ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (12/12/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, December 12, 1986 10:35AM
Volume 7, Issue 83
Today's Topics:
Administrivia
Deterrence versus Defense
U.S. motives
Re: popular support for arms race
Other cultures
Acceptable bounds for debate
Popular support for the arms race
treaty violations
Why we do what we do
Re: Offensive vs. defensive
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Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1986 16:20 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Administrivia
==>> My mailer no longer recognizes the site LLL-MFE. The following people
are now off the list. Someone please tell them.
MORRIS%ORN@LLL-MFE
"greyzck terry%e.mfenet"@LLL-MFE.ARPA
==>> I have been leaving out of the digest comments about moving the
LOW discussion off the digest, as they essentially say "Take it oof"
or "Keep it on". So far mail is running 4 or 5 to 1 in favor of "take
it off".
==>> I got a garbled message from jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM with the
header
Subject: Re: popular support for arms race
but nothing else.
------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 10
Dec 86 22:31:15 pst
From: Dave Benson <benson%wsu.csnet@RELAY.CS.NET>
Subject: "Deterrence versus Defense"
Authors:
Steven J. Brams D. Marc Kilgour
Dept. of Politics Dept. of Mathmatics
New York University Wilfrid Laurier University
New York NY 10003 Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3C5
Canada
Title:
Deterrence versus Defense: a game-theoretic model of star wars
Abstract
A game-theoretic model of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or
"Star Wars", is developed based on a deterrence model founded on the
game of Chicken. In this model, two players can choose any level of
preemption, and threaten any level of retaliation against preemption,
whereas in the Star Wars Game they are constrained in these choices by
the defensive capabilities of an opponent.
Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are dervied in this game
and illustrated for three different scenarios involving various
postulated relationships between the first-strike and second-strike
defenses of the players. Unlike the deterrence model, mutual
preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wars Game,
underscoring the problem -- particularly if defensive capabilities are
unbalanced -- of deterrence's being subverted by the development of
Star Wars. Ramifications of this model for avoiding preemption and
preserving crisis stability, especially in superpower relations, are
discussed.
From the conclusion:
Our major concern is that, short of being leakproof, Star Wars
is probably more destabilizing than stabilizing. For one thing, it
inevitably introduces MPE (Mutual Preemption Equilibrium) into the
Star Wars Game, which did not crop up in the Deterrence Game. For
another, it shows, especially in the third scenario, that the
unbalanced development of Star Wars capabilities by both sides is
preemption-inducing, and becomes more so as the Star Wars defense of
the superior player approaches perfection.
Commentary by David B. Benson:
Games such as Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken illustrate many
aspects of real-life negotiations, international affairs, and
politics. The Star Wars Game is complex, and the analysis requires a
42 page (double-spaced) paper. But the conclusion of destabilization
pervades the game. One might argue with the premisses -- or rather
their validity to actual affairs. The premisses appear plausible to
me, however. Now the results of this study suggest to me reasons why
the Russians might be strenuously opposed to SDI, even SDI research.
The study suggests why everyone concerned about stability in the
affairs between the two superpowers might be opposed to SDI, including
SDI research.
The paper is recommended to those who enjoy precise
rationality in the never-ending arms debate...
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1986 16:29 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: U.S. motives
From: pom at along.s1.gov
Essential point is that US has no plans and reasons to attack SU, and
its history (not just words) show that it was using it's power in a
responsible ( i.e. ethical ) way - i.e. for selfdefense and just goals.
Are you aware that the U.S. invaded the Soviet Union in 1918? That it
is U.S. bases that surround the S.U.? That the U.S. unilaterally
violated Soviet air space with the U-2 flights?
The point is that while it is probably true that the U.S. are the good
guys and the Soviets are the bad guys, to make foreign and defense
policy on the assumption that the Soviets know that the U.S. is good
and that they are bad is not likely to achieve very much.
------------------------------
Date: Thursday, 11 Dec 1986 12:28:38-PST
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: Re: popular support for arms race
Drawing from my miniscule knowledge of history, I wouldn't characterize
Americans as warlike, not compared with, say, the Romans or the English
during their imperial days. US imperialism seems to be more economic
than military in nature.
Leaving aside nuclear weapons (a rare event in ARMS-D! :-), America
has never had much to fear, thanks to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Who has the conventional forces to attack the US?
I suggest another motivation for the arms race, though. Judging from
the loving way weapons of war are photographed and documented, some
folks just find them "sexy," the way a car might be "sexy." Remember
the opening sequence of "Dr. Strangelove"? That's what I call a
fatal attraction!
------------------------------
Subject: Other cultures
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 86 13:41:19 -0800
From: foy@aerospace.ARPA
< Hmm... now I understand what Marcuse was talking about when he
< referred to "The Closing of the Political Universe." In his book, he
< talks about how technology, philosophy, and even language are
< perverted to reinforce the political system. I will get some comments
< from an MIT linguist/philosopher on this if you like. They could tell
< you whether the concept of "public interest" is different in other
< languages and cultures.
I would be very interested in hearing something about other cultures
way of relating to "public interest."
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1986 17:22 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Acceptable bounds for debate
Date: Thursday, 11 December 1986 02:39-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN>
C. On question 4, when I point out that since there is no real way of
defining "public interest," I think the concept should NOT BE USED.
Why do you insist on defining it?
I use it as a short hand to refer to what the nation decides to do.
However, I may disagree with current conceptions of "public interest",
and I am free to try to change those conceptions to something more
akin to my preferences.
Since it has no real meaning, the
fact that it is mainly used is as a PR device to stifle critical
thinking is insidious.
Hardly. People can and do argue about what the public interest should
be all the time.
This discussion started with my supporting the claim that MIT
operating the Labs was in the public interest, by definition, since
the Congress had authorized such labs. In retrospect, I should
clarify it. My use of the term "public interest" was meant in the
Congressional sense. But MIT's operation of those labs, or those labs
themselves, may or may not be in what I would call the public
interest. In fact, my definition of "public interest" includes the
Labs -- I think they are good things to have --, and I am willing to
defend that point of view. That is an argument that I can engage in
on substantive terms.
D. On question 5, your first point is inconsistent, and your second
don't address my point.
1) First, you said that questions asking facts are not political, but "it
becomes political when one tries to make inferences based on the
[answers]."
2) By this, I assume you mean inferences about policy, to satisfy your
definition of "political." But it follows that you would say that the
following inference is NOT political, because it is not related to
policy: inferences by activists that they should hold a protest
outside a particular administrator's lab (because of facts that show
that the person is well-connected).
3) Then you contradict yourself... "Assume you have a list of all
corporate connections to SDI researchers... You seem to be making the
argument that we should infer something inappropriate about this.
Such a claim IS a political statement."
1 & 3 above are consistent; they both fall under the rubric of
"political" as performed with the purpose of influencing policy. #2
is political too, if the purpose is to influence policy. If they are
doing it because they believe that he should not have received tenure
due to inadequate scholarship, then the act is not political.
Are such inferences by activists political, or are they not?
Yes, if they are made with the intention of influencing policy.
I should mention that I am not at all saying these ties are
"inappropriate." Rather, they are proper and necessary to serve the
current interests of the military-industrial complex.
What you call the interests of the MIC, I can call the interests of
those charged with the defense of the nation. By "inappropriate", I
meant with reference to a generally accepted (i.e., mainstream) set of
ethics and values.
... this
information is USEFUL for activists who want to reduce the power and
influence of the defense establishment.
Actually, I would be interested in why you believe that this info is
useful in this way.
When facts are
researched, they are not always purposefully gathered IN ORDER to
examine a single policy question. Sometimes they are gathered to
contribute to many policy questions; other times just for "their own
sake." If the power of money influences which facts are gathered, it
clearly influences which decisions are made, and is clearly political.
It is clearly political with respect to your definition of the term
"political". With respect to mine, I partially agree. By my original
definition, a political act is one conducted with the purpose of
influencing policy. I should have said a political act is one
conducted with the purpose of influencing policy in a particular
direction. If the fact are gathered with the intention of supporting
a predetermined point of view, then it is political. But if not, then
it is not.
E. Finally, this corrects my previous note on Question 3. Reviewing,
Here's my view: there is already a "political test" for the conduct of
research -- the allocation of money. All research involves making a
proper and unavoidable implicit political statement that you accept
externally imposed funding priorities.
In my [HL] view, priorities are not the issue. The issue is whether
or not
you see the activity itself as objectionable, or worthy of approval.
By "accepting the priorities," I meant, though did not
exactly say, that you accept that the research determined by the
funding for your project is a worthy activity.
I agree. But I don't think that qualifies as a political statement,
since I do not accept research money with the intention of furthering
a particular purpose. I may lobby for continued or additional
funding, and that would be political.
Date: Wednesday, 10 December 1986 22:22-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN>
Can you see how a society with universities, or "knowledge factories,"
that funds a lot of research, ON OR PERTAINING TO CONCEPTS of interest
to those in power, would tend to alter those concepts..
[wiping] out a previous, broader meaning?
The question is whether or not the previous broader meaning is one
that is closer to your use of the word or to mine. I have consulted a
couple of linguists about the origin of the word "political" and they
tell me that its root is the same as the root of the word for
"policy". Thus, I stand by my first definition.
That said, I certainly agree with you that changing the meaning of
labels and words is one way that fields of study get redefined.
Someone once said that true power is the power to give names and
enforce definitions. The *solution* to that (rather than the problem)
is to give operational definitions to terms, so that anyone can
unambiguously determine what is being said.
------------------------------
Subject: Popular support for the arms race
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 86 15:06:48 -0800
From: foy@aerospace.ARPA
>From: Calton Pu <CALTON@CS.COLUMBIA.EDU>
> As long as the U.S. continue to be the rich among poor, strong
> defense (stronger than everybody else) seems to make sense.
> Therefore, Russians, or somebody else, would feel compelled to
> match the American might, thus the arms race, and in particular,
> SDI. In other words, it is not just the Rambo warmongers, but
> also the middle-class trying to maintain the status quo.
>
> -Calton-
How much risk of the ultimate disaster does preserving the inequality in
riches justify?
Does the defense have to be stronger than everyone elses, or does it only
have to be strong enough to make it not cost effective to try to take our
riches?
Richard Foy, Redondo Beach, CA
The opinions I have expressed are the result of many years in the school of
hard knocks. Thus they are my own.
------------------------------
Subject: treaty violations
Reply-To: mvs@meccsd.UUCP (Michael V. Stein)
Date: 10 Dec 86 20:06:14 CST (Wed)
From: rutgers!mvs@meccsd.MECC.COM
>> me
> from lin@xx.lcs.mit.edu
>>[Backfire production may be higher than promised amounts. Some Backfire
squadrons are positioned near the artic circle so they can reach US targets.]
>The latter is legal, and the former is not militarily significant,
>even if true.
Brezhnev promised Carter that the SU would not increase the radius of action
of the Backfire in such a way to enable it to strike targets in the USA.
He also stated that the SU would not increase the production rate of the
plane as compared to the present rate.
Carter later publicly stated that the U.S. considered the carrying out of
this commitment by Brezhnev essential to SALT II.
>>There are still questions about the actual capabilities of the SS-20
>>missile. There is some speculation that its range is actually greater
>>than the claimed 3000 miles.
>There is also speculation that the Soviets try to use telepathy to
>find submarines.
I would really like to think that we could leave such ridicule
out of this forum...
Getting back to the point, I am not trying to catalog real and/or
suspected violations of arms treaties by the Soviets. Rather, I am
trying to point out that it is far easier to hide possible violations
from observation by sattelites than it is by inspection. The questions
as to the capabilities of the SS-20 and the possible designs of the
Soviet air defense system have been brought up by noted physicist
and inventor of the neutron bomb, Sam Cohen. Maybe it is safe to
ignore the concerns.
I haven't been convinced that the best approach is to dismiss all
such questions out of hand.
>>[ Soviet encrypting of SS-20 telemtry and flying tests under the cover
of night. ]
>...We also encrypt telemetry.
Since the US has made quite a bit of noise about the Soviet's encrypting
of telemetry, I assumed the US didn't have a policy of encrypting
missile telemetry. (If encrypting telemetry isn't a violation of
agreements not to interfere with NTM, it should be pretty close.)
Can anyone verify this one way or the other or give a source?
>>[ Soviet air defense network may be used to hide research on a nation wide
ABM system. If so, this would be a violation of ABM treaty. ]
>...It [ the ABM treaty] specifically says STRATEGIC ballistic missiles.
Yes of course it says strategic missiles - that isn't the point.
>Radar is not limited in the way you describe it either.
Article VI of the treaty says:
...not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along
the periphery of its national terrority and oriented outward.
Seems pretty clear to me.
>>During the late 70's evidence started coming in that the Soviet's were
>>working on a particle beam weapon ABM system based on low yield
>>nuclear weapons. ...
>No one knows the first. ...
Exactly my point. The issue that all policy makers must face is that
by not knowing for sure, how do you decide what to do? A large part of
the nuclear problem is simply that decision making occurs under
such uncertainty.
Virtually every major nuclear weapon system in the U.S. arsenal seems to have
been started in response to real or suspected Soviet work in the field.
It seems to have been that way from the first ICBM to the proposed
Midgetman missile. Without true verification, this will probably
only continue.
>The impetus to SDI was hardly that...
The first proposal for a strategic defense was probably BAMBI (Ballistic
Missile Boost Intercept) which was proposed back in the Eisenhower
administration. Since then their have been other ABM systems proposed
but none have really stirred much media interest. Yet, the reported
Soviet particle beam work made a fairly large stir in the popular
media (60 Minutes, etc.) and started public debate again on this topic.
If I had to guess, I would say that the biggest influence for SDI itself
was probably the High Frontier group, some members of which hold
a high influence with Reagan.
>> [ SALT I was negociated by using missile figures from Washington,
the Soviet's didn't even let their negotiators know the size
of their arsenal. ]
>...That's not surprising. In fact, the story is that the U.S. began to
>tell the Soviets about the Soviet arsenal, and some Soviets asked the
>U.S. to not reveal such information, since not all Soviets were
>cleared to have such information.
The orginal statement made was that you don't agree to treaties on
trust alone. My reply to that statement was that in a sence we
weren't even bothering to rely on trust - we were willing to
base a treaty on our best guess. The Soviet's didn't seem to mind.
It seems a little strange to sign a treaty where the Soviet's agree to
not deploy more missiles than we told them that we thought they had.
>Trident II will be on line in 1989, and will have a 475 KT warhead
>with 400 foot accuracy. That IS accurate enough for a hard target
>kill counterforce capability.
Agreed, assuming you actually mean CEP, when you say accuracy.
But, that isn't the point. Today, the best submarine missile is
a Trident I, and it isn't a counter force weapon, nor should it be
portrayed as a first strike weapon.
>>... the probability of arrival for
>>submarine missiles is equal to about 80% of the reliability of the
>>overall system. This makes them (and the eventual successors like the
>>Trident II) even less usable for a first-strike. You can be certain
>>that the Soviet's are also aware of this.
>Such is true for the Soviet Union as well, thereby making a Soviet
>first strike less plausible too.
Relatively little of the Soviet strategic missiles are based on
submarines where they could be subject to ASW operations or the
added operational difficulties of firing. This limitation thus doesn't
apply to the majority of their missiles.
---
Michael V. Stein
Minnesota Educational Computing Corporation - Technical Services
UUCP ihnp4!meccts!mvs
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 86 20:27:17 PST
From: mse%Phobos.Caltech.Edu@DEImos.Caltech.Edu (Martin Ewing)
Subject: Why we do what we do
Of some relevance to the debate on "acceptable bounds for debate" is
the following quotation of IBM chairman John F. Akers, originally from
a NY Times interview, quoted in a recent IEEE "The Institute"
newspapaper. It was in response to a challenge on South African
involvement.
"We are not in business to conduct moral activity, we are not in business
to conduct socially responsible action. We are in business to conduct
business."
A company spokesman hurried to add that "this does not mean that IBM
sanctions unethical behavior to benefit its business."
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 11 Dec 86 22:05:50 pst
From: Eugene Miya N. <eugene@ames-pioneer.arpa>
Subject: Re: Offensive vs. defensive
No plans to attack the SU? I thought Herb answered my query about
that by saying the Commandant of the Marines noted two landing sites
after a nuclear attack (best of all possible worlds, of course).
--eugene
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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