ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU (Moderator) (03/08/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, March 8, 1987 1:05PM
Volume 7, Issue 107
Today's Topics:
Occupation of USSR/US (3 msgs)
Verification of Mobile Missiles
Amnesty International
Economics of SDI (and other military expenditures)
Rs: SLBMs in the Great Lakes
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Subject: Occupation of US
Reply-To: campbell%maynard.UUCP@talcott.HARVARD.EDU (Larry Campbell)
Date: 4 Mar 87 22:26:35 EST (Wed)
From: campbell@maynard.BSW.COM
>From: pom%under.s1.gov@mordor.s1.gov
>
>>> Q1: If slimy alien would vaporize all US weapons, would SU occupy US?
>>> A1: yes, for sure.
>
>>(1)Why?
>>Larry Campbell
>
> pom: ad (1) :I explained why: It is a big burden for US to have
>an arms race (as summarised aptly by John_Boies@ub.cc.umich.edu).
> Well, it is even bigger burden for SU, which (for whatever reasons ) is
>a poor country when compared with US . I feel that ball is now in your court.
You say that the SU would invade because the arms race is an economic
burden to them.
What utter tripe.
The cost of the arms race is chicken feed compared to what it would cost
the SU to finance an occupying army.
--
Larry Campbell The Boston Software Works, Inc.
Internet: campbell@maynard.uucp 120 Fulton Street, Boston MA 02109
uucp: {alliant,wjh12}!maynard!campbell +1 617 367 6846
ARPA: campbell%maynard.uucp@harvisr.harvard.edu MCI: LCAMPBELL
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1987 22:47 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Occupation of USSR/US
Date: Wednesday, 4 March 1987 17:04-EST
From: John_Boies at ub.cc.umich.edu
Reply to POM:
The world is a lot more complex a place than I think POM realizes.
Societies and nations do not just up and try and invade each other at a drop of
a hat just because the other side has something they want, is weaker, or is
misbehaving somehow. If the world was as simplistically tooth and claw as
POM suggests you would think that nations with more military power would have
long since gobbled up all the nations with less military power, after all
most countries have plenty of greivances with any number of larger and smaller
countries. No, I think it is important to realize that relations between
nations are very complex and that individual societies are not so easily
mobilized for war on other societies as POM seems to believe.
The U.S. is an excellent case in point. The resistance to the US entering WWI
and WWII was tremendous. During WWI some sources suggest that as many as
200,000 (probably 50,000 to 100,000 is closer to the actual number) people
were arrested for violating the Alien and Sedition acts and other laws
relating to criticizing the government. During WWII a large number of
industrialists, including Henry Ford, opposed the war and were even supportive
of Hitler (you should read some of H. Ford's editorials concerning Jews
and blacks that he wrote for his newspaper, they are quite shocking). Also
just before the war there were a number of peace marches through Washington,
D.C. and N.Y.C. that had more than 100,000 participants. I don't think it is
necessary to say much about the resistance to the Korean War or the Vietnam
War or our involvement in C. America. Going to war is not a simple thing,
even when a nation has prepared for it for 30 years and when it is appears
to be a sure thing.
One last thing. How many troops and material do you think it would require
to occupy either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.? (assuming either population
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 87 05:24:30 PST
From: walker%castor.usc.edu@usc-oberon.ARPA (Michael D. Walker)
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V7 #106
In response to the scenaio/question of the USA being suddenly disarmed by
aliens and how would the USSR respond (invade or no?):
As one who considers the USSR agressively expansionist, into worldwide
mischief, and something of an evil empire, I'd say that they definitely
would NOT invade the USA. To see why, consider the cost of doing so and
their past behavior.
The USA has a large area, a large population, and a fairly nationalist,
freedom accustomed people. It is on the other side of the world from the
USSR. If the USA was disarmed, they could probably invade successfully
but to hold it would take a large expensive army. This from a country
with an already restless population. And for what? If they tried for
spoils they'd need even more forces to hold it. Just to hold the USA
without benefits would be hard to justify. After all, the USA was
disarmed beforehand so they can't tell Joe Muscovite they're spending the
money for his security. Actually though, holding the USA would be an a
great disadvantage for the Soviet elite. All those soldiers,
technicians, and such would be bringing back new ideas and change.
Change is the thing the elite fear the most. Having a hostile USA
actually benefits these elite as long as it doesn't break out into a real
war. It justifies the current order.
The USSR has expanded greatly over the last century. But they did this
by taking over border states. This enhanced their security with little
risk. Sometimes they already had a client regime in power before invading
i.e., Afghanistan. They never have large direct military involvement if
they can avoid it. They use client states, like Cuba, whenever possible.
Making a large scale invasion far from home hasn't been the Soviet way.
What would happen if the USA was disarmed would be a shift of power.
Europe would become servile with a large powerful USSR hanging over them
and no USA to counterbalance it. Third world countries would become
passive and quiet or servile without a USA to play the USSR off against.
The USA wouldn't become servile (too proud for that) but would become
passive and isolationist. Soviet mischief would expand around the world
and PRC's role would increase as the next best thing to an American
counterweight. Of course without a USA threat the Soviets use to keep
their people in line, they'd have to generate something else. Perhaps
some border fighting with the PRC?
--
:-]
Arpa: walker%castor.usc.edu@usc-oberon.arpa
Uucp: ihnp4!sdcrdcf!usc-oberon!castor!walker
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 1987 20:07 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Verification of Mobile Missiles
Note to the Reader: This is a working paper only; I am not
prepared to say that it is a workable scheme. Nevertheless, I
think it presents some potentially useful ideas that warrant
some attention. Comments are solicited!!!
Verification of Mobile Missiles
Recent trends on both sides toward the deployment of
land-based mobile missiles present certain difficulties for the
verification process. However, using cooperative means it
should be possible to verify deployments of nuclear weapons
with reasonable confidence. This note provides a conceptual
sketch of one generic method of counting missiles that may have
potential.
An agreement to ban mobile missiles is easy to verify -- any
missile carrier observed is a violation of the ban. However,
if an agreement merely limits the number of mobile missiles,
verification becomes much more problematic. With non-zero
limits, the sighting of a mobile missile cannot be taken as
prima facie evidence of violation. Instead, the question that
must be answered becomes "Is the sighted missile a deployment
in excess of the agreed limits?" Without all the other mobile
missiles in sight at the same time, it is impossible to answer
this question.
The proposed method monitors the number of platforms (in
this case, mobile missile carriers) on the assumption that
missile carriers are assembled in a small number of known
locations. Upon leaving the assembly plant, each carrier
belonging to one side (for the sake of discussion, the Soviet
Union) is fitted with a box (an "identity" box) supplied by the
other side (in this case, the U.S.).
Therefore, any carrier not attached to an identity box can
be deemed a violation. The problem is then to determine if a
missile carrier observed by national technical means is
attached to one of these boxes. However, whatever method is
chosen to make this determination must not divulge the position
of the carrier in a way that makes it vulnerable to targeting
by the other side.
Let us assume that an identity box can be designed in a way
that it is tamper-proof; it will contain electronics that can
certify the identity of the box, sensors that can detect if the
box has been removed moved from the platform, some means for
determining its position upon command, and some input/output
mechanism.
American authorities would interrogate a specific identity
box by asking Soviet authorities to use their own (Soviet)
communication channels to transmit a specific (American)
message to the Soviet platform associated with that specific
box. Personnel with the Soviet platform would receive these
orders. They would enter the American message. This input
message would order the box to display an encrypted output
message, which would be transmitted back to Soviet authorities,
who would then transmit the reply back to the U.S. With a
secure public-key encryption scheme, the U.S. could be
confident that the data it received from the Soviet authorities
had not been compromised or altered; the Soviets could be
confident that the information transmitted to the U.S.
contained nothing harmful to the Soviets, since they could read
the message. In addition, the use of Soviet communication
channels would allow Soviet platforms to maintain their
operational flexibility without compromising their location.
The message could contain various pieces of information.
For example, it would have the identity of the box, so that
American authorities would know that the message did indeed
come from the carrier to which the query was directed. The
sensors on the box would monitor whether or not the box had
been disassociated from the platform, and appropriate status
information could be included in the message as well.
Including the time and date as part of the message would
guarantee that the Soviets did not simply substitute an old
previously transmitted message for the message that the box
actually produced.
The message also contains information about the position of
the carrier at the moment that the message is received.
However, since the Soviet Union controls when the information
requested will be delivered (but not its content), the
information can be delayed by any desired amount of time. An
agreed delay would allow the Soviet Union to move its mobile
missile launchers so that the U.S. could not target them
directly. However, if prompt information about position were
necessary, the identity box could also report its own position
by transmitting a coded signal into space, where satellites
could triangulate its position.
Under this scheme, U.S. NTMs locate a mobile missile
carrier. It wishes to know if this carrier exceeds the agreed
limits. The U.S. requests that the Soviets identify the
carrier at the location where the U.S. has seen a carrier. If
the Soviets are unable to produce an authenticated message from
that carrier, it is prima facie evidence of a violation. The
U.S. would know if another carrier were used to generate the
message because the identity box would generate a message with
the wrong location information.
This method can also be used to verify the deployment of
mobile missiles within designated areas. For example, the
identity box could also contain an internally stored map
describing the geographical boundaries of the agreed-upon
deployment area. Output messages from the identity box
concerning location could be transmitted at any level of detail
desired. For example, it could be limited to a determination
of whether or not the carrier is or is not within the
designated deployment area at the time of the inquiry.
In all cases, the Soviets would know what data had been
transmitted. This would alleviate their apprehension that
these identity boxes could be used for non-agreed purposes.
Of course, the technical challenge is to design a
tamper-proof identity box that cannot be removed from the
platform surreptitously. This engineering task is left for
someone else to tackle.
------------------------------
Date: Wednesday, 4 March 1987 12:55-EST
From: pom%under.s1.gov at mordor.s1.gov
Subject: Amnesty International
Couple cycles ago, somebody asked about Amnesty International,
how to join and what it does. I have now more information, which
I will reproduce below, so that you may decide if it is of interest
to you. Based on my judgement, AI would be about the best and fair
sources for assesment of e.g. 'How much Ortega violates which rights';
as far as I can tell, it is not a PR or 'front' for anybody.
[If you want more information, contact POM directly. Application form
and fee information provided by POM deleted by moderator. Complains
about censorship will be entertained.]
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 87 21:10:30 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry%hplabs@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: Economics of SDI (and other military expenditures)
> Mr. Spencer seems to feel that one or two trillion dollars is
> perfectly affordable nowadays...
> One of the things the reader was supposed to
> pick up from my posting was that SDI was not affordable, it is truly an
> astronomical expense...
The US government is now spending that much money every year. One can
(and should) argue that the current deficit is dangerous, but even if you
cut the deficit to zero, the US government is still spending well over
half a trillion a year. Clearly a trillion-dollar expenditure is *not*
out of the question, especially spread over a number of years, especially
if it is important enough to justify cutting other things drastically.
Note that I am not stating that it *is* that important, just pointing out
that there are not-grossly-implausible circumstances in which a trillion-
dollar investment is clearly practical. Difficult, troublesome, and with
adverse effects, but *not* impossible. Stating that it is impossible (as
opposed to unwise or harmful) discredits your argument. If it were obviously
crucial to national survival, the money could and would be spent.
> and an expense that will have no positive effects on the U.S. economy...
The same comment can be made about virtually all defense spending: its
purpose is not to have positive effects but to prevent negative effects.
Claims about how much money it will pump into the economy are silly
excuses used when a program is difficult to justify on grounds of military
necessity.
> To put the price into the perspective that Henry
> Spencer does--i.e. comparing it to farm subsidies...
I agree that the farm-subsidy comparison was a poor one; I had an inaccurate
idea about subsidy sizes. My point was that the US government can and does
spend money on the hundred-of-billions-a-year scale.
> I want to say that I think cost-effectiveness is important to
> examine, it is just that while the effectiveness issue is debated constantly
> here on ARMS-D the cost issue is rarely examined. How come Henry Spencer
> does not criticize those who only examine issues of effectiveness,
> but is quick to criticize the discussion of costs?
"Cost-effectiveness" is the word. Note that "cost" is the first part of that.
Unless the project is utterly beyond any possibility of financing, which this
one isn't, the question is not "could we find the money?" but "is it worth
the money?". The question of effectiveness (and, also, the effectiveness of
alternatives like arms reduction and war prevention) is crucial because it
makes the difference between "is it worth spending $1T on a useless boon-
doggle?" and "is it worth spending $1T to save our lives and our nation?".
The answer to the former is "no", the answer to the latter is probably "yes".
The real question is somewhere in between -- but exactly where?
I've actually seen plenty of cost discussion in ARMS-D, usually with an
implicit assumption that the former question is the one being asked. And
I've criticized quite a few discussions of effectiveness.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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Date: Sat, 7 Mar 87 21:11:04 pst
From: pyramid!utzoo!henry%hplabs@hplabs.HP.COM
Subject: Rs: SLBMs in the Great Lakes
> The efficacy of a barrage attack depends on how close to the submarine
> you have to get a warhead in order to kill it. Water is pretty
> viscous stuff, not as good a sheltering material as dirt or concrete,
> but much better than air...
It's better shielding than air against radiation (of all flavors, including
heat), but unfortunately it's awfully good at carrying sound of all kinds,
including the pressure pulse from a bomb. The real danger underwater is
blast.
> I WOULD appreciate a pointer to a good reference on weapons effects on
> submarines, so the above speculations could be refined a bit beyond
> the realm of wild-ass guesses.
I'm unaware of anything unclassified on the subject that I would consider
"good". (Herb, any suggestions?) As far as I know, all the real data on
kill radius of underwater blasts against submarines is secret... but there
are hints that it's pretty damn large. The idea of barraging the Great
Lakes can't be entirely dismissed.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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