ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (01/16/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, January 15, 1987 9:31PM
Volume 7, Issue 95
Today's Topics:
"offensive"
Soviet History / Glasnost
Offensive uses of SDI
POM on Soviet Reality etc..
use of America for the USA
Satellite killers a threat?
Star Wars against communications
Hitler & Stalin
Les Aspin
Comparing SDI to Apollo
Call for Papers: "Directions & Implications of Advanced Computing"
Fact, Fiction, and 'Star Wars'
stopping SDI by banning specific technologies
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 87 19:38:24 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: "offensive"
> ... a tentative definition of an offensive weapon is: a
> weapon which can be used to attack or, a weapon which is used in an
> attack to blunt any response to the attack.
>
> This is the definition that I will use in this article. If I have
> not made it clear that an apparently "defensive" weapon can be used to
> improve the effectiveness of the offense to the point of becoming
> "offensive", I will be happy to discuss it further.
Groan. Please name three real weapons that are, by your definition, clearly
and inarguably defensive and not offensive.
There aren't any.
Defences, by definition, are intended to stop or hamper offensive actions.
If a counter-offensive is considered a plausible response to an attack
(which it clearly is, especially in a world dominated by deterrence), then
ALL defences can serve to blunt responses to attacks, and thus are offensive
by your definition. So the distinction becomes meaningless, and the word
"offensive" is used as a propaganda tool to beat people over the head with,
rather than a meaningful term to aid in rational discussion. You complain
about the semantic ruse of classifying everything as defensive, i.e. "good",
and then proceed to classify everything as offensive, i.e. "bad". Can we
stop this, please?
If classifying weapons as "defensive" and "offensive" is to have meaning --
and I contend that there is a useful meaning there -- then an "offensive"
weapon is one used to attack, and a "defensive" weapon is one used to
destroy or hamper attacks. Period. The classification of something as
"defensive" must not be used to imply "good", since defensive systems can
be used to support offensive actions. This does not make them "offensive
weapons", any more than ICBMs used in a preemptive strike are "defensive
weapons" because they destroy attack-capable forces and thus support defence.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: 13 Jan 87 15:09:30 gmt
From: S.WILSON%UK.AC.EDINBURGH@ac.uk
Subject: Soviet History / Glasnost
Interesting to know when the book (which book?) reviewed by Gillette
reviewed by Steve Walton was published. 'Glasnost' (is that how it's
transliterated?) is a relatively recent phenomenon (post-Chernobyl, I
guess) and the USSR is a large place to control centrally. Unless
the SU has lots of Winston Smiths ready to go and rewrite all its
literature at the drop of a speechmaker's phrase then presumably
we shouldn't expect to see anything we would recognise as 'fairer'
literature for a while yet.
Sam Wilson, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
------------------------------
Date: 13 Jan 87 15:38:34 gmt
From: S.WILSON%UK.AC.EDINBURGH@ac.uk
Subject: Offensive uses of SDI
Perhaps you couldn't destroy items at ground level with a
boost-phase system, but you could presumably hit airborne
targets such as the Soviet equivalent of AWACS which (correct
me if I'm wrong) would need to fly fairly high to work properly.
And they could bring AWACS and all the other flying command
structure down too...
Sam Wilson, Univerity of Edinburgh
------------------------------
Date: 13 Jan 87 15:35:12 gmt
From: S.WILSON%UK.AC.EDINBURGH@ac.uk
Subject: POM on Soviet Reality etc..
A niggle: "What really matters to US is what they WILL DO."
There is a problem with this - what they (SU) WILL DO is
governed by (a) what they would like to do and (b) what US does
based on what US THINKS SU will do. From the God's eye view (or
with 20/20 hindsight) what they will actually do is important,
but that information is not accessible to planners before it
happens. Ho hum.
That apart, I THINK I agree with quite a lot of what POM said,
especially the general idea of self-determination, but I don't
agree with the idea that 'each ethnic or other interest group has
a right to select their own representatives (sic)'. On that
basis you would have a congessman for blacks, one (or more of course)
for Puerto Ricans, one for farmers, one for Taiwanese tea-tray
importers and so on, not to mention half the house being there
to represent FEMALE blacks, Puerto Ricans, Taiwanese .. blah
blah blah. Democracy has to be a compromise between interests,
and that includes, alas, the interests of those presenting
interests!
Sam Wilson, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
------------------------------
Date: 13 Jan 87 12:52:00 PST (Tuesday)
From: Schuster.Pasa@Xerox.COM
Subject: use of America for the USA
Re: Henry Spencer's comment on the use of "America" to apply to the USA.
(Apology: The following has nothing to do with Arms-D per se but since
the discussion started there, I don't know where else to send this
observation.)
I agree with Henry Spencer on the use of the term "Soviets" as shorthand
for the USSR and I used to agree with his point about his being mildly
resentful of our use of the term "America" when referring to the U.S. of
A.
Regarding the latter point, even though I'm a USAnian, I used to think
it presumptious of us to use the term "America" to refer to our country
when we're not the only inhabitant of the Americas (North or South as it
may be) and as Henry pointed out.
However, recently it ocurred to me that my country is the only one that
has the word "America" in its actual name. Therefore, other than using
USAnian or USian (neither of which are too pronouncable) and "The
States" which is used sometimes for the country ('though I feel that
this isn't definitive, despite popular usage), the only convenient term
is "America" for the country and thus "American" for a citizen threof
(somewhat akin to using "Soviet" for lack of a better word -
interestingly enough one has to fall back on "Russian" for the citizen.
You can't really refer to him as a "Sovieten").
I really don't think that our calling ourselves "Americans" had its
inception in any arrogance on our part as much as it had to do with
another desireable trait; i.e. laziness. It's just a lot easier to say
than any of the other possibilities and by virtue of our country's
actual name, we're the only ones "entitled" to use it. Why no other
American nation has the word America in its name is beyond me. Of course
there is a country named for the other explorer; Columbus - Columbia.
This America business may all be very obvious to everyone else but it
made me feel better when I thought of it.
Now if some other nation in the Americas had used the word "America" as
a part of its name we might have had a real identity/naming problem. But
there isn't. So I stopped feeling guilty about referring to myself as an
"American" from "America". (I'm glad we're not the United States of
Vespucchi.)
Norm Schuster,
Xerox Artificial Intelligence Sys.
------------------------------
Subject: Satellite killers a threat?
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 87 13:46:10 -0800
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
This is a reply to Henry Spencer's note of 6 Jan 87 on the subject of the
offensive uses of SDI.
>> Just because a weapon can't penetrate the atmosphere doesn't mean it can't
>> be used for offensive purposes. Such a weapon obviously could be used to
>> disable surveillance satellites...
>
(Henry replies:)
>Sigh, we are going around in circles: earlier in this discussion (I think)
>I explicitly acknowledged antisatellite attack as a *minor* offensive use
>of most any antimissile system. My point was that it's not what most people
>think of when they hear the word "offensive", and hence it is misleading
>advertising and propaganda rather than rational argument.
On the contrary; this brings us back to a very important point. What you
so graciously acknowledge as a *minor* offensive use is, of course, a major
offensive use. If we or the Soviet Union were to have the power to attack
satellites that would mean that we (or they) would also have the power to
deny the other the use of space for anything but an all-out offensive
strike. If we had this capability the Soviet Union could not be sure of
their ability to see what we are doing and thus might construe any failure
of their satellite system as preparation for a first strike from us. This
would be a very dangerous situation indeed. There may be a great
difference between what "most people think of when they hear the word
'offensive'" and what is actually offensive, especially if they are not
well-versed in military strategy or at least the use of rhetoric to color
an issue.
(Incidentally, the rhetorical device Henry uses, namely to mention an issue
and dismiss it with a wave of the hand in lieu of seriously considering it
has been used many times in Star Wars discussions. I heard a deputy of
Gen. Abramson use the same ploy with respect to the effectiveness of SDI
"at the margin". After bringing up the subject and explaining the concept
he just dropped it without actually even defending it in favor of SDI.
Many people listening, who wanted to believe, had their curiosity assuaged by
this vacuous device.)
--Charlie
------------------------------
Date: Tue 13 Jan 87 18:12:43-PST
From: David Jacobson <DMJ@WARD.CS.WASHINGTON.EDU>
Subject: Star Wars against communications
Paul Kalapathy writes:
The ASAT (anti-satellite) uses of SDI components are fairly
obvious. ... The deprivation of these resources in a crisis
situation could be disastrous due to the military habit of
assuming the worst in absence of information to the contrary. ...
Communications between the US and Europe would have to take place
over the *telephone cables* at the bottom of the Atlantic, or over
HF radio (subject to interception and jamming).
This assumes that geosynchronous communications satellites could
be destroyed by Star Wars like weapons. They are about 22,300
miles above the surface of the earth. If the Star Wars platforms
are in low orbit, say 200 miles up, that means a distance of at
least 22,100 miles. In a lecture Hans Bethe gave here at
University of Washington a while ago, he claimed that it would be
very difficult to focus beams narrow enough to destroy warheads at
a range of (I think I recall correctly) 1000 miles. He was
assuming chemical lasers. Communications satellites in
geosynchronous orbit would be a minimum of 22 times as far away.
On the other hand, communications satellites would probably be
more vulnerable than warheads to radiant energy. Does anyone have
any information on whether Star Wars weapons could in fact destroy
geosynchronous communications satellites?
-- David Jacobson
------------------------------
Subject: Hitler & Stalin
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 87 13:52:14 -0800
From: crummer@aerospace.ARPA
Henry Spencer (10 Jan) compared Stalin and Hitler. This comparison is not
new and may be the seat of the great fear some people have of the Soviets.
For sheer butchery Stalin took no back seat to Hitler, as is now well
known. This is where the similarity ends, however.
Hitler, by word and deed, was bent on conquering the world and Stalin was
perfectly happy to let him march across Europe hoping, naively, to divide
the spoils with him. Stalin's activity was within his own country. If
Hitler was like Genghis Kahn, Stalin was more like Don Corleone. Anyone
who can remember the days before VE day knows that the world had real
reason to fear Hitler's seemingly inexorable blitzkrieg and how the
European countries fell day by day. Stalin's Russia did not compete with
Hitler's Third Reich on this score. Hitler was an actual threat to the
nations of Europe and the world, Stalin was not.
--Charlie
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 87 15:08:26 est
From: drogers%farg.umich@umix.cc.umich.edu (David Rogers)
Subject: Les Aspin
What is the likely effect of Les Aspin's removal from the chair of the
Armed Service Committee in the House? I was quite surprised, since
given the (supposedly) close relation between Les Aspin and Sam Nunn,
and the democrats having taken control of the Senate, the opportunity
was there to forge an effective legislative policy of military matters.
Am I missing something obvious here?
David Rogers
DRogers@farg.UMICH.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 87 10:43:49 cst
From: convex!paulk@a.cs.uiuc.edu (Paul Kalapathy)
Subject: Comparing SDI to Apollo
Something has really been getting my goat for a while, and that is
people equating the feasibility of SDI with the feasability of the
Apollo program. I have seen this argument made in newspaper editorials, here
on the net, by individuals in private conversation, in Aviation Week, and in
EE Times(among others). To paraphrase: "Of course we can make an impenetrable
shield of SDI; people said we couldn't make it to the moon either; all who
disagree are naysayers". To this I would generally respond "If Ronny said
we were going to send a manned mission to the center of the sun, would you
suggest that we go at night?" Unfortunately, this rarely succeeded in
raising the level of the dialog. So, I have resolved to attempt to analyze
the analogy made of SDI to Apollo. Not to nitpick, but to see if the
analogy is grossly invalid.
How is SDI similar to Apollo?
The basic similarity is that both are space programs which push
the limits of technology to do something which has not been done before.
In this respect the two programs are quite similar, and it is on the
overt appearance of similarity that the argument has been riding.
How is SDI different from Apollo?
There are, I think, two main differences between SDI and Apollo which
totally invalidate any analogy.
1. In Apollo, THE MOON WAS NOT TRYING TO AVOID BEING LANDED ON.
2. In Apollo, NONE OF THE SPACECRAFT HAD TO OPERATE UNDER ENEMY
FIRE (except maybe 13).
These may seem like fairly obvious, even ludicrous, points, but that
is some indication of how ridiculous it is to compare SDI with Apollo.
Let us consider what a "moon shot" might have been like under conditions
similar to those SDI would face in operation. Were the Soviets to launch
a missile attack on the US (which is supposedly what SDI is to defend us
from), they would certainly attempt to defeat SDI in order to make their
attack succeed. The attacks (active and passive) on SDI would likely
consist of:
1. Decoys.
2. Jamming of SDI sensors.
3. Spoofing of SDI sensors.
4. Stealthy warheads.
5. Maneuvering warheads?
6. Physical Attacks on space assets.
7. Jamming of communications.
8. Nuclear assault on ground C^3 centers.
Now, how would this look to Apollo?
1. Decoys. The Apollo astronauts would be confronted with 10 or 50 moons
which all look alike, if they had any working sensors. Which one to
land on?
2. Jamming of spacecraft sensors. The Apollo astronauts wouldn't be
able to find anything, much less the real moon.
3. Spoofing of spacecraft sensors. On top of being jammed, their sensors
might indicate that the moon was somewhere entirely other than where it
actually is.
4. Stealthy moon. The moon and its decoys would be treated to have as
little visibility as possible to radar and infrared and visible light.
There wouldn't be any moon to see out the window, and maybe no moon
to see even with unjammed sensors.
5. Maneuvering moon? The moon would not be obeying any sort of celestial
mechanics. It would be evading any landing attempt.
6. Physical Attacks on the spacecraft. The Apollo spacecraft would have
space mines detonated next to it. It would be cooked by visible and
x-ray lasers. It would be fired on by railguns and hypervelocity
rockets. (Don't people realize that SDI systems can fire on
other SDI systems?). Think of what happened to Apollo 13.
7. Jamming of communications. There would be no communication with mission
control or between the orbiter and the LEM.
8. Nuclear assault on mission control. Houston would not be something to
be relied upon. Its just three guys on their own in a little spaceship.
There you have it. Three guys in a little spaceship, on their own, trying
to figure out where the moon is without working sensors, while being fired
upon by some of the most potent weapons in the world.
This may seem like an exceedingly silly analysis, but that is because
the analogy between SDI and Apollo is exceedingly silly and the silliness
of it becomes obvious when it is scrutinized. In short, there is no
useful analogy between SDI and Apollo.
Those who support SDI should consider the number of scientists, engineers,
and academics who denounce SDI as unworkable and dangerous. These are the
people who can determine its workability. There was certainly no such
response to the Apollo program. It has been suggested that the reason for
this is that SDI is "political" and Apollo was not. But Apollo was the
upshot of the "space race", was it not?
-Paul Kalapathy
------------------------------
Date: Monday, 12 January 1987 16:00-EST
From: michael%iris.Berkeley.EDU at BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Slone [(415)486-5954])
Re: Call for Papers: "Directions & Implications of Advanced Computing"
DIRECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED COMPUTING
Seattle, Washington
July 12, 1987
The adoption of current computing technology, and of technologies that seem
likely to emerge in the near future, will have a significant impact on the
military, on financial affairs, on privacy and civil liberty, on the medical
and educational professions, and on commerce and business.
The aim of the symposium is to consider these influences in a social and
political context as well as a technical one. The social implications of
current computing technology, particularly in artificial intelligence, are such
that attempts to separate science and policy are unrealistic. We therefore
solicit papers that directly address the wide range of ethical and moral
questions that lie at the junction of science and policy.
Within this broad context, we request papers that address the following
particular topics. The scope of the topics includes, but is not limited to, the
sub-topics listed.
RESEARCH FUNDING: Sources; Effects; Funding alternatives.
DEFENSE APPLICATIONS: Machine autonomy and the conduct of war; Practical limits
on the automation of war; Can an automated defense system make war
obsolete?
COMPUTING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: Community access; Computerized voting; Civil
liberties; Computing and the future of work; Risks of the new technology
COMPUTERS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: Computing access for handicapped people;
Resource modeling; Arbitration and conflict resolution; Educational,
medical and legal software
Submissions will be read by members of the program committee, with the
assistance of outside referees. Tentative program committee includes Andrew
Black (U.Wa), Alan Borning (U.Wa), Jonathan Jacky (U.Wa), Nancy Leveson (UCI),
Abbe Mowshowitz (CCNY), Herb Simon (CMU) and Terry Winograd (Stanford).
Complete papers, not exceeding 6000 words, should include an abstract, and a
heading indicating to which topic it relates. Papers related to AI and/or
in-progress work will be favored. Submissions will be judged on clarity,
insight, significance, and originality. Papers (3 copies) are due by April 1.
Notices of acceptance or rejection will by mailed by May 1. Camera ready copy
will by due by June 1.
Proceedings will be distributed at the Symposium, and will be on sale during the
1987 AAAI conference.
For further information contact Jonathan Jacky (206-548-4117) or Doug Schuler
(206-783-0145).
Sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, P.O. Box 85481,
Seattle, WA 98105.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 87 17:40:21 pst
From: turtlevax!weitek!mae@decwrl.DEC.COM (Mike Ekberg)
Subject: Fact, Fiction, and 'Star Wars'
[The following is excerpted from an article in the December 13, 1986
San Fransisco Sunday Examiner/Chronicle written by Denise Caruso in a
column intitled 'Inside Silicon Valley'.]
Near Perfection: It came as quite a shock, seeing Jerry Pournelle quoted
in December's MicroTimes as saying, "I write the president's speeches on
SDI(Strategic Defense Initaitive)."
Considering that Pournelle writes science fiction in addition to his
duties as PC-industry gadfly and columnist for Byte and InfoWorld, it was a
scenario too perfect to pass up: a sci-fi writer concocting speeches for
Reagan about a program that plenty of scientists think is science fiction to
start with!
But a White House spokesman said Pournelle is not on the list of White
House speech writers. And Pournelle, who will deliver a zealous speech on
the merits of "Star Wars" at the drop of the name (and who did just that at
the Hackers Conference Version 2.0, where MicroTimes got the quote), claims,
"I never said that."
What he does say is that he helped write some of the position papers
that Reagan used in his first speech on SDI, delivered on March 23, 1983.
But he wants to make one thing perfectly clear:" I'm careful not to say I run
the White House, because I don't. I'm not some Svengali telling the president
what to do. I'm one of a group of advisors to the president."
[End excerpt]
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 14 January 1987 18:13-EST
From: Bryan Fugate <fugate at mcc.com>
To: ARMS-D
Re: stopping SDI by banning specific technologies
Posted-Date: Wed, 14 Jan 87 17:13:55 CST
Many of the arguements against building SDI revolve around some sort of moral
obligation not to build offensive weapons or not to build weapons that will
destabilize the balance to terror. Also, many say that we should never even
try to build it because: a) It will never work, so why waste the money, or
b) Even if we could get it to work, how could we test it. The only real test
is in a full-scale war and then you don't have time to go back and fix the
bugs.
While all these arguements have a point, I think they overlook a basic fact.
There are countless hundreds (thousands?) of technologies that will go into
SDI, from computers and lasers to sensors and satellites. The entire U.S.
economy is gearing up to produce these technologies at a rapid rate, despite
anything the government might, or might not do. To say that we can somehow
stop research on things that will lead to SDI would be like trying to find
a simple way to plug up the Amazon River.
This, to me, is what really scares the hell out of the Russians. In their
hearts, they know they won't be able to compete with the torrent of technology
that is flowing in the U.S., Japan and Europe. They think they can get a few
labs here to stop working on SDI. Au contraire, in order to stop progress
on SDI, progress would have to stop in virtually our entire technology
revolution.
The problem is that they cannot steal our secrets and stamp out sheet metal
copies like they have with weapon systems in the past. The software problem
is vastly too complex for them to deal with, as an example, with their current
system of computer usage and educcation.
If the Soviets plan to keep their system intact, they will have to come to
grips with change. They will have to learn to encourage entrepeneurship and
individualism on a scale wholly unimagined in that country. Otherwise, they
will cease to be a relevant world power. We will produce weapons which will
nullify their ability to harm us or our allies. This will occur despite
anything they, or we, can consciously do.
The technology of the 21st Century will arrive with or without the Soviet
Union participating. It's their choice, not ours.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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