mck@ratex.UUCP (Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan) (04/22/85)
Lines marked with an odd number of >s are Toreks; the rest are mine. >>>"there are some important consequences of libertarian principles >>>which (most) libertarians have failed to note." >>That's true of almost any ideology. So what? > >Ah, but some of these are fatal (or so I argue). Ah, but you argue wrongly. >>No complex ideology has been as fully discussed on the net as we might like; >>which proves nothing about the virtues of any. > >Of course--but it probably does indicate the types of issues that the netters >think about. It may indicate the range of issues that SOME net-users consider; it doesn't indicate mine or Cipriani's or Creighton's, and I suspect that it doesn't indicate the range of several other net-users. >>> To return to the >>>Indian who says "my father told me he would have given the land to me", >>>but can't prove this -- perhaps one should take his word for it. >>That would depend on the quality of his word. If I knew that he never lied >>and was never mistaken about such things, you'd be right. > >>>now consider it from the Indian's point of view -- suppose he *knows* >>>his father would have given it -- it would seem that, by lib. std's, he >>>has a right to take it. >>Yes. Which is simply to say that ignorance can create conflicts. > >But it seems to me that such conflicts present bigger problems from a >libertarian viewpoint than from most non-libertarian viewpoints. For >example, if you forcibly resist his attempt to take it, and harm him, >wouldn't you then owe him (probably huge) compensation? (And worse yet, >what if you killed him?) On the other hand, conventional morality/politics >would say that while he has a right to the land, he doesn't have a right >to take it by stealth or force, at least not without a court decision in >his favor. Admittedly, that doesn't seem fair either, but I think conven- >tional morality gives a less implausible answer here than libertarian... >Or have I gotten something wrong here? Actually, you've asked a good question here, and I suspect that Libertarians will split on this issue. If a person presents (intentionally or unintentionally) a convincing (but false) image of coercion, is he liable for resultant attacks on his person? >I've thought harder about the reparations issue, and the absurdity doesn't >follow from the libertarian view as easily as I thought. Suppose we knew >the history of every object which anyone claimed to own, and we could >trace every incident where the object was coercively taken from someone. >We could then determine the proper owner of every object, and for most >wealth, that very well might not be the same as the current possessor. If I read you correctly in the above (and in the concluding) paragraph, you're making the mistake of thinking that establishment of justice REQUIRES a knowledge of 'the history of every object which anyone claimed to own, and' [...] 'every incident where the object was coercively taken'. This interpretation is wrong. When a person does not know that she had title to something, there is (at least) some doubt as to whether she transferred it to another (let alone WHICH other); after a sequence, it becomes unreasonable to suppose that the victim(s) transferred their claims to anyone. >But it would be disastrous to switch possessions -- I might find out that >I own land in Russia, while the land I was using is owned by someone else, >but I don't want to move... Given the point that I made above (and in an earlier posting to sevener), there wouldn't be that many transfers. > Fortunately, there IS a simple solution: we >could determine how much compensation each person owed each other due to >the injustices that figured into his coming to possess the objects he now >does. Everybody could then settle his debts, which would be hectic but >not absurd. I hate to undercut your attempt to shore-up Libertarianism (albeit an unnecessary attempt), but I don't see an acceptable system of calculating compensation value. >But here's another problem: suppose most people didn't want to go along. >Suppose, as is the case today, most people weren't libertarians, and they >didn't see why they had to make all these compensations. Now Joe >Libertarian looks at the situation and realizes that the land he was using >is properly owned by a particular Indian, whereas the land Joe properly >owns is being used by some non-libertarian Moe who tells Joe to f--- off, >when Joe explains to him the coercive history of that land. It looks like >Joe is stuck. He can't tell the Indian "Look, Moe owes me that land or >$40,000 (whichever Moe chooses), I owe you my land or $40,000; so let's >simplify things -- you go bother Moe." "Sorry Joe," says the Indian, "I >think you're a nice guy and all, and I don't like to see you sweat, but >Moe is YOUR problem. I want my land." This is an example of a practical problem for all ideologies: What if the majority won't go along? If a radically different order were established tomorrow, then it would probably be gone by month's end. As Jerome Tuccille noted, the idea of a hardy band of Libertarians mounting up and storming the Fed is ludicrous. C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre. >Of course, we *don't* know the history of all objects, we *can't* tabulate >all the injustices and calculate everyone's debt to each other; we don't >have 1/10th the information. But before any libertarian breathes a sigh >of relief, he should consider that by his lights WE SHOULD BE UPSET, NOT >RELIEVED that the info isn't available. So, I think I have found an >implausible consequence of libertarian theory. This above paragraph is the one that a referred to as 'the concluding paragraph', and repeats the argument which I undercut. > And now it's everybody >else's turn to explain why I'm wrong. Your basic point on reparations has been shown to be wrong. Your point on the possible majority rejection of Libertarianism is valid when applied to a naive (but extant) program for Libertarian take-over. Back later, DKMcK PS: I don't think harder; I just think better.