[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V7 #82

ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (12/11/86)

Arms-Discussion Digest             Thursday, December 11, 1986 11:32AM
Volume 7, Issue 82

Today's Topics:

                               TCI goal
                        KAL007 -- Restatement
                             Contra-versy
                        Offensive vs defensive
                     The Second Labor of Hercules
                   Re: Acceptable bounds for debate
              Re: Acceptable bounds for political debate
                     Acceptable Bounds for Debate
                     Acceptable Bounds for Debate
                    cultural roots of competition
                       The Target is Destroyed

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: hplabs!pyramid!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 86 21:46:12 pst
Subject: TCI goal

Hank Walker comments:

> I should clarify.  The goal of the five-year TCI (Tau Ceti Initiative) is to
> demonstrate the engineering feasibility of sending a crew of humans from
> Earth to Tau Ceti and having them return alive.  At the end of the TCI,
> engineering development will begin.  If you think this is just around the
> corner (say 30-50 years), I'd like to hear your ideas on accomplishing it.
> Describe any fundamental breakthroughs you plan on using.

Since most of what's needed to make antimatter rockets feasible is precisely
engineering development, it's not clear to me that you need to spend $30B on
the TCI first.  I was thinking of $30B for engineering development, ending
with the launch.  Thirty billion develops a lot of technology, especially
if you bar major defense contractors from taking part.  (Those people have
no concept of cost control.  When Max Faget's Space Industries Inc. was
looking for a corporate partner, he looked for big high-tech companies
that were *not* major government contractors, for that reason.)  (If you
don't know who Faget is, note that he definitely knows what aerospace 
companies are like:  he set the basic design for the Mercury capsule,
was chief engineer for the Apollo spacecraft, and headed the early design
work on the Shuttle orbiter.)  No fundamental breakthroughs appear to be
required; all the tough feasibility questions are of the form "can we make
an X that has at least Y performance?", not "can we make an X at all?".

I don't know for sure that it could be done for $30B, and I'm pretty sure
that it couldn't be done in five years -- it would be very difficult to
rush development along that quickly.  I'm not at all sure that it *will*
be feasible in 30-50 years, but I see enough evidence that it *could* be,
if we tried hard -- say $30B hard -- that I think I'd be willing to try
such a project, given the money and support.

				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry

------------------------------

Date: Wednesday, 10 Dec 1986 06:38:56-PST
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM  (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: KAL007 -- Restatement

If you thought my submission on KAL007 sounded like it belonged in the
RISKS Digest, you're right.  (I can't wait to see what I sent them!)

In the now-lost ARMS-D submission, I mentioned how the author (Seymour
Hersh, not Hirsh) concluded that the flight was not on a spy mission
(maintenance crews were all over the plane in Anchorage).  The Soviets
genuinely confused the flight with an American recon flight.  Western
electronic intelligence captured (though not always in real time)
stunning details: there is a tape of the Soviet commander's frantic
telephone call to Moscow seeking directions.  (He was put on hold.)

After the barbaric shootdown, Washington's reaction was reflexive.
Despite initial evidence that the Soviets screwed up, the US
propaganda machine blasted them all over the world.  Subsequent
evidence pointed more strongly to error, not malice, but by now it was
politcally more important to blame them.  The two superpowers to this
day consider that the other side acted deliberately.  Talk about
communications problems!

US-Soviet relations of course soured after the shootdown, but I didn't
know how dangerous the situation was.  A mid-level American officer
dispatched a squadron of fighters to Japan, with orders to fly near
the point of the attack, in hopes of provoking further Soviet
response!  Cooler heads prevailed, or we might have gone to war over
it.

I recommend the book as a supplement to the reading lists of ARMS-D
enthusiasts.  It convinced me, particularly the unreferenced and
casual statement that the Soviets have misidentified and shot down
DOMESTIC flights!  They must be capable of anything.

The book's theme: Never ascribe to malice that which can be explained
by mere stupidity.

------------------------------

Subject: Contra-versy
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 86 13:56:10 EST
From: Wes Miller <wesm@mitre-bedford.ARPA>

	Personally, I feel this is the first favorable Balance of
Trade deal this country has made since I can't remember when. $3
billion in cash in with strings attached. Maybe we should do it more
often, to eleviate our current Balance of Payments deficits. The only
thing I object to is why be sneaky about it. Iran wasn't a policy made
by this administration, I feel they would have the right to modify it,
if appropriate.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 10 Dec 86 12:43:43 PST
From: pom@along.s1.gov
Subject: Offensive vs defensive

     POM: I want to comment on two fragments below, which while
	taken from a recent posting, seem to be reccuring over and over
	and over again ( by many different people).

....In general, the terms "offensive weapons" and "defensive weapons" have
little meaning until it is known how they might function with other intercept 
attacking RVs and of being able to detonate nuclear weapons......

....The second point I am trying to make is that terms must be defined
before any meaningful dialogue can occur.  Seemingly, advocates of SDI
say it's defensive largely because it can be made so it cannot
directly attack Russian soil, or some similar argument.  Critics of
DI, on the other hand, often suggest that SDI can be made a part of
an offensive strategy or plan--it can blunt retaliation by USSR after...

	POM: Actually, defensive or offensive cannot be defined in
technical terms: An umbrella is used offensively, when used to attack
unsuspecting passer-by and  a long-range rifle can be used for defense.
While some gizmos are more suitable for attack then other, arguments
about which one is which are pointless. Any weapon can be used either
way and whether a use is defensive  is essentially a moral judgement. 
 Defense is justified ,  unprovoked attack is not.( In normal society, If I
 kill 'in selfdefense' I go free) .The issue is 'what is just selfdefense',
 not whether a handgun is defensive and rifle offensive weapon.

 There is no reason whatsoever, why US should limit itself to weapons
 which can be used ONLY for defense. { Yes, I recall that president said
 something about 'defensive shield'. Please bear in mind that I am not
 responsible for what he sais and nobody but me is responsible for what
 I say.} 
 Essential point is that US has no plans and reasons to attack SU, and
 its history (not just words) show that it was using it's power in a
 responsible ( i.e. ethical ) way - i.e. for selfdefense and just goals.
  Pseudo-arguments for SDI, such as (it's defense only, it will provide
 spin-offs, ..and what not,} were made, but it is silly to  take them
 seriously and argue with them.

  Why  should we not agree, that mere fact that US is strong ( which
 means it is using whatever appropriate technology becomes feasible)
 does not necessarily means that it's policy will be more aggresive.
 There is a moral judgment made, before US would use that strength, is it not?
 If we  do agree on that, why we must have a uproar about  as each new
 technology comes to point in which it can be  applied.( Please note,
 in this posting I do not argue that SDI is technicaly feasible or
 cost-effective. The issue I address is non-technical).
   
  In short: - guns and robots - do not kill people. People do . 
 I hope we all agree that it  is wrong to  kill - except in selfdefense,
 do'nt we? 
  Now do you really think that SU is killing Afghans in self-defense? 


------------------------------

Date: Sun, 7 Dec 86 18:43:13 pst
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@RELAY.CS.NET>
Subject:  The Second Labor of Hercules

Free copies of the report
	David B. Benson
	The Second Labor of Hercules:  An essay on software engineering
	and the Strategic Defense Initiative -- Preliminary Draft
	CS-86-148
are available from
	Technical Reports Secretary
	Computer Science Department
	Washington State University
	Pullman WA 99164-1210
by written request while the supply lasts.

The essay was finished in May, 1986, and has been only slightly dated by
events.  I intend to begin revising this essay upon the turn of the
new year, and would appreciate criticisms from all who would care
to send such to me.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

------------------------------


Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1986  10:08 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Acceptable Bounds for Debate

    From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN>
        In my [HL] view, priorities are not the issue.  The issue is whether 
        or not
        you see the activity itself as objectionable, or worthy of approval.

    By accepting the priorities ... that you accept that the research 
    determined by the
    funding for your project is a worthy activity.

Not quite.  I need not accept the priorities placed on research to
believe that the activity I want to pursue is worthy.  It is true that
I do not pursue projects that I do not believe to be worthy.  No
researcher does.  He may think it won't work, but that is a different
question. 

    I would add that this
    IS a political statement, especially when... you
    are "using up" part of the resources of the academic/scientific
    community so that fewer people can be devoted to other pursuits.

I don't think so.  The people who are setting the priorities are
making a political statement, because they are attempting to influence
policy.  The people demanding funds toi do research all believe that
their own individual projects should get priority, and it is not their
job to determine overall allocation of resources.  EVERYONE thinks
his/her work is important and deserves priority.

    ***4) Is a public service defined by anything that "the nation decides to
          expend national resources on? [HL]" such as MIT running Lincoln Lab?

               Herb would say yes.  I would say no.  There is a fundamental
            assumption which is necessary to sustain Herb Lin's argument: that
            government policies really reflect the will of an informed,
            independent electorate.

        I agree that the assumption you assert is necessary sustain my
        argument.  I am not entirely comfortable with it, but I can't work on
        the basis of any other assumption...
        I work on the basis of the assumption you describe, because I cannot
        forumlate a better definition of "the public interest".  I think the
        challenge is to you to formulate a better one.

    This is an entirely reasonable objection!  The reason is that the
    public interest cannot be defined in concrete terms...
    I have to agree with Herb that "public interest" HAS BEEN defined this
    way.  And I must say, Orwell would be proud!  Perhaps this reflects
    the trend in advanced industrial society to use OPERATIONAL
    definitions of concepts...

The problem with using any other method is that we get into long
arguments about whose measure of public interest is more appropriate.
You have one set of priorities, I have another, the U.S. Congress has
a third.  My willingness to give the priority setting power to
Congress reflects my understanding that others have different
priorities.  If I am able to force my set of priorities today, someone
else who is bigger and stronger may be able to force his way tomorrow.
That is why a procedure, a process, which is (maybe only marginally)
acceptable to all participants is necessary.  If you can't agree on
product, you can at least agree on process, which is far easier.

         ... there are political questions
        whose answers are far more important for those who ARE NOT IN POWER.
        Examples of these are, "What are the corporate connections of all
        researchers and administrators receiving SDI funds?"

      I don't regard this type of question as an inherently political
      political question.  Rather, it is a question of fact.  It becomes
      political when one tries to make inferences based on the factual
      answers to these questions.

    Well, I don't think the two (gathering facts, inferring from facts)
    are independent.

They are in the following sense.  Assume you have a list of all
corporate connections to SDI researchers.  That is factual.  What are
you then to infer from such a list?  You seem to be making the
argument that we should infer something inappropriate about this.
Such a claim IS a political statement.

    Surely, if on a particular policy question, 90% of
    the relevant facts gathered by the combined efforts of all U.S.
    researchers support conclusion 'A', and only 10% of these facts
    support another conclusion ('B'), policymakers are likely to choose
    conclusion 'A.' 

True.  But those aren't the investigations you described above.  You
were talking about questions that people NOT in power ask.

    ****6) Herb's Question: "What is a political act?"  My working
        definition is that an act is political when its purpose is to
        influence public policy.  "Purpose" is important, because all
acts
        influence public policy, and I don't find very useful the
statement
        that "All acts are political."

    This is ** THE CRUCIAL QUESTION **, since all other points I made
    hinged on this.  Well, now I can answer this.  I would define a
    political act as any act which has an influence on other members
of
    some societal structure one is a part of.  This, I admit, is a
    human-centered definition.

    If you don't find this definition "very useful," I ask in all
    seriousness, why not?

Because it is too broad and covers essentially any act you want.
Breathing is then a political act, because it contributes to my
survival and therefore influences other members of my family.  In this
case, I believe you are corrupting the language for your own purposes,
adopting a non-standard definition of the word and using it in an
already-framed debate.

You are certainly entitled to discuss issues that go beyond the
existing framework, but you are not entitled to usurp words that most
people already understand in one way and use them in another way.
That is not much different from calling the color red green, and then
going through a formerly "red" light because it was now "green".
Communication is based on shared meaning, and your use of the word
"political" destroys that shared meaning.

    I guess that the problem is that we have to define "political" in a
    concrete way.  As an concept that only has meaning with reference to
    whatever societal structures currently exist, I don't think it SHOULD
    EVER be defined in such a particular fashion.

Then you will never achieve meaningful communication with broad set of
people.  I don't care what words you use, but their meanings must be
stable if I am to engage in meaningful discourse.

------------------------------

Date: Thu 11 Dec 86 02:39:13-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable bounds for debate

Here is a point by point response [to Lin] -- I ask only a few specific
questions.

A.  On Question 3, the only difference between us was our definitions
of the word "political."  Mine regards the effects of an individual
doing research as political; yours doesn't.  This is explained in
Appendix 1.

B.  We used exactly the same arguments (and had exactly the same
difference) on question 1.

C.  On question 4, when I point out that since there is no real way of
defining "public interest," I think the concept should NOT BE USED.
Why do you insist on defining it?  Since it has no real meaning, the
fact that it is mainly used is as a PR device to stifle critical
thinking is insidious.  (Frank Press, who invented the similarly
Orwellian phrase "mission-oriented basic research," also said "The
advancement of science is inevitably in the public interest.")

D.  On question 5, your first point is inconsistent, and your second
don't address my point.

First, you said that questions asking facts are not political, but "it
becomes political when one tries to make inferences based on the
[answers]."

By this, I assume you mean inferences about policy, to satisfy your
definition of "political."  But it follows that you would say that the
following inference is NOT political, because it is not related to
policy: inferences by activists that they should hold a protest
outside a particular administrator's lab (because of facts that show
that the person is well-connected).

Then you contradict yourself...  "Assume you have a list of all
corporate connections to SDI researchers...  You seem to be making the
argument that we should infer something inappropriate about this.
Such a claim IS a political statement."  

Are such inferences by activists political, or are they not?

I should mention that I am not at all saying these ties are
"inappropriate."  Rather, they are proper and necessary to serve the
current interests of the military-industrial complex.  And, that this
information is USEFUL for activists who want to reduce the power and
influence of the defense establishment.  The power and the influence
are what they would view as "inappropriate."

You don't address my second point because of a difference in
interpreting my statement.  Let me restate it.  When facts are
researched, they are not always purposefully gathered IN ORDER to
examine a single policy question.  Sometimes they are gathered to
contribute to many policy questions; other times just for "their own
sake."  If the power of money influences which facts are gathered, it
clearly influences which decisions are made, and is clearly political.

A prime example is facts about US competitiveness vis a vis Japan.
Many people are funded to gather "facts" about productivity, the
impact of legal burdens, the effect of differing management
techniques, regulations, worker salaries, etc.  Fewer people are
funded to gather facts comparing the effects of draining technical
expertise into military research and development, due to the influence
of money in examining these questions.  Certainly, this affects the
debate, and the political policies adopted.  Therefore the gathering
of facts can not be regarded as independent from the inference of
conclusions.  You can not state that one is political and one is not.

E.  Finally, this corrects my previous note on Question 3.  Reviewing,

           Here's my view: there is already a "political test" for the conduct of
           research -- the allocation of money.  All research involves making a
           proper and unavoidable implicit political statement that you accept
           externally imposed funding priorities.

        In my [HL] view, priorities are not the issue.  The issue is whether 
        or not
        you see the activity itself as objectionable, or worthy of approval.
     
    Exactly right! ...

Please accept a correction on what originally followed.  I forgot the
punctuation, making my meaning ambiguous.  The second version is
correct, and if you substitute this, your objection is no longer valid.

	  By accepting the priorities, I meant, though did not
	exactly say, that you accept that the research determined by the
	funding for your project is a worthy activity.

	  By "accepting the priorities," I meant, though did not
	exactly say, that you accept that the research determined by the
	funding for your project is a worthy activity.

-rich

------------------------------

Date: Thu 11 Dec 86 03:10:21-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable bounds for political debate


From: Rich Cowan
To: Herb Lin
Date: December 11, 1986
Subject: Acceptable Bounds for Debate

All the points between Herb and myself about how debate (originally
about SDI) is influenced have come down to the question of "what is a
political act."  Reasons why all 5 points hinge on this are summarized
in the accompanying note.  But I screwed up with my former
definition of "political," and Herb jumped on me.

Fortunately, I have a new definition (which does not imply that
breathing as a political act).  Perhaps some of my silly-sounding
arguments will have some merit if the new definition is substituted?

"A political act -- with respect to society as a whole -- is something
which affects the DISTRIBUTION OF POWER within that society."

(We're still talking about people; "power" refers to power of people
over other people.)

Stepping back for a moment, remember that words have multiple meanings
to begin with.  Isn't it common sense that a society, merely by
funding lots of research at universities (or "knowledge factories"?),
which pertains to CONCEPTS of interest to those in power, would tend
to alter those concepts?

Isn't it obvious that this research would make more common the
denotations of words that are used in the papers the research
produces?  Wouldn't such research, conducted on a large scale,
naturally make prevalent the definitions that are most commonly used
by those who fund most research and steer the questions; those in power?

Finally, isn't it true that a field of "political science" that deals
primarily with relations between governments would tend to reinforce
such a particular meaning of "political" which could overshadow a
broader meaning?

*******

Reviewing what I said before,

    Now, when fewer social structures existed and people were more
    self-dependent (say in 1789 when the Constitution was ratified),
    Herb's definition of political may have been more "suitable" to
    reality, though anthropologically unfortunate, since it cannot
    withstand the test of time.  Society has changed since 1789 (and is
    now changing faster than language?) and we cannot
    use a literal definition of the concept "political" that worked then
    but is now obsolete.  Because of the increasing degree of organization
    and coordination of society, there are new societal structures --
    economic interests -- which are not covered by the this functional
    definition of "political," but would be covered by a broader and older
    notion of "political" that would withstand the test of time.

My argument still hinges on my belief that Herb's definition of
"political" -- of or relating to public policy -- is now a caricature
which deprives the term of the critical meaning it was originally
intended to have.

The result of such a definition is this: only that which those in
power consider to be "political" is permitted to enter the debate.
Other influences that are more important from other perspectives (like
the effects of individual SDI researchers, or of economic power) don't
count as political, and are barred from the discussion.  In this way,
OPPOSITIONAL concepts are "prohibited."

Thought becomes one-dimensional.
Criticism is paralyzed.
The system is reinforced.

-rich

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1986  10:11 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Acceptable Bounds for Debate

This discussion is an interesting one, and I will continue to
participate in it.  However, I think it is getting pretty far beyond
the ground-rules of ARMS-D.  Unless I hear a large uproar from the
readership, I ask that the participants each limit themsevles to one
more contribution (short please!) each, and then move the discussion
to a private forum.

I don't want to get into another LOW hassle again, and this has every
possibility of doing so.

[Notice the dates of the messages involved.  Still pending is a
response from Lin to Cowan, which will appear in the next issue.  If
you want to be included in the private discussion, please let me know.
-- Moderator (note added in proof 12/11 at 16:14)]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 11 Dec 86  9:50:47 EST
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: cultural roots of competition

I recommend to your attention a recent book titled _Finite and
Infinite Games_.  The author's last name is Carse.  Anyone interested
in game-theoretic modelling of conflict and conflict resolution should
look at it too.

One important parameter is humiliation.

Competition appears always to be a reaction to past humiliation, real or
imagined.  "Remember the Alamo!"  "Remember the Maine!"  "Remember Pearl
Harbor!"  These were the slogans that impelled Americans to three wars.

Note that if you are humble you cannot be humiliated.  If you feel
humiliated, you cannot have been humble.  Defeat is equated with "being
humbled."  Humility is a paradoxical virtue in our culture, designated
as only for saints and other unrealistic folks.  But `he who feels
punctured must once have been a bubble!'  Who is being realistic?

We have a president who epitomizes all the virtues antithetical to
humility.  Is that not why he was elected?  Yet those qualities require
us to engage in competition, so defined as to require humiliation of
losers by a winner.

Reaction to humiliation, real or imagined, is a great motivator, but a
dangerous one.

Humiliation is always imagined.

What would it be like to be humble and strong?  Humble and powerful?

Bruce Nevin
bn@cch.bbn.com

(This is my own personal communication, and in no way expresses or
implies anything about the opinions of my employer, its clients, etc.)

------------------------------

Date: Tuesday,  9 Dec 1986 08:23:47-PST
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM  (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: The Target is Destroyed

I've just finished reading "The Target is Destroyed," a new book
by the Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Seymour M.  Hirsh.  In it, he
details the behind-the-scenes activity in both the US and the
Soviet Union on September 1, 1983, when Korean Air Lines flight
007 crossed into Soviet airspace and was shot down.

The Korean Airline Massacre has been discussed at length in this
digest, with entries focusing on its possible role as a spy
plane.  I recommend the book, both on its merits and as a
supplement to the ARMS-D enthusiast's knowledge base.  While I
won't go into the book in detail, I will pluck some nuggets from
it.

The author's bottom-line explanation has the virtue of simplicity:
the plan was no spy, but a civilian airliner that, through an
unknowable but tragic series of human errors, soared far off
course.  The Soviet controllers ordered it shot it down in the
mistaken belief that it was an American reconnaissance plane,
though the interceptor pilot knew otherwise.  The US, seizing on a
golden opportunity to make the Soviets look like barbarians, leapt
on preliminary intelligence data and trumpeted that the shootdown
was deliberate, then ignored slowly mounting evidence that it was
in fact accidental.  (This has led to the subsequent confusion and
doubt.)

I was fascinated that US-Soviet relations could be so damaged by
this incident.  (Both superpowers are convinced the other side
acted deliberately.  Is this dialog?) I was amazed that US
intelligence had such complete access to Soviet electronic
broadcasts.  (There is a tape of the local commander's frantic
phone call to Moscow for instructions.  He was put on hold.) I was
sobered to read of one mid-level US officer who ordered a squadron
of fighters into the area in the hope of provoking the Soviets to
try it again.  (Cooler heads prevailed, or we could conceivably
have gone to war over an escalation of the incident.) And I was
unconvinced, until I read a casual statement that the Soviets have
been known to misidentify and shoot down DOMESTIC flights.  (No
reference given.  That blew my mind!)

If you accept the cynical creed, "Never ascribe to malice that
which can be explained by mere stupidity," then you can accept
this book.  Clearly, we have far to go in US-Soviet relations.

------------------------------

End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************