed and acceleration.
Interceptors with limited speed, acceleration, altitude and speed are
not ABM-capable, and a set of threshold values could be defined to
define the kinematic profile of an ABM interceptor. Publicly
available information suggests that the Soviet SA-X-12 missile has a
very marginal capability to intercept strategic ballistic missiles; an
educated guess about the profile of the SA-X-12 would be that it has a
range of about 100 km, an altitude of about 30 km, a speed of about
Mach 4, and an acceleration of about 50 g's. An ABM-capable
interceptor could be defined as one that exceeded one or more of these
values.
It is possible that current national technical means are not
adequate to verify that all tests of interceptor missiles fell within
these limits. However, a cooperative verification regime could
increase the data available beyond that which can be collected by
national technical means operating alone. For example, the two sides
might agree to equip all test missiles with a radio beacon. The data
from two listening stations tracking the missile through the beacon
would yield the complete kinematic profile of the missile. Under such
an arrangement, the verification problem would be reduced to one of
detecting all missile launches, rather than the far more difficult one
of monitoring the entire flight of all missile launches.
Finally, it might be possible to circumvent limits on interceptor
performance. For example, the trajectory of a re-entry vehicle in
principle completely predictable from the moment that the RV separates
from its delivery vehicle. A very slow interceptor launched a few
moments after RV separation could be aimed to collide with the RV many
minutes after separation. However, it would be very difficult to
develop the technology that would be needed to give a slow interceptor
the ability to intercept the fast-moving RV, or even to predict the
exact trajectory of the RV so that such an intercept could be
performed; indeed, such capabilities might never be achieved. Thus,
while it is theoretically possible to circumvent limits on interceptor
performance in this manner, such limits provide at the very least a
grace period in which both sides may proceed with fewer concerns.
4.2 Space-Based Lasers
A second example involves space-based lasers and mirrors that
direct laser beams to their target. One plausible parameter for laser
technology is the brightness of the laser (given essentially by the
power of the laser times its mirror area divided by its operating
wavelength squared). A threshold of 10**19 watts/steradian in
brightness corresponds roughly to the power and brightness of the
Alpha laser/LODE mirror currently being developed under the auspices
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. This limit would
prevent the development of laser weapons in low-earth orbit (LEO)
capable of destroying either significant numbers of ballistic missiles
or satellites in geo-synchronous orbit.[13]
The power of a space-based laser could be monitored to a certain
extent by measuring the heat it radiates. An output power of 20 MW
would require significantly more input power, the generation of which
would be detectable by monitoring waste heat produced with a set of
infra-red detectors observing the structure from different positions.
Other parameters could be determined by direct measurement or
observation.
'5 Quantitative Limits
Though directed primarily towards qualitative limitations on
weapons performance, the approach described above can be extended to a
certain extent into the quantitative domain. In particular, the
primary parameter relevant to quantitative arms control is simply the
number of units required to perform a particular military mission.
For example, while ABM-capable technology by assumption demands high
levels of performance, an ABM system to defend the territory of a
large nation requires highly capable technology in large quantities.
Mission-based quantitative restraints are possible if it is possible
to determine the number of units necessary for the military mission to
be forbidden, and if the forbidden military mission requires a larger
number of units than would be required for other allowed military
missions.
The limit of one hundred ABM interceptors provided by the ABM
Treaty is an example of a mission-based limit. One hundred
interceptors are far from sufficient to perform territorial defense,
but are sufficient for other military missions such as the defense of
single highly valued target (e.g., a national capitol or a missile
field) against a small attack.
Quantitative limits may be desirable by themselves, or they may be
used in conjunction with qualitative limits. For example, in the
event that it is impossible for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to agree
on reasonable performance restrictions for new ABM technology, it may
still be possible to agree on a scale of deployment that would still
maintain an effective ban on territorial defenses.
6 Conclusion
The drafters of the original ABM treaty anticipated that ABM
technology would evolve, and they established a body called the
Standing Consultative Commission to "promote the objectives and
implementation of the provisions of the [ABM] Treaty". Such a body
would be the logical forum in which to take up the question of how to
interpret the intent of 1972 in a technological and strategic world a
decade or two later.
However, the sine qua non of arms control is the political will to
reach agreement. In the absence of political will, progress in new
technologies can indeed erode the basis underlying any arms control
agreement. As one example, the current timeline for SDI experiments
suggests that technological progress may be used purposefully to
destroy the ABM Treaty; the Treaty will not endure if either side is
committed to actions that fundamentally contravene its original
purpose.
In the strategic competition, it is generally held that the
comparative advantage of the U.S. over the Soviet Union is the
technological strength of the former, while the comparative advantage
of the Soviet Union is its ability to exceed (in some cases by far)
U.S. weapon production rates. Thus, if the U.S. decides to forego
qualitative arms control (for example, by allowing refusing to update
the ABM Treaty to take into account new technologies), it must face
the prospect that the unilateral military advantages it would have in
the short term might well be illusory in the face of long Soviet
production runs of comparable and offsetting weapon technologies that
would in the long term leave the U.S. more insecure.
Notes
1. The same restrictions apply to development and testing of ABM
system components, according to the "restrictive" interpretation of
the Treaty, adopted by the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and early Reagan
Administrations. The "so-called" broad interpretation, promulgated in
October 1985 by the current Administration, suggests that only the
deployment of these components is prohibited. The restrictive
interpretation governs this analysis.
2. See for example, Bruce Berkowitz, "Coming Constraints in Arms
Control Agreements -- Approaching the Limits of Feasible Regulation",
in Science, Technology, and Human Values, Winter 1986, page 24; and
Christoph Bertram, "Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of
a New Approach", Adelphi Paper #146, __ 1979, pages 2-6.
3. Unless otherwise specified, an "observable" activity is one that
can be observed either unilaterally or cooperatively.
4. The terms "capability" and "mission" are used in different senses
in this paper. "Capability" refers individual weapons and targets: an
interceptor missile has the "capability" to destroy a re-entry vehicle
traveling at 6 km/sec. By contrast, "mission" refers to the aggregate
assignment of these weapons used to achieve a specific objective: a
network of 10,000 interceptor missiles can perform the "mission" of
defending the entire territory of the continental U.S.
5. Since then, U.S. weapons with yields larger than the 150 KT
threshold have been planned and even deployed, though no U.S. weapons
have been deliberately tested above the threshold. This has been
possible because it is a relatively simple matter to increase the
yield of a thermonuclear weapon by adding more explosive material to
the basic weapon.
6. I am grateful to Matthew Bunn for this example.
7. I am grateful to Peter Sharfman for this point.
8. SDIO Report to Congress, 1986, page C-7.
9. Thomas Longstreth, John Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, The Impact
of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM
Treaty, National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, March 1985, page 55.
10. Soviet Non-Compliance, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
February 1, 1986, page 4.
11. The negotiating history of the ABM Treaty suggests that the U.S.
attempted to specify an altitude threshold above which any test
conducted would be a test in an ABM mode, but was unsuccessful in
obtaining Soviet agreement to this provision.
12. A somewhat weaker condition would be to consider the speed and
altitude of the target at the moment of intercept. This is an example
of an important implementation detail that would have to be worked out
between the U.S. and Soviet Union.
13. Carter estimates that 160 lasers in 1,000 km orbit with a
brightness of 2 x 10**20 watts/steradian would be required to destroy
1400 simultaneously launched boosters hardened to 10 kilojoules/square
centimeter. See OTA Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, page
20.
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Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1986 13:52 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: papers appearing in ARMS-D
An administrative note: by now, it should be obvious that as moderator
I believe that ARMS-D can serve a useful role in distributing for
comment the e-mail equivalent of pre-prints for commentary and
discussion.
I have put into the digest all papers that have been submitted, and I
want to encourage the readership to submit for comment anything that
they have written.
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Subject: anti-tank weapons
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 86 14:25:22 EST
From: Wes Miller <wesm@mitre-bedford.ARPA>
The following is from the September 1986 issue of 'Proceedings'
magazine, page 112, entitled 'BANG-LESS TANK KILLER', and is copied in part
without permission. The atricle is by Roland K. Mar.
..."In 1975, at the urging of Professor Stuart Hoenig of the
University of Arizona, the Army's Fuels and Lubricants Research Laboratory
conducted a series of tests on 'engine interferants' - substances that, when
ingested into an operating internal combustion engine, would cause it to fail.
Professor Hoenig beleived that there is more than one way to kill a tank.
As armor-piercing rounds become less and less capable of penetrating
tank frontal armor - at least for man-portable weapons - other means must be
found. If the traditional hard kill is impossible for the individual infantry-
man, the next best thing is a 'mobility kill.'
Professor Hoenig's research focused on substances that could degrade
the performance of tank engine lubricants or damage the engine directly. Using
data developed by Hoenig and the Army Fuels and Lubricants Laboratory staff,
the laboratory ran a series of tests on both types of substances. Results
indicated that lubricant interferants were not feasable, but that several
combustion interferants were highly effective. Foremost of these were common
acetylene (C2H2) and butane. Butane was found to be too difficult to handle
and easy to counter. However, acetylene can be easily and cheaply procured and
handled as the compound calcium carbide, which is available in any hardware
store.
Exposing a running diesel engine to an ambient air concentration of
about 3% acetylene causes engine preignition so severe that the engine has to
be shut off in one or two seconds to avoid self-destruction. Concentrations
only slightly higher have the same effect on standard gasoline-powered
internal combustion engines. These tests were conducted with normal engine
air filtration systems in place.
Despite the positive results of the tests and the laboratory's
favorable endorsement of Hoenig's concepts, the Army Material Command declined
to follow up on the tests. After all, an engine mobility kill would stop a
tank, armored personnel carrier, or truck, disable all sensors, and remove the
power needed to operate the weapons systems, but it would not make a
satisfying bang. And, the idea came from an outsider.
Although the Army gave up on the concept, Hoenig did not. In a further
test at the University of Arizona, a diesel engine was totally destroyed
internally in less than three seconds upon exposure to the gas. Hoenig
continued with a design for a binary warhead containing one pound of
commercially available calcium carbide and 0.28 pounds of a water gel
compound. Upon impact, the two substances mixed and stuck to the target, while
sufficient gas was produced to contaminate a sphere 7.07 feet in diameter with
enough gas to damage any internal combustion engine (greater than 16% by
volume). Chemical warfare-protected vehicles can filter driving compartment
air and protect the crews through positive pressure measures, but the engines
must draw on ambient air, which cannot be filtered finely enough to block out
acetylene molecules."
The article goes on to dicuss replacing the warheads on obsolete LAWs
to fit this purpose, and an example of how an amphibious assault can be
stopped (as an example) by several of these charges exploded under water below
the ships and landing craft. Any dicussion?
Wes Miller
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 86 15:26:37 PST
From: toma@Sun.COM (Tom Athanasiou)
Subject: Re: RFP: A Star Wars Game
>It seems to me that someone could (should!) write the "Star Wars
>Game," making the player just such a video Defender of the
>American Homeland. The view could be from a network of orbital
>sensors (under constant Soviet attack, of course), and the players
>would have to watch moving targets (hundreds during boost phase,
>more after MIRV separation) and discriminate warheads from decoys.
I think it would be a lot easier, and more realistic, to just hack
up a program that looped until either:
1) You used it offensively, e.g. as an ASAT
2) It thought there was an attack.
Then, once things got going, it could get a random number somewhere.
It it was even, it'd do nothing. If odd, it'd crash. The program
wouldn't take long to write, and it'd be pretty portable. The
crash() routine could be arbitrarily flashy.
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 24 November 1986 18:06-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: ARMS-D
Re: Government
Let us remember...'government' does not default to federal government.
There are many levels of government from federal to city. I know this
is obvious, but some people seem to have forgotton it when composing
their messages.
Each level has certain responsibilities. Some extremists believe the
federal government is responsible for everything from education and
feeding the hungry to defense of the nation and international
negotiations.
My definition of federal government responsibilities is "those whhich
cannot be accomplished more effectively at a lower level". Again,
this is very simple. That is on purpose. Governmental responsibility
should be passed. That is the only way to maintain a people's
government.
The nextt time the 'federal' government is blamed for cutting funds or
support to a program, ask yourself why one of the lower levels of
government haven't picked it up and why they didn't have it all along?
G. CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 24 November 1986 18:22-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: SDI is research
I do not know the numbers involved in federal research projects, so I
cannot judge what you are asking.
I do know that if money were not being spent on SDI, it would not
necessarily providde money for any other projects. It wasn't taken
out of other needed project budgets to begin with. If the money is
wasted on non-productive 'fluff' as someone once called it, I am all
for rectifying the situation. I am not in favor of cutting a
project's funding before it has been proven or disproven. the
arguements presented so far simply say that if SDI proceeds in a
certain manner, certain faults are probable. That sounds like a
theory and I hope no one uses theory as fact. My crystal ball is in
the repair shop this week.
As for priority, the elected representatives of the people are the
ones you have to convince of that. It is the people's money that is
being spent, and they generally trust their representatives to
allocate it properly. If you are in the minority, you still have the
right to be heard, but to get anything changed you will have to
convince the majority of your views. Our Senate and House do have
experts in every field advising them of the situation. The
information is available. The president too has experts and knows
what is going on. The difference between them and us is that when
they make a mistake in judgement, they have to stand up under it to
the whole nation. When one of us makes a mistake in our opinions of
SDI, LOW, etc., we just change our opinion and try to get rid of the
red face. Hindsight is always 20/20.
CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 24 November 1986 19:22-EST
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: ARMS-D
Re: spending research money
To: Lin
would you be more supportive of putting money into a research project that
had no chance of seeing the light of day (fulfilling its goal)? That is why
we don't develop ABM. As the president said, it would effectively kill any
chance SDI has of success.
CFCCS @ HAWAII-EMH
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 86 16:56:15 pst
Subject: SDI "pilot plant" test
A thought came the other day. Any sensible engineer knows that it's unwise
to go direct from a laboratory demo to construction of a full-scale plant;
one first builds a pilot plant, big enough to simulate full-scale operating
conditions accurately, yet small enough to make changes cheaply.
Paul Nitze's criteria for a successful SDI -- survivability and cost-
effectiveness at the margin -- are well-known, and with minor reservations
I agree with them. I would suggest a third criterion should be satisfied
before any attempt at operational deployment: a successful "pilot plant"
test. Specifically, I would suggest that no SDI deployment should take
place until SDI has shown clearly that it can defend Kwajalein Island
*completely* against heavy attack.
The reason for using Kwajalein is simple: it's at the receiving end of
the Pacific Missile Range, and is already used as the target area for ICBM
tests, so a simulated attack there can use *real* *missiles*. (Obviously
it can't use real nuclear warheads, so the reentry vehicles will have to
carry instruments and ballast instead.)
The attack should use several missiles, multiple "warheads", and a full set
of penetration aids. SDI should not itself be in charge of the attack;
the ideal attack commanders would be the people working on getting US
missiles past Soviet defences. The idea here is to get people who will
seriously try to outwit the defenders. Strenuous efforts should be made
to ensure that the defenders do not know exactly when the attack will be
launched. If the pilot-plant nature of the operation makes it necessary
to have only a few satellites rather than a full constellation, there will
undoubtedly be "attack windows", outside of which the satellites are not
in the right places to simulate a full constellation. If at all possible,
things should be arranged so that there are multiple windows and so that
they are fairly wide, to maximize the uncertainty. Consideration should
be given to simulating communications jamming and other real problems.
The evaluation criterion should be 100% success, nothing less. I do not
believe perfection is the right criterion for a full-scale system, but we
are talking about a limited pilot-plant test. Many of the problems that
a full-scale defence would face will be present only in miniature. There
will be no nuclear explosions in space and no major attempts to destroy the
defences themselves. The problems of tracking and discrimination will be
vastly simplified by the small scale. Kwajalein is essentially a point
target, so there will be little uncertainty about the destination of the
"warheads". In many ways this is a much easier problem than full defence
of the US. IF SDI CANNOT DEFEND KWAJALEIN PERFECTLY, IT CANNOT POSSIBLY
DEFEND NORTH AMERICA ADEQUATELY!
Of course, successful complete defence of Kwajalein doesn't in itself
imply the ability to defend North America. Scaling up from a pilot plant
to a full-scale plant does have its own problems. But if the pilot plant
doesn't work, the real thing won't either. A pilot-plant test for SDI
would not be simple, quick, or cheap, but I think it would be a worthwhile
investment if deployment starts to become a serious prospect.
(Do I think it could be done successfully? Yes. Do I think SDI, as now
organized and run, could do it successfully? No. Best to find out early.)
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1986 23:13 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
My mailer no longer recognizes the following host
B.ISI.EDU.#Internet
This recipient (ISI-ARMS-D@B.ISI.EDU) is off my list until I get a
notice that the problem has been fixed.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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