ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (01/11/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 10, 1987 11:01PM
Volume 7, Issue 93
Today's Topics:
Offensive Uses of SDI
Israel's Role In Irangate
Reference on ballistic missile carrying subs
Re: utility of arms control
German/Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939
FBMs on station
Censorship (and an example: P-3s)
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Date: Friday, 9 January 1987 15:25-EST
From: convex!paulk at a.cs.uiuc.edu (Paul Kalapathy)
To: ARMS-D
Re: Offensive Uses of SDI
THE SEMANTICS
Before I discuss what I consider to be the offensive uses of SDI
components, I will try to make some sort of definition of what I
consider to be an "offensive weapon". First, I think that the
categorization of weapons as "offensive" and "defensive" is frequently
(not always) a semantic ruse. The categorization is generally used
with the implicit connotation that "defensive"="good" and
"offensive"="bad". Witness the Strategic *Defense* Initiative or the
Peacekeeper (which will no doubt be operated by the Ministry of Peace
someday). Our bombers, missiles, and others are never referred to as
"our offensive B-52's" or "our offensive Warmaker". Due to the hidden
implications of the terms, I think one needs to be very careful about
categorizing weapons as either "offensive" or "defensive".
Second, because of the complex nature of the tactics and strategies
of war, the classification of a single weapon is almost meaningless.
Analogy: bulletproof clothing would be classified by most people as a
defensive item when it is regarded in isolation. However, if the
wearer of the clothing can as a consequence walk into an enemy camp
and kill freely, with no worry of being shot or otherwise retaliated
against, then the classification of bulletproof clothing as defensive
is false.
Therefore, a tentative definition of an offensive weapon is: a
weapon which can be used to attack or, a weapon which is used in an
attack to blunt any response to the attack.
This is the definition that I will use in this article. If I have
not made it clear that an apparently "defensive" weapon can be used to
improve the effectiveness of the offense to the point of becoming
"offensive", I will be happy to discuss it further.
SDI USED AS AN OFFENSIVE SHIELD
The SDI system's ability to shoot down missiles is usually gauged
as a percentage of the incoming missiles. Estimates of this
percentage vary wildly (30%-99%), but I think that no one with
knowledge of the program (including the SDIO) gives numbers larger
than 95% any more (correct me if I'm wrong). These numbers generally
refer to a mass attack of several thousand warheads. A critical point
here is that a system which can destroy 95% of several thousand
warheads CAN PERFORM MUCH BETTER AGAINST AN ATTACK OF A FEW HUNDRED
WEAPONS.
What is the benefit of a system which can destroy 95% of 5000
warheads leaving several hundred warheads to fall on our cities and
annihilate our society? The benefit is its use in a preemptive
strike. If the US launches a preemptive counterforce strike against
the SU, destroying the bulk of their missiles on the ground then the
remnants of the Soviet missile force (perhaps a few hundred warheads)
is easy pickings for an SDI system designed to cope with thousands of
warheads.
There is even motivation to launch such a preemptive strike. The
SDI system will respond much better to the reduced threat posed by a
diminished response to a preemptive strike than it would to a massed
attack. This is even more true since a Soviet massed attack would
surely be simultaneous, while the response to a preemptive strike
would necessarily be sporadic and uncoordinated.
This is why Gorbachev is worried. SDI looks better used in a
preemptive strike than as a "peace shield".
SDI AS ASAT
The ASAT (anti-satellite) uses of SDI components are fairly obvious.
What is not so obvious is the substantial implications of this.
Satellites are of paramount importance to the military in both the US
and SU. The deprivation of these resources in a crisis situation
could be disastrous due to the military habit of assuming the worst in
absence of information to the contrary. Deprived of
photoreconnaisance satellites, there would be great difficulty in
determining troop and ship movements. Communications between the US
and Europe would have to take place over the *telephone cables* at the
bottom of the Atlantic, or over HF radio (subject to interception and
jamming). I haven't even scratched the surface. This is a topic for
an article of its own. The current consideration by both sides of
satellites as almost sacrosanct is a real case of enlightened self
interest.
SDI AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT
High flying aircraft are vulnerable to laser weapons and
kinetic-kill weapons. This is certainly an offensive capability of
the SDI system. Space based weapons which can strike at aircraft
provide bait for escalating a conflict into space by making themselves
targets.
It has been rumored that SDIO wants components which are capable of
striking cruise missiles. If this comes to pass, SDI components will
be capable of striking down to the earth. It is possible even now
that the lasers used for SDI are capable of incendiary action at
ground level. Cities could be burned to the ground.
SDI AS ANTI-SDI
SDI components placed in space are fully capable of striking at
Soviet SDI components placed in space, and vice-verse. Worse, optical
laser and X-ray lasers are capable of carrying their destruction at
the speed of light. One side could entirely eliminate the other's
space assets in a fraction of a second, with no warning. This is
probably the most unstable situation thinkable. In a crisis
situation, SDI begs to be used. It puts nuclear war on a hair
trigger. Consider the situation of a serious crisis with SDI
possessed by both the US and SU:
--They could destroy our BMD and all of our satellites instantaneously.
- Then they could destroy our missiles if we launch an attack in response.
- We could not respond in any way if they launch a nuclear attack at us as
our BMD would be gone.
- We would be completely vulnerable before we even knew what was happening.
--On the other hand, they would be in that situation IF WE STRIKE FIRST.
- We must strike first because they are thinking the same thing.
This is the situation, then, if both sides have their own SDI. Each
side must shoot first or be completely vulnerable, for it cannot be
known when SDI will be taken away by the other side. And a weapon
that can be taken away in an instant by the other side is not worth
diddley-squat.
SDI AS ANTI-INTELLECTUAL
The conclusion that I make is that SDI is indeed an "offensive"
weapon in both senses; it can be used to attack and it can be used in
an attack to blunt any response. In addition, even a marginally
functional SDI (which is what it is likely to be) is exceedingly
destabilizing and would grossly complicate and aggravate our
relationship with the SU.
The bulk of the arguments for SDI are emotional (nuclear weapons
will be obsolete and there will be peace and happiness on earth with
SDI), political (jobs, spinoffs), paranoid (the Soviets are waaaay
ahead of us), deceptive ("defensive" weapon), or falsehood
(impenetrable shield). This country is a democracy, and there should
be intelligent and responsible discussion of something as
consequential as SDI.
-Paul Kalapathy
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Date: 10 Jan 1987 02:18 EST (Sat)
From: Wayne McGuire <Wayne%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Israel's Role In Irangate
> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 87 18:34:37 PST
> From: lieman@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Dan Lieman)
> Subject: Israel & Iran/Iraq
> A recent posting asserted many untruths about Israel's sales of "billions"
> of dollars of weapons to Iran. Further, this article stated as fact
> claims concerning Israel's motivations for its actions with respect to
> arms sales in the region, claims which are in fact not true.
The phrase "billions" is a number which has been bandied about in the
American press, and which would represent Israel's total sales to Iran
since the hostage crisis of 1979-80. No one in the general public yet
knows what the exact figure is, but in light of the latest information
"billions" is a believable description.
Re: "bleeding": some of Israel's close friends are refreshingly honest
on the subject. The columnist Carl Alpert recently wrote: "Israel's
military authorities make no secret of the fact that a decisive victory
by either side would be bad for the Jewish state. It would be better if
there were no victor, and the two sides simply went on bleeding each other
until they both collapsed, leaving behind a mess of human misery which the
Moslem world would somehow have to salvage before the Communists stepped
into the vacuum created." A question arises in my mind: would Israel be
willing to play the U.S. and USSR off against each another as it has Iran
and Iraq? Have in fact some of Israel's more militant supporters in the
U.S. been doing this, and might this account for their frenzied efforts
to torpedo arms control agreements between the U.S. and USSR?
The notion that the U.S. and Israel are in perfect consonance on the arms
sales, and that Israel was acting passively as a good and obedient friend
of the U.S., is contradicted every day in the charges that are being
hurled back and forth between the U.S. and Israeli governments about the
source of responsibility for this fiasco. As the Congressional and
executive branch investigations begin to grind down forcefully on the actors
and information in the scandal, we'll probably find out who is lying and
who is telling the truth. I've already seen enough to convince me that
Israel's role was far from passive, and that Israel in truth may have
masterminded importants aspects of the scheme and dragged the U.S. in its
wake to satisfy its own geopolitical objectives in the region (and perhaps
also in part to gratify the greed of a few arms dealers).
But you miss the main thrust of my posting. My criticism was targeted not
so much at Israel, but at the monumental hypocrisy and foolishness of two
very powerful political movements in the U.S.--neoconservatism and
neoliberalism--which have stridently (and often abusively) promoted
something called a "Reagan Doctrine," which is founded on a highly
moralistic crusade against "terrorism" and which invests a special value in
the state of Israel as a symbol of the civilized "West" in this struggle.
Irangate has dramatically kicked out the central pillar propping up this
fantasy, and I am wondering if the entire neocon political edifice will
now tumble. As someone who believes in the value of arms control, and who
feels that the program of aggressively rolling back and destroying our
ideological enemies throughout the world by military force is dangerously
misguided, I wouldn't be displeased.
One last point: don't you think that Iranian-brand Islamic fundamentalism
is a greater threat to Israel over the long run than Iraq, Syria, or the
Palestinians? That is my view, and I am not alone in holding it. This view
does not necessarily spring from an unsophisticated understanding of the
Middle East.
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From: drogers%farg.umich@umix.cc.umich.edu (David Rogers)
Subject: Reference on ballistic missile carrying subs
Date: Sat 10 Jan 13:54:04 1987
>From Andrew Cockburn's "The Threat":
"These problem [of safety] with both the submarines and the missiles may
account for the fact that only about 9 of the Soviet Union's 84 missile
carrying submarines are at sea at any one time. In contrast, the
United States manages to keep half its missile-carrying vessels
permanently out on patrol, which means that the United States has more
submarines in use, even though its force of 36 such vessels is little
more than half the size of the Soviet force."
If someone is REALLY interested, I can poke into the bibiliography to
find out who his sources were on this.
David Rogers
drogers@farg.UMICH.CSNET
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Date: Sat, 10 Jan 87 19:20:41 EST
From: bzs@bu-cs.bu.edu (Barry Shein)
Subject: Re: utility of arms control
>For good or bad (and I certainly don't admire Soviet politics), the Soviet
>government is one of the most stable in the world. It is *not* going to
>go away. It is *not* going to be overthrown -- at least not during our
>lifetimes. And it, by and large, has the support of its people.
>--
>Larry Campbell
Unfortunately this addresses a much harder question than may have been
apparent from the original note.
Many people are quick to damn the Soviet government, usually with good
motivation. The hard question is, could we stand its overthrow?
I am sure most fantasies of the collapse of the USSR magically
envisage a sudden change to a western style democracy. My suspicion is
that it would more likely entail a slow economic collapse, anarchy,
temporary (?) worse governments (eg. panicky generals) before better,
and lord only knows what else (autocratic attempts to reunite by
fanning the flames of fear of a "common enemy", who might that
scapegoat be?) One can only wonder who's fingers will have access
to "the button" during such an unrest.
In brief, think about to what extent our peace and security is utterly
dependant upon the stability of the current Soviet government. At least
they are a known quantity. It is a depressing but sobering thought. I
suppose one can take some comfort in the thought that the same reasoning
would apply to the U.S. (from the Soviet's perspective.)
-Barry Shein, Boston University
A thousand years scarce serve to form a state; An hour may lay it
in the dust -- Lord Byron
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Date: Sat, 10 Jan 87 19:15:22 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: German/Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939
> >The Soviet Union was Hitler's *ally*, and fellow land-grabber, until...
>
> The way I remember the history I was taught is that the non-aggression
> pact between the SU and Nazi Germany was a temporary treaty of
> convenience only, and both sides knew it... Far from
> being buddies, they deeply mistrusted and hated each other...
Deep mistrust and hatred for each other, and knowledge that the relationship
is a temporary one, does not preclude alliances and the appearance of buddy-
ship. My point was that Stalin seemed perfectly happy to amiably divide up
Europe with Hitler, and did so. How do you *know* Stalin deeply mistrusted
and hated Hitler? Even if he said so, was he telling the truth? Ultimately
it is necessary to judge people by actions, not supposed motives.
This has drifted a little off the topic. My original comment was a response
to an article that seemed to imply that both the US and the USSR had gone to
war with Hitler because they recognized his inherent awfulness. This seemed
dubious to me, especially since Stalin was Hitler's peer in inherent awfulness
by almost any realistic measure.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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Date: Sat, 10 Jan 87 19:15:47 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: FBMs on station
> ..."assume that 60% of the Fleet Balistic Missile boats were either on
> station or in transit." Since the other assumptions he gave us were
> correct ... I tend to believe the 60% number.
This is broadly consistent with the 1-in-5-on-station rule, since 60% means
3 out of 5 at sea, with some substantial fraction of those in transit. The
biggest question is what contribution the in-transit boats could make in
the event of sudden nuclear war. Outbound boats should be full participants,
given some delay to reach a firing position and some risk of being found
before then (missile subs are much noisier in transit than on station).
Homebound boats I'm less sure about. I assume the major reasons for heading
for home are food supplies and crew rotation; anybody know details? If the
USS Walla Walla, Ohio class, is six hours from port after a routine patrol
and the excrement hits the fan, how drastic a change of plans can her captain
make? What kind of time margin is there between "preferred time of return
to port" and "must refurbish/resupply/whatever somewhere at once"? I would
guess it's considerable, but don't know for sure. Might be classified.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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Date: Sat, 10 Jan 87 19:14:34 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: Censorship (and an example: P-3s)
> Wonder when we (arms-d) make the National Enquirer?
> [Henry Spencer tells all....;-)
Not until they start offering me more money than they have so far! :-) :-)
Fortunately, I have no security/military connection and no security clearance,
and in that state of blissful innocence I can feel free to blab. I do wonder
a bit whether there is any possibility of Arms-D getting into trouble because
somebody with security on the brain decides that item X discloses classified
information, and won't accept a pointer to open sources as an excuse. (This
was arguably the case in the Progressive/Morland case, although there it was
complicated by the "born secret" rule.) Being technically in the right would
not be much comfort if it caused Arms-D to get shut down.
Actually, "free to blab" is a slight overstatement, since there are things
I wouldn't be willing to discuss in public. There are some things that would
be genuinely harmful to disclose [as opposed to being harmful to bureaucrats'
careers or stupid DoD ideas of classifying the color of the sky], but I am
most unlikely to ever see such information. More significantly, it *does*
happen (occasionally) that some friend tells me something that probably
isn't secret in any legal or moral sense but which he flags as "not for
publication, please". This sort of confidence I feel bound to respect, but
I can't help wondering whether careful study of my public utterances might
hint at such information anyway. Even just being told, by someone I have
reason to *believe*, "problem X isn't as straightforward as you suggest" may
introduce a note of caution into later comments that wasn't there before.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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