desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) (09/24/86)
In article <434@inuxm.UUCP> arlan@inuxm.UUCP (A Andrews) writes: >[...] (The Colonel also told us that the evidence was strong that he and >his buddies and the whole fleet had been set up for the surprise attack, >so that Roosevelt could get us into the war. So much for another Democrat >Party hero. How unheard of -- the armed forces blaming politicians instead of accepting responsibility for their mistakes! I have read extensively on this subject, with no particular preconceptions, and I have seen nothing that would make me believe that Roosevelt knew exactly when the Japanese would attack, or that their fleet was sailing toward Pearl Harbor. Or that the Japanese had developed modifications to their torpedoes which would allow them to be used against ships at Pearl (which the military considered essentially invulnerable). -- David desJardins P.S. There is a huge difference between an early experimental radar, which might have shown a featureless blur at a range of 50 miles or so, and an E-3 AWACS which would identify each and every plane at a substantially greater distance. It is true, however, that it is not clear how much would have been gained by the advance warning. Certainly substantially greater damage to the Japanese planes, and reduced American casualties, but probably still a Japanese victory.
suhler@im4u.UUCP (Paul A. Suhler) (09/24/86)
In article <15779@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins) writes: >................................................ and I have seen nothing >that would make me believe that Roosevelt knew exactly when the Japanese >would attack, or that their fleet was sailing toward Pearl Harbor. See John Toland's _Infamy_. There were Naval sigint people happy when they first heard the news of a Japanese attack because they had intercepted so much information that they expected that the Navy had been ready and waiting to ambush the attack. Why the information never made it too Pearl Harbor is still somewhat debatable.
james@osi3b2.UUCP (James R. Van Artsdalen) (09/25/86)
> How unheard of -- the armed forces blaming politicians instead of > accepting responsibility for their mistakes! I agree Roosevelt did not know exactly when the Japanese were to attack, but the politicians do not escape blame for everything. Cutting off the Japanese oil supplies was a major blunder if one assumes that Roosevelt did not want war then. My personal opinion is that Roosevelt *did* want the war then and not later: he had to have been aware of the political realities of cut off the Japanese oil supply. That act essentially forced Japan into war: they had to have fuel. It would probably have happened eventually anyway, but my assumption is that Roosevelt wanted to force things to an early conclusion. Not that he wanted a war, but he wanted it while Britain was still afloat, and cutting off Japan's oil supply was the best way of "innocently" bringing it about. If this was his line of thought I would agree with it, although it ultimately proved that the War Department was not ready for a war, and probably did not realize the impact of the oil cut-off. He should have realized that cutting the oil supply would put an end to the posturings and so forth and given his commanders real reason to believe that the next "War Warning" wasn't just another cry of "Wolf". Clearly the military was at fault, but I would blame all of them together, as they were all too complacent. In particular Kimmel should not have been used as the scapegoat, and he might have saved the men at Wake. American naval commanders did not go down with their ships as the Japanese tended to because they were too valuable to lose, and the same philosophy should have been used to save Kimmel for a chance to redeem himself. > might have shown a featureless blur at a range of 50 miles or so, and an > E-3 AWACS which would identify each and every plane at a substantially > greater distance. It is true, however, that it is not clear how much > would have been gained by the advance warning. Certainly substantially > greater damage to the Japanese planes, and reduced American casualties, > but probably still a Japanese victory. I'll use this chance to clarify something in my previous message: the reason I thought that US casualties might have been even higher if the US Fleet sailed was that the action would have been in deep water, away from shore. I know nothing about the rescue efforts at the time, but I have to assume that they were substantially aided by the fact the boats were basically tied up at the docks. I'm not sure how much Japanese plane losses would have increased: there was a second air strike later on that met a hot reception from the various ships and installations, but there were still few Japanese losses in spite of the fire (sorry, I don't have references at hand). There would have been factors either way... Now of course, it the new navy ship "Bunker Hill" were with that AWACS... :-) PS. Yes, I realize that the Bunker Hill has an electrically steerable radar and probably doesn't need an AWACS to help... -- James R. Van Artsdalen ...!ut-ngp!utastro!osi3b2!james Live Free or Die
me142-af@newton.Berkeley.EDU (Richard A. Levin) (09/26/86)
I can't quote a source for this but I recall reading somewhere that the japanese pilots later commented on the AA at pearl coming up very quickly after the attack started. Considering that the aaf planes were set up to be less vulnerable to a sabotage attack (unfuelled, no ammmo, etc.) another hour may not have made any difference. If the warning were several days (intellegence, say) the navy would undoubtedly have moved the fleet to the open ocean. then they could manouver (sp?) to avoid attacking planes, but: one interesting fact about pearl harbor is that all the major ships (arizona excepted) were (as I recall) salvaged. I don't know about the little ships (dds and such). In the open ocean as ship that sinks is sunk. One could argue that the bbs didn't matter that much anyway.... sorry about the grammer, spelling and such. I hate vi. RAL "The only knowledge man can obtain absolutely is that life is meaningless. -tolstoy (???) me142-af@newton.berkeley.edu levin2@ucbcmsa
caf@omen.UUCP (Chuck Forsberg WA7KGX) (09/27/86)
John Toland's "Infamy" (Pearl Harbor and its aftermath) details how the U.S. was quite aware of the Japanese fleet approaching Pearl. There were radio intercepts from ships of the fleet itself in addition to the U.S. rading Japanese secret traffic. Pearl Harbor was purposely not warned because FDR didn't wish the Japanese attack to be called off. The resulting coverup makes WaterGate look like child's play. Go ahead and read the book. BTW, I think history shows FDR did the right thing. Had we not entered the war when we did, Germany could have completed their atomic bomb and V-9.
grr@cbmvax.cbm.UUCP (George Robbins) (09/29/86)
In article <401@omen.UUCP> caf@omen.UUCP (PUT YOUR NAME HERE) writes: >John Toland's "Infamy" (Pearl Harbor and its aftermath) details how the U.S. >was quite aware of the Japanese fleet approaching Pearl. There were radio >intercepts from ships of the fleet itself in addition to the U.S. rading >Japanese secret traffic. Pearl Harbor was purposely not warned because FDR >didn't wish the Japanese attack to be called off. The resulting coverup >makes WaterGate look like child's play. Go ahead and read the book. The book is an interpretation of available historical data. It may or may not represent the situation as seen by FDR and his Cabinet. Some analysts see the American side of the envents leading up to Pearl Harbour as a failure in communications and lack of understanding of the Japanese, others see it as intentional. I think Toland's books are pretty good, and would recommend them for one perspective, but there is no shortage of other good material on the war years. Anyway, the interesting issues are not how we got into the war, but how we got out of it, and made the transition to the current miserable state of the world. -- George Robbins - now working for, uucp: {ihnp4|seismo|caip}!cbmvax!grr but no way officially representing arpa: cbmvax!grr@seismo.css.GOV Commodore, Engineering Department fone: 215-431-9255 (only by moonlite)