[net.sf-lovers] Matter transmission and duplication

DP0N@A.CS.CMU.EDU (09/12/85)

From: Don.Provan@CMU-CS-A

oboy.  we get to talk about matter transmission again.

i don't care how many ra81's of data you have on me, and i don't care
how good you are at reconstructing me: once i'm dead, i'm dead.  you
can make copies of me until you're blue in the face, but *i*'ll still
be dead.

you can walk into a disintegrator beam and have a copy of you made
on another planet if you want, but i'm fond of this particular copy
of myself.

i suppose that's why i don't have any interest in having children.

						don provan@cmua.arpa

davidson@sdcsvax.UUCP (Greg Davidson) (09/13/85)

People who won't accept a perfect duplicate of themselves as a
substitute for their continuity in their original body may be
idealizing the continuity of their body and personality over time, both
of which are only approximate.  They may also have some unexamined
mystical concepts of self.  Let's do a thought experiment and find
out.

How do you know that your personality DOESN'T die every night, and 
get recreated imperfectly from backups in the morning?  Imagine this
were really the case; say it had just been discovered, and you read
it this morning in Science magazine.  Would it matter?  Would you
avoid going to sleep, since it WAS death to do so? I can't see as
how it would make ANY difference, so why should I object to a perfect
copy replacing me?  As long as the change over were done gracefully.

_Greg Davidson			Virtual Infinity Systems, San Diego

dta@cpsc53.UUCP (Doug Anderson) (09/13/85)

> From: Don.Provan@CMU-CS-A
> 
> oboy.  we get to talk about matter transmission again.
> 
> i don't care how many ra81's of data you have on me, and i don't care
> how good you are at reconstructing me: once i'm dead, i'm dead.  you
> can make copies of me until you're blue in the face, but *i*'ll still
> be dead.
> 
> you can walk into a disintegrator beam and have a copy of you made
> on another planet if you want, but i'm fond of this particular copy
> of myself.
> 
> 						don provan@cmua.arpa


	Kirk: Ok McCoy get into the damn transporter and shut up

	:-) :-) :-) :-) :-) :-)

KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA (09/15/85)

From: Keith F. Lynch <KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA>

    Date: 11 Sep 85 19:50:08 EDT
    From: Don.Provan@CMU-CS-A

    i don't care how many ra81's of data you have on me, and i don't
    care how good you are at reconstructing me: once i'm dead, i'm dead.
    you can make copies of me until you're blue in the face, but *i*'ll
    still be dead.

    you can walk into a disintegrator beam and have a copy of you made
    on another planet if you want, but i'm fond of this particular copy
    of myself.

  I have heard this attitude before, but I didn't expect to find it
amongst computer people, who are supposed to know that all that is
important is information.
  A duplicate isn't satisfactory?  Don't you know that the average
atom in the body only stays there a few weeks?  Only a small percentage
of the you of a year ago still exists.
  I would bet that if you were duplicated, that you (the duplicate)
wouldn't notice the difference.
  Still waiting for a personal backup service...
								...Keith

DP0N@A.CS.CMU.EDU (09/17/85)

From: don.provan@A.CS.CMU.EDU

look at it this way: you make two copies of yourself.  which is you?
both?  how is your consciousness going to be in both?  that seems to make
it obvious to me that it would be in neither.  information is only good
for making copies.  for the external observer, the copy might be identical,
if we assume that everything that makes me is physical.  and, in fact, the
copy will serve just as well.  but internally, my consiousness will be blown
away.  the continuity that make me will be blasted.

information is only the end all be all for the person using the information,
not for the information itself.

as i say, feel free to be transmitted to mars, but you ain't getting me
up in one of them things.

DP0N@A.CS.CMU.EDU (09/17/85)

From: don.provan@A.CS.CMU.EDU

yes, the duplicate might not notice the difference.  it's the original
i'm worried about.

clelau@wateng.UUCP (Eric C.L. Lau) (09/17/85)

In article <3661@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU> KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA writes:
>From: Keith F. Lynch <KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA>
>    i don't care how many ra81's of data you have on me, and i don't
>    care how good you are at reconstructing me: once i'm dead, i'm dead.
>    you can make copies of me until you're blue in the face, but *i*'ll
>    still be dead.
>  A duplicate isn't satisfactory?  Don't you know that the average
>atom in the body only stays there a few weeks?  Only a small percentage
>of the you of a year ago still exists.
>  I would bet that if you were duplicated, that you (the duplicate)
>wouldn't notice the difference.
>								...Keith

I guess this question comes down to whether *I* am more than a bunch of
atoms, i.e. the existence of a soul.  Of course, that leaves another good
question: if you tranmit all my atoms elsewhere, where does that leave
my soul(assuming one exists)?  But if you don't believe that souls exist,
then transmit away.

		Eric Lau
		...!ihnp4!watmath!wateng!clelau

P.S. Please don't start a theological argument over this.  Leave that in
net.religion.  My brain was just running over onto my keyboard.

ethan@utastro.UUCP (Ethan Vishniac) (09/17/85)

> From: don.provan@A.CS.CMU.EDU
> 
> look at it this way: you make two copies of yourself.  which is you?
> both?  how is your consciousness going to be in both?  that seems to make
> it obvious to me that it would be in neither.  information is only good
> for making copies.  for the external observer, the copy might be identical,
> if we assume that everything that makes me is physical.  and, in fact, the
> copy will serve just as well.  but internally, my consiousness will be blown
> away.  the continuity that make me will be blasted.

On the other hand, each of the copies will have the precise sensation of
continuity whose loss you fear.  As far as they are concerned nothing
happened.  Which brings us to the question, what exactly do you mean
by "the continuity that makes me"?  To the outside observer it's just
not obvious that that has any meaning.
-- 
"Support the revolution        Ethan Vishniac
 in Latin America...           {charm,ut-sally,ut-ngp,noao}!utastro!ethan
    Buy Cocaine"               ethan@astro.UTEXAS.EDU
                               Department of Astronomy
                               University of Texas

ewiles@netex.UUCP (Ed Wiles) (09/18/85)

In article <3617@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU>, DP0N@A.CS.CMU.EDU writes:
> From: Don.Provan@CMU-CS-A
  
> i don't care how many ra81's of data you have on me, and i don't care
> how good you are at reconstructing me: once i'm dead, i'm dead.  you
> can make copies of me until you're blue in the face, but *i*'ll still
> be dead.
> 
> you can walk into a disintegrator beam and have a copy of you made
> on another planet if you want, but i'm fond of this particular copy
> of myself.
> 

I know I have qualms about walking into a Trans Mat and having it fail,
but taking the view that it kills you when the 'copy' is indistinguishable
from the original is a bit radical.

					E. L. Wiles

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/19/85)

[Not food]

There is a discussion raging on this issue in net.philosophy.  I have
expressed the opinion there that if you made two copies of yourself,
they would both be you.  I am not going to defend that opinion here;
see the net.philosophy postings if you are interested.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

Susser.pasa@Xerox.ARPA (09/19/85)

From: Josh Susser <Susser.pasa@Xerox.ARPA>

>From: Keith F. Lynch <KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA>
>  A duplicate isn't satisfactory?  Don't you know that the average
>atom in the body only stays there a few weeks?  Only a small
>percentage of the you of a year ago still exists.

I remember when my 9th grade biology teacher told me this.  It seems to
be a common belief among high-school science teachers.  But look at it
this way:  if "the average atom in the body only stays there a few
weeks" (let "a few weeks" = a fortnight), then one would have to replace
half his body mass twice a month, with most of the replacement mass
coming from food.  For a person of average mass, say 80 kg, this would
require eating and ABSORBING 20 kg of food a week!  While eating 20 kg a
week (about 5 lbs a day) isn't unreasonable, absorbing that many
molecules is ridiculous.  Most of what we absorb from food is glucose,
vitamins, some amino acids, a few nucleotides, and water.  The rest of
what we eat is roughage.  So I really can't believe that a human could
eat enough to replace an appreciable proportion of its body mass even in
a few months.  I'm sure there is some amount of turnover in some of the
more active structures (muscles, bone marrow, skin, blood), but I can't
believe that the atoms in my brain cells or in my DNA molecules are that
volatile.

Any molecular biologists out there care to tell me what I'm made of?

-- Josh Susser <Susser.pasa@Xerox.arpa>

"Even the Devil needs an advocate now and then."

jam@dcl-cs.UUCP (John A. Mariani) (09/20/85)

>I guess this question comes down to whether *I* am more than a bunch of
>atoms, i.e. the existence of a soul.  Of course, that leaves another good
>question: if you tranmit all my atoms elsewhere, where does that leave
>my soul(assuming one exists)?  But if you don't believe that souls exist,
>then transmit away.
>
>		Eric Lau
>		...!ihnp4!watmath!wateng!clelau

Sorry if someones already mentioned this, but this whole argument/situation
is the basis of James Blish's (sadly) one and only original Star Trek
novel "Spock Must Die!" (Hmm... sounds like he knew about the Wrath of
Khan ... if only he'd written the followup "Spock Must Live!").

"It's a one-way ticket to mid-night"

-- 
"You see me now a veteran of a thousand psychic wars...."

UUCP:  ...!seismo!mcvax!ukc!dcl-cs!jam 
DARPA: jam%lancs.comp@ucl-cs	| Post: University of Lancaster,
JANET: jam@uk.ac.lancs.comp	|	Department of Computing,
Phone: +44 524 65201 ext 4467	|	Bailrigg, Lancaster, LA1 4YR, UK.

Newman.pasa@Xerox.ARPA (09/20/85)

From: Newman.pasa@Xerox.ARPA

To all who are currently embroiled in this discussion:

I suggest that you read "Where am I" by Daniel Dennett. This is a paper
that is directly applicable to the problem at hand. I think that it (and
other related articles) can be found in "The Mind's I" by Hofsteader and
Dennett. I will try to find my copy and verify this over the weekend.

>>Dave

PS There is also a SF short story in "The Mind's I" by Stanislaw Lem. It
is quite good.

ayers@convexs.UUCP (09/20/85)

>yes, the duplicate might not notice the difference.  it's the original
>i'm worried about.

Well stop worrying.  We _destroy_ the original...

(And they said to me "You've lost your mind!" 
   and I said "No I haven't, I just can't 
       remember where I left it...")




					B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)
						 B~)
						 B~)
					   B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)
						 B~)
						 B~)
					B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)B~)
					B~)		  B~)
					B~) B~)B~)B~)B~)  B~)
					B~)	      /	  B~)
					B~)		  B~)
					B~) B~)B~)B~)B~)  B~)
					B~)	      /	  B~)
					B~)		  ;-)

leeper@mtgzz.UUCP (m.r.leeper) (09/21/85)

 >How do you know that your personality DOESN'T die every
 >night, and  get recreated imperfectly from backups in the
 >morning?  Imagine this were really the case; say it had just
 >been discovered, and you read it this morning in Science
 >magazine.  Would it matter?  Would you avoid going to sleep,
 >since it WAS death to do so?  I can't see as how it would
 >make ANY difference, so why should I object to a perfect
 >copy replacing me?  As long as the change over were done
 >gracefully.

If I knew it was happening every night, then my life would have only
been a few hours long and that it would end within hours.  Then dying
probably would not matter much to me.  But if it were the first time I
was dying and being recreated, I would avoid it like death.  Which is
what it is.

				Mark Leeper
				...ihnp4!mtgzz!leeper

crm@duke.UUCP (Charlie Martin) (09/22/85)

In article <3699@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU> Susser.pasa@Xerox.ARPA writes:
>From: Josh Susser <Susser.pasa@Xerox.ARPA>
>
>>From: Keith F. Lynch <KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA>
>>  A duplicate isn't satisfactory?  Don't you know that the average
>>atom in the body only stays there a few weeks?
...
>  For a person of average mass, say 80 kg, this would
>require eating and ABSORBING 20 kg of food a week!  While eating 20 kg a
>week (about 5 lbs a day) isn't unreasonable, absorbing that many
>molecules is ridiculous.
>Any molecular biologists out there care to tell me what I'm made of?
>
>-- Josh Susser <Susser.pasa@Xerox.arpa>
	Impure water, mostly.

	People in general require about 2 qts..1 gallon of water a day
(and those of you who want to argue -- count up the number of coffes,
teas, and sodas you consume; if it still is less than 2 qts (8 cups,
a little under 2 litres) then go drink something, for ghodsakes.)
That comes out to be 2-4 kilos a day right there.  I also recall (this
isn't certain, but not a bad ROM I'm sure) that people require about
1.5 to 2.0 kilos of oxygen a day.  So that makes up the required 3 kilo
a week nicely.

	Remember, it says ``average molecule'' -- I'm sure that some
molecules don't turn over in anything like that length of time.

-- 

			Charlie Martin
			(...mcnc!duke!crm)

KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA (09/24/85)

From: Keith F. Lynch <KFL@MIT-MC.ARPA>

    Date: 19 Sep 85 13:42:13 PDT (Thursday)
    From: Josh Susser <Susser.pasa@Xerox.ARPA>

    ... if "the average atom in the body only stays there a
    few weeks" (let "a few weeks" = a fortnight), then one would have to
    replace half his body mass twice a month, with most of the
    replacement mass coming from food.  For a person of average mass,
    say 80 kg, this would require eating and ABSORBING 20 kg of food a
    week!

  A few usually means 5 to 10, not 2.
  Average mass is closer to 50 kg (don't forget women and children).
  That much WATER turnover is quite reasonable.  People are mostly water.

								...Keith

hollombe@ttidcc.UUCP (The Polymath) (09/27/85)

In article <109@netex.UUCP> ewiles@netex.UUCP (Ed Wiles) writes:
>In article <3617@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU>, DP0N@A.CS.CMU.EDU writes:
>> From: Don.Provan@CMU-CS-A
>  
>> you can walk into a disintegrator beam and have a copy of you made
>> on another planet if you want, but i'm fond of this particular copy
>> of myself.
>
>I know I have qualms about walking into a Trans Mat and having it fail,
>but taking the view that it kills you when the 'copy' is indistinguishable
>from the original is a bit radical.

There seem to be two key issues in this discussion:

1) Point of view.

From the point of view of the rest of the universe, it makes no  difference
whether  matter  transmission kills the original or not.  If the person who
comes out the other end is an identical copy then they're the  same  person
for all practical purposes.

From the point of view of the person being transmitted it matters very much
indeed (at least, it does to me).  This bring us to issue two:

2) The nature of consciousness and its reaction to the death  of  the  host
organism.

The problem here is we simply don't know.  Dozens of speculative  scenarios
come to mind, some more encouraging than others.

a) The original is dead and the new personality takes up where the old  one
   left off. (Thanks, but I'd rather walk).

b) The mind, liberated from the original body automatically seeks  out  the
   duplicate and re-installs itself. (How do we know?)

c) The mind is transmitted with the body and emerges intact  at  the  other
   end. (How do we know?)

d) Etc., etc.

I don't know about anyone else, but until we get some proven, reliable  way
of  communicating with a mind separated from any host organism (i.e.: proof
of continued consciousness after organic death), I  wouldn't  ride  in  the
damn  thing.  Given  such proof, I'd want to hear what such a consciousness
had to say about the matter transmission experience  before  making  up  my
mind.

-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
The Polymath (aka: Jerry Hollombe)
Citicorp(+)TTI                    Common Sense is what tells you that a ten
3100 Ocean Park Blvd.             pound weight falls ten times as fast as a
Santa Monica, CA  90405           one pound weight.
(213) 450-9111, ext. 2483
{philabs,randvax,trwrb,vortex}!ttidca!ttidcc!hollombe

waltervj@dartvax.UUCP (walter jeffries) (09/28/85)

hmmm... about the replacement of the atoms of our body...   According to a
reliable source, my doctor, it takes about seven years for our body to 
completely replace all of its components and even then not *everything* get's
replaced as some toxins can accumulate (radioactive items...).  By the way, it 
is the bones which take the longest to replace all of their atoms.  Other parts
are preplaced MUCH more frequently.
 
                Just stirring up the mud...
                     -From the original keyboard of a duplicate of Walter.
 
< o> < o>                 "You expect me to be responsible for what my
    _\                     duplicates told you."  -from the memoirs of a clone.
   -==-
   iiii  (v512.09)