ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (12/14/86)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, December 14, 1986 2:58PM
Volume 7, Issue 84
Today's Topics:
Re: KAL007
"Politics" and arms research discussion
Killing in self-defense
Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
Ethics and Morality of U.S. Foreign Policy/Offensive Use of SDI
public opinion and summit
treaty violations
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Date: Fri, 12 Dec 86 10:53:04 EST
From: John Allred <jallred@labs-b.bbn.com>
Subject: Re: KAL007
While it may be true that the Soviets did not maliciously shoot down
KAL007, they *definitely* were malicious during the attempts to
recover KAL007's black box. My brother, who is in the Navy and is
stationed in the western pacific, was on a ship that was part of the
search. He tells hair-raising stories about Soviet Men-Of-War playing
chicken with US Forces, causing several near-collisions and many
maneuvers in extremis.
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Date: Fri, 12 Dec 86 10:10:28 PST
From: wild@Sun.COM (Will Doherty)
Subject: "Politics" and arms research discussion
I find this dialogue between Rich Cowan and Herb Lin to be far more
interesting that the continual rehashings of the KAL situation or the
semantic nit-picking on LOW (not that both of those discussions
haven't resulted in some interesting points as well). I'm concerned
about the squelching of Rich's comments because they seem to be the
only discussion we have had about the ideology within which "defense"
RD&D (research, development, and deployment) occurs. Please continue
the discussion within the framework of the digest; if that is not
possible, add me to the off-line discussion.
Will Doherty
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Subject: Killing in self-defense
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 86 11:55:07 -0800
From: foy@aerospace.ARPA
pom writes:
........
> Now do you really think that SU is killing Afghans in self-defense?
........
And do you really think that US was killing Vietnamese in
self-defense? And do you really think that US (by proxy) is killing
Nicaraguans and El Salvadoreans in self-defense?
Richard Foy, Redondo Beach, CA
The opinions I have expressed are the result of many years in the school of
hard knocks. Thus they are my own.
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Date: Fri 12 Dec 86 16:16:30-EST
From: Richard A. Cowan <COWAN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Acceptable Bounds for Debate
That said, I certainly agree with you that changing the meaning of
labels and words is one way that fields of study get redefined.
Someone once said that true power is the power to give names and
enforce definitions. The *solution* to that (rather than the problem)
is to give operational definitions to terms, so that anyone can
unambiguously determine what is being said.
I very much like your first two sentences, but I am somewhat skeptical
about the third one.
I'm not sure what you meant by putting *solution* in asterisks; are
you entirely comfortable with that statement? The problem, it seems,
is that operational definitions by their very nature in this society,
will reflect the interests of those in power, because operational
means according to how the terms are used, and I ask,
used by WHOM?
-rich
[This is the last message on the subject, unless I hear from the
readership otherwise. Moderator]
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 86 15:40:04 EST
From: John_Boies@ub.cc.umich.edu
To: POM
Subject: Ethics and Morality of U.S. Foreign Policy/Offensive vs.
Defensive/ Offensive Use of SDI
While I agree with POM that defensive and offensive cannot be defined
in technical terms as well as with the idea that people do the killing
regardless of the available technologies. I find I must disagree with
the point:
<Essential Point is that US has no plans and reason to attack SU and its >
<history (not just word) show that is was using its power in a responsible>
<way (i.e. ethical way) e.i. for self defense and just goals>
Whenever I read such statements I am always amazed by the ability of the
U.S. government and society to manipulate4e the minds of its citizens and
employees. I guess history is there to be manipulated and not there to
help us make intelligent decisions.
Some brief comments on the subject of U.S. use of power for "self-defense"
and "just goals" (implicit in POM's and others comments along these lines
is that the Russkies use power in a threatening and unethical way e.g.
Afghanistan).:
1) Since WW II the U.S. has used force or threatened to use force 215
times to achieve its foreign policy goals. Of these actions at least 19
incidents involved threatening the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In
less than one-half of these cases the U.S. threatened the SU. Included in
the list of nations threatened are China, Nicaragua, N.Korea, and
Guatemala. (Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War)
2) During that same period the Russians threatened to use force 73 times
and even conservative researchers have yet to find any cases of the
Russians initiating threats of nuclear war against the U.S.
3) The U.S. refuses to announce a "No First Use" policy, the USSR has had
such a policy for years.
4) Since 1840 the U.S. has placed troops inside others nation's borders
without their permission (some people call it invasion) over 250 times
(the actual number depends on how you count multiple invasions of single
countries that occur with in months of one another). Included in this
total are at least two invasions of Russian soil. During that same period
the Russians have invaded other nations only 10-15 times (depending on
source).
5) As long as we are thinking about Afghanistan it is imperative we also
look at Vietnam. The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan which lies on their
border and we call it a moral outrage. When the U.S. invaded and bombed
(troops were actually landed using landing craft) Vietnam it was a just
war, even though it was over 8000 miles from the U.S. In that nation we
denied the people a democratic election in 1954, installed and supported a
number of impressively corrupt and repressive governments, killed hundreds
of thousands of people, dropped so many bombs that there are whole areas
of northern Vietnam that cannot be farmed anymore, sprayed carcinogens and
mutagens on ripening rice paddies, and so on, where is the moral outrage?
6) On the subject of ethical and just uses of force by the U.S. I think
it is also important to think a little about the role of the U.S. in
supporting nations such as Guatemala (in which 50-100,000 people were
killed by security forces during the 1970s), El Salvador (where only 20,000
or so have been killed), Marcos in the Philippines, S. Africa, Somoza in
Nicaragua, just to name a few.
7) The U.S. even gets into overthrowing nations with popular government
just because they get in our way (usually by getting in the way of the
profits of big multinationals). This list includes our help in
overthrowing the democratically elected Allende government in Chile (which
only resulted in the deaths of 20,000 or so Chileans), Mosaddegh's elected
regime in Iran (1953), and the various coups in Guatemala and Nicaragua.
8) Does anyone know about the Philippino insurrection during the early
part of this century where U.S. military forces directly participated in
the murder of 100,000 to 300,000 people? (Zinn, A Peoples History of the
U.S.)
*************************************************************************
BUT THEY WERE ALL COMMUNISTS SO THEY DESERVED TO DIE
*************************************************************************
9) Might I also remind everyone of the fact that the U.S. keeps six percent
or so of its B-52 force (and during the late fifties and early sixties
some 33%) in the air at any given time, that usually more than one-half of
the fleet ballistic missile force is kept at sea, and that supposedly 85%
of our ICBM force is kept at a state of readiness sufficient that upon
receiving a launch order the silo commander can have his (no hers) missile
in the air within as little as one minute. On the other hand the Russians
keep 15% or less of their fleet ballistic missile submarines at sea at any
given time, less than 25% of their ICBMs are kept in a high state of
readiness (remember most of them are liquid fueled), and their obsolete
bomber force is only considered a serious threat by the most paranoid of
the members of the Committee on the Present Danger (the main source of
Reagan's foreign policy elite).
9) Here are some interesting quotations by folks currently in the White
House:
Charles Kupperman, ACDA, 1981
...it is possible for any society to survive [a nuclear war]
..nuclear war is a destructive thing, but still in large part
a physics problem.
T.K Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (1981)
If there are enough shovels to go around everybody's going to
make it. ...it is the dirt that does it!
Colin S. Gray, consultant to the ACDA
American strategic forces do not exist solely for the purpose
of deterring a Soviet nuclear threat or attack against the U.S.
itself. Instead, they are intended to support U.S. foreign policy,
as reflected, for example, in the commitment to preserve W. Europe
against aggression. Such a function requires American strategic
forces that would enable a president to initiate strategic nuclear
use for coercive, though politically defensive purposes.
Phylis Schafly, an ardent supporter of the President
...the bomb is a marvelous gift given to American by a wise God
Eugene Rostow, in 1981 when he was Director of the ACDA
Japan after all not only survived but flourished after the nuclear
attack.
Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, before Congress
If we could get a system which is effective [BMD] and which
we know can render their missiles impotent we could be back in
a situation we were in, for example when we were the only nation
with the nuclear weapon.
What a tirade!!! I do not want people to think that I am unpatriotic
or anything, but when we are talking about designing, advocating, and
producing weapons that could help destroy large parts of the world, it
is very important to have a sense of what they might be used for, who
is going to use them, and why they might get used. POM is right about
people killing people, but what must be kept in mind is that just
because it is our side doing the killing, it does not mean that the
killing is right or justified.
Something else that we might want to think about. Considering the
history of U.S. and Soviet foreign policies do we want either the U.S.
or the USSR to have any more technologies that might be used to fight
a nuclear (or conventional war)? Does it matter if you are killed by
a Russian retaliation to a US first strike, by a Russian first strike,
an accidental strike, or during some long protracted war between the
superpowers?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 86 09:03:35 est
From: rutgers!gwe@cbosgd.MIS.OH.ATT.COM (George Erhart)
Subject: public opinion and summit
I have followed with interest your recent discussion of public opinion
folllowing the Reykjavic meeting. While I agree that the media has a
large influence upon popular opinion, and that many of the
psychological effects mentioned are quite plausible, I fail to
understand why it seems to be a foregone conclusion that none of the
65% of Americans who agree with Reagan arrived at that agreement
through a process of rational thought ! One must admit that several
logical arguments exist which support Reagan's actions, and that many
"intellectuals" agree. Is it so difficult to believe that at least a
sizeable fraction of US citizens are sentient creatures, with minds of
their own ? The unstated conclusion of the discussion to date seems to
be that agreement with Reagan's acts can only be the result of
ignorance and Freudian mechanisms. As one of the 65%, I must point out
that this is not the case.
{By the way, my name is Bill Thacker. You can reply to me via my
friend's login, or directly at cbatt!cbosgd!cbdkc1!serial!wbt (say
THAT three times fast). I should point out the the views expressed in
this letter do not necessarily reflect those of my employer or
coworkers; they are the result of my suppressed Oedipal complex. I
enjoy your form immensely...keep it up !}
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1986 17:35 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: treaty violations
>> mvs at meccsd.UUCP (Michael V. Stein)
> from lin@xx.lcs.mit.edu
>>[Backfire production may be higher than promised amounts. Some Backfire
squadrons are positioned near the artic circle so they can reach US
targets.]
>The latter is legal, and the former is not militarily significant,
>even if true.
Brezhnev promised Carter that the SU would not increase the radius
of action
of the Backfire in such a way to enable it to strike targets in the USA.
The wording is ambiguous. Radius of action means the range (two
way) from a base. No restrictions on basing are included in the
Brezhnev statement.
He also stated that the SU would not increase the production rate of the
plane as compared to the present rate.
The statement was that the SU would not increase the production rate
byeond 30 per year. Estimates of the production rates have not
gone beyond 32 per year, and in fact are not confirmed. In any case,
it isn't militarily significant.
>>There are still questions about the actual capabilities of the SS-20
>>missile. There is some speculation that its range is actually greater
>>than the claimed 3000 miles.
>There is also speculation that the Soviets try to use telepathy to
>find submarines.
I would really like to think that we could leave such ridicule
out of this forum...
Or such blatant speculation. In all seriousness, I have seen reports
that the intelligence community is worried about a "psychic gap" with
the SU.
There is no evidence that the range of the SS-20 has been tested in
excess of 3000 miles. It is a 3 warhead missile, so that off-loading
one or two warheads would of course increase its range. Is that what
you mean?
Rather, I am
trying to point out that it is far easier to hide possible violations
from observation by sattelites than it is by inspection.
Actually, none of the possible violations you mention could be
settled by on-site inspection either. Indeed, national technical
means are MORE likely to provide the relevant information on some of
them.
The questions
as to the capabilities of the SS-20 and the possible designs of the
Soviet air defense system have been brought up by noted physicist
and inventor of the neutron bomb, Sam Cohen.
What air defeense questions?
I haven't been convinced that the best approach is to dismiss all
such questions out of hand.
I don't do so. I've looked at the publicly available reports of most
of the evidence, and I'd talked to people who do the analysis.
Since the US has made quite a bit of noise about the Soviet's encrypting
of telemetry, I assumed the US didn't have a policy of encrypting
missile telemetry. (If encrypting telemetry isn't a violation of
agreements not to interfere with NTM, it should be pretty close.)
The agreement is that you can't encrypt when it impedes verification
of compliance. The Soviets have asked us what we think we need to
verify compliance, and it is the US that has refused to respond.
Encryption per se is allowed.
Can anyone verify this one way or the other or give a source?
Personal communication with people in the know is the best I can do
for you.
>...It [ the ABM treaty] specifically says STRATEGIC ballistic missiles.
Yes of course it says strategic missiles - that isn't the point.
Then what is the point?
>Radar is not limited in the way you describe it either.
Article VI of the treaty says:
...not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along
the periphery of its national terrority and oriented outward.
Seems pretty clear to me.
Your original message said that
... the ABM treaty says that the Soviet's are not permitted to
test their air-defense missiles against incoming ballistic missiles
and must not deploy radar that could track incoming warheads.
Your cite to the treaty says something entirely different. The treaty
says that they ARE allowed to deploy radar that can track incoming
warheads, but that they must be located in certain places. The radar
at Krasnoyarsk appears capable of doing so, and it is a pretty clear
violation. However, the radars we are building in Georgia, Texas, and
especially at Fylingsdale ALSO are questionable.
>>During the late 70's evidence started coming in that the Soviet's were
>>working on a particle beam weapon ABM system based on low yield
>>nuclear weapons. ...
>No one knows the first. ...
Exactly my point. The issue that all policy makers must face is that
by not knowing for sure, how do you decide what to do? A large part of
the nuclear problem is simply that decision making occurs under
such uncertainty.
You have to make a judgment about evidence you find credible. Do YOU
read the people who explain the source of the evidence of
non-compliance? I do. I'm afraid I don't find most arguments about
Soviet non-compliance credible. There are gray areas, that both sides
push; I expect that. In some cases, a clear violation comes along,
like the Krasnoyarsk radar. But they are exceedingly rare.
Virtually every major nuclear weapon system in the U.S. arsenal
seems to have
been started in response to real or suspected Soviet work in the field.
It seems to have been that way from the first ICBM to the proposed
Midgetman missile. Without true verification, this will probably
only continue.
Then why is it that the US introduction of major weapons systems lead
that of the SU by an average of four years. (A-bomb 4 yrs,
intercontinental bomber 7 y, jet bomber 3 y, H-bomb 1 y, icbm minus 1
y, SLBM 4 y, solid fuel ICBM 4 yr, ABM minus 8 yr, ASAT 5 y, MIRV 5 y)
If I had to guess, I would say that the biggest influence for SDI itself
was probably the High Frontier group, some members of which hold
a high influence with Reagan.
Then it isn't a response. It is HF's dream. (I agree with you on
this one.)
>>... the probability of arrival for
>>submarine missiles is equal to about 80% of the reliability of the
>>overall system. This makes them (and the eventual successors like the
>>Trident II) even less usable for a first-strike. You can be certain
>>that the Soviet's are also aware of this.
>Such is true for the Soviet Union as well, thereby making a Soviet
>first strike less plausible too.
Relatively little of the Soviet strategic missiles are based on
submarines where they could be subject to ASW operations or the
added operational difficulties of firing. This limitation thus doesn't
apply to the majority of their missiles.
But submarines can get in close, thereby reducing warning time and
preventing the Sovs from evein doing a launch on warning.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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