ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (12/02/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, December 2, 1986 2:52PM
Volume 7, Issue 76
Today's Topics:
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
Re: Limits to what we can do with software
Offensive uses of SDI
Dimwitted scientists
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
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Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1986 14:00 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Lin> A policy *OF* LOW means that when we receive warning, we will
Lin> launch. A policy *ON* LOW (identical to your usage of the
Lin> phrase "LOW policy", tough not mine) means when we recieve
Lin> warning, we MIGHT (try to) launch, depending on the
Lin> circumstances.
I think it's valuable for you to expand your first definition as
follows: A policy *OF* LOW means that when we receive warning, we
will *try to* launch.
Agreed.
Lin> But during peacetime, decisions are also made on less than
Lin> perfect information.
But not a decision to initiate war, and not by the wrong people.
Decisions to initiate war can also be made on imperfect information.
Are yousaying that the President will NOT be consulted?
I am suing against first-use, but I leave out other escalatory
steps, e.g., from demo-nuc to tac-nuc, and from tac-nuc to
IC-exchange.
Then you are ignoring the basic issue inherent in first use.
Only to repel *sudden* attack, when there's not enough time for
Congress to act; and not to repel a non-attack.
It is a sudden attack, and to the best of the President's knowledge at
the time, it IS an attack, based on information provided by
information systems that are fallible, just as all other information
is transmitted to him.
Are you convinced that the day-to-operation of a LOWC is
justified to protect against a bolt-from-the-blue decapitation
scenario, or conversely?
It's either that, or delegation of authority, or both. On balance, yes.
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 1 December 1986 16:58-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
> .. Are you saying that the President will NOT be
> consulted?
I'm saying that it's *highly probable* the President would not be
consulted, and that he isn't entitled to take the decision anyway.
Only Congress can initiate war, and the Pres. can only respond to
a *certain* attack. I repeat Wilson's statement that "The war powers
were framed so as to make it *certain* that nothing but our national
interest can draw us into war."
> Then you are ignoring the basic issue inherent in first use.
I don't see how. I draw a natural line at the very first use,
rather than somewhere above this is the escalation ladder. This is
in the spirit of the U.S. official declaration in May, 1974 by the
U.S. delegate to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:
"In response to speculation that further development of low-yield
tactical nuclear weapons would blur the distinction between
conventional and nuclear weapons, I wish to state categorically that
the U.S. government has no intention whatever to treat such tactical
systems as interchangeable with conventional arms. We fully
appreciate that the distinction, or 'firebreak,' between nuclear and
non-nuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare,
and will not act to erode this distinction."
> Are you convinced that the day-to-operation of a LOWC is
> justified to protect against a bolt-from-the-blue decapitation
> scenario, or conversely?
>
> It's either that, or delegation of authority, or both. On
> balance, yes.
Is it your opinion that there could be an attack warning, in what we
now call day-to-day peacetime, so sure as to warrant the
retaliatory launch decision -- in the face of the obviously minute
probability that the USSR would launch such a bolt-from-the-blue
attack?
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1986 18:21 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
I'm saying that it's *highly probable* the President would not be
consulted, and that he isn't entitled to take the decision anyway.
I disagree. That is one of the first specific points of disagreement
that I can identify.
Only Congress can initiate war, and the Pres. can only respond to
a *certain* attack. I repeat Wilson's statement that "The war powers
were framed so as to make it *certain* that nothing but our national
interest can draw us into war."
The word "certain" in the second sentence does not correspond to its
use in the first sentence. I agree with Wilson's statement, and
disagree with your first statement.
> I am suing against first-use, but I leave out other escalatory
> steps, e.g., from demo-nuc to tac-nuc, and from tac-nuc to
> IC-exchange.
>
> Then you are ignoring the basic issue inherent in first use.
I don't see how. I draw a natural line at the very first use,
rather than somewhere above this in (?) the escalation ladder.
When Soviet missiles are on the way, LOWed missiles are the SECOND
use.
> It's either that, or delegation of authority, or both. On
> balance, yes.
Is it your opinion that there could be an attack warning, in what we
now call day-to-day peacetime, so sure as to warrant the
retaliatory launch decision -- in the face of the obviously minute
probability that the USSR would launch such a bolt-from-the-blue
attack?
I would want a President informed enough to refrain from saying OK,
for precisely the reasons you have described. But I don't want to
enforce it mechanically.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 86 01:11:56 PST
From: mse%Phobos.Caltech.Edu@DEImos.Caltech.Edu (Martin Ewing)
Subject: Re: Limits to what we can do with software
Responding to Lin, who said
Specifically, we could imagine a "BMD" system that consisted of thick
orbiting shells of gravel at 500 km altitude.
(If you could afford such a defense, you could even more afford a rock-
throwing offense. Offense still has the advantage.)
The existence of this "alternative" BMD suggests that the "software"
needed to control it need not be complex, extensive or unreliable...
...my problem with my own position on BMD software (i.e., very critical)
is that I have constructed an existence proof that says that in some
circumstances, I am wrong.
What are those circumstances?
The software demands seem to come from the "fast active precision" of the
defense. Building passive stone walls used to be a good idea, but the only
modern counterparts would be Lin's gravel or underground cities. Short of
those we have to shoot many bullets at many bullets, and that takes some
computing. The space-time cross-section of the incoming fire is so small
that unassisted humans couldn't cope. (Worse, humans apparently can't make
a trustworthy judgement that they're under attack until they've taken
unacceptable losses.)
It could be just an accident of nature that the directed energy defenses
(and control software) seem to be unworkable against BMs. It is
conceivable that some technical development could be effective as a
(population) defense, but relatively useless as an offense. I see no sign
of such a welcome thing, but it must be inaccurate to say that high
technology (even software!) can not save us from nuclear attack *in
principle*.
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 86 01:57:00 pst
Subject: Offensive uses of SDI
> From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
>
> The other side of my statement is that yes, it is *possible* to build an
> SDI system which *would* have major offensive uses.
>
> Does a BMD system used to blunt Soviet retaliation count as a system
> with offensive uses? If so, that offensive use is system independent.
If blunting a counterattack is an offensive use, then there is no such
thing as a defensive weapon. While use of defensive weaponry to
support offensive actions cannot be ignored, calling it "offensive"
for that reason alone robs the terms of all meaning. NORAD is an
offensive system by that rule, even though it is normally thought of
as purely defensive. By my reckoning, calling a BMD system
"offensive" because it can be used to defend against a counterattack
is false and misleading advertising.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 86 08:36:20 PST
From: Peter O. Mikes <pom@s1-c.arpa>
Re: Dimwitted scientistts (ours and theirs)
Wimpy Grad Student/ says I have two questions:
Q1) Can anyone identify a quote top science journal unquote that is pub-
lishing Dr Franz' letter?
Q2) What is known/believed about Soviet failsafe mechanisms?
1) I doubt that story like would be acceptable to any technical journal,
particularly the part in which Dr. F says that squirting oil on
PC boards 'blew all circuits'. Oil is a non-conducting liquid.
So I guess that the 'top journal' was some National Enquirer.
2) Very little - even inside of SU, Soviets are much more security
conscious. I suugest you count the ratio of the space launch
failures to get a representative ratio of safety margins.
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Date: Tuesday, 2 December 1986 14:31-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
REPLY TO 12/01/86 15:45 FROM LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU: Launch on warning
> > Are you saying that the President will NOT be consulted?
>
> I'm saying that it's *highly probable* the President would not be
> consulted.
>
> I disagree. That is one of the first specific points of
> disagreement that I can identify.
I do agree that the Pres. would be consulted in the declaratory
policy on LOW. I'm really addressing the de facto policy.
(1) Do you think there's a difference between the declaratory
policy and the de facto policy, and if so, in what respects
do they differ?
(2) If by the "Use them or lose them" decision time the military
have been unable to contact the Pres., do you think they have (a) the
understood authority, and (b) the power to take a LOW decision?
> Only Congress can initiate war, and the Pres. can only respond to
> a *certain* attack. I repeat Wilson's statement that "The war powers
> were framed so as to make it *certain* that nothing but our national
> interest can draw us into war."
>
> The word "certain" in the second sentence does not correspond to
> its use in the first sentence. I agree with Wilson's statement,
> and disagree with your first statement.
If the Congress OK'd the operation of a LOWC, I'd find it harder
to disagree with your perception. But the key to Wilson's
"certainty" is the reservation of such a decision for Congress,
in my view.
> When Soviet missiles are on the way, LOWed missiles are the
> SECOND use.
And when they're not on the way, LOWed missiles are the FIRST use.
To paraphrase an old ditty:
"Oh the grand SAC C-in-C,
He had one thousand (Minute)men,
He almost LOWed them once before,
And he almost LOWed them again.
And when there was peace there was peace,
And when there was war there was war,
And when there was only clear blue sky,
There was neither peace nor war."
> Is it your opinion that there could be an attack warning, in what we
> now call day-to-day peacetime, so sure as to warrant the
> retaliatory launch decision -- in the face of the obviously minute
> probability that the USSR would launch such a bolt-from-the-blue
> attack?
>
> I would want a President informed enough to refrain from saying
> OK, for precisely the reasons you have described.
But the Pres. is only informed after it has been determined that an
attack is confirmed. He's told "We're under attack," and proceeds
from that point. Or do you disagree, and think that the Pres. has
the role of determining if the warning is valid? Isn't that
NORAD's function?
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 1986 14:50 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
I do agree that the Pres. would be consulted in the declaratory
policy on LOW. I'm really addressing the de facto policy.
I don't know how to discuss de facto policy; since it really rests on
a chain of inferences, and I disagree with some of your inferences, I
can't discuss aspects of it because I don't acknowledge their
existence.
Everything that you have presented to this forum suggests that the DoD
refuses to disavow LOW as an option, and I don't see grounds for going
beyond that statement.
(2) If by the "Use them or lose them" decision time the military
have been unable to contact the Pres., do you think they have (a) the
understood authority, and (b) the power to take a LOW decision?
They clearly have the physical power to make such a decision, in that
Looking Glass certainly has some launch codes. However, I do not
believe that they would execute an LOW in the absence of Presidential
contact under peacetime circumstances. I'm less sure about wartime.
If the Congress OK'd the operation of a LOWC, I'd find it harder
to disagree with your perception.
I believe that Congress has in fact done so, by default, and in the
absence of specific legislation to the contrary.
> When Soviet missiles are on the way, LOWed missiles are the
> SECOND use.
And when they're not on the way, LOWed missiles are the FIRST use.
True. But then the issue revolves around the reliability of any
information system. You can't ever GUARANTEE that the information on
which decisions are based is correct.
> I would want a President informed enough to refrain from saying
> OK, for precisely the reasons you have described.
But the Pres. is only informed after it has been determined that an
attack is confirmed. He's told "We're under attack," and proceeds
from that point. Or do you disagree, and think that the Pres. has
the role of determining if the warning is valid? Isn't that
NORAD's function?
Sorry, I was unclear. Here is what I meant: I would want a President
informed enough (i.e., one that was smart, skeptical, and mistrustful
of computers) to refrain from saying OK, for precisely the reasons you
have described.
The President's role is to process a variety of data, of which one
(important piece) is what NORAD tells him. It is the President who
must make the ultimate subjective judgment. For example, if NORAD
reported that the U.S. were under attack by British SLBMs, I would
want the President to disbelieve that report, and say "No, don't
launch." In other words, the President must judge the plausibility of
the NORAD warning in light of what his other sources tell him.
Tactical warning is important, but I don't think it should be the only
input; strategic information counts too, and I want a President
knowledgeable enough in general to be able to make those judgments.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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