[net.politics.theory] Carnes on Marx

mck@ratex.UUCP (Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan) (03/26/85)

     The works of Marx and Engels are rather like the Bible, in that enough
is said about enough things that the Marxist, like the Judeo-Christian, can
always find a quote that seems to substantiate h(is|er) interpretation.
This does not necessarily mean that the quote is taken out of context; it
often reflects inconsistency in the writings (in Marx's case, this
inconsistency is largely because his thoughts evolved -- changed; I will
leave it to the Christian to tell us whether Yahweh was irrational or
merely changed his mind alot).
     To arrive at the interpretation of Marx given by Mr Carnes, we must
ignore Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of History*, ignore Engels' *Anti-
Duhring* and *Dialectics of Nature*, and, indeed, take it that Marx
trivialized the definition of 'dialectic' to the point that its essence
vanishes in the rhetorical mists.  It is quite true that much of Marx's
work is independent of Dialectical Materialism (I have read it suggested
that Marx treated the subject mostly to keep Engels happy), but this does
not make the problem go away (similarly, much of von Mises's work is
independent of his Kantianism, but this flaw remains nonetheless).
     The resultant interpretation reminds me of U.S. military policy in
Viet Nam, where villages were 'saved' by their destruction.  Carnes's
interpretation amounts to little more than the claim that an understanding
of a state-of-affairs requires an understanding of prior history.  Not an
earth-shaking (or even remotely original) theory.  And a theory of limited
use at that.  If reality CANNOT be understood without an understanding of
prior history, then unless we can start at a point where the universe was
created *ex nihilo* (say, the Judeo-Christian 4004 BC), we can never
understand anything (note the implicit contradiction). (Current physical
theory, with its Big Bang of some billions of years ago, cannot even
explain why the universe is not omnisymetrical!)
     Carnes gives us an example of Marxist thought by reiterating the
Marxist model of Capitalism:
>           the capitalist takes a sum of money and spends it on raw
>materials, instruments of production, and sells the resulting product for
>an amount greater than he laid out originally, resulting in a profit.
Given Carnes's reiteration of this notion, I will reiterate what is wrong
with it: It (ironically) fails to recognize the intertemporal effects on
value (this is ironic because the history-oriented Marx has adopted a
static theory of value).

                                        Hoo hah!
                                        DKMcK

myers@uwmacc.UUCP (Jeff Myers) (03/27/85)

>      To arrive at the interpretation of Marx given by Mr Carnes, we must
> ignore Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of History*, ignore Engels' *Anti-
> Duhring* and *Dialectics of Nature*, and, indeed, take it that Marx
> trivialized the definition of 'dialectic' to the point that its essence
> vanishes in the rhetorical mists.  It is quite true that much of Marx's
> work is independent of Dialectical Materialism (I have read it suggested
> that Marx treated the subject mostly to keep Engels happy), but this does
> not make the problem go away (similarly, much of von Mises's work is
> independent of his Kantianism, but this flaw remains nonetheless).

The importance of the dialectic to Marxism has long been a topic of debate.
Because the dialectic is often so strongly connected to either the
idealism of Hegel or the natural materialism of Engels, I much prefer the
term ``Historical Materialism'', which has fewer trappings associated
with it.  For me, the best statements of Marx's method of exploring the
world are contained in the *Theses on Feuerbach* and the Introduction of
the *Grundrisse* (sort of a first draft of the *Capital* project).

What is so exceptional about Marx is that he treats humans NOT as simply
products of their surroundings NOR as magic ``you are what you shape
yourself to be'' humans (the vision of Ayn Rand).  Humans are not
treated as little automotans maximizing profit nor as individuals
completely free of societal constraints.  Hence the stress on social
relations, on the necessity of understanding the manner in which
individuals are woven into the fabric of society; it is necessary to
focus both on individuals and on their interconnections in order to
understand humans at all.

This balancing of ways of looking at the world, the rejection both of
pure idealism and pure materialism, sets up a tension in Marx's work,
leading to contradictions when his work is viewed as a whole.  But
human relations themselves are often inherently contradictory.

Thesis II: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question.
Man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking in practice.  The dispute over the reality or
non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely
*scholastic* question." [the rejection of idealism]

Thesis III: "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances
and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other
circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change
circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself.
Hence, this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two
parts, one of which is superior to society.
   The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice."
[the rejection of pure materialism]

>      The resultant interpretation reminds me of U.S. military policy in
> Viet Nam, where villages were 'saved' by their destruction.  Carnes's
> interpretation amounts to little more than the claim that an understanding
> of a state-of-affairs requires an understanding of prior history.  Not an
> earth-shaking (or even remotely original) theory.  And a theory of limited
> use at that.  If reality CANNOT be understood without an understanding of
> prior history, then unless we can start at a point where the universe was
> created *ex nihilo* (say, the Judeo-Christian 4004 BC), we can never
> understand anything (note the implicit contradiction). (Current physical
> theory, with its Big Bang of some billions of years ago, cannot even
> explain why the universe is not omnisymetrical!)

We could get into some really heavy philosophy of science discussions here.
While Marx may not seem that original in stressing the importance of history
in understanding today, remember the extremely scientistic age in which he
was working.  Looking at the world thru sociologically colored glasses
was not particularly in vogue then.

While Marxism emphasizes the understanding of the totality, it's obvious
that no one can shove ``totality'' in their head.  Understanding of the
universe will always be a partial affair (prior to attaining nirvana,
or course).

> It (ironically) fails to recognize the intertemporal effects on
> value (this is ironic because the history-oriented Marx has adopted a
> static theory of value).
>                                         DKMcK

OK, we'll bite.  Please explain the intertemporal theory of value,
in five thousand words or less.

jeff m