ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/26/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, November 25, 1986 9:36PM
Volume 7, Issue 71
Today's Topics:
Administrivia
24 hours response delay question (2 messages)
SDI as promoted has boost-phase intercept, offensive capability
SDI is research
spending research money
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
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Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1986 08:37 EST
From: LIN@[10.0.0.44]
Subject: Administrivia
==>> Someone at BBN should help this guy:
ezf@APMASTER.BBN.COM
who my mailer has bounced.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 86 01:02:27 EST
From: Douglas Humphrey <deh@eneevax.umd.edu>
Subject: 24 hours response delay question
>[From LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU]
>
>Please give an example of how waiting 24 hours would significantly impede
>the U.S. response.
A 24 hour delay in response would allow a number of things to happen
which are not possible in other response postures:
1. Strike evaluation - The Soviets would have 24 hours in which to determine
the effectivness of counter-force strikes and to establish a very effective
target list for a second strike. The conditions of ground based facilities
will be very obvious 12-24 hours after a strike, including ICBM and Bomber
forces, communications facilities, etc.
2. Follow-up Strike - Once a list of targets is established, most of the
Soviet ground-based ICBM facilities can be reloaded and reused due to
their use of 'cold' launch techniques. These Land Based ICBMs should be
able to do a very effective secondary strike and assure that the
original goals of the mission (remember, this assumes that they first
strike us) are accomplished.
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare - A first strike would provide greatly increased
activity in the Fleet Balistic Missle boats, both in communications with
their authorities (COMSUBLANT, etc.) and possibly the physical movement
of boats that were caught out of optimum position for their assigned
target lists, etc. This unusual level of activity might be of asistance
in Soviet hunter subs mission to kill FBMs before they launch.
4. Negotiating Position - This one is very uncertain. Could there be an advantage
in having struck and then negotiating ? Why does everyone assume that
Washington D.C. is such a high priority target ? Many senarios work
best when there is still someone on the other side to talk with and
deal with. A hard US position on a 24 hour waiting period might make
possible the limited first strike only on hard military targets, with the
possibility of talks with the US in case A) the strikes are fantasticaly
effective and crush the fighting spirit and leaders of the US, or
B) The strikes are totaly ineffective and the Soviets have to do the
fancy footwork to try to convince the US not to go with a vengance
strike. In many cases, the United States willingness to deal and to
lose face is a very big disadvantage. What is the Soviets DID go for
a disarming type of strike with limited non-military damage and have
it turn out that it does not work. If we have a policy of waiting
24 hours, the Soviets call on the hot line and say 'OK. It didn't
work. If you guys (the US) want to hit us, we are going to cut loose
with everything we have in a massive counter-value strike and blow
every city in the US right off the map. We all die. On the other
hand, if y'all want to cut a deal, say us backing out of East Germany
and someother hand-waving, then you (the US) don't attack us, we
take our lumps in the World Community (big lunps to be sure),
and most everyone survives. In fact, we like this so much that we
have made it all public world-wide. Think it over' [click]
End result ? The US waits 24 hours, and then gets to make the choice of
either attacking the Soviet union and unleashing Total Nuclear War
(we all die) or of being 'reasonable' about it and letting the Soviets
off the hook with some sort of substantial penalty, but no nuclear hits.
What do you think that World Public Opinion will FORCE us to do ???
One of the things that keeps nuclear exchanges in the briefing books and
out of the real world is the near-certainty that one it gets going it
will go all of the way. I think that having the 24 hour wait in their
(there)changes a lot of important balances.
Doug
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Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1986 20:12 EST
From: LIN@[10.0.0.44]
Subject: 24 hours response delay question
From: Douglas Humphrey <deh at eneevax.umd.edu>
1. Strike evaluation - The Soviets would have 24 hours in which to
determine the effectivness of counter-force strikes..
Satellite-based nuclear detonation sensors would also provide this
information for the Soviets. The U.S. will have very precise sensors
for this purpose in the near future; the Soviets are capable of having
it too. Coarse resolution is already available to both sides.
2. Follow-up Strike - Once a list of targets is established, most of
the Soviet ground-based ICBM facilities can be reloaded and reused due
to their use of 'cold' launch techniques. These Land Based ICBMs
should be able to do a very effective secondary strike..
Actually, I've been told it takes 24-48 hours to reload Soviet silos,
but that's secondary. Besides, what would they hit now? Calling for
a 24 hour delay in response does NOT mean that the U.S. would sit back
and wait. It would just respond in ways other than with nuclear
strikes; for example, bombers would disperse. IF Soviet missiles are
as good at killing U.S. silos as claimed, then there won't be much to
go after.
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare - A first strike would provide greatly
increased activity in the Fleet Balistic Missle boats, both in
communications with their authorities (COMSUBLANT, etc.)
Why? The job of FBM boats is to hide until ready to fire; they don't
broadcast at all.
and possibly
the physical movement of boats that were caught out of optimum
position for their assigned target lists, etc.
The boats on station are by definition in optimum position. The boats
in transit travel there at high speed anyway.
This unusual level of
activity might be of asistance in Soviet hunter subs mission to kill
FBMs before they launch.
The FBM force is probably the one force that would NOT do things
differently in the 24 hours.
4. Negotiating Position: A hard US position on a 24 hour waiting
.... A)
the strikes are fantasticaly effective and crush the fighting spirit
and leaders of the US,
But then by assumption there is nothing left to do -- we have been
disarmed by your hypothesis.
B) The strikes are totaly ineffective ... The US waits 24 hours,
and then gets to make the choice of either attacking the Soviet union
and unleashing Total Nuclear War (we all die) or of being 'reasonable'
about it and letting the Soviets off the hook with some sort of
substantial penalty, but no nuclear hits.
They can do this now without a 24 hour wait. They can force us to
make the same choice giving us 30 minutes, which is better for them.
What do you think that World Public Opinion will FORCE us to do ???
You tell me. We don't HAVE to do anything. The question is what is a
WISE thing to do.
Your scenarios do not present anything that is not true now.
------------------------------
Date: 1986 November 25 02:24:18 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:SDI as promoted has boost-phase intercept, offensive capability
<H> From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
<H> Date: Fri, 21 Nov 86 21:28:16 pst
<H> The other side of my statement is that yes, it is *possible* to build an
<H> SDI system which *would* have major offensive uses. But this is not an
<H> argument against SDI as a whole; it is an argument against certain types
<H> of SDI systems. ... <and Midgetman comparison flushed below>
<H> The existence of undesirable types of SDI system does not imply that
<H> SDI as a whole is undesirable, unless it becomes clear that the
<H> undesirable systems are in fact the ones being pursued seriously.
But in fact any permanent (not pop-up) space-based system flies over
the USSR and has virtually instant offensive access, and that is a
major component in the preliminary designs that claim to be layered to
stop more than 99% of USSR ICBMs. Therefore SDI as currently proposed
is undesirable as a whole. Whenever a lesser system is proposed,
everybody gets upset about all the decoys/drones and says it can't
possibly work that way, so we absolutely need boost-phase intercept
based on permanent space-based battle stations. (Does anybody on
ARMS-D claim that even without boost-phase intercept we can stop 99.9%
of Soviet ICBMs, or know somebody who so claims? Speak now!)
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1986 08:53 EST
From: LIN@[10.0.0.44]
Subject: SDI is research
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
I do know that if money were not being spent on SDI, it would not
necessarily providde money for any other projects.
But if it is spent on SDI, it SURELY isn't available for other projects.
If the money is
wasted on non-productive 'fluff' as someone once called it, I am all
for rectifying the situation.
How would you recognize fluff when you see it? (This is a general
question to the readership.)
I am not in favor of cutting a
project's funding before it has been proven or disproven.
What would you accept as proof that large-scale, near-perfect
population defense against nuclear ballistic missiles is highly
improbable?
the
arguements presented so far simply say that if SDI proceeds in a
certain manner, certain faults are probable.
Or would you insist on impossible? i.e., without a proof that
something is totally impossible, it should be researched.
As for priority, the elected representatives of the people are the
ones you have to convince of that... Our Senate and House do have
experts in every field advising them of the situation...
I am going to be one of these "experts" in January. I am asking you,
in your role as the equivalent of a pro-SDI lobbyist, how you would
advise a decision-maker given that money is not infinite. What
procedure should decision-makers use to set priorities? The problem
is -- in general -- that decision-makers are faced with everyone
screaming for their own programs, someone here for SDI, someone there
for anti-tank weapons, and so on. If you can't come in with a case
that X is not only good, but better than Y for spending money, they
will say "thank you" and show you the door.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1986 08:57 EST
From: LIN@[10.0.0.44]
Subject: spending research money
From: cfccs at HAWAII-EMH
To: Lin
would you be more supportive of putting money into a research project that
had no chance of seeing the light of day (fulfilling its goal)?
A great deal of research does not see the light of day, and such money
can still be well-spent. As you yourself once pointed out, the goal
of research is to see if something is possible. If the answer is no,
then it has by your definition fulfilled its goal, whether or not it
sees the light of day.
I support spending $1.5 B or so on BMD related research, conducted
within the proper (i.e., restrictive) interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, and without the high visibility it has now.
------------------------------
Date: Tuesday, 25 November 1986 20:30-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
Lin> A de facto policy of LOW (presumably as a way of protecting
Lin> strategic forces) would mean that we would not spend money on
Lin> trying to make strategic forces invulnerable. The SLBM force
Lin> is more expensive to maintain and operate than the ICBM force,
Lin> and many allege that the C3 to the SLBM forces is less secure.
Lin> Why would we do that if we had such a de facto LOW policy?
We have the subs. because LOW is (far) less than perfect, but we
nevertheless have a LOW policy because the Air Force wants MX and
competes with the Navy. Re your first point, the Air Force indeed
cites LOW (as of about 1985) as the primary reason their big
missiles are survivable and relatively cheap.
> Given the appearance of an "unequivocal" warning, we are indeed set
> to attempt retaliation via launch on warning. Even today.
>
> Agreed. But being set to do something does NOT mean that you will do
> it. That's what makes it NOT policy.
Are you sure you mean this? I say that the pre-decision to *attempt*
LOW would by any definition amount to having a LOW policy. Surely
you don't say "we don't have a policy if there's a chance the attempt
to do a LOW would fail" (which is always the case)?
> By your definition, the U.S. has a "policy ON X" if it has a
> set of procedures that provide for the taking of a decision of
> whether or not to do X. Now do I understand you?
Yes. "Policy" is a general term, in my books.
> The War Powers Act says that Congress must be notified when there is a
> significant probability that U.S. forces will be committed. As
> I understand the act, it refers to situations in which outside
> influences could lead to the committment of forces. It
> postulates a President reacting to these outside influences,
> and contemplating the use of forces. I don't think it is meant
> to deal with situations in which the President initiates
> actions that might be foolish or misguided.
The act contains sections meant to *prohibit* Presidential initiation
of conflict. In that sense it strictly limits Presidential actions.
It additionally prescribes reporting requirements in the event of
the permitted Presidential reactions. I'm concerned with the
bar on conflict initiation, but most attention in the media is
given to the reporting requirement in the event of permitted reaction.
The act emphatically does NOT say that the Pres. can go ahead so
long as he tells Congress, but most people seem to think this is
the case, and this misperception seems to be the basis of your
point.
> Lin> So if you were guaranteed to have perfect sensors, operating
> Lin> LOWC would be OK?
>
> You didn't answer this question in my previous message.
I prefer not to engage in this unreal hypothesis, but even if I did,
perfect sensors would only remove one objection to a LOWC. A more
resilient objection would be that the size of the target sets could
well initiate nuclear winter per se. Another would be that millions
and millions of innocent civilians would be killed even if there
weren't a nuclear winter. But, I admit that one legal objection
would be removed.
> ... a nuclear response should be congressionally
> authorized. The decision's obviously too big for one man, and
> there would be time to get a congressional subcommittee together.
>
> I'm not sure I entirely disagree. But such a decision for a
> nuclear response is certainly not covered under current
> statutes.
On the contrary, the Atomic Energy Act gives the Pres. a full
go-ahead on the first-use decision. Because I think first-use is
a *qualitative* expansion of war, rather than its continued waging;
and because the Constitution allocates such qualitative expansions
of war as then existed solely to Congress; I think this delegation
of first-use authority is unconstitutional. Conclusion: the
Atomic Energy Act is unconstitutionally overbroad, and needs
revision.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1986 21:34 EST
From: LIN@[10.0.0.44]
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Lin> A de facto policy of LOW (presumably as a way of protecting
Lin> strategic forces) would mean that we would not spend money on
Lin> trying to make strategic forces invulnerable.
We have the subs because LOW is (far) less than perfect, but we
nevertheless have a LOW policy because the Air Force wants MX and
competes with the Navy.
Please specify who you mean by "we" as in "we" have a de facto policy
of LOW.
Re your first point, the Air Force indeed
cites LOW (as of about 1985) as the primary reason their big
missiles are survivable and relatively cheap.
True. But the Air Force does not set national policy.
> Given the appearance of an "unequivocal" warning, we are indeed set
> to attempt retaliation via launch on warning. Even today.
>
> Agreed. But being set to do something does NOT mean that you will do
> it. That's what makes it NOT policy.
Are you sure you mean this? I say that the pre-decision to *attempt*
LOW would by any definition amount to having a LOW policy.
You are using the term "LOW policy" in a very slippery way. It can
mean two things. It can mean (1) "policy on the possibility of an
LOW" or (2) "policy that we will in fact execute an LOW". When you
use the phrase "LOW policy", I sometimes hear you saying #2, but when
pressed you revert to #1. That is why I use the phrase "policy ON
LOW" to denote #1, and "policy OF LOW" to denote #2.
Surely
you don't say "we don't have a policy if there's a chance the attempt
to do a LOW would fail" (which is always the case)?
In the interests of clarification, I would rephrase it to say that
"But being set to do something does NOT mean that you will do it, or
that you would even TRY to do it. That's what makes it NOT policy."
> By your definition, the U.S. has a "policy ON X" if it has a
> set of procedures that provide for the taking of a decision of
> whether or not to do X. Now do I understand you?
Yes. "Policy" is a general term, in my books.
But it is not the same thing as a policy OF X; see above.
The act contains sections meant to *prohibit* Presidential initiation
of conflict.
But Soviet missiles on the way are not a Presidential decision; Soviet
missiles on the way *are* the indication of conflict. That is why the
question of reliable sensor information is so important.
The act emphatically does NOT say that the Pres. can go ahead so
long as he tells Congress, but most people seem to think this is
the case, and this misperception seems to be the basis of your
point.
Hardly. I had not thought of notification at all. Your points about
the WP Act are correct though.
> Lin> So if you were guaranteed to have perfect sensors, operating
> Lin> LOWC would be OK?
>
> You didn't answer this question in my previous message.
I prefer not to engage in this unreal hypothesis, but even if I did,
perfect sensors would only remove one objection to a LOWC. A more
resilient objection would be that the size of the target sets could
well initiate nuclear winter per se. Another would be that millions
and millions of innocent civilians would be killed even if there
weren't a nuclear winter. But, I admit that one legal objection
would be removed.
Unreliable sensors is the only basis for your case against LOW, at
least as you have presented here in the Digest. The other reasons you
describe have nothing to do with LOW, but rather with targeting
strategy. You might want to argue that the SIOP target sets are
illegal, but that's not what you have been saying here.
the Atomic Energy Act gives the Pres. a full
go-ahead on the first-use decision. Because I think first-use is
a *qualitative* expansion of war, rather than its continued waging;
and because the Constitution allocates such qualitative expansions
of war as then existed solely to Congress; I think this delegation
of first-use authority is unconstitutional. Conclusion: the
Atomic Energy Act is unconstitutionally overbroad, and needs revision.
OK; I see (but don't agree with) your argument, but note that on the
basis of what you have said, you concede my point, namely that a
Congressional subcommittee decision for a nuclear response is not
covered under current statutes. Indeed, your problem is that under
current law, it is not, and you want to change the law (by judicial
review) so that it is.
A couple of additional points:
1) I would feel far more sympathetic to the requirement for a
Congressional decision on pre-emptive first use in the absence of
tactical warning. In that case, your argument about qualitative
expansion of war would carry far more weight.
2) I want to make it clear that I am NOT advocating a declaratory
policy of LOW. I do want to retain the LOW option.
3) Indeed, I see no need for such massive prompt hard-target kill as
we have on the ICBM forces. Pending further research, I advocate a
deep underground missile basing (an unfortunate acronym that could
kill it all by itself) that would NOT allow prompt hard-target kill,
but that could dig itself out in a day or so, or maybe even a week.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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