fagin@ucbvax.ARPA (Barry Steven Fagin) (03/08/85)
>> me > Paul Torek >>... Any system of reasoning we attempt >> to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove"; >> we simply accept them because we believe them to be true. The non- >> coercion principle is, for me, just such an axiom. > >I disagree -- science is a counterexample. Unlike mathematics, science >takes as "input" not only axioms or definitions but also the evidence >of experience. In other words, science is empirical; not a mere formal >system. So it is not true that argument must stop at the level of axioms; >there remains the possibility of appeal to experience. Good point. Libertarians also argue that we should learn from the lessons of history: see DKMcK. > >> 5) The NCP is extremely tolerant of people who do not accept it. >> If people believe that the non-coercion principle leads to injustice, they >> posess great liberty in voluntary, non-coercive action to achieve what they >> feel is just. Other distributive principles are not nearly so forgiving. > >Compare: the socialist principle is extremely tolerant ... If people believe >it leads to injustice, they posses great liberty in pro-proletarian, social- >istic action to achieve what they feel is just. But isn't the kind of action permitted in the former much greater than that in the latter? As a real world example, I note that freer societies have books and newspapers representing a huge spectrum of opinions, (stop by the Marxist-Leninist bookstore in Oakland sometime), that the free market offers investment opportunities for people who think free markets stink (Working Assets, Inc), and that all those who wish to form a property-free society are at liberty to join with others who feel similarly and go live on a commune. By contrast, in how many socialist countries can you find the works of Ludwig Von Mises? Which socialist countries permit you to start a factory and keep the profits? Free societies are much more tolerant of opposition than planned ones. >> 4) The non-coercion principle, when accepted as an axiom >> of economics, leads to an intelligent, predicitive scientific discipline... > >This is a curious claim. The non-coercion principle says something like >"coercion is *wrong*". I fail to see how this could POSSIBLY be related >to *economic predictions*. Try this: the coercion of human beings is wrong, so it the NCP should be followed. How are resources distributed in a society that follows the NCP? >But if everybody's so rational, how come >we aren't all libertarians? :-> 'Cause you haven't thought about it long enough :-). >> 3) Justice ought to be as objective and verifiable as >> possible. It should be linked to lasting, fundamental concepts (i.e. >> something less ephemeral than the will of the majority). > >I saved the best for last. Consider the following attempt by Cliff >(@unmvax) to answer Biep's questions from an article titled "What is a >libertarian go[u]vernment?" > >>> - Is it the go[u]vernment that decides when something is reasonable >>> (my neigbo[u]r is infesting my land with sound waves. I am >>> a physicist and for my experiments I need *silence*, and >>> my neighbo[u]r keeps whispering all the time)? ...[Biep.] > >> There are easily as many answers to this question as there are flavors of >> UNIX. [cliff@unmvax] > >>> But what exactly is *using* land? ... Can the physicist of above claim >>> to need lots of land around him "since it has to be silent here"? [Biep] > >> Again, this is another point of contention. ... [Cliff] > >I conclude that libertarianism is too vague and subjective to qualify on >the terms of condition 3). You mean that because one can construct situations in which it is difficult to decide right and wrong, libertarianism is too vague? By that standard, all political theories will fail the test. Life is full of tricky legal dilemnas, and the fact that justice is not Turing-computable does not bother me in the least. Do you really think that libertarian criteria are too ambiguous for a theory of justice because there are hard questions in law that contain no easy answers? Recall today that we draw upon a large body of law that attempts to decide just those very things: what kind of care a competent physician administers, what constitutes negligence in a particular situation, what circumstances determine land use and ownerhsip, etc. Where would this dissapear to in Libertaria? > Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 --Barry -- Barry Fagin @ University of California, Berkeley
faustus@ucbcad.UUCP (03/08/85)
> >... Any system of reasoning we attempt > > to use will ultimately be founded upon axioms which we cannot "prove"; > > we simply accept them because we believe them to be true. > > I disagree -- science is a counterexample. Unlike mathematics, science > takes as "input" not only axioms or definitions but also the evidence > of experience. In other words, science is empirical; not a mere formal > system. So it is not true that argument must stop at the level of axioms; > there remains the possibility of appeal to experience. Not that this is very relevant, but there is one big axiom: Nature is regular. Without this you are just wasting your time. Wayne