ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (11/30/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, November 30, 1986 2:31PM
Volume 7, Issue 74
Today's Topics:
Administrivia: IMPORTANT TO BITNET SUBSCRIBERS
Launch on warning
"Limits on what we can do with software"
SDI "pilot plant" test
Launch on warning
Pentagon Action Project
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Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1986 22:00 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia: IMPORTANT TO BITNET SUBSCRIBERS
I received a note foretelling nasty things if I am unable to find a
BITNET host to act as redistribution point for ARMS-D. Apparently,
WISCVM.WISC.EDU is being swamped by ARPANET-based hosts, and they
would like to reduce the load on it. A BITNET host would help
tremendously.
I need one volunteer who can act as BITNET maintainer of ARMS-D.
His/her job would be to process any additions/deletions from BITNET
people, and to maintain a remailing point from his/her host so that
ARMS-D need only send one copy to BITNET.
Any volunteers?
Thanks...
Herb Lin
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Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1986 15:44 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
GA.CJJ
> We have the subs because LOW is (far) less than perfect, but we
> nevertheless have a LOW policy because the Air Force wants MX and
> competes with the Navy.
> LIN
> Please specify who you mean by "we" as in "we" have a de facto
> policy of LOW.
GA.CJJ
In the above, we = the United States; but the de facto control is
exercised by the Air Force.
> .. the Air Force does not set national policy.
The USAF *runs* national policy! Ergo, the USAF de facto sets it.
The USAF *implements* national policy, which is supposed to be done in
a way that conforms to guidance provided by the National Command
Authority. If they are in fact subverting it, then I see the basis
for your complaint, but then the NCA is not the target of your
complaints; it should be the USAF.
I don't disagree with you when you say the USAF competes with the
Navy, but then you can't really talk about "national policy" when you
are more properly talking about air force policy.
GA.CJJ
> I say that the pre-decision to *attempt*
> LOW would by any definition amount to having a LOW policy.
> LIN
> You are using the term "LOW policy" in a very slippery way. It
> can mean two things. It can mean (1) "policy on the possibility
> of an LOW" or (2) "policy that we will in fact execute an LOW".
> When you use the phrase "LOW policy", I sometimes hear you
> saying #2, but when pressed you revert to #1.
GA.CJJ
In my lexicon, (1)=all LOWCs; (2)=empty set...
It's crucial to realize that there's *never* more than a possibility
of performing a LOW.
I'm still not coming through. Does the phrase "LOW policy" mean: (1)
"policy governing whether we will attempt to execute an LOW" or (2)
"policy that we will in fact attempt to execute an LOW". When you use
the phrase "LOW policy", I sometimes hear you saying #2, but when
pressed you revert to #1. The feasibility of LOW is not at issue in
this question. #1 is a "policy ON (the subject of) LOW" and #2 is
"policy OF (actually attempting to execute) LOW".
... we agree that any set of procedures that is preset to *attempt*
LOW in some circumstances is fairly called having a policy of
launch on warning?
No. It is a policy *ON* (the subject of) LOW. The specific
circumstances are what constitute the policy.
> Unreliable sensors is the only basis for your case against LOW,
> at least as you have presented here in the Digest.
True, that's the thrust of my case.
But then you have to deal with the fact that ALL systems for providing
information to the NCA can be faulty and are not 100% reliable.
Indeed, your case must then rest on the argument (far more difficult
to make) that mechanical/electronic sensors + people (i.e., the NORAD
early warning system) are QUALITATIVELY more prone to error than other
information-providing systems that other NCAs have used without
challenge.
But the environmental
catastrophe is part of the damages aspect of the allegations.
That's what gives you standing to sue. But since it is not unique to
the LOW issue, the LOW issue cannot stand or fall on those issues
unless you are willing to go after all of current nuclear strategy.
You may want to do that, but that opens up additional points that you
have not addressed.
[under GA.CJJ's case] it still would be the
Pres. who decides, operationally, that nukes should be first-used,
but only after a special OK from Congress.
But Congress has already given him the OK, as you yourself have
pointed out, when it gives him what you described as "overly broad"
authority. You want Congress to be able to VETO his decision, which
is a different matter entirely.
Would you support a peacetime 30-minute timelock on MX/Minuteman?
I'd have to hear better arguments than I have heard now, but under
some circumstances, I would be willing to support such locks.
However, I cannot support going any farther than that.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1986 16:40 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: "Limits on what we can do with software"
Parnas (as reported by Benson)
To satisfy [the demand that nuclear ballistic missile be rendered
impotent and obsolete], the software must perform the following functions:
o Rapid and reliable warning of attack...
o Efficient intercept...
etc..
It must be constructed in such a way that all the parties are
confident that it will perform these functions when called upon to do
so.
This list of functions raises an interesting point. I agree with the
list, but am troubled by its dependence on system architecture.
Specifically, we could imagine a "BMD" system that consisted of thick
orbiting shells of gravel at 500 km altitude. No ballistic missile
now known could penetrate that, and we could have confidence that it
would work. We would not need to perform all of the functions that
Parnas listed. The sole issue is the cost of putting all that junk
in space.
The existence of this "alternative" BMD suggests that the "software"
needed to control it need not be complex, extensive or unreliable; the
system just proposed doesn't need it at all. However, no one thinks
that an actual BMD will not require software. Thus, we conclude that
for deviations that are "large enough" from "prototypical"
architectures, the software problem can be made tractable.
An interesting question arises: How can we develop more precise
measures for the phrase "large enough deviations" and the word
"prototypical"?
The Eastport Study used such an approach; they said that an
unconventional architecture would make the software problem tractable.
The argument above suggests that for a sufficiently unconventional
architecture, they are right. My problem with the Eastport study is
that they have not made an argument that their preferred architecture
is even in the right direction of "unconventionality", let alone "far
enough"; indeed, I think they have gone in the wrong direction. But
my problem with my own position on BMD software (i.e., very critical)
is that I have constructed an existence proof that says that in some
circumstances, I am wrong.
What are those circumstances? I can't speak in general, but obviously
one issue is cost. If you are willing to spend enough money (in the
case above, on lift costs), the software problem is tractable. My
intellectual question is "Where do I draw the line?"
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1986 16:49 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI "pilot plant" test
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
The attack should use several missiles, multiple "warheads", and a full set
of penetration aids...
Any suggestion about how the Soviets will react to the simultaneous
launch of several missiles (probably SLBMs)? How should we convince
them that it's not part of an attack?
(Picky details like this not withstanding, a pilot plant test is a
great idea.)
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 28 November 1986 17:41-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
> The USAF *implements* national policy, which is supposed to be
> done in a way that conforms to guidance provided by the National
> Command Authority. If they are in fact subverting it, then I
> see the basis for your complaint, but then the NCA is not the
> target of your complaints; it should be the USAF.
Weinberger is the target for my complaint -- the USAF reports to him,
and other organizations responsible for the presently operated LOWC.
His order could prohibit operation of the LOWC.
> I don't disagree with you when you say the USAF competes with
> the Navy, but then you can't really talk about "national policy"
> when you are more properly talking about air force policy.
One can talk about the "de facto" policy in such terms. When the
"de facto" policy is tolerated by the nation, regardless of the
official policy, then that de facto policy is reasonably construed
as the nation's policy.
> I'm still not coming through. Does the phrase "LOW policy"
> mean: (1) "policy governing whether we will attempt to execute
> an LOW" or (2) "policy that we will in fact attempt to execute
> an LOW".
According to my definition, it means (1). According to your
definition, it means (2). That's my understanding.
> ... we agree that any set of procedures that is preset to *attempt*
> LOW in some circumstances is fairly called having a policy of
> launch on warning?
>
> No. It is a policy *ON* (the subject of) LOW. The specific
> circumstances are what constitute the policy.
Hmm. It seems you've just answered "yes", not "no". I did mean
that the circumstances would be predefined, so it fits your reply
re policy.
> > Unreliable sensors is the only basis for your case against LOW,
> > at least as you have presented here in the Digest.
>
> True, that's the thrust of my case.
>
> But then you have to deal with the fact that ALL systems for
> providing information to the NCA can be faulty and are not 100%
> reliable.
No I don't. I'm selecting a particular set of procedures (the
LOWC) because they are easily separable and published. Most
importantly, they concern conflict *initiation*, or nuclear
*escalation*. With a war in full swing, of course decisions must
be made on less than perfect information. But, if you know of any
other such dangerous, conflict intiation/escalation (and therefore
illegal) sets of procedures, I'd likely sue against them also,
except the LOW issue has my hands full already.
> [under GA.CJJ's case] it still would be the
> Pres. who decides, operationally, that nukes should be first-used,
> but only after a special OK from Congress.
>
> But Congress has already given him the OK, as you yourself have
> pointed out, when it gives him what you described as "overly
> broad" authority. You want Congress to be able to VETO his
> decision, which is a different matter entirely.
No, the Atomic Energy Act does not give the Pres. any right to
decide to use nukes in peacetime, any more than he can use any
kinds of bombs in peacetime. Your above interpretation exemplifies
the need for a clarifying revision of the act.
> Would you support a peacetime 30-minute timelock on MX/Minuteman?
>
> I'd have to hear better arguments than I have heard now, but
> under some circumstances, I would be willing to support such
> locks. However, I cannot support going any farther than that.
What circumstances do you have in mind?
------------------------------
Date: Sunday, 30 November 1986 13:12-EST
From: michael%iris.Berkeley.EDU at UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU
Re: Pentagon Action Project
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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