ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (01/17/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Friday, January 16, 1987 6:26PM
Volume 7, Issue 96
Today's Topics:
Hitler and Stalin
Technology Marches On
Re: US/USSR perceptions of the other
Re: Star Wars against communications
When is a weapon "defensive"?
Preemptive attacks and SDI
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 87 08:59:09 est
From: rutgers!gwe@cbosgd.MIS.OH.ATT.COM (George Erhart)
Subject: Hitler and Stalin
Charlie Crummer stated in his recent article :
>Hitler, by word and deed, was bent on conquering the world and Stalin was
>perfectly happy to let him march across Europe hoping, naively, to divide
>the spoils with him. Stalin's activity was within his own country ...
>Hitler was an actual threat to the nations of Europe and the world, Stalin
>was not.
I understand your point, but I don't think you'll get much agreement from the
people of Poland, Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lituania, ...
Need I go on ?
Subject: 1939 Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact
Actually, in the text I referenced earlier, the Soviets DO acknowledge this
treaty. It was signed after:
1) the western allies granted Czechoslavakia to Germany at the Munich
Conference (a move intended to give Germany a doorway to attack the SU)
and
2) the failure of the British and French negotiators to reach agreement
with the SU (sp `39).
The Non-Agression Pact was signed to "stave off the creation of the united
anti-Soviet front which was being prepared by the imperialist states."
(Lyons, Graham (ed.), _The_Russian_Version_of_the_Second_World_War_,
New York, 1976, p.10)
More realistically, it allowed the Soviets to release more forces for the
invasion of Finland in Feb '40.
Subject: Proper Terminology for citizens of SU
Much debate has centered around this issue. They're not Russian, nor Soviets.
What should they be called ?
Well, we in the US live in the United States of America, and are called
Americans. As THEY live in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, perhaps
we should call them Republicans ! :-)
Bill Thacker AT&T Network Systems, Columbus, Ohio
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 16 Jan 1987 09:22:52-PST
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: Technology Marches On
For about five years, from 1945 to 1950, the U.S. had the ultimate weapon
to itself. Had she been of a mind to, the U.S. could have imposed a
militaristic Pax Americana. However, the Soviet Union was allowed to
test and develop a nuclear capability.
I've wondered what sort of world it would be if the U.S. had simply nuked
the Soviets the day they tested their A-bomb. I don't think it would be
a world I'd want to live in, even as a U.S. citizen. I'm sure U.S. leaders
thought of taking that action and decided against it.
Assuming SDI can be made to work, there will be another decision point in
the future, except that this time it will be the Soviets who must choose.
When the Peace Shield starts to go {in|up}, the Soviets may be faced with
the choice of acquiescing to the nullification of their nuclear arsenal,
and very likely to their stature as a superpower, or using those weapons
before they lose them.
I don't think SDI will work. If it did work, I don't think the Soviets
would choose to go out with a bang, because they're rational humans too, and
because we had the chance to squash them and chose not to. But there is
the possibility, and it is frightening.
Discussion?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 87 09:27:30 PST
From: pom@along.s1.gov
Re: US/USSR perceptions of the other
>Subject: SU (> US & US (> SU (=how they see each other)
pom in response to some Lin's argument:
( Lin: Soviets will pursue their self-interest) wrote:
>> In your model of the world there is something called "Soviets",
>> and you have some ideas about what they may do... In my model...
>> there is also word 'soviets' and it means what it indeed means to
>> inhabitants of the Soviet Union. 'Soviets' are councils...
>
>I won't comment on the rest of the discussion, some of which I agree with
>and some of which I don't, but I do want to briefly address the issue of
>terminology.
>Just what *are* we supposed to call inhabitants of the Soviet Union (more
>properly, the USSR)? "Russians" is even more inaccurate. "USSRians" is
>unfamiliar and ridiculously pedantic, not to mention irrational unless we
>also insist on calling you a USAnian. After all, some of us non-USAnians
>mildly resent a certain nation -- comprising rather less than half of the
>northern part of America -- using that word to refer only to itself. Please
>don't get nit-picky about the meaning of "Soviets" unless you are prepared
>for us to nit-pick right back.
> Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
> {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
pom responds to Henry's comment:
Actually, Henry, the only time I ever complained about terminology was about a
year ago, when Jeff Miller discovered the sinister significance of the
European railroad system and wrote: " SU and it's EE allies operate railroads
with different gauge than western Europe". It was really confusing since
e.g. Ukraina is in Eastern Europe but uses mostly Asian gauge and so I
suggested terms 'Soviet Empire' for the whole Warsaw Pact block or SU&comp.
For SU occupied countries of the Central Europe, such as Hungary I
suggest CE (Central Europe) as best or Socialist countries; SU satellites
or clients. About 2000 lines below is paragraph 'RETRACE' in which I am
attempting to recall how and why we got to discuss meaning of the word 'Soviets'
I am not rising question of terminology. I was comparing different models
of political realities. It is all right to say e.g. Both US and Soviets wants
to survive, since just about anybody in US and SU wants to survive. People
starts to differ when they start selecting the strategy for survival. Those
differences represent certain dynamics (or game) and by understanding
the players,one can make some guesses about the "what XX will do". As an
example I have used the GOP and Democrats as two major players in US. In case
of SU, you do not have such (horizontal) stratification. Does that mean
they are no major players? Certainly not. There is certain dynamics in
the hierarchy of the 'councils', which I do not consider important or major
and so I lump it together as SU state (or apparat or establishment= SUe).
There is another (minor but growing) player, the SU dissidents (SUd). And both
SUe and SUd court the other major player the Soviet people (or masses = SUm).
So, why should we care about the internal game within SU, when we
can get the 'official results' from SU embassy? I think that the main
reason is that when you have the (1) simplest model of global situation
namely US&comp vs SU&comp you end-up with classical Richardson's model,
with the 'cone of deterrence', which is just a glorified Prisoner Dilemma.
It says that MAD is best we can have. I think that most people (I do) feel
it's not *really* that impossible to do better. So, the artful modeler
knows she needs to enrich the model into (2) a model with cost of arms
and competition for resources. This is model I once posted on this net:
(combination of Richardson and Nash's Bargaining problem).
It captures *real* dynamics much better: each player needs to partition
her resources into a) consumption and b) armaments. I think you do
agree that arm race is controlled mostly by cost (rather then by treaties).
But, -------
> but you are wrong to say that
>we are not better off for having signed the arms control treaties we have.
>In particular, the atmospheric test ban treaty has been a benefit to ALL
>inhabitants of the world -- I shudder to think what background radiation
>levels would be now if the US and SU had continued atmospheric weapons
>testing at the level of the early 1950's. Cancer, anyone?
>Larry
As Larry correctly pointed out, it (model 2) still leaves something
important out. Namely the (win-win or )plus aspects of the game. The model
is zero-sum (since if A gets more of the resource, B gets that much less) or
negative sum when the 'brinkmanship' and 'bluffing', which this model has as
'optimal strategy', leads to limited or global war. The nuclear winter and
such aspects of common global ecology just ain't there. Also, there is this
theorem in mathematical statistics (the Peterburg Problem) which says that
as long as you start with finite amount of money and play poker long enough,
you will fer_sure go bankrupt, eventually.
So, I think that model is still too over-simplified to have 'the critical
mass' needed to capture the real dynamics. I think that model (3), which
would split the US player into USd (doves) USh (hawks) and USo (owls)
and split SU player into SU(d,e,m) i.e. dissidents, establishment & masses
may do the trick. You get all kinds of interactions between 3 * 3 pairs,
e.g. Head-to-Tail (of the thirties?) with US leftist having illusion about
SUe or Tail-to-Tail (citizens diplomacy?) and the model indeed includes
the internal dialog on survival, which we know is going on in both countries.
Naturally, one would have to bring in some other players (such as China,
Japan, Independents ( France, Yugoslavia, New Zeland?) so you would end up
with dozen or two of players - that's still quite manageable. --
So anyway, when I was pointing out that difference in models, the
Lin's model which has SU as one undifferentiated (or atomic) player and
my model of the world, I have used that word 'soviets' as somewhat flippant
example of the fact that SU is not a monolith but has an internal structure.
I got frustrated by Herb's stubborn refusal to consider the opinions of that
silent majority, opinions of SUm to which, he says, "nobody is privy".
(I thought that if he can see the structure of SU as described in the SU
constitution, he will believe that there is some :-) :-) :-) :-)
Let's recapitulate how we got to this issue and why it is relevant:
^^^^^^^RETRACE:^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^start:R
I said that SU is not that afraid of SDI in itself, but rather of SDI
combined with hostile rhetorics of 'evil empires' and *recent*
history of agresive or arbitrary acts. Actually I have that exchange:
>>>In article <8612222111.AA12791@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> pom wrote:
>>>
>>> The degree to which they (Soviets) are
>>> afraid depends on THEIR perceptions of how much of a good guy
>>> that other nation is.
>>LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU asked (pointedly)
>>Precisely. Do you think the SU perceives the US as a good guy?
..thats where we got to what the SU(= Soviets) means. Since SUm thinks
differently than SUe. "Are you aware of 1918 US intervention in SU?"
Lin asked (pointedly again) and I responded (with an overbearing
smile :^} which my terminal did not transmit): Yes, I am quite
familiar with ALL THREE versions of the Soviet History, namely:
a) official or SUe version which is found in soviet textbooks and books
on history and fed to american tourists i.e SU (> SUe.
footnote (> is a relational operator meaning 'as seen by', It looks like an eye.
b) The view of history which a typical student will form by combining
"a)" with input from parents, banned books, peers, own experience and even foreign broadcast. That's SU as seen by masses: SU (> SUm.
and c) The SU according to western historians, the SU (> US, which is what
YOU have (probably) learned in school.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv.end.of.retrace.vvvvvvv.end:Rvvvvvvvvv
In some cases the views of SUe and SUm agree. For example that quote
of Truman "So that most get killed" is widely known and believed in SU
but apparently not mentioned in US textbooks of history. On the 1918
caper the versions differ, and that's why I said that it is "BS, not
shared by the bulk of the population".
I hope that I have shown by *facts* that '1918 caper' indeed is not that
important as SUe says; yet Lin still refuses to accept the fact that
SUm can have different mentality and memories then SUe. There are two
possible tests. a) one is to search for logical inconsitencies in the
official view and note that assumption of the 'submerged' personality
has predictive value. (That's essentially Freud's approach and also the
view of three players (SUm, SUe and SUd) as a model of soviet reality)
or b) In case of 'psychology of a country' we have another method,
which we do not (so far) have for individual humans. And that is,
simply: Go and visit SU and talk to people which were not preselected
by SUe, e.g. pick them up in the metro. Then you can compare SUe vs SUm
On the second thought, I see that trying to get Lin to accept structured,
non~atomic, view of soviet reality, by pointing out 'the official structure'
of all the soviets and politbyro, was a bad example. Since all those soviet
'soviets' share the same official policies and views. Such model would have
too many details to be of use. But ability to see Soviets as composed of three
groups SUd, SUe and the soviet people, who are neither party-members nor active
dissidents, the SUm group, which is the *real* (and silent) majority is useful
for any American interested in foreign affairs. Just try it! Some say
that this 'vast majority' supports SUe. There certainly seem to tolerate it
so far. But masses are fickle in democracies. They are just as fickle in
oligarchies but shut-up due to fear rather then indiference. That is worse,
since one never knows how much of popular support for ruling Junta was eroded.
Also, from the distance, things may look more stable then they are. Don't
forget that until Kchrushchev, deposed 'leaders' were routinely shot. Rumor has it that Stalin shared that fate that and tanks encircled Moscow couple times.
Let's just face the fact that Soviets do not put their Watergates and Irangates
on TV (: and that and lack od comercials may be the *real* reason for getting
such a bad ratings of most of their shows :=) pom.
------------------------------
Date: Friday, 16 Jan 1987 09:18:50-PST
From: jong%derep.DEC@decwrl.DEC.COM (Steve Jong/NaC Pubs)
Subject: Re: Star Wars against communications
David Jacobson cites a Hans Bethe statement that it would be difficult to
focus laser energy on a communications satellite because of its distance
(22,300 miles) from the battle platform (presumably).
I find this hard to understand. At least from Earth orbit, there is very littleattenuating matter between the weapon and the satellite. Crippling it
doesn't sound hard at all. (It wouldn't take much energy to burn out its
transponders, right?)
------------------------------
From: mogul@decwrl.DEC.COM (Jeffrey Mogul)
Date: 16 Jan 1987 1130-PST (Friday)
Subject: When is a weapon "defensive"?
Several people have argued that a weapon that may be used to blunt
a retaliatory attack should be regarded as an offensive weapon, not
a defensive one. Henry Spencer correctly notes that this leads to
a meaningless distinction; i.e., any weapon that can be used defensively
can also be used offensively.
This is not to say that a distinction cannot be made. I suggest that
the test to apply to SDI is whether it is at all credible as a defense.
Most SDI critics do not deny that it would shoot down ICBMs; what we
do argue is that it is not likely that it could defend against a
Soviet first strike. It is considerably more likely that an SDI
system might succeed against a Soviet retaliatory strike; thus, I
would argue that SDI is far more credible as part of an offense than
as part of a defense.
Consider SLBMs for an analogous problem. Early (current?) SLBMs cannot
be relied upon to destroy Soviet ICBMs in their silos; therefore, nobody
would expect the US to use them to try to destroy ICBMs as part of a first
strike. They fit much better into a revenge-against-cities strategy.
The Trident II is advertised as able to destroy silos; this capability
does not seem to improve its use as a means of revenge, but it does make
it more credible as a first-strike weapon [I don't argue that the US
necessarily intends to use it as such; rather that the Soviets might
draw that conclusion.]
On the other hand, there are weapons that I would regard as far more
credible as part of a defense than as part of an offense. For example,
land mines placed within a country's borders, fixed gun emplacements to
defend coasts, etc., seem fairly useless to an aggressor who doesn't expect
to be driven back onto its own territory. Even TOW missiles might be
regarded as defensive; at least they aren't significantly more useful
on offense than they are on defense.
I happen to believe that labeling "defensive" weapons, such as TOWs,
supplied to countries like Iran, is naive or obfuscatory, or both.
Context is important; you can't tell the offensive weapons from the
defensive ones without imagining how they might be used.
------------------------------
Date: Fri 16 Jan 87 12:46:56-PST
From: Andy Freeman <ANDY@Sushi.Stanford.EDU>
Subject: Preemptive attacks and SDI
Paul Kalapathy (convex!paulk at a.cs.uiuc.edu) wrote:
A critical point here is that a system which can destroy 95% of
several thousand warheads CAN PERFORM MUCH BETTER AGAINST AN ATTACK OF
A FEW HUNDRED WEAPONS.
Preemptive and retaliatory attacks work differently. The former has
to destroy the defender's offense. The latter merely has to attack
cities. The consequences of missing 50 MIRV delivery vehicles are
different from just missing New York City. (Missing 5 in each of 10
areas is much worse than missing sections of 10 different cities.) A
working SDI system makes a preemptive attack more risky. It doesn't
much affect the success of retaliation.
A preemptive attack that takes out 99.9% of the defender is unlikely.
Even if SDI is 95% good against small attacks, a preemptive attack by
the US guarantees that the US will take >20 nukes. Is that a
successful attack? (No.) If the USSR worries about a preemptive
attack, they will target ONLY cities and will launch on evacuation.
Those 20 nukes will really hurt.
Previous arms-d articles have said that a system that can destroy 95%
of an attack of 10k missles (in a given period of time) will probably
be unable to destroy >40% of an attack of 20k missles; <10% is more
likely. I claim that it is also unlikely that it would kill
substantially more than 95% of a much smaller attack either. I'll bet
that its kill percentage will actually be lower.
For example, if SDI chooses its target's characteristics based the
characteristics of objects it shouldn't have ignored, so that it
"learns" the characteristics of the real threats by letting the first
n possible threats through and observing which ones are real, it will
miss most of a small attack.
This strategy can be defeated by an attack that starts at full force
or one whose characteristics change throughout the attack. Both are
goals of conventional war, but are quite difficult to achieve because
they require a lot of coordination. (The latter is well simulated by
the inherently random response to a preemptive attack....) Remember,
the preemptor can't miss; the retaliator can.
This strategy appears to be both stable and effective because it makes
the attackers job harder yet it ignores non-attacks. Knowing the
details of this strategy doesn't help the attacker. It can be
combined with "kill all blue missles every other second" to give the
attacker even more trouble. It performs as well as possible against
non-coordinated brute force attacks.
SDI doesn't protect us against lots of damage even if we attack
preemtively, but [if it works] it ensures that we can return
sufficient fire if we're preemptively attacked.
-andy
[Note to moderator: Feel free to delete this if you don't think it
adds anything to what Henry Spencer wrote.]
Paul Kalapathy (convex!paulk at a.cs.uiuc.edu) wrote:
[He claims that bulletproof clothing is offensive because an
attacker can use it.]
Therefore, a tentative definition of an offensive weapon is: a weapon
which can be used to attack or, a weapon which is used in an attack to
blunt any response to the attack.
According to this definition, both advanced wheat growing techniques
and antibiotics are offensive weapons. (The former feeds an invader;
the latter makes sure that he can fight when he gets there. Remember,
most war-time deaths used to be caused by disease and starvation.)
Bulletproof clothing can also defend a non-combatant, or defender.
The attacker can't use it alone to attack, but he can attack without
it (even though his effectiveness is limited).
Henry Spencer asked for Kalapathy to give an example of a defensive
weapon, according to Kalapathy's definition. I think that Spencer's
point, that Kalapathy's definition is useless, can be demonstrated by
the fact that it defines everything as an offensive weapon. It's even
worse than Spencer claimed, because it includes things that aren't
usually considered weapons.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************