ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (12/07/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, December 7, 1986 9:20AM
Volume 7, Issue 78
Today's Topics:
Administrivia: LOW is tedious?
SDI (and arms race) desirability
SDI "pilot plant" test
Orbiting Gravel
Offensive uses of SDI
scary thought on SDI
Re: Selling SDI
Antimatter rockets?
Launch on warning
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Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 16:21 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia: LOW is tedious?
I have received a complaint from a reader that I take seriously.
He complains that the discussion between Cliff and me regarding LOW is
getting tedious. I have wondered about this, as this LOW discussion
consumes on average about half the digest recently. Moreover, I have
had some people (perhaps 3) cancel their digest subscriptions because
they are being overloaded.
I have taken the liberty of moving the LOW discussions to the end of
the digest, where people can skip over them at will. However, a
broader issue remains. Should the digest be a forum for extended
discussions of this nature? It is not meant as a private discussion,
and all are invited to join in. However, maybe the readership as a
whole is bored with the discussion Cliff and I have been having.
Feedback is welcomed. I am willing to conduct my discussion with
Cliff in private if people wish, maybe work with him to generate a
summary of our differences etc. Or is the broad discussion useful
and/or informative?
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Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 16:24 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI (and arms race) desirability
From: Calton Pu <CALTON at CS.COLUMBIA.EDU>
If this hypothesis is valid, then the arms race will continue not
because of public ignorance or greed, but to keep the American pride,
to satisfy the need for victory after victory. This hypothesis
implies that a better informed public will continue to support arms
race. Any comments? Any suggestions to test this hypothesis?
There are a scholl of analysts who assert that the arms race and
mini-fights like Grenada occur BECAUSE all-out war is too horrible.
Thus, these things become surrogates for conflict, and we as a nation
project our fears, etc onto these surrogates, endowing them with
"grand war" consciousness.
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Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 16:31 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: SDI "pilot plant" test
From: mogul at decwrl.DEC.COM (Jeffrey Mogul)
Testing is thus quite different from research. "Research" is when a
negative result doesn't hurt you; once we start testing we cannot
accept a negative result without potentially serious changes in nuclear
arsenals. In this light, it is not sufficient to ask "is SDI feasible?"
but rather "can we afford to find out that the answer is no?"
A good point. But both sides have been conducting BMD research for
many years now. The thing that is different now is that the
Administration TALKS about it differently.
Conclusion? Probably the worst thing about SDI is the rhetoric rather
than the programs themselves.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1986 16:34 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Orbiting Gravel
From: Dave Berry <mcvax!itspna.ed.ac.uk!db at seismo.CSS.GOV>
Since Herb has suggested orbiting shells of gravel for BMD..
I hope you know that I did not suggest such a thing seriously; it was
intended as a thought experiment.
All we have to do is
to fetch an asteroid back to Earth orbit, blow it up, and make sure all the
rubble goes where we want it to.
If we can fetch an asteroid, we can dump it on the SU. I don't think
the Soviets would react positively to that possibility.
If these aren't practical suggestions, what are they doing on the arms
digest?
What is SDI doing on the defense agenda?
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Date: Sun, 7 Dec 86 02:41:01 EST
From: campbell%maynard.UUCP@talcott.HARVARD.EDU
Subject: Offensive uses of SDI
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@talcott.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
>From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
>
>Why should flying over the USSR imply offensive access? If, for example,
>the space-based weapons cannot penetrate atmosphere, their position over
>the USSR is largely irrelevant.
> ...
> Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
Just because a weapon can't penetrate the atmosphere doesn't mean it can't
be used for offensive purposes. Such a weapon obviously could be used to
disable surveillance satellites. If Soviet satellites suddenly toasted
all our observation platforms, we'd consider it a rather offensive act.
--
Larry Campbell The Boston Software Works, Inc.
Internet: campbell@maynard.bsw.com 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
uucp: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell +1 617 367 6846
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu MCI: LCAMPBELL
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 7 Dec 86 01:33:20 pst
Subject: Re: scary thought on SDI
> That's a terrifying thought: don't verify Star Wars, it's too secret to have
> the code so exposed!
Not at all unlikely, either. This is already true of things like banking-
machine software: I believe at least one group interested in doing security
work on real banking-machine software discovered that the banks were horrified
by the idea.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 7 Dec 86 01:32:14 pst
Subject: Re: Selling SDI
> If Reagan is unwilling to come out and announce that SDI is not meant to be
> thought of as this "Peace Shield", then he is feeding off their propaganda.
True. But this is also true of many other government activities. Should
every military-aerospace ad in Aviation Week carry a disclaimer saying "the
government does not necessarily agree that the above-described equipment is
a useful contribution to our defence"? If not, then clearly the government
is feeding off the manufacturers' propaganda in keeping disputed programs
alive. There is just no way the government can disavow, disclaim, or rebut
every silly ad that happens to be related to a government program.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Sun, 7 Dec 86 01:32:45 pst
Subject: Antimatter rockets?
> Is there anything to this work of Forward? He's considered something of a
> crackpot in the physics community--if I remember correctly I saw a passing
> reference to this in a recent "Discover" magazine.
Forward has a tendency to specialize in far-out ideas, but that doesn't make
him a crackpot. It is difficult for a crackpot to become a senior scientist
at Hughes Research and a consultant on advanced propulsion to the USAF. His
work on antimatter propulsion gets published in refereed journals, and such
of it as I've read has been solid as far as I could check it. He's not the
only one working in the field, either. A project to develop an antimatter
rocket would definitely be a long-term high-risk investment with somewhat
uncertain cost and schedule, but the idea is not ridiculous any more.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Saturday, 6 December 1986 19:23-EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at forsythe.stanford.edu>
To: LIN, arms-d
Re: Launch on warning
> All sensors, including people, have limitations. That's not
> compelling to me.
All I'm saying is let's call the whole thing (LOW) off.
> The VP could be sent up long before
> anything untoward happened.
But he still wouldn't have authority to LOW, only to LOI (launch
on impact).
==>> [If the President is alive, then the VP doesn't have the authority.
If the President is dead, then the VP does. You could certainly
design a system that would accept orders from both the Pres and VP,
but act only on those from the President if such orders do come in.]
-- Lin
> Incidentally, Ford's "The Button" makes it pretty clear that
> Looking Glass is much better geared for the LOW decision than
> NEACAP.
>
> Evidence?
Among other inconcevniences, "Kneecap, unlike Looking Glass, does
not carry launch control officers and is not set up to send
orders directly to the Minuteman silos. Kneecap is also unable
to launch the ERCS rockets by itself. Only Looking Glass...
etc." (P.151.)
==>> [This isn't evidence that Looking Glass is better able to MAKE the LOW
decision. It is evidence that LG can execute the LOW decision better,
but NEACP was never designed to have that ability. Do I hear you
suggesting that it should? -- Lin]
> You won't be happy with anything less than eliminating LOWC. I'm
> trying to find a step that is safer than the present but which
> does not give up the LOW option.
I don't think an ICBM-destruct mechanism leads to a "safer" LOW.
True, I won't be happy until LOW is swept away (and all other
nuclear options), but I too have a piecemeal approach. I think
LOW's an urgent first target for abolition.
> It (ICBM-destruct in-flight mechanism) fills in another rung
> between blue sky and nuclear war.
>
> Why is that bad?
Because it makes that ladder all the more likely to be climbed.
==>>[Arguing about nuclear strategy is an entirely different matter. I
don't quite understand the escalation ladder either, and I'm not
convinced that it is a coherent doctrine. But it is inappropriate to
single out LOW. IF escalation is a reasonable way to fight a war,
then LOW makes some kind of sense. You can't get rid of LOW unless
you can make the case that it isn't necessary, and the only case for
that is that the greater strategy in which it is embedded makes no
sense. -- Lin]
In fact, I gave the ICBM-destruct mechanism careful thought in
defining a LOWC to include launch of in-flight-destructible ICBMS.
My current lawsuit definition reads:
"A Launch On Warning Capability is defined to be any set of
procedures whereby the retaliatory launch of nonrecoverable nuclear
missiles may be committed in response to a valid tactical
(in-flight) warning of attacking Soviet missiles and
prior to the unequivocal (multiple witness) confirmation of a
detonation of an attacking Soviet missile to the direct injury of
the United States or its allies.
In the foregoing, a launch is deemed "committed" either when orders
to execute the launch are issued, or when orders are issued making
launch execution contingent upon imminent electronic communication
failures."
==>>[So your definition allows the U.S. to launch its missiles if there is
unequivocal comfirmation of Soviet nucelar ballistic missile attack in
EUROPE? --Lin ]
The latter clause is equivalent to including any proceudres whereby a
succession of mechanical failures, including a false alert, could
cause accidental launch.
> Missiles on the way ARE armed conflict. After the President
> orders an LOW, the WP act says he must report to Congress.
No. The WP prohibits the operation of a LOWC because it gives
rise to a possibility that it would be violated by a response to
a non-attack. Let's agree that the courts have not yet construed
the applicability of the War Powers Act to LOW, and hope they
clarify its meaning in the context of my case.
==>>[But that is true for any reporting system that would supply
information on which forces could be committed; it is NOT unique to
LOW. -- Lin]
To: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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