esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (02/27/85)
[] From: Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley > You can see the problem. Any system of reasoning we attempt > to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove"; > we simply accept them because we believe them to be true. The non- > coercion principle is, for me, just such an axiom. I disagree -- science is a counterexample. Unlike mathematics, science takes as "input" not only axioms or definitions but also the evidence of experience. In other words, science is empirical; not a mere formal system. So it is not true that argument must stop at the level of axioms; there remains the possibility of appeal to experience. > I cannot "prove" [the non-coercion principle's] validity; I can only offer > the following reasons why I accept it. Some of these may be the "rational > statements" in support of libertarian assertions that [Carnes] seek[s] I want to comment on some of these. I presume the order doesn't matter. > 5) The NCP is extremely tolerant of people who do not accept it. > If people believe that the non-coercion principle leads to injustice, they > posess great liberty in voluntary, non-coercive action to achieve what they > feel is just. Other distributive principles are not nearly so forgiving. Compare: the socialist principle is extremely tolerant ... If people believe it leads to injustice, they posses great liberty in pro-proletarian, social- istic action to achieve what they feel is just. > 4) The non-coercion principle, when accepted as an axiom > of economics, leads to an intelligent, predicitive scientific discipline... This is a curious claim. The non-coercion principle says something like "coercion is *wrong*". I fail to see how this could POSSIBLY be related to *economic predictions*. The only prediction I can derive from such a moral judgement is that people who are sufficiently rational, informed and thoughtful won't use coercion. One could predict economic behavior only if we all fit these conditions. But if everybody's so rational, how come we aren't all libertarians? :-> > 3) Justice ought to be as objective and verifiable as > possible. It should be linked to lasting, fundamental concepts (i.e. > something less ephemeral than the will of the majority). I saved the best for last. Consider the following attempt by Cliff (@unmvax) to answer Biep's questions from an article titled "What is a libertarian go[u]vernment?" >> - Is it the go[u]vernment that decides when something is reasonable >> (my neigbo[u]r is infesting my land with sound waves. I am >> a physicist and for my experiments I need *silence*, and >> my neighbo[u]r keeps whispering all the time)? ...[Biep.] > There are easily as many answers to this question as there are flavors of > UNIX. [cliff@unmvax] >> But what exactly is *using* land? ... Can the physicist of above claim >> to need lots of land around him "since it has to be silent here"? [Biep] > Again, this is another point of contention. ... [Cliff] I conclude that libertarianism is too vague and subjective to qualify on the terms of condition 3). :-> :-> :-> :-> --The mischievous iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Don't hit that 'r' key! Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.