fagin@ucbvax.ARPA (Barry Steven Fagin) (02/10/85)
Richard Carnes would prefer libertarians to be more philosophically precise. Here is my humble attempt: (regarding the definition of theft) > Please refer to your favorite dictionary. Therein you will find that theft > is by definition "felonious," i.e., unlawful. Taxation is by definition > enforced by law. Whether "taxation is theft" is merely a matter of > *definition* and is not in itself a question of political philosophy. Definitions are crucial in philosophy, indeed in reasoning in general. They're the starting point for all productive philosophical discussion. Whether or not taxation is theft is indeed a matter of definition, PROVIDED we accept your definition of theft. Consider, however, another definition: "Theft: the taking of justly obtained property from one or more persons by one or more persons, in an unjust manner". This definition seems to me to be much more interesting, since it contains the words "just" and "unjust" in it. If we accept this definition of theft, then whether or not taxation is theft becomes a question of political philosophy, since in order to answer the question we have to deal with justice and injustice. I think this is a good definition of theft, but if you refuse to accept it then it would be foolish for us to proceed further until we have arrived at a definition of theft that is mutually satisfactory. I think, however, that the definition you propose is not a good one, because from it it follows tautologically that governments never commit theft, and that theft is subjective, determined entirely by law. It implies that if a government passed a law allowing its officials to confiscate the property of any of its citizens for any reason whatsoever, such confiscation would not be theft. I find this an unsatisfactory definition, though of course you may differ. > As to the philosophical question: When such ordinary mortals as Kant and > J.S. Mill justified taxation, they found it necessary and advisable to > provide arguments in support of their assertions. Libertarians, however, > are above such requirements. All that they have to do is to proclaim that > "no one ever has the right, under any circumstances, to transfer wealth by > forcible means or by threat of force," and the rest of us will have to bow > down to this proposition as a self-evident axiom. Ignoring the slight sarcasm and poetic rhetoric, I belive this statement has an element of truth in it. But Richard, consider the problem of political discourse, and of reasoning in general. When we reason, we must begin from somewhere; no matter how far back we go, eventually we must stop at primitive concepts which we cannot define, but which we hope are understood by all parties with whom we wish to communicate. This is a well known deficiency of the axiomatic method of reasoning. Consider, for example, a mathematician trying to explain the concept of infinity to an extraterrestrial intelligence. Mathematician: "Consider a set with the following properties: ..." Blancmange from the Planet Skyron in the Galaxy of Andromeda: "Wait a minute. What's a set?" M: "Why, its a collection of things." BFTPSITGOA: "What's a collection? What are things?" You can see the problem. Any system of reasoning we attempt to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove"; we simply accept them because we believe them to be true. The non- coercion principle is, for me, just such an axiom. I cannot "prove" its validity; I can only offer the following reasons why I accept it. Some of these may be the "rational statements" in support of libertarian assertions that you seek: 1) There seems to be something special about human beings. They can think, they have free will, they are born with natural control over their thoughts, actions, bodies, etc. 2) Consistency in thought and action is a desirable thing. 3) Justice ought to be as objective and verifiable as possible. It should be linked to lasting, fundamental concepts (i.e. something less ephemeral than the will of the majority). 4) The non-coercion principle, when accepted as an axiom of economics, leads to an intelligent, predicitive scientific discipline that accurately explains how large numbers of freely acting people distribute their resources (Austrian economics). The high correlation of Austrian economic theory with observed reality leads me to conclude that it ought to be accepted as a science, (a distinction which I would not confer on any other branch of economics), and to conclude that the NCP is an essential part of a healthy, prosperous society. 5) The NCP is extremely tolerant of people who do not accept it. If people believe that the non-coercion principle leads to injustice, they posess great liberty in voluntary, non-coercive action to achieve what they feelis just. Other distributive principles are not nearly so forgiving. 6) Freedom is inspiring; it inspires one to do good things. It also produces an uncommon, almost indescribable feeling in those who obtain it after previously not posessing it. I interpret this as evidence of its value and importance. I do not claim that the NCP falls out as a consequence of the above; as I said, I accept the NCP as an axiom. I simply offer the above reasons (other libertarians doubtless have many others) for accepting it as making a true statement about being a human being on planet Earth. I also note that people who come from Richard's perspective are guilty of the same "crime" that he accuses libertarians of: the assertion of axioms without supporting statements. In his case, equality is asserted as an axiom; something like "some sort of equality of wealth is just and right". I have yet to read an argument that attempts to support this statement. All egalitarian philosophers with which I am familiar, from Marx to Rawls, imply or state right out that some kind of equality of wealth is desirable and go from there. It seems to me, however, that there are numerous reasons for not accepting this equality principle (EP) as making a true statement about justice in the world we live in. Two of them are: 1) The EP is too vague to be a satisfactory foundation for a theory of justice. 2) Human beings are not naturally endowed with equal talents and abilities, and if left to themselves will realize unequal distributions of wealth. (Remember, these do not "disprove" the EP. They are simply reasons why I do not believe it should be accepted as an axiom of philosophical discourse). There are numerous others, but this posting is too long-winded as it is. Perhaps another time. --Barry -- Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley
chenr@tilt.FUN (Ray Chen) (02/12/85)
First, my compliments to Barry Fagin for writing a calm, rational article. Now, to the point at hand... Barry writes that > All egalitarian philosophers with which I > am familiar, from Marx to Rawls, imply or state right out that some kind > of equality of wealth is desirable and go from there. In the case of Rawls and Marx, this isn't true. Rawls attempts to describe a philosophical procedure for constructing a just society The desired outcome is a society in which a person, given knowledge of the society, the philosophical principles upon which that society is based, and no knowledge of his place in that society or his resources in terms of natural talents/inherited wealth, etc. would choose to participate in. This does not imply egalitarianism. As a matter of fact, inequalities are specifically allowed as long as "they are to the benefit of the least advantaged". In other words, as long as the inequality in some way improves the lot of EVERYONE in the society. What is prohibited is the "rich get richer and the poor get poorer cycle". Or to be more precise, "the more advantaged get more advantages and the less ..." as advantaged is not defined in terms of wealth per se, but in primary goods of which monetary resources/property are a subset. For those of you interested in Rawls, I'd suggest reading A Theory of Justice, The Dewey Lectures, and "Fairness to Goodness" by John Rawls. A Theory of Justice alone no longer suffices as there have been significant improvements to his theory since then. The Dewey Lectures and "Fairness to Goodness" were both published in The Journal of Philosophy. As for Marx, my classical Marxism is a little fuzzy. However, Marx's main point was that control of the means of production influences the political structure of a society. This has since been refined (and a good thing too, or classical Marxism would have gone the way of the buffalo in theory-land) by the Frankfurt School of Philosophy to the idea of a critical theory, ideology, false consciousness, and their roles in political theory, none of which have ANYTHING to do with egalitarianism. In short, while classical Marxism and Rawls advocate a form of egalitarianism under certain circumstances, I'd hardly label them as egalitarian philosophers. Rawls' theory is a contract theory. While agents in his Original Position are equal in some respects, I don't think that merits labeling the theory as egalitarian as neither economic nor civil (having to do with rights) equality is a mandated result of his Original Position. Neither is classical Marxism really egalitarian as the primary theoretical problem is the influence of control of the means of production on society. Ray Chen princeton!tilt!chenr
tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) (02/14/85)
Ray Chen's explication of the lack of a relationship between classical Marxism and egalitarianism is right on the mark, and very well expressed. I once went to a talk on organizational effectiveness where the first question asked was "Why does the speaker think it is that the word 'effectiveness' doesn't exist in any language other than English?" I doubt that European Marxists give egalitarianism even lip service. It's a concept that can't be given a concrete or an ideological form in the usual European environment. And Europe, not the U.S., is the fount of clear and pragmatic Marxist writing. I did find once, though, a place where something like egalitarianism was stressed in modern Marxism, other than being criticized as just another figment of false consciousness. Ernesto Laclau has a concept of "the people" as an organizing tool in political systems tied to democratic ideals which he uses in reference to political protest in Latin America. If you want to change the economic system, you have to overthrow the state and fight on its rhetorical and political ground, using democratic slogans and forming popular coalitions based on same. Since the founding documents of Latin American political systems all have references to "the people", as in the U.S. Constitution's "We the people", there is lots of accumulated egalitarian sentiment in these systems, waiting to be stirred up. Most statements of liberation theology, and the manifestos of most of the Central American revolutionary organizations, are plastered with references to "poder popular," meaning power to "the people". I'd suggest that the further one gets away from American-derived "We the people" political ideologies, the less relevance egalitarianism as a motivating force has, and the more Illyrian talk about egalitarianism appears. Classical Marxism battles not with inequality, but with property; not with income, but with capital; not with profits, but with the disbursement of profits; not with markets, but with the control of markets. The forms that Marxism takes outside of its original environment (Europe and Russia) are adapted to their new surroundings. These new forms are often not classical. (The Ernesto Laclau book is "Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory", New Left Books, 1978) Tony Wuersch