ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (01/17/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 17, 1987 11:30AM
Volume 7, Issue 97
Today's Topics:
Roots of The Reagan Doctrine
Re: Preemptive attacks and SDI
Sub deployment
Sub deployment
Does ARMS-D evulgate?
Hitler & Stalin
Satellite killers a threat?
US/USSR perceptions of the other
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Date: 16 Jan 1987 18:40 EST (Fri)
From: Wayne McGuire <Wayne%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Roots of The Reagan Doctrine
This reply is on the long side, but I think it is worthwhile to try to pin
down carefully what exactly is "the Reagan Doctrine" and "global
unilateralism," and what is the character of the neoconservative and
neoliberal forces that have forged and are driving it. One thing that
troubles me about this list is the too great attention paid to
bean-counting and technical quibbles, and the insufficient concentration
on understanding the roots of the larger ideological forces that mold
history in general and which create and control the context in which arms
and other issues are debated. The creators of the Reagan Doctrine have
also been the most emotional and vocal supporters of SDI.
> Date: 11 Jan 1987 14:21:59-EST
> From: Hank.Walker@gauss.ECE.CMU.EDU
> Subject: Reagan Doctrine
>
> I believe that Wayne McGuire misstates the "Reagan Doctrine." My
> understanding is that the Reagan Doctrine is the informal policy of
> aggressively supporting "freedom fighters" around the world. If you
> think about it, many of the guerrillas in the world today are "our"
> guerrillas, in places like Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and
> Cambodia, and our support for most of them has elicited little public
> dissent. The Reagan Doctrine doesn't have anything to do with Israel
> per se.
First let me say that "the Reagan Doctrine" is a broad umbrella that
describes the political goals and aspirations of a wide diversity of
actors, but two major groups have forged it: (1) traditional right-wing
ideologues and conservatives (although many conservatives are strongly
opposed to it), and (2) a new school of neoconservatives (later joined
by "neoliberals," another slippery term) whose ideas are obsessively
organized around the security interests and policy goals of Israel, and
in whose lexicon "the West," "terrorists," and "appeasers" loom large.
_The National Review_ is the chief organ of the traditional conservatives,
_Commentary_ the prime ideological incubator of the neocons, and _The New
Republic_ the leading voice of neoliberalism. Arguably the Israeli
faction of this alliance--which includes nearly all of the neocons, and
many of the leading neoliberals--has played a much greater role in
defining and selling the Reagan Doctrine than have traditional
conservatives.
As to the character of "the Reagan Doctrine," let me defer to two experts.
Christopher Layne, writing in the Winter 1985-86 _Foreign Policy_, remarks
in "The Real Conservative Agenda":
Real conservatives and neoconservatives are especially divided over
the questions of what America should do and what it can afford to
do. To the extent it seriously addresses these questions at all, the
Reagan Doctrine offers simple answers. Its neoconservative authors
depict world politics as a Manichaean struggle between democracy and
communism. Neoconservatives believe that the primary threat to the
United States is ideological and that the balance of power is fragile.
When combined, these two assumptions suggest that if America fails to
resist the advance of communism worldwide, its allies and neutrals
will realign with the USSR.
According to the Reagan Doctrine, communist ideology per se threatens
American security. Neoconservative intellectuals like Norman Podhoretz
and Irving Kristol, who have given the Reagan Doctrine its conceptual
underpinnings, stress that America is locked in an ideological
struggle with communism rather than in a traditional great-power
rivalry with the Soviet Union.
There is much more to Layne's analysis, but that will do for the moment.
(Layne, by the way, characterizes himself as a traditional conservative and
argues that "the Reagan Doctrine" is potentially a disaster for American
interests. Irangate has confirmed his warnings.)
Another perspective on "the Reagan Doctrine" is provided by Theodore
Draper in an article called "Neoconservative History" in _The New York
Review of Books_ for January 16, 1986:
"Global unilateralism" has been presented by Irving Kristol, the
reputed "godfather" and "standard-bearer" of the new creed, as the
neoconservative alternative to "liberal internationalism." His new
order would require a total break with all our allies and the
abandonment by the United States of NATO, the United Nations, and
the Organization of American States. He wants to get rid of allies,
because they are "very effective hindrances to American action." This
is another myth; the United States has not been hindered by NATO or
the UN from doing anything it really wanted to do--not in Korea, not
in Vietnam or Grenanda or Central America or anywhere....
.... Kristol seems to need a Soviet messianism in order to convert
the United States to a corresponding Soviet messianism....
There surely are ideological elements in the Soviet-American conflict,
but they are precisely those elements that could be pursued most
peacefully. Kristol and cohorts have something more in mind. Their
version of ideological conflict shades into a real, ordinary,
bloodletting war--anything up to nuclear devastation, which is the
only concession Kristol makes to stopping short of mutual catastrophe.
We are instructed to be "not at all risk-averse." We are also
assured that "in the years ahead, the United States will be far less
inhibited in its use of military power." If the Soviet Union does
not convert "its secular, political messianism into a stable
orthodoxy," whatever the latter may mean, global conflict will
likely be "political, economic, and military, though always short of
nuclear war," as if an impenetrable barrier could be built between
nuclear and other types of war. In any case, Kristol's "war of
ideology" is not likely to be purely ideological.
This neoconservatism is not merely a hopeless muddle; it is also
misnamed. We are probably stuck with the term, but it has little or
nothing to do with traditional conservatism, particularly in foreign
policy; it is a new concoction, much closer to other types of
political extremism. We have had isolationists; we have had inter-
ventionists; we have never had isolationists who were also interven-
tionists. This abnormal crossbreeding of isolationism and interven-
tionism has produced the new species of "global unilateralists."
They are global in their interventionism and unilateral in the way
they wish to go about it. In the past, isolationists did not want
us to intervene and interventionists did not want us to be isolated.
Though the enemy is ostensibly communism and the Soviet Union, what
really stirs the "neo" to a sort of holy wrath is anything that can
be blamed on liberals.... Against this enemy the "neo" goes into
battle as if in a civil war, with more than a hint that those who
differ are really serving the enemy. A disagreement over policy comes
to resemble a quasi-religious war rather than a legitimate secular
dispute. Indeed, Kristol wishes us to believe that "in our own era,
the distinction between religious ideas and political ideas is
blurred."
One of the central features of the key ideological forces behind "the Reagan
Doctrine" then is its messianic and quasi-religious character. The Reagan
Doctrine sometimes seems to be Marxism-Leninism in reverse, a philosophy
infected with the uncompromising fervor aggressively to impose its will
on the entire globe. Some of its proponents are clearly determined to try
to "roll back" through military force the Great Satan of Marxism-Leninism
right off the face of the earth, regardless of the consequences.
Steve Walton in V. 7, #94 comments that he considers himself more-or-less
a neoliberal, and then mentions Michael Kinsley and James Fallows. Kinsley
and Fallows are on the left of the neoliberal spectrum. Martin Peretz (the
owner of _The New Republic_) and Charles Krauthammer are the more relevant
figures, since they have taken the lead in defining a highly aggressive
and militaristic position for neoliberalism and the Reagan Doctrine which
is often hard to distinguish from the neoconservatism of Norman Podhoretz
and Irving Kristol. Steve's characterization of the Reagan Doctrine as
seeking to roll back the Communist gains of the last decade significantly
understates the fanaticism and ambitions of many of the ideologues who are
promoting neocon/libism.
Finally, Steve comments: "I do hope that debate over the appropriate role
of the US in these situations will not become another part of the acri-
monious and largely emotional argument about US-Israeli relations."
Certainly we should try to keep acrimony and emotion out of this debate.
But surely the role of Israel in the forging of neoconservatism,
neoliberalism, and the Reagan Docrine can no more be ignored than can
Israel's role in the scandal which this ideology has helped bring forth:
Irangate.
_The New York Times_ has reported that American foreign policy experts
have come to the conclusion that perhaps the single greatest cause of the
scandal which has brought our terrorism policy to ruin and made the U.S. a
laughingstock around the world is that the American officials who master-
minded or cooperated with this scam failed to take proper account of Israeli
motives in pressuring us to trade arms for hostages, and to consider
fully whether Israeli objectives were truly in the best interests of the
U.S. On a larger scale, what are some of the broader motives of the
Reagan Doctrine, and are the objectives of this so-called doctrine truly
in the interests of the U.S.?
To understand the mentality of one of the godfathers of neoconservatism,
consider an essay by Norman Podhoretz in the September 1982 issue of
_Commentary_ called "J'Accuse," in which he suggests that many reputable
critics of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the American press, academia,
and foreign policy circles--figures like Anthony Lewis, Stanley Hoffmann,
George Ball, and Mary McGrory--are anti-Semites (never mind that the best
and brightest even within the Israeli intelligence community now consider
the invasion an unmitigated disaster). In the final paragraphs his
values and priorities are put forward directly:
The Bible tells us that God commanded the ancient Israelites to "choose
life," and it also suggests to us that for a nation, the choice of
life often involves choosing the sacrifices and horrors of war. The
people of contemporary Israel are still guided by that commandment
and its accompanying demands. This is why Israel is a light unto
other peoples who have come to believe that nothing is worth fighting
or dying for. [Note the messianic and religious flavor here].
.... Hostility toward Israel is a sure sign of failing faith in and
support for the virtues and values of WESTERN CIVILIZATION [my
emphasis] in general and AMERICA [my emphasis] in particular....
.... I charge here that the anti-Semitic attacks on Israel which have
erupted in recent weeks are also a cover. They are a cover for
AMERICAN LOSS OF NERVE [my emphasis]. They are a cover for
ACQUIESCENCE IN TERRORISM [my emphasis]. They are a cover for the
APPEASEMENT OF TOTALITARIANISM [my emphasis]. And I accuse all those
who have joined in these attacks not merely of anti-Semitism but of
the broader sin of FAITHLESSNESS TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND INDEED TO THE VALUES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION AS A WHOLE
[my emphasis].
Now there is a prime architect of "the Reagan Doctrine" in full throat,
thundering all the dominant principles. (Is there anyone on the list who
would really argue that someone who writes like this would be able to think
coolly, clearly, and objectively about how best to protect and advance
American interests and promote global well-being?) Put these bullying
remarks (so typical of the neocon rhetorical style) together with Israel's
arms deals with Iran, and the discrepancy between image and reality does
come forcibly to the fore.
(Footnote: Layne, in his survey of the philosophical foundations of "the
Reagan Doctrine" in _Foreign Policy_, cites a key article by Michael
Ledeen from the March 1985 _Commentary_. At this point, Ledeen appears to
be one of the central figures connected to the Administration who
engineered Irangate.)
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 87 18:39:51 cst
From: convex!paulk@a.cs.uiuc.edu (Paul Kalapathy)
Subject: Re: Preemptive attacks and SDI
[A thousand apologies for the tardiness of my replies. We receive each
digest about 4 to 5 days after it is dated -PK]
I originally wrote:
> A critical point here is that a system which can destroy 95% of
> several thousand warheads CAN PERFORM MUCH BETTER AGAINST AN ATTACK OF
> A FEW HUNDRED WEAPONS.
Andy Freeman responded:
>> Previous arms-d articles have said that a system that can destroy 95%
>> of an attack of 10k missiles (in a given period of time) will probably
>> be unable to destroy >40% of an attack of 20k missles; <10% is more
>> likely. I claim that it is also unlikely that it would kill
>> substantially more than 95% of a much smaller attack either. I'll bet
>> that its kill percentage will actually be lower.
I stand by my original point. Consider an anti-missile system which fires
"shots" (be they laser, railgun, rockets, or whatever) at a warhead, with
some probability X of destroying the warhead on each shot. The probability
of missing is Y=(1-X). By shooting more than once, the probability of
missing decreases dramatically. The probability of missing with two shots
is Y^2, with three shots Y^3, etc. A system with only a .5 probability of
success with one shot, has a .75 probability with two, .875 with three
shots, and .999 with 10 shots.
Now consider that the US has an SDI system which is 50% effective against
a 5000 warhead attack. Then the US then launches a preemptive attack on the
SU and destroys 90% of their forces, leaving them with 500 warheads to respond.
The US SDI system can then take ten times as many shots at each Soviet
warhead. The kill probability with ten shots is .999=.5^10 . The number
of Soviet warheads penetrating the defense is 500-(.999*500)=0.5; half of
a warhead, statistically. In addition, these 500 warheads would appear
sporadically (since the preemptive attack would have damaged their C^3)
as opposed to the near simultaneous 5000 that could be expected from a
coordinated attack.
I maintain that any SDI system will operate in a very much better fashion
against a retaliatory strike than against a preemptive one. This is because:
1. It would have fewer warheads to contend with and could
a. spend more time discriminating targets from decoys
since this is a function of the size of attack.
b. take many more shots at each warhead, raising its
kill probability by a phenomenal amount.
2. Would deal with fewer warheads at a time since a response
would not be coordinated in the way that a mass attack would be.
3. Would have less jamming and countermeasures to deal with
since a preemptive attack would logically target any assets
which would hinder SDI's effectiveness.
>> For example, if SDI chooses its target's characteristics based the
>> characteristics of objects it shouldn't have ignored, so that it
>> "learns" the characteristics of the real threats by letting the first
>> n possible threats through and observing which ones are real, it will
>> miss most of a small attack.
There is no reason to believe that any SDI would operate in any sort of
learning mode. Quite the contrary, an SDI which must operate against a
simultaneous mass attack which takes 28 minutes from launch to landing,
has no time for learning. It must look and shoot, look and shoot. No
sane design would let "the first n possible threats" through. That would
be like shooting a gun at your head to find out if it was really loaded.
>> [He claims that bulletproof clothing is offensive because an
>> attacker can use it.]
>>
> Therefore, a tentative definition of an offensive weapon is: a weapon
> which can be used to attack or, a weapon which is used in an attack to
> blunt any response to the attack.
>> According to this definition, both advanced wheat growing techniques
>> and antibiotics are offensive weapons. (The former feeds an invader;
>> the latter makes sure that he can fight when he gets there. Remember,
>> most war-time deaths used to be caused by disease and starvation.)
>> Bulletproof clothing can also defend a non-combatant, or defender.
>> The attacker can't use it alone to attack, but he can attack without
>> it (even though his effectiveness is limited).
Not so. Wheat is not planted by the attacker, is not used to attack,
and does not blunt any response to attack. Antibiotics are not used
to attack, or to blunt the response to the attack.
>> Henry Spencer asked for Kalapathy to give an example of a defensive
>> weapon, according to Kalapathy's definition. I think that Spencer's
>> point, that Kalapathy's definition is useless, can be demonstrated by
>> the fact that it defines everything as an offensive weapon. It's even
>> worse than Spencer claimed, because it includes things that aren't
>> usually considered weapons.
[I ,unfortunately, have not received the digest containing Spencers comments.]
I do not offer an example of a defensive weapon, because, as I made clear
in my original posting, the term is a sort of oxymoron. A weapon is
something that you clobber someone or something with, and SDI is a weapon.
The terms "offensive" and "defensive" are used with the implicit connotation
that "offensive"="bad" and "defensive"="good". These connotations are
longstanding in Western culture and understood by everyone. The Lone Ranger
would *never* attack anyone with his gun. Nevertheless, guns are weapons.
SDI is a weapon, and we could use it to clobber the SU. Calling it
"defensive" is playing semantic games for people who do not look beyond
the implicit implication that it is "good" because it is "defensive".
-Paul Kalapathy
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Date: Friday, 16 January 1987 07:58-EST
From: "When pasta comes into contact with antipasta, does it explode and turn into energy?" <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet" at RELAY.CS.NET>
To: arms-d
Re: Sub deployment
>Consider the other side of the argument. If your goal is to attack,
>you need to deploy as many assets as possible, because if you attack,
>you don't want the enemy to know that you are going to attack, so that
>forces in the field make it possible to mount a much larger attack
>from a standing start with minimal warning. Similarly, if you have
>few forces deployed, you can't mount a significant first strike
>without giving lots of warning and prompting the possibility that your
>enemy will attack you pre-emptively.
I tend to agree but would like to point out that this is less true for
sub forces as for conventional forces. 15% of the Soviet sub force would
make a respectable first strike. In addition, subs can be deployed in a
covert manner and work on their own (Soviet sub pens are enclosed so they
can deploy unseen). At any rate, the low level of deployment indicates
that they don't consider our deployment as offensive.
>I intentionally make no reference to who has what posture. Both sides
>believe that their posture is defensive.
I agree. The posting was to refute the origianl posting which implied our
deployment of subs was offensive in nature.
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Date: Fri, 16 Jan 1987 22:03 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Sub deployment
From: <"NGSTL1::SHERZER%ti-eg.csnet" at RELAY.CS.NET>
15% of the Soviet sub force would
make a respectable first strike.
On what?
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Date: Fri, 16 Jan 87 19:13:01 PST
From: "Clifford Johnson" <GA.CJJ@Forsythe.Stanford.EDU>
Subject: Does ARMS-D evulgate?
Evulgation: The action of making commonly known; publishing,
publication. (OED)
Generally applied to "promulgation" of Laws or Principles or
Schools of Thought. I don't think we qualify. How about
"ARMS-DELETE," because it is phonetically isomorphic to
"ARMS-D ELITE?"
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
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Date: Sat, 17 Jan 87 01:31:24 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: Hitler & Stalin
> ...For sheer butchery Stalin took no back seat to Hitler, as is now well
> known. This is where the similarity ends, however. ...
> Hitler, by word and deed, was bent on conquering the world and Stalin was
> perfectly happy to let him march across Europe hoping, naively, to divide
> the spoils with him. Stalin's activity was within his own country. ...
True, if you consider Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and arguably Finland and
parts of Poland as being within Stalin's own country. The inhabitants of
those areas viewed the situation a little differently.
> ... the world had real reason to fear Hitler's seemingly inexorable
> blitzkrieg and how the European countries fell day by day. Stalin's Russia
> did not compete with Hitler's Third Reich on this score.
That is certainly true.
> Hitler was an actual threat to the nations of Europe and the world, Stalin
> was not.
True at the time. Hitler was certainly a more immediate, higher-priority
problem. Taking a longer view, though, I wonder what might have happened
had Stalin's opponents circa 1950 looked weaker, or Hitler's circa 1940
looked stronger.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 87 01:31:00 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: Satellite killers a threat?
> ...What you so graciously acknowledge as a *minor* offensive use [anti-
> satellite attack] is, of course, a major offensive use...
This is degenerating into semantic quibbles. I think we have general
agreement that most any SDI system has serious antisatellite capability,
and that this does create problems. Can we possibly get equally general
agreement that the simple word "offensive" carries too many complicated
connotations to be used as a synonym for "bad", and thus that we should
not scream "SDI is an offensive weapon!" as if that meant something nasty
and important? (If you contend that you are not using "offensive" as a
synonym for "bad", please explain why classifying SDI as "offensive" is
so significant that it is repeatedly cited as an argument against SDI.)
> (... the rhetorical device Henry uses, namely to mention an issue
> and dismiss it with a wave of the hand in lieu of seriously considering it
> has been used many times in Star Wars discussions...
In the original discussion, the point of which was that SDI was being
branded "offensive" as a propaganda tactic aimed at people who think this
means ruined cities, dismissing antisatellite attack as irrelevant was
appropriate. I do not claim that it is irrelevant to evaluation of SDI as
a whole. Changing the subject when the opposition seems to be winning
is another popular rhetorical device. (There, have we insulted each other
sufficiently?)
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 1987 11:22 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: US/USSR perceptions of the other
From: pom at along.s1.gov
I got frustrated by Herb's stubborn refusal to consider the opinions of
that
silent majority, opinions of SUm to which, he says, "nobody is privy".
If you mean the people of the SU, then my response is that you haven't
convinced me that their opinions do matter in anything but the
broadest way. For example, the "masses" want better standards of
living, and the SU government must respond. But beyond that level of
detail, I remain unconvinced. I'm afraid I do accept the common view
that the international policies of the Soviet government are
determined only marginally by the masses' views on war and peace with
the US.
Lin still refuses to accept the fact that
SUm can have different mentality and memories then SUe.
On the contrary, I do accept this possibility. I simply believe
that it is irrelevant.
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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