ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (12/06/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, December 6, 1986 3:51PM
Volume 7, Issue 77
Today's Topics:
Administrivia (BITNET readers take special note)
policy on LOW: footnote in OTA report
SDI (and arms race) desirability
War by robots, humans "not involved"??? What does that mean?
Forwarding Arms-D
Matter - Anti-matter Propulsion
Re: Santa Claus Poem
Re: SDI "pilot plant" test
SDI as promoted has boost-phase intercept, offensive capability
List
Re: New book, *The Automated Battlefield*
Re: Defending Kwajalein
Orbiting Gravel
Launch on warning and the president's military advisor
Launch on warning and the president's military advisor
Launch on warning
Launch on warning
LOW
ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct
ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 02 Dec 86 14:28:18 -0800
From: arms-d-request@xx.lcs.mit.edu
re: Administrivia
TO ALL BITNET READERS: IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL BE RECEIVING ARMS-D
FROM
GROSS%BCVAX3.BITNET@WISCVM.WISC.EDU
who has graciously volunteered to act as a BITNET redistribution site.
------------------------------
Subject: policy on LOW: footnote in OTA report
Date: Tue, 02 Dec 86 14:28:18 -0800
From: Dave Suess (CSL) <zeus@aero2.ARPA>
(In case this hasn't been cited already)
The OTA report "Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies" (Sept. '85, as
reprinted in "Strategic Defenses," Princeton University Press, 1986,
ISBN 0-691-02252-6) has a footnote (page 56) that states,
"For many years it has been U.S. policy to have a
capability to launch on warning. Although we have
no declared policy to do so, the possibility that
we might is a part of our deterrent posture."
Dave Suess (zeus@aero2.arpa) (I am not a spokesman for my employer.)
------------------------------
Date: Tue 2 Dec 86 20:13:23-EST
From: Calton Pu <CALTON@CS.COLUMBIA.EDU>
Subject: SDI (and arms race) desirability
I have posted a message on "Reykjavik Mystery" some time ago, asking
why Reagan and Gorbachev abandoned a possible missile ban because of
a hypothetical SDI deployment. Also, why 65% of American public
thought Reagan did the right thing.
The answers say that both Reagan and Gorbachev want supermacy, and
therefore they have to make SDI an issue independently of the missiles
themselves. Also, American public would support SDI for presumed
ignorance (insufficient information), irrationality (love Reagan), and
greed (personal gains).
Is there a chance that a good percentage of the American public
actually support SDI and Reagan because they want American supremacy?
This question occurred to me after the Grenada invasion, er,
liberation. Maybe the concept of domination, winning, and being
Number One is deeply rooted in the American culture, so people tend
naturally to support American efforts to achieve victory in any kind
of contest.
If this hypothesis is valid, then the arms race will continue not
because of public ignorance or greed, but to keep the American pride,
to satisfy the need for victory after victory. This hypothesis
implies that a better informed public will continue to support arms
race. Any comments? Any suggestions to test this hypothesis?
-Calton-
fearfully cognizant
------------------------------
Date: 1986 December 02 22:02:46 PST (=GMT-8hr)
From: Robert Elton Maas <REM%IMSSS@SU-AI.ARPA>
Subject:War by robots, humans "not involved"??? What does that mean?
<GC> Date: Tuesday, 25 November 1986 17:54-EST
<GC> From: Gary Chapman <chapman at russell.stanford.edu>
<GC> Re: New book, *The Automated Battlefield*
<GC> I have finally picked up a copy of Frank Barnaby's new book, *The
<GC> Automated Battlefield* (The Free Press, $18.95 hardcover). I am
<GC> having a hard time believing what I find in it.
<GC> ...
<GC> Barnaby only rhetorically asks what it would take to produce a victory
<GC> in a war of robots against robots. I find it incredible that we've
<GC> reached a stage where such a question is on the public agenda. A
<GC> Deputy Director of DARPA recently asked me what I could have against
<GC> war involving only robots. I was, for a while, speechless. I can't
--- --------- ---- ------
<GC> understand the world view that would produce a question like that.
What does that phrase mean? Does it mean only robots fight the war, or
only robots are hurt by the war. If robots fight the war, but human
civilians get killed by the robots in massive numbers, possibly
becoming extinct as the robots continue to fight even after all
visible humans are gone, that's the very thing we are trying to
prevent!! If it means only robots are hurt by the war, I don't believe
it. I don't see how after one nation's robots totally defeat the other
nation's robots, the winning nation won't proceed to try to take over
the populace of the defeated nation. I think maybe somebody is using
the ambiguous phrase deliberately to switch definitions in the middle
of an argument. Define the situation that only robots will fight
the war, but then delude the audience that only robots will be hurt.
------------------------------
Subject: Matter - Anti-matter Propulsion
Date: Wed, 03 Dec 86 07:40:10 -0800
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
Henry Spencer mentioned some "serious" study if not work on anti-matter
propulsion. This may be an even more ludicrous proposal than the Tau Ceti
project. If the problem of storage of the anti-matter is not enough (It would
have to be stored in a vacuum of 10^-20 torr or so to keep air molecules from
detonating on it and within that, to keep it away from the container walls,
it would have to reside in a magnetic bottle.), how would it be produced?
Not likely from moon-mines! It can only be created by nuclear chemistry, i.e.
high-energy particle accelerators. Talk about a break-even problem! The
energy needed to produce even a few molecules would be prohibitive!
But enough of this nay-saying! To the word processors! Let's get busy
on the grant proposals! We'll have to be fast because the clandestine
Iran-Contra connection may be the unravelling of this whole infantile, sci-fi
atmosphere created by Ronald Reagan.
--Charlie
------------------------------
Date: Wed 3 Dec 86 20:48:28-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Santa Claus Poem
[This is like the original, except the meter is slightly improved;
e.g. "set fire to" is replaced by "ignited" which works better.]
'Twas the Night before Christmas -- The Very Last One
-----------------------------------------------------
(Anon. 1986)
'Twas the night before Christmas -- the very last one --
When the blazing of lasers destroyed all our fun.
As Santa Claus left for work, driving his sleigh,
A satellite spotted him making his way.
The Star Wars Defense System -- Reagan's desire
Was ready for action, and started to fire!
The laser beams criss-crossed and lit up the sky
Like a fireworks show on the Fourth of July.
I'd just finished wrapping the last of the toys
When out of my chimney there came a great noise.
I looked to the fireplace, hoping to see
St. Nick bringing presents for missus and me.
But what I saw next was disturbing and shocking:
A flaming red jacket igniting my stocking!
Charred reindeer remains and a melted sleigh-bell;
Outside, burning toys -- like confetti they fell.
So now you know, children, why Christmas is gone:
The Star Wars computer had got something wrong.
Only programmed for battle, it hadn't a heart;
'Twas hardly a chance it would work from the start.
It couldn't be tested, and no one could tell,
If the crazy contraption would work very well.
So after a trillion or two had been spent
The system thought Santa a Red missle sent.
So kids dry your tears now, and get off to bed,
There won't be a Christmas -- since Santa is dead.
------------------------------
From: mogul@decwrl.DEC.COM (Jeffrey Mogul)
Date: 4 Dec 1986 1338-PST (Thursday)
Subject: Re: SDI "pilot plant" test
I think this is poor idea, and it illustrates the danger of decoupling
the technical question of SDI feasibility from the political question
of SDI desirability, and the political implications of testing SDI.
If I were a Soviet defense planner, I would be most scared of an
SDI "pilot plant" test, whether or not it succeeded according to Henry's
criteria. For, once it has shown partial success, my opponent would
have a great deal more confidence in its ability to neutralize a
retaliatory strike; i.e., I would fear that the U.S. has a much better
idea of how successful a first strike would be. The time-to-deployment
would also be much lower, since the U.S. could afford to build a lot
of hardware once it had confidence in how well it worked. This is the
kind of worry that would make me build lots more ICBMs, and go to
launch-on-warning much earlier in a crisis.
An undeployed but tested SDI system is more destabilizing than an
undeployed, untested SDI because it forces the other side to either
accept an "inferior" position in the near future, or to build a bigger
deterrent.
While I think I'm agreeing with Henry when I believe that we could not
rationally rely on an SDI without some operational test of this sort,
I think the mere act of testing it changes the political environment
to the point where we could put the genie back into the bottle even if
the test showed that it would be infeasible to make SDI into a population
defense.
Testing is thus quite different from research. "Research" is when a
negative result doesn't hurt you; once we start testing we cannot
accept a negative result without potentially serious changes in nuclear
arsenals. In this light, it is not sufficient to ask "is SDI feasible?"
but rather "can we afford to find out that the answer is no?"
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 86 21:00:57 pst
Subject: SDI as promoted has boost-phase intercept, offensive capability
REM writes:
> But in fact any permanent (not pop-up) space-based system flies over
> the USSR and has virtually instant offensive access... Therefore SDI
> as currently proposed is undesirable as a whole...
Why should flying over the USSR imply offensive access? If, for example,
the space-based weapons cannot penetrate atmosphere, their position over
the USSR is largely irrelevant. Existing large satellites fly over the
USSR a great deal; surely this does not make them undesirable because they
have "virtually instant offensive access". The question is not whether a
defensive system is in the right position to take offensive action, because
most any boost-phase system will be, but whether it is capable of using that
position to take offensive action. If it's not, the position doesn't matter.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 86 13:43:47 pst
Subject: Re: New book, *The Automated Battlefield*
> ... Moreover, there is no discussion at all
> of the prospects for the Mutually Balanced Force Reductions talks
> (MBFR), which have been going on for the *last 15 years* in an attempt
> to get some kind of arms control on conventional weapons in the
> European theater. [emphasis added]
I'm afraid I too would pay little attention to the "prospects" for talks
that have been running for 15 years with no major results.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 86 13:43:08 pst
Subject: Re: Defending Kwajalein
> ... But you forgot to mention one important thing. The tendency
> to modify the outcome of such tests, experiments and war games
> to "Successful" conclusions...
Yes, you're right, this is important. Some sort of third-party assessment
is in order. Even if the success criterion is, as I suggested, total and
absolute defense against all incoming warheads, there will still be some
judgement calls about things like marginally successful kills.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: Dave Berry <mcvax!itspna.ed.ac.uk!db@seismo.CSS.GOV>
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 86 14:46:30 GMT
Subject: Orbiting Gravel
Since Herb has suggested orbiting shells of gravel for BMD, and Henry
Spencer has suggested mining the asteroids to provide the armour necessary
to make SDI satellites secure against pre-emptive attack, it looks like
we could have an effective BMD system rather easily. All we have to do is
to fetch an asteroid back to Earth orbit, blow it up, and make sure all the
rubble goes where we want it to. This also has the advantage that since
it would affect all missiles, the problem of one side worrying about the
other preparing a first strike wouldn't apply.
Now, are these really practical suggestions? What would the climatic
effects of orbiting shells of gravel be? (Maybe they would counter
the greenhouse effect, so we could kill two problems with one suitably
large stone). What would happen when their orbits started to decay?
Just how much work is needed to bring an asteroid back to Earth orbit
(without hitting the Earth, please), and to convert it into rubble
(or armour, for that matter)?
If these aren't practical suggestions, what are they doing on the arms
digest?
Dave Berry.
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 3 December 1986 20:08-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning and the president's military advisor
> Everything that you have presented to this forum suggests that
> the DoD refuses to disavow LOW as an option, and I don't see
> grounds for going beyond that statement.
I think the new citations of LOW as the prime reason MX/Minuteman are
survivable indicates an alarmingly heightened DEGREE OF RELIANCE
upon the LOWC. My inference chain is quite simple. The military,
essentially the Air Force *really* would LOW in some circumstances.
For example, in a crisis, they'd be prepared to take such steps as
make it probable that, if there were an attack, they *would* LOW.
Consider, e.g., the testimony of General Burke:
"The United States never has and never should renounce the
possibility of doing just what you said (launch on warning).
That is always there as an ultimate deterrent. We must always
preserve that... We always want the option... we are going to
put our finger on the trigger and he is going to put his finger
on the trigger... as soon as we get into a crisis situation,
long before he has pulled that trigger, we know our only choice
is to use it or lose it, we are going to get very close to the
trigger and he is going to know we are doing that, and he is
going to do it. And I think the analogy of two scorpions in the
bottle will be very apt.
The other problem, of course, is there is just not much time."
(House Armed Services Committee, DOD Appropriations FY 1981, 1044.)
Inference #1 is: in some circumstances, e.g. stratgeic warning,
the US would enact a level of alert so as to make LOW a probability
in the event of an attack. Do you concur?
Inferences two and three are like the mean value theorem: from
the conclusion one can realistically infer the intermediate
steps. If, in the event of a realistic attack, the US were
configured to LOW with a truly deterrent probability, it would
have to do things like provide for the possibility of launch even
if satellite or radar sensors suddenly went dead (especially the
former). A strategic warning, for example, could relax
the "dual" phenomenology "requirement." The conclusion is that a LOW
*would* occur based upon substantially risky warning. By the same
token, for credibility, there would necessarily have to be
preauthorization for the military to perform a LOW without real-time
presidential order. If the response depended on the President being
online, the USSR would have an *easy* way to prevent a LOW.
So, from inference #1, I deduce that, in some circumstances, LOW
would be performed -- inference #2 -- based on warning riskier
than that implied by satellite/radar dual phenomenology, and --
inference #3 -- likely without real-time presidential
authorization. Do you concur? If not, where does my inference
break down?
> They clearly have the physical power to make such a decision,
> in that Looking Glass certainly has some launch codes.
> However, I do not believe that they would execute an LOW in the
> absence of Presidential contact under peacetime circumstances.
> I'm less sure about wartime.
Then you might want a 30-minute time-lock on missiles in wartime
more than in peacetime?
> I would want a
> President informed enough (i.e., one that was smart, skeptical,
> and mistrustful of computers) to refrain from saying OK, for
> precisely the reasons you have described. (False alert risks.)
I think our basic disagreement may be on the trust we owe the
administration. My opinion is that, as a matter of fact, they can't
be trusted any further than they can be seen. Evidence supporting
this is abundant. In such an awesome matter, we have a *duty* not
to rest on assurances which we don't have good cause to believe.
Most ominously, the *de facto* "president" is construed by the
military as a White House military advisor to the President:
Admiral HARDISTY: Only the President or the President's successor
can authorize the release of nuclear wepaons.
Mr. BROOKS: What if the President and Vice-President are out,
the Capitol has been slowed down and you can't find the Speaker or
the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Cabinet officers
are all down here eating lunch? Who would then take over?
Admiral HARDISTY: ...the continuity of government plan is the
responsibility of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and
the White House, sir, and the White House military office as to
who that would be.
Mr. BROOKS: The White House military office?
Admiral HARDISTY: As advisor to the President.
Mr. BROOKS: That is kind of interesting.
(Our Nation's Nuclear Warning System: Will It Work If We Need It?,
hearing of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, Sep 26, 1985.)
It is with the White House military office that NORAD/SAC maintains
a constantly open line. I think it unrealistic not to suppose that
this unit would operate as the de facto president in a real LOWC
contingency. Another job for another Colonel North. We simply
cannot tolerate the fact that this might well be the situation
we are in, and must demand better-than-boy-scout reassurances
to the contrary.
> If the Congress OK'd the operation of a LOWC, I'd find it harder
> to disagree with your perception.
>
> I believe that Congress has in fact done so, by default, and in
> the absence of specific legislation to the contrary.
There *is* specific legislation to the contrary, in that the
war powers act specifically prohibits such a construction from
the absence of specific legislation/appropriation to the contrary.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 1986 22:28 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning and the president's military advisor
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
I think the new citations of LOW as the prime reason MX/Minuteman are
survivable indicates an alarmingly heightened DEGREE OF RELIANCE
upon the LOWC.
I concur. That is consistent with the statement that I made.
Inference #1 is: in some circumstances, e.g. stratgeic warning,
the US would enact a level of alert so as to make LOW a probability
in the event of an attack. Do you concur?
No. The level of alert for MM/MX is such that they are always ready
to perform an LOW, at least as I understand the DEFCON system. I
don't think that level of alert would matter for the ready ICBM's.
A strategic warning, for example, could relax
the "dual" phenomenology "requirement."
It might, or it might not. That is a judgment I don't want to make.
Besides, if that is the problem, then the solution is to make the
sensor system more reliable.
... for credibility, there would necessarily have to be
preauthorization for the military to perform a LOW without real-time
presidential order. If the response depended on the President being
online, the USSR would have an *easy* way to prevent a LOW.
No. If as you assume, there is a crisis, the President or at least
the VP would be airborne in NEACP, and NEACP would be the one to
make the LOW decision.
Then you might want a 30-minute time-lock on missiles in wartime
more than in peacetime?
No. I don't want any mechanical restraints at all. I am willing to
have my mind changed on it, but I haven't yet heard an argument I
believe.
I WOULD support a command destruct option built into the ICBMs, to be
fired if indeed they were launched in error.
I think our basic disagreement may be on the trust we owe the
administration.
I agree that this is probably the substance of the disagreement.
In my view, the solution is to elect a good President. We had one in
Carter, and I'm sorry to have seen him go.
Most ominously, the *de facto* "president" is construed by the
military as a White House military advisor to the President:
Admiral HARDISTY: ...the continuity of government plan is the
responsibility of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and
the White House, sir, and the White House military office as to
who that would be.
Mr. BROOKS: The White House military office?
Admiral HARDISTY: As advisor to the President.
I don't think that supports your position at all. The exchange you
cite is not unreasonable if the circumstances outlined by Brook are
present -- namely, no one there. A de facto President to me is one
that acts as President even when the real President is around.
Besides, it could be construed as saying that FEMA and the White House
are all responsible for the continuity of government PLAN.
> If the Congress OK'd the operation of a LOWC, I'd find it harder
> to disagree with your perception.
>
> I believe that Congress has in fact done so, by default, and in
> the absence of specific legislation to the contrary.
There *is* specific legislation to the contrary, in that the
war powers act specifically prohibits such a construction from
the absence of specific legislation/appropriation to the contrary.
We've been over this one too. The WP Act explicitly does not restrict
the ability of the President to act responsively to immediate and
sudden threat. It says he must notify Congress 48 hours after he has
committed U.S. forces to action.
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 3 December 1986 23:54-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
REPLY TO 12/03/86 19:30 FROM LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU:
> A strategic warning, for example, could relax
> the "dual" phenomenology "requirement."
>
> It might, or it might not. That is a judgment I don't want to make.
> Besides, if that is the problem, then the solution is to
> make the sensor system more reliable.
The judgment must be made by someone. The problem I've
identified is the inherent limitation of sensor technology, or
the inherent advantage to a first-striker. It's not reasonable
simply to say we need better sensors when we can't them or
don't have them.
> If as you assume, there is a crisis, the President or at
> least the VP would be airborne in NEACP, and NEACP would be the
> one to make the LOW decision.
That again is an unreasonable assumption. The evacuation of
Washington would only occur in a super-telegraphed situation.
Incidentally, Ford's "The Button" makes it pretty clear that
Looking Glass is much better geared for the LOW decision than
NEACAP. NEACAP seems to be more a "tension reliever"
for peacetime, than a real command post in crisis. Remember
that Air Force One took off -- without President Carter -- in the
November 1979 false alert?
> I WOULD support a command destruct option built into the ICBMs,
> to be fired if indeed they were launched in error.
Now, that I'm against, if it means relaxing the constraints on
doing LOW, which it probably does mean. It fills in another rung
between blue sky and nuclear war.
> In my view, the solution is to elect a good President. We had
> one in Carter, and I'm sorry to have seen him go.
As a resident alien, I can't vote, so I sue. But, even if I could
vote, we have to make sure that the President, and his advisors, do
what the politicians we've elected constitutionally require. This
administration's been funding Contras in violation of Congress's
orders. Politics wasn't good enough, and we'd better make sure
the control over nuclear weapons really is constitutional. Otherwise
the vote is meaningless.
> A de facto President
> to me is one that acts as President even when the real President
> is around.
I agree... I just can't see the de facto control not being with
the military advisor, given the required response time.
> The War Powers Act explicitly does not
> restrict the ability of the President to act responsively to
> immediate and sudden threat. It says he must notify Congress 48
> hours after he has committed U.S. forces to action.
It *does* explicitly restrict his ability to react to a *threat*.
The notification clause operates after he *responds* to armed
conflict. For example, the mining of Nicaraguan harbors was
illegal fron start to finish, it didn't become illegal
after 60 days expired. I do agree that the notification clause
has abusively been interpreted as giving the Pres. a free hand for
60 days, but it's not that way if you read the text carefully.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 15:25 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Launch on warning
The problem I've
identified is the inherent limitation of sensor technology, or
the inherent advantage to a first-striker.
All sensors, including people, have limitations. That's not
compelling to me.
> If as you assume, there is a crisis, the President or at
> least the VP would be airborne in NEACP, and NEACP would be the
> one to make the LOW decision.
That again is an unreasonable assumption.
I believe you are wrong. The VP could be sent up long before anything
untoward happened.
The evacuation of
Washington would only occur in a super-telegraphed situation.
True. But no one said anything about evacuating DC. Besides, YOU
posited a time of high tension.
Incidentally, Ford's "The Button" makes it pretty clear that
Looking Glass is much better geared for the LOW decision than
NEACAP.
Evidence?
NEACAP seems to be more a "tension reliever"
for peacetime, than a real command post in crisis. Remember
that Air Force One took off -- without President Carter -- in the
November 1979 false alert?
I don't think so, though I could be wrong. Still, there have been
reports that the President could not evacuate the White House rapidly
enough. I believe them. But what is the point of that?
> I WOULD support a command destruct option built into the ICBMs,
> to be fired if indeed they were launched in error.
Now, that I'm against, if it means relaxing the constraints on
doing LOW, which it probably does mean.
But I want to *maintain* the LOW option, so that is consistent. You
won't be happy with anything less than eliminating LOWC. I'm trying
to find a step that is safer than the present but which does not give
up the LOW option.
It fills in another rung
between blue sky and nuclear war.
Why is that bad?
> The War Powers Act explicitly does not
> restrict the ability of the President to act responsively to
> immediate and sudden threat. It says he must notify Congress 48
> hours after he has committed U.S. forces to action.
It *does* explicitly restrict his ability to react to a *threat*.
The notification clause operates after he *responds* to armed
conflict.
Missiles on the way ARE armed conflict. After the President orders
an LOW, the WP act says he must report to Congress.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 4 December 1986 08:03-EST
From: Don Chiasson <CHIASSON at DREA-XX.ARPA>
To: lin, arms-d
Re: LOW
Most of the discussion between Herb and Cliff seems to center
on semantics, and I do have trouble with some of Cliff's definitions.
One example is the term LOWC(apability). I find the term almost
meaningless. If you have a sensor to detect launch of hostile
missiles, capability to launch your own missiles in less than the
flight time, and communication then you have LOWC. Or am I missing
something?
It might help to speak of procedures. Designing or planning
various procedures does not mean that a specific one of them is
policy, i.e. in effect at a given time. Policy is implemented by
choosing a particular set of procedures. Depending on the situation,
different sets of procedures may be in effect.
Is LOW such a horrid process that it should NEVER be policy?
Suppose that within a short period of time the USSR made very
threatening moves at Germany, put all its SSBN's to sea, mobilized all
reserves, placed all armed forces on high alert, dispersed its
bombers, and evacuated its twenty largest cities. Shortly after all
this happens, sensors detect a number of missiles being launched from
the USSR. What do you do???? LOW may be the best option. Far
fetched? Sure, but in large organizations you plan (i.e. design
procedures) for as many eventualities as possible. Such contingency
planning will cover many unlikely scenarios. Procedure is not the
same as policy.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 15:42 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: [GA.CJJ: ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct]
Date: Friday, 5 December 1986 15:03-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN
Re: ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct
Lin> I WOULD support a command destruct option built into the ICBMs,
Lin> to be fired if indeed they were launched in error.
To clarify my opposition to this, I'm against such a mechanism
only so long as a LOWC is operated. Because, as I said before,
it acts as a stepping-stone that encourages, by seemingly
providing a "fail-safe", LOW. But, combined with a 30-minute
time lock, I'm not opposed to it. Re the 30-minute time-lock,
you say "I haven't yet heard an argument I believe." Isn't it
obvious that the time-lock would act as a safety, and that the
very existence of a hair-trigger poses a risk of accident? Maybe
you think the deterrent threat outweighs this disadvantage (I
don't), but you surely can't say there's nothing in favor of the
idea.
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 15:44 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
Re: ICBM timelock/in-flight destruct
Maybe
you think the deterrent threat outweighs this disadvantage (I
don't), but you surely can't say there's nothing in favor of the
idea.
I never said that. I don't like relying on LOW as a deterrent. But I
do think as you described.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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