fagin%ji@UCBVAX.BERKELEY.EDU (08/06/86)
Lynn Gazis writes: > But I can't agree with the premise that I have no obligation to > anyone unless I have contracted it or have injured that person. I > certainly think we have an obligation to feed the hungry, heal the > sick, and so on.... Well, of course, this is one of the central tenets of modern liberal political theory, so it bears closer examination. The main problem with it is that it's full of phrases that sound wonderful and make you feel good but are in fact extremely vague. > "...we have an obligation..." "we": Everyone in the world? Do people in China have an obligation to help the sick in India? I must assume you're talking about America. "an obligation": ...such that if we don't fulfill it then the use of force is justified? This must be what you mean, since if you didn't think force was justified to compel ethical obligations we'd be in agreement. Thus so far we've got: "People in America may be compelled to ..." > "... feed the hungry": Everyone in America who is hungry? Assuming this is the case, there is still the matter of redistributing the food. Food is not something the world is endowed with that can be transferred to the hungry by legislative fiat. It is grown by people, who usually want something in exchange for it. Same with medical care. Despite the massive amount of governmental involvement in it, in the final analysis it's provided by particular persons who don't like being coerced. Anyway, with a few finishing touches I think I can legitimately rephrase Lynn's belief as: "It is just that people in America may have force used against them in order to make sure that noone is hungry, noone is sick, and so on ..." (It is the "and so on" that's responsible for the vast majority of governmental activity in the US that I find objectionable, but let's carry on ...) This new formulation seems far more interesting. My apologies to Lynn if something got lost in translation. I also apoligize in advance by referring to this argument as a liberal one, even though Lynn may not consider herself a liberal. The problem with statements like Lynn's is that it ignores the basic nature of human beings: free, independent (albeit extremely social) creatures with free will. It confuses *ethical* values with *political* ones: "X is obviously a good thing, therefore everyone should be forced to do X". Or, perhaps a bit more accurately, "X is so obviously a good thing that using a little bit of force against people to achieve X is just". These kind of statements, if accepted as axioms (on faith, if you prefer), are of course not debatable. You either accept them or you don't. However, as with any theory, one hopes that the axioms upon which you build your theory of justice are 1) clear, 2) have some basis in reality, and 3) consistent. Alas, one can't get the same kind of clarity and consistency in political philosophy that one can in mathematics, but they still seem worth striving for. Anyway, contrast the liberal axiom of justice with the libertarian one: "Coercion must not be used against an individual who has not initiated force or fraud". Ambiguous? Of course, but much clearer than the liberal axiom. Basis in reality? You bet. It arises from the nature of human beings; independent (albeit extrmely social) entities each with free will, each inherently precious. By contrast, the liberal axiom seems transitory and ephemeral: once I leave the country my "obligation" to help people here dis- sappears. (I'm assuming that noone out there thinks it's legit to force people in Indonesia to help the homeless in New York). Again, the non-coercion principle refers to all human beings everywhere; it is applicable no matter what arbitrary geopolitical boundaries surround the person in question (though, alas, it is usually unenforceable). An even more compelling reason for accepting the non-coercion principle as an axiom is that it *includes* action under the liberal philosophy of government. The NCP allows a great deal of freedom of action to help the sick and feed the hungry; the NCP and moral action are entirely compatible with one another. (In fact, some have argued that moral action performed under coercion is not really moral at all, but this isn't net.philosophy). The point is that liberal principles of justice are not nearly so tolerant. I think helping the sick and feeding the hungry are good things; that's why I send money to CARE and the Red Cross. I just think liberty and voluntary choice are even better. Especially when a society based on the NCP would be a society far healthier and more prosperous than the present one. --Barry -------