wallace@ucbvax.ARPA (David E. Wallace) (02/19/85)
I have some questions for those on the net who consider themselves libertarians. Suppose that a government has been established in accordance with your favorite libertarian principles. Now suppose the following situation arises: Joe and Bob are two hikers who independently decide to go backpacking in a remote wilderness, away from any naturally occurring sources of food or water. Joe encounters a band of thugs who beat him up, take all his equipment (including all his food and water), and leave him badly injured and unable to get help unassisted. Bob subsequently comes along and finds Joe lying by the side of the trail. Bob has enough food, water, and medical supplies in his pack to treat Joe and allow both of them to return safely to civilization. Both men realize that if Bob does not help Joe, it is extremely unlikely that anyone else will come that way before Joe dies from a combination of hunger, thirst, and the effects of his injuries. Bob offers to help Joe, but only if Joe will sign a contract with him first. The major provisions of this contract are: A. Bob will treat Joe's injuries and assist him in returning to civilization, B. Bob agrees to supply Joe with at least a minimal amount of food, clothing, and shelter (enough for survival) for the rest of Joe's life. In exchange for these, Joe agrees: C. To give Bob all property that he currently owns (presumably he had some property that he left behind when setting out on this trip), and D. To work for Bob without further compensation (beyond that specified in (A) and (B) above) at any tasks Bob may require, up to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week, for the rest of his (Joe's) life. Finally, E. Bob may transfer his rights and obligations under this contract to anyone he chooses, either temporarily or permanently, for any consideration whatever. In addition, there are whatever standard enforcement and arbitration provisions are typical for legal contracts in this society. Joe, after considering his alternatives (most likely a rather unpleasant death), signs this contract, and Bob treats his wounds and helps him return to civilization. After recovering from his injuries, however, Joe decides that he has gotten a rather raw deal and appeals to an arbitrator, asking to be released from this contract (particularly provision (D) above). Now for the questions: 1. If you were the arbitrator, presumably ruling in accordance with whatever principles of libertarian society you value most, how would you resolve this dispute, and why? 2. If the contract were to be upheld, do you think that Joe's status under it would be significantly different from a slave in pre-Civil War times (other than that his status would not automatically be transferred to his children, if any)? If so, what do you think the significant differences are? If not (I don't see much difference), is such a status acceptable in a society that values human freedom? 3. If you felt the contract should be struck down (in whole or in part), what do you think should be the limits of governmental interference with individual's rights to contract with one another? Is there a difference between a claim on Joe's future labor (provision D) and a claim on the results of his past labor (provision C)? Would it make a difference if the period covered by the contract was a fixed period rather than Joe's lifetime (say, seven years? What about if it was for one day?). Does it make any difference if the labor required of Joe endangers his life (such as service in Bob's private army)? 4. Suppose the contract were upheld, and Joe subsequently runs away. Has Joe thereby initiated the use of force against Bob's property (Bob's interest in Joe's future labor)? Is Bob therefore justified in using force against Joe to reclaim his property rights? Is this situation any different from that of a burglar who comes on to Bob's property, takes something belonging to Bob, and then leaves? Why or why not? 5. Regardless of whether or not you felt the conditions Bob imposed on providing aid should be legal, do you think he was right (i.e., morally justified) in doing so? (I trust the distinction is clear). Dave Wallace (...!ucbvax!wallace, wallace@Berkeley) (Not a libertarian, but interested in responses from those who are.)
nrh@inmet.UUCP (02/23/85)
>***** inmet:net.politics.t / ucbvax!wallace / 5:28 am Feb 19, 1985 > > I have some questions for those on the net who consider themselves >libertarians. Suppose that a government has been established in accordance >with your favorite libertarian principles. Now suppose the following >situation arises: > I find the situation given more than a little incredible. Joe's obvious solution is to simply refuse the ignominious offer that Bob makes, on the following grounds: 1. Bob will gain *NOTHING* and run the risk of being suspected of killing Joe should Bob return alone and Joe's body be subsequently discovered, to say nothing of what would happen to Bob socially were Joe to be rescued (by a remorseful thug, say) and return to civilization and tell of Bob's conduct (who would chose to associate with someone KNOWN to be such a knave when there are people NOT known to be knaves available? 2. Joe, realizing this, may (and should) hold out for a better deal than giving himself into slavery. 3. If Joe is in such dire straits that he *cannot* *think* *clearly*, then it would be hard to argue that he could understand clearly the agreement he was making -- therefore no such agreement would, depending of course on the arbitration agencies involved, exist. 4. Were word of the agreement to get out, Bob would quickly find himself incapable of making deals with anyone who knows about it. People do not, as a rule, shake hands with sharks. > 1. If you were the arbitrator, presumably ruling in accordance with > whatever principles of libertarian society you value most, how > would you resolve this dispute, and why? Hmmmm. I'm no arbitrator, so one shouldn't consult me, but I would ask the following questions: Was Joe in a position to think clearly when the agreement was made? If Joe WAS in such a position, why didn't he hold out for a better deal? Now, let us say that Joe and Bob are hooked up to some sort of device (say a voice-stress analyzer) that will (in this hypothetical example) tell me whether they're telling the truth when asked the first question. I suspect that Joe's answer will be "no", and I expect I'll get an ambiguous answer from the analyzer. I suspect that Bob's answer will be (if he doesn't know about the analyzer) "yes", and I expect that the analyzer will record that this is a lie. Given this situation, (Bob attempted to get Joe to sign an agreement in a situation where Joe would have great trouble thinking clearly) it's dubious whether a valid agreement has, in fact, been made. Absent a lie-detector I'll evaluate on the basis of my own prejudice: would Joe make an agreement were he thinking clearly at the time? On top of all this, it may be that Joe's arbitration firm (and Bob's, too) believe in the concept of, and enforce decisions consistent with, the doctrine of inalienable rights. Liberty may be among those rights, in which case the contract, even made freely, would be void in the face of previous agreements made with the arbitration agencies. In other words, Joe may already have made an agreement that prohibits him selling himself into slavery; Bob may be part of an organization the bylaws of which prohibit the holding of slaves. I suppose it is possible that the arbitration agency involved held to the position that such a contract was enforceable after all (doubtless a decision that will prove very bad for business), in which case we come to: > 2. If the contract were to be upheld, do you think that Joe's status > under it would be significantly different from a slave in > pre-Civil War times (other than that his status would not > automatically be transferred to his children, if any)? > If so, what do you think the significant differences are? Absolutely! I suspect you'll find VERY few records of slaves who (under pressures not related to the slave-taker's presence) agreed in advance to be slaves. Remember, the Joe and Bob example is rather contrived. In Joe's case, he's CHOSEN something like slavery WITHOUT PRESSURE FROM Bob (he's under terrific pressure, but that's not Bob's fault). For one thing, it's not at all clear that Bob may harm Joe in any way, nor may he limit his discourse with others (an important point), nor do any uninvolved third parties have an obligation to help keep Joe from escaping. > If not (I don't see much difference), is such a status acceptable > in a society that values human freedom? Unacceptable enough for the society to abandon libertarianism in favor of having the government arbitrarily abrogate freely made agreements? I would hope not -- there are such obvious non-governmental ways of convincing Bob that he should renegotiate: For example I, and (I suspect) many others who value freedom would refuse to deal with Bob in any way until he renegotiated the contract with Joe. I suspect that a general boycott of Bob's work would be in order. There is precedent for this -- for example, there is a general understanding that the results of the experiments done by Nazis on unwilling human beings during WWII are NOT used by the medical profession. > 3. If you felt the contract should be struck down (in whole or in > part), what do you think should be the limits of governmental > interference with individual's rights to contract with one > another? Whoops! Hold it right there -- there's no need for a government to be involved here. Let's stick to PRIVATE arbitration. > Is there a difference between a claim on Joe's > future labor (provision D) and a claim on the results of > his past labor (provision C)? Would it make a difference if > the period covered by the contract was a fixed period rather > than Joe's lifetime (say, seven years? What about if it was for > one day?). Does it make any difference if the labor required > of Joe endangers his life (such as service in Bob's private army)? Again, we're now into the sort of agreement that Joe SHOULD have negotiated with Bob. The one that you have him making is outrageous, and only makes sense if you ASSUME he could not reason clearly at the time. On the other hand, it may strike me as reasonable that Joe agree to help Bob to the extent of Bob's outlay, and perhaps a little bit extra. The voluntary sanctions of others (myself in the boycott mentioned above) would vary according to how they understood Joe's agreement with Bob. As far as the basis of the agreement, the less sensible the agreement the more likely it would seem to outsiders (arbitrators included) that Joe was not capable of thinking clearly at the time, and therefore that no binding agreement was made. On the other hand, were such an agreement normal in Joe's culture (I understand (vaguely) that parts of the orient had such understandings commonly) the becomes more acceptable because the likelyhood that Joe would make such an agreement only under extreme stress becomes less likely. It's certainly fair, and probably likely that Joe would want to reward Bob for saving Joe's life. The bizarre part comes when Bob takes advantage of Joe's agitated state to get terms that Joe would not agree to were he able to ponder. > 4. Suppose the contract were upheld, and Joe subsequently runs away. > Has Joe thereby initiated the use of force against Bob's property > (Bob's interest in Joe's future labor)? Is Bob therefore justified > in using force against Joe to reclaim his property rights? Hmmm..... I notice that there was no provision for enforcement in the contract. What sort of force did you have in mind? A chase with pack hounds? Chains, to "protect" Bob's property? The answer is that Joe is probably better off simply refusing to live up to his end of the contract and paying the penalty (if any) levied by the arbitrators. I imagine it wouldn't be long before Bob tires of this, and before the continual picketing and boycott by civil liberties groups got to be too much. ("What time is it Charley?", "Sorry, Bob, I'll want 30 years of hard labor from you if I answer that question.") > Is this situation any different from that of a burglar who comes > on to Bob's property, takes something belonging to Bob, and then > leaves? Why or why not? > This is not the issue -- if Joe's life were Bob's property, the cases would be similar, but Bob would be very hard-pressed, as I've tried to show, to show that Joe's life (or not-quite-interchangably) Joe's labor IS Bob's property. > 5. Regardless of whether or not you felt the conditions Bob imposed > on providing aid should be legal, do you think he was right > (i.e., morally justified) in doing so? (I trust the distinction > is clear). I do NOT think that Bob was morally justified in doing what he (hypothetically) did. I don't think it is a rational act at all, given the likely consequences (severe embarrassment, a recalcitrant Joe who will certainly harass you at every turn, boycotts, the immediate cancellation of all arbitration contracts (arbitrators would be fools to let you subscribe, just as health maintainance organizations would be fools to allow a person with massive (incurable) leukemia to join their rolls (I assume this happens, but only under special conditions)). The interesting part about the situation you propose is that it provides a good illustration of how people depend on the state for solutions when they don't need to. In non-libertarian societies governments could and did enforce the slaveholder's claim to the slave, regardless of the personal feelings of onlookers. In a libertarian society, Bob is much less likely to be able to enforce his claim on Joe (bystanders are under no obligation not to help Joe), and you will note that only an extremely contrived situation results in even a very implausible slavery being enacted. My own opinion is that long-term enslavement of the unwilling is possible only where a government supports it. Variations (such as Indenture) are possible, but not very likely given an industrial society and efficient teaching methods. >Dave Wallace (...!ucbvax!wallace, wallace@Berkeley) >(Not a libertarian, but interested in responses from those who are.) Nat Howard