[net.micro.amiga] << Piracy flame wars >>

cthulhu@athena.MIT.EDU (04/17/86)

From: cthulhu@athena.MIT.EDU

Ah yes, the 'if you can't afford the software, get out of the market'
argument.  After spending almost $2000 on a computer, it's not so easy
to just get out of the market... Anyway, I do believe that Amigaware
prices will come down, but it certainly doesn't help to tell the software
companies 'sure, go ahead and overcharge, we don't mind!'  I have an Amiga,
I have to believe prices will come down, because if they don't, I've just 
wasted a vast quantity of money.  As for my 'rationalization,' I don't
have anything to rationalize;  my software library consists of originals and
Pub. Domain... I am simply stating one vital fact: the Amiga can not, and
will not succeed if software prices continue to follow the current trend in
pricing while ST companies are making bold strides in lowering prices.
Software companies may win by ripping the customers off in the short
term, but in the end, everybody loses.
					- Jim

rb@ccird2 (04/25/86)

In article <1914@caip.RUTGERS.EDU> cthulhu@athena.MIT.EDU writes:
>From: cthulhu@athena.MIT.EDU
>
>After spending almost $2000 on a computer, it's not so easy
>to just get out of the market...
>I have to believe prices will come down,...
>I am simply stating one vital fact: the Amiga can not, and
>will not succeed if software prices continue to follow the current trend in
>pricing while ST companies are making bold strides in lowering prices.

Well Jim, I hate to break the news, but...

There is a mindset on the part of both customers and publishers that seems
to be self defeating.  To begin with, until the micro market started really
booming, software was a "custom" operation.  Frequently, an end user would
go to a consultant, OEM, or vertical market integrator, and have them put
together a "turnkey system" where all they would have to do is "flip the
switch".  If something went wrong, the hardware was upgraded, or a new
feature was desired, the OEM would make the changes as part of the support
package.

When IBM-PC's were accepted by the MIS directors of major companies,
those people expected the same software service they got with their
mini-computers.  Many little companies that thrived in the CP/M & Apple
II days simply weren't geared for that kind of support.  Customers were
asking for free or low cost upgrades to both documentation and
software, replacement and upgrades for upgraded hardware, and of
course, bug fixes.  Typical support costs for a company with 20 users
of that software could easily run into the thousands.  The response was
simply to raise the price.  Hence the $500-$1000 "integrated systems".

Generally, software prices have been geared to a percentage of the
hardware purchase price.  If this trend continues, the ST will ALWAYS
have lower priced software than the Amiga.  Amiga, on the other hand
will have most of the "Big Name" publishers coding for their machine.

Many companies, willing to accept software at "Face Value" and provide
internal support, distribution, and "hand holding", felt that it was
morally acceptable to buy five or six copies, (to compensate for royalties),
and make more copies of their own internally.  In fact, many companies
attempted to negotiate "royalty schedules" and were flatly refused.

Unfortunately, the costs of getting software onto the dealer's shelves
started to go up substantially.  More advertising was needed to get
dealers to accept the software, and more still to get customers to
request it from dealers who didn't carry it.  Furthermore, publishers
didn't trust retailers or customers and so started to put
copy-protection on the software.  Of course, there were legitimate
reasons for legitimate customers to make copies to hard disks, but
copy-protection meant more calls to the publisher.

There are ways to break the cycle.  Borland has shown that it is possible
to sell a product with minimal support and still have it accepted.  Share-ware
products have shown that, for reasonable prices, the product can be
distributed at a much lower cost and still be somewhat profitable.
Book-ware (software is free, but the documentation "book" can be purchased
at the book store), has proven to be very profitable.

One of the more interesting developments is the GNU products.  Although
these are "free to anyone", upgrades come out so frequently that
customers order new copies about once a month, often taking turns ordering
the almost weekly upgrades.  Properly scaled, this would be like purchasing
software for about $15 every month or two.  The product is the advertising,
and the advertising is the product.  The usual response to problems is
"have you tried the new release?" :-).  They are also real good about
posting notice of the latest upgrade availability (17.59 this week :-)).
Problems are fixed, enhancements are made, and good things happen, but
always to a later release than the one you currently have.  Even more
interesting is that you get source code.  The irony of this is that
although the product isn't intended to be a big money maker, it has
turned out to be a good source of developement capital for other products.
Imagine what would happen if this organisation wanted to make money :-).

In the past, two approaches to developement were used.
In one case, a start-up company would get lots of capital for an undeveloped
product, hire a developement staff, create the product, do the marketing,
and, if all went well, the revenue would start coming in before the venture
capital ran out.  In the other case, a handfull of developers would develope
a product in their spare time and when it was finished, would get the capital,
marketing, and publication facilities for a new company, these are the "kitchen
table" companies.  Unfortunately, many start-up venture companies did not get
their product to market before the venture capital ran out, and many of the
kitchen table companies lacked the marketing talent required for substantial
success.

Other "alternative procurement" patterns for software developement have also
begun to crop up.  Many are developing publisher/author relationships, where
an author gets a working version together, puts it on a BBS, and the publisher
agrees to pay the author royalties on the "Next Version", usually marketed
under a new name.  Several of the ST products fit into this category.  There
are several programs that were originally posted to the net (in binary),
enhanced, and sold over the counter for $15-$20/copy.

Considering the number of "underground markets" for quality software, I
seriously doubt that the copy-protected, over-priced, over-advertised,
over-supported "Big Name" products will continue to dominate the market.
They will still have their place, they will still get most of the media
attention, they will still be purchased by those who don't know any better,
but they will be missing a lot of the "real market".