ARMS-D-Request@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU.UUCP (03/28/87)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, March 28, 1987 12:23AM
Volume 7, Issue 111
Today's Topics:
Zuckerman cites ARMS-D in NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS.
Censorship on Arms-d (complaint)
sadarm
smart weapons
Weinberger claims Congress has authorized launch on warning
MAD Nuke Subs in Great Lakes
Open Letter to Congress on SDI
More on Open Letter to Congress on SDI
Life with SDI: Peasant Under Glass?
Antimatter Research
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From: jon@june.cs.washington.edu (Jon Jacky)
Subject: Zuckerman cites ARMS-D in NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS.
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 87 09:38:41 PST
In the April 9, 1987 issue of the NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, p. 39,
Solly Zuckerman ("Lord" Zuckerman, no less) cites material that appeared
in the ARMS-D digest, an electronic bulletin board moderated by Herb Lin.
Zuckerman's article, "Reagan's highest folly," is a review of the current
status of the 'Star Wars' program. Reviewing the debate over SDI computing,
Zuckerman first cites AT&T VP Solomon Buschbaum's testimony to the Senate
Armed Services Committee that the telephone system is a good model for the
'Star Wars' battle management computers. In reply, he cites AT&T scientist
Karl Dahlke's reminder that AT&T's software is also buggy when first
delivered, and requires debugging after installation. Some of you may
remember Dahlke's posting in ARMS-D several months ago. Zuckerman cites it
in a footnote, as "Arms-D Notebook (November 24, 1986)."
This is the first example of which I am aware in which a traditional
publication cites an electronic communication as a scholarly reference. It
is evidence that increasing amounts of important communication are
being conducted electronically, without leaving traces in the print media.
This is not an unmixed blessing - I wonder
if any benighted souls will go to their libraries asking to
look at the back issues of "Arms-D Notebook." Those without net access may
find themselves excluded from the mainstream of discussion and debate. This
has been the case in computer science for some time, but here is evidence
that it is becoming the case in the wider arena of public affairs also.
Zuckerman's article also reviews the Eastport Report and the critique by
Nelson and Redell that appears in the book EMPTY PROMISE.
-Jonathan Jacky
University of Washington
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Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1987 20:58 EST
From: LIN@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: Censorship on Arms-d (complaint)
From: campbell at maynard.BSW.COM
>[If you want more information, contact POM directly. Application form
>and fee information provided by POM deleted by moderator. Complaints
>about censorship will be entertained.]
... I can't see any reason
whatsoever for censoring this message.
... What possible harm
could there be in dissemination purely informational material (name,
address, phone number, annual dues, etc.) about such organizations?
I'm not unsympathetic about these concerns. But please recall that
Arms-d exists at the pleasure of the U.S. Government. The functional
test of whether or not a list is welcome is whether the traffic it
carries is "for the conduct of or in support of official U.S.
Government business." It is the vagueness of the term "official U.S.
Government business" that forces me to make a judgment call on what
activities constitute "support of U.S. Government business." ARMS-D
exists to discuss policy issues related to war and peace, national
security and the like, and in doing so provides support for many
individuals doing work for the U.S. government. My judgment call is
that dissemination of information such as you describe above
(especially when it involves fees or money) does not fit these
guidelines.
It is a judgment call, and I recognize that others may have reasonably
differing opinions. I can be persuaded by an appropriate argument.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 87 21:33:58 MST
From: cetron@utah-cs.arpa (Edward J Cetron)
Subject: sadarm
Reply-To: cetron@utah-cs.UUCP (Edward J Cetron)
I've been following this newsgroup for quite a while but this is
the first time I managed to find something I could comment on without having
security problems.....A long, long time ago, I helped work on a study about
what the battlefield of the future (at that time years 2000+) for the Army.
Most is still classified but SADARM is no longer (and I remember it before it
even had a name :-).
the basic premise we used was for 'intelligent' shelling of high armor
and artillery concentrations. Conventional saturation bombing is quite
expensive in terms of time and money. If one could instead launch fewer
projectiles, each with a better kill ratio (we worked on 3-10 to 1) then the
idea could be economically 'better' then saturation bombing. The most obvious
telltale of all was the gun (or more specifically the gun barrel). Even a
poor infared scanner can easily spot a recently fired gun barrel. When I last
heard of it, the problems were NOT in spotting targets (since you've assumed
it was a high target density area) but in positioning the platform to launch
the depleted uranium slugs.
SADARM was only one of many many 'concepts' developed, some of which
are finally coming on line now....most of which are still classified... But
what I remember most was in one of the first briefings we had at HQ DARCOM,
we were told to always design weapons systems to maim not to kill.... to maim
a soldier puts a heavier pschycological (sp?) burden on the next soldier (its
easier to 'do or die' than 'do or lose my legs') as well as crippiling (pun
intended) the 'threats' logistics to render aid to maimed soldiers.....
ed cetron
center for engineering design
univ of utah
ps. this is my first posting so keep the flames mild (but after my second
posting, then you can use the tactical nukes....)
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Date: Monday, 16 March 1987 23:51-EST
From: Michael Gunzler <ucbcad!ames!ucla-cs!gunzler at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
To: ucla-cs!XX.LCS.MIT.EDU!ARMS-D-Request at ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Subject: smart weapons
Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d
Organization: UCLA Computer Science Department
On the subject of "smart" weapons, I have two points to add.
(1) Remote controlled. While in general not much favored, I have seen
an article on an anti tank missile that flies at relatively low speeds,
while maintaining a fiber optic link to the launch platform. This device
(FOG-M, I think) has a tv camera in the front, so that the soldier con-
trolling can launch it, and then cruise it around for a couple of minutes
looking for a target. The picture is good enough, and can probably be
improved, so the targeting on this thing approaches unimpaired human vision.
I would have thought the link impractical, but glass fiber is strong and
light enough that it works; the system HAS been tested.
(2) Why use "smart" weapons. You suggest it is entirely a matter of
increased valuation of the individual soldier. This may in part be true,
but it is ALSO true that armor is quite effective against infantry without
some kind of anti-tank weapon. The first tanks in WWI could be damaged
by machine gun fire, nowadays you need weapons designed specifically for
use against armor. With widely distributed, effective anti-tank weapons,
armor becomes little more than mobile fire support, considerably more
vulnerable to fire than infantry. Against men armed only with small arms,
though, armor is a devestating offensive force even unsupported.
Mitch Gunzler
--
Comments always appreciated.
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 22 Mar 87 15:26:35 PST
From: "Clifford Johnson" <GA.CJJ@STANFORD.BITNET>
Subject: Weinberger claims Congress has authorized launch on warning
The long-awaited March 18 hearing of Weinberger's motion to dismiss
is reported. To recap. Weinberger filed a motion to dismiss
saying the case was the same as the previous one, except for the
added allegation that nuclear release authority had been delegated
to the military in violation of the Atomic Energy (& Subdelegation)
Act, 42 USC 2122. To this he responded: "The Atomic Energy Act
does not cover the military use or application of atomic weapons
and Plaintiff cites 42 USC Section 2122 in error as authority...
The Plaintiff has failed to show that... only the President is
vested by law with authority to launch such weapons." Weinberger
even accused me of "a tortured reading of the act."
I replied, pointing out that the Atomic Energy Act assuredly does
cover the military application of nuclear weapons, and that the new
case was both factually and legally original. This stung
Weinberger into a reply (twice as long as the original motion)
based on two wholly new grounds - lack of standing and political
question. Extraordinarily, Weinberger included a declaration by
Col. Hope swearing that "positive controls" guaranteed
Presidential authorization for a nuclear release, but he did not
admit error re the Atomic Energy Act. He argued simply that the
President had *inherent* Commander-In-Chief powers to operate the
alleged launch on warning capability, regardless of degree of
delegation/automation, and without congressional approval.
In response, I made a motion for discovery, disputing the truth of
Col. Hope's declaration. I included evidence that the declaration
was a canned Pentagon statement that had already been discredited
in congressional testimony (Adm. Miller, 1976). To avoid discovery,
but unwilling to admit his bluff had been called, Weinberger termed
Col. Hope's declaration "unequivocal" proof that my allegations
were untrue -- but asked the court to entirely ignore it!
Weinberger repeated this request at the March 18 hearing, and
carefully asked that the court make its determination based on the
assumption that all the facts I alleged were true. That is, based
on the assumption that the U.S. is *now* in a dangerous, military
launch on warning posture. The case should be dismissed, he then
argued, because Congress had provided for the operation of the
alleged launch on warning capability by appropriations. Judge
Williams concurred, and dismissed the action as a political
question.
The existence of these appropriations is a disputed fact. Can
anyone point me to the appropriation(s) that authorize the
*operation* of a launch on warning capability?
On the subject of Weinberger's dubious claims, I happened to be
interviewing Dennis Healey for an S.F. news show on Friday, and he
recounted a very recent meeting with Weinberger. Healey had said
that England was closer to Russia than Nicaragua to the United
States, but Weinberger disagreed. They then went to an atlas to
find out.
To: ARMS-D@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 87 15:42:26 EST
From: David Lloyd-Jones <dalj@gpu.utcs.utoronto>
Subject: MAD Nuke Subs in Great Lakes
Reply-To: dalj@gpu.utcs.utoronto (David Lloyd-Jones)
Re: Rockets in the Great Lakes.
Recently some correspondents have been debating nuke subs in the Great Lakes
as a potential part of the retaliatory triad. The main argument against them
seems to have been that the lakes could be slopped out by the "Russkies", their
term, dropping enough bombs in the water.
This, while typical of all too much American political debate about all our
futures, is all rather silly.
A more cogent argument against nuke subs in the lake is that the Treaty of
Ghent or whatever it was, ending the War of 1812 -- great little war, us little
Canadians torched the White House... this treaty limits aramaments on the Lakes
to something like six fifteen pound guns. Half for you. Half for us. None for
the Ruskies.
We still believe in that treaty (and were offended when the US sent a
frigate as its first ship through the St. Lawrence Seaway).
frigate a its firt ship through the
For people interested in arms control, may I suggest this model of an
undefended border as something worth some study?
David Lloyd-Jones
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Date: Thu, 26 Mar 87 12:13 EST
From: Bruce Boghosian <bmb@Think.COM>
Subject: Open Letter to Congress on SDI
If anybody is interested in signing an open letter to Congress from an
ad hoc group of scientists and engineers concerned about SDI research,
please see me. The letter has been signed by over 2100 scientists and
engineers from 26 government and 70 industrial labs in 23 states.
Included in this group are five Nobel laureates, 3 Turing medalists,
former directors of five government labs and several former members of
top management at Los Alamos, as well as many other distinguished
members of the technical community. I also have literature if anyone is
interested.
Thanks,
Bruce B. (bmb)
P.S. The signatures need to be in by March 31, so if you're interested
please see me today or tomorrow.
------------------------------
Subject: Life with SDI: Peasant Under Glass?
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 87 07:36:39 -0800
From: Dave Suess (CSL) <zeus@aero2.aero.org>
What effects on society might we expect, given that an SDI "umbrella" is
built and deployed? What would be the changes to our lives in the U.S.?
Given that the Reagan model is successfully designed and deployed, forming
a shield that will eliminate 100% of incoming ballistic missiles, what kind
of an organizational and authority structure must be put in place to ensure
its continued operation? As it is now, there is a defacto "priesthood" of
nuclear experts that shape policy for the electorate, as well as the military
organization that oversees the installation, maintenance, and readiness of
our deterrent forces. Will not the SDI shield require even more? A set of
SDI "gurus," to make decisions on maintenance, upgrades, and readiness will
be needed, perhaps. And the military will continue to oversee the use and
facets of the design and operation of the system.
Two thoughts: what will be the place, if any, for civilian control and
oversight of an operating SDI system? And how will the installation and
operation of the SDI system affect the lives of ordinary citizens?
As to the latter, I envision more areas where people may not travel freely,
because of earth-stations and facilities and factories that are of supreme
national defense importance. More people than ever will be involved in a
highly-classified, highly-controlled workforce; a highly-centralized
authority structure that will administrate and operate the system will have
to be powerful and deliberate, as well as a closed community.
Moreover, if the threat of ICBMs disappears, I find it likely that the USSR
will not cede political power and will instead increase pressure on the West
in other ways, militarily and more. In-place weapons, cruise missile
outposts near all our borders and interests, increased conventional weapons,
and added emphasis to alternate forms of mass destruction (biological and
chemical) and delivery can all be used to retain a perception of balance.
Would our borders be safe places for citizens to be? Would our lives be
safer than they are now? Would travel be as free, or commerce?
Finally, if our defense is "defense" and not deterrence, what would be the
safeguards necessary for SDI? Perhaps more laws governing matters related
to espionage will be necessary. Perhaps more thorough vetting of employees
of places involved with SDI operation and maintenance, perhaps more
restrictions on writing about government and military matters in the media,
perhaps more secrecy and less freedom -- all these and more could be
necessary to ensure that the only thing protecting us from USSR missiles is
not compromised, sabotaged, or weakened.
Dave Suess zeus@aero2.aero.org "not a spokesperson for my employer"
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 87 18:41:09 PST
From: weemba@brahms.Berkeley.EDU (Matthew P Wiener)
Subject: Antimatter Research
In [1], the first successful antiproton traps are described. This brief
article concludes with a comment that antimatter weaponry is a "score or
so of orders of difficulty" away, despite the "torrent of tales" to the
contrary, which he finds outrageous.
In [2], this last paragraph is rebutted. The authors point out that while
large amounts are needs for certain applications, like antiballistic mis-
siles, others require very small amounts. They claim, not too coherently,
that a microgram (or perhaps mere nanograms) antiprotons can, via anni-
hilation into muons, trigger a thermonuclear explosion or pump a powerful
X-ray laser, and that nanograms in other cases. They further claim that
"conservative estimates" about the technology to handle such amounts is
"only a couple of orders of magnitudes away". Finally, the authors call
for an immediate ban on all antimatter-related research.
I disagree with both articles when they claim that antimatter is the most
portable of high explosives--I consider it one of the least portable.
I do not know what "orders of magnitude away" means here.
References:
[1] Maddox "How to make antimatter last" Nature v324 p299 (27 Nov 1986)
[2] Gsponer, Hurni "Antimatter underestimated" Nature v325 p754 (26 Feb 1987)
ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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