[net.politics.theory] Ayn Rand's derivation of her ethics

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/10/85)

I still haven't gotten (and would like) a copy of the article that
asked me what I found wrong with Rand's argument.  I also don't
have my copy of *Atlas Shrugged* with me (I seem to have left it
in my future residence at U of MI), but here goes anyway.

Rand's arguments seemed to me to have more holes than swiss cheese,
but since an argument is only as strong as its weakest step, I'll
concentrate on one point.  Rand states (not an exact quote) that her 
ethics follows from the law of non-contradiction plus a choice:  the
choice of life over death.  Apparently she thinks that the rest,
including the non-initiation of force/fraud principle (NIFFP for
short), follows logically from the choice of life.  The problem
right away is that this represents as binary a choice that in truth
is multiple:  there are many ways to live and many ways to die.  It
is true that AT ANY ONE TIME one is either alive or not, but there
are many possible futures open to a person.  Unless we are given
some reason to suppose that one should always strive to stay alive
no matter what, there is no reason to take staying alive as the
be-all and end-all.  Indeed, the fact that one must be alive to
enjoy any benefits whatsoever says NOTHING about the relative
merits of, for example, living by force or fraud.

A person could reply, without logical error, to Rand's argument:
"I choose to live for now, but only as long as it takes to kill
743 people at random, because I like the number 743, so much so
that any other goal is meaningless to me."  I am not saying that
such a person would be rational -- he wouldn't -- or that he is
in touch with reality -- he isn't -- BUT NOTHING IN RAND'S ARGUMENT
shows what is wrong with such logic.  The only argument against
his screwed up values is experience, which shows that life is or
can be worth very much and that killing people deprives them of
that as well as inspiring them to deprive you...

More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist"
ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is
worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there
is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would
forgo all future benefits to myself".   Call it altruism (def.?) or 
humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied
to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand
et. al. a great deal.  (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care 
ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers
the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand 
represents as binary a choice that is multiple.)

Rand gives no solid reason for following the non-initiation of force/
fraud principle.  She claims that initiating force will cause others
to retaliate, but that's not always true, nor is it always impossible
to tell when one could "get away with it".  Nor does she demonstrate
that people have an absolute right to be free from such initiation
of force or fraud, since this is just the other side of the coin of
an obligation not to initiate force/fraud, and from whence comes this
obligation?  Not from an agreement, because such an agreement binds
only if there is ALREADY an obligation not to initiate fraud.  And
if the word "obligation" is DEFINED by fiat to be implied by agreements,
then it remains to be shown that people have a REASON TO CARE about
their obligations.

By the way, I don't disagree with Rand's contention that there is an
objective fact of the matter about ethical questions; it's just that
she hasn't demonstrated the correctness of HER views.

Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink

ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) (07/11/85)

> More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist"
> ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is
> worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there
> is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would
> forgo all future benefits to myself".   Call it altruism (def.?) or 
> humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied
> to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand
> et. al. a great deal.  (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care 
> ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers
> the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand 
> represents as binary a choice that is multiple.)

I do not think Rand had any desire to prevent individuals from
believing they are the least important people in the world.
I expect she would hold that belief to be mistaken.

What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence
of that belief:  people who say "I believe that everyone else's
life is more important to me than my own.  Therefore, YOU should
believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than
your own."  THAT is the view of her villains.

In several places, she said that it is entirely rational that you
might value another person so much that you would be willing to
do anything for that other person.  But to so value people you have
never met?  That you don't even know exist?

Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a
sacrifice.  Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is.

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/12/85)

>>More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist"
>>ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is
>>worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there
>>is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would
>>forgo all future benefits to myself".   Call it altruism (def.?) or 
>>humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied
>>to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand
>>et. al. a great deal.  (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care 
>>ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers
>>the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand 
>>represents as binary a choice that is multiple.)

> I do not think Rand had any desire to prevent individuals from
> believing they are the least important people in the world.
> I expect she would hold that belief to be mistaken.
> What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence
> of that belief:  people who say "I believe that everyone else's
> life is more important to me than my own.  Therefore, YOU should
> believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than
> your own."  THAT is the view of her villains.

What irks me here is the seeming black-and-white dichotomy I seem to
hear here.  Either you're the least important person in the world or
the most important.  How about JUST as important as anybody else?
Granted, you want your own self-interests to be taken care of, but do
you define your self-interest to be so much more important than that
of someone else that you take care of it at the other person's
expense?  One thing seemingly forgotten is the fact that no matter how
much you claim to be self-sufficient, you still live in a world with other
human beings, and that only through cooperation can real long term survival
be ensured and maximized.  (Hofstadter is supposed to have shown empirically
that such cooperation is best in one of the articles he reprinted in
Metamagical Themas, but I've yet to read that.)

> In several places, she said that it is entirely rational that you
> might value another person so much that you would be willing to
> do anything for that other person.  But to so value people you have
> never met?  That you don't even know exist?
> Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a
> sacrifice.  Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is.

Again, it's not as simple as "do anything" or "do nothing".  Who says it's
not a sacrifice?  It sure as hell is!  But one you willingly choose to
make because you want to.  Most people seem to forget that love is that
sort of investment in another person:  you trust them or care for them
enough that you put in that investment or sacrifice, knowing that you'll
get it back (maybe even tenfold!) in return, either through similar
investment and sacrifice on the other person's part, or just through the
sheer force of pleasure you receive from their company/existence.  Of course,
some people make such sacrifices with no hope of a "return" on their
investment.  Who is any of us to say that that's wrong? (Unless of course
it's emotionally damaging.)  By that same token, who is any of us to claim
that it's wrong or misguided when one does the same thing for someone who's
just a fellow human being, not expecting a return?  Again, in the case of
the bum, it may be a bad investment, a case of poor judgment (the bum may
spend it all on booze or some other such horrible thing); but just as often
it may be a case of good judgment.  The recognition of interdependence
among human beings may certainly lead one to do such things, and to gain
positive results from them.

If you get something emotionally, spiritually, or (perhaps in the long term)
economically from performing an altruistic, then you gain from it, and thus
you are being selfish!  Tell THAT to Ayn Rand...  (I know, I know.)
-- 
Like a bourbon?  (HIC!)  Drunk for the very first time...
			Rich Rosen   ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/13/85)

In article <3978@alice.UUCP> ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) writes:
>In several places, [Rand] said that it is entirely rational that you
>might value another person so much that you would be willing to
>do anything for that other person.  But to so value people you have
>never met?  That you don't even know exist?

I value people I've never met -- not THAT much.  But some.  It's not
irrational; it comes from acknowledging their similarity as human
subjects with benefit and harm at stake.  Valuing others to the exclusion
of oneself is indeed irrational, but "selfishness" (even Rand's mild
variety of it) is not the only alternative.
						--Paul V Torek

mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (07/21/85)

In article <3978@alice.UUCP> ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) writes:

>What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence
>of that belief:  people who say "I believe that everyone else's
>life is more important to me than my own.  Therefore, YOU should
>believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than
>your own."  THAT is the view of her villains.

Is this belief really common?  I can't say that I've heard of anyone (when I
properly understood them) who advocated such a position, much less lived by
it.  

>Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a
>sacrifice.  Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is.

This is a strange use of the word "sacrifice" which I have not heard of
before.  Whether or not saving to send your kids through college is a
sacrifice depends on your priorities.  It also depends on your means.
Giving 1% of your income to charity is, I submit, not a sacrifice if you
make over a million dollars a year.

Charley Wingate

mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (07/25/85)

>/* mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) /  4:25 pm  Jul 21, 1985 */

>Is this belief really common?  I can't say that I've heard of anyone (when I
>properly understood them) who advocated such a position, much less lived by
>it.  

I believe you are right that there aren't many people (at least in the U.S.)
who advocate such a position with regard to what they consider their own
interests, but I believe there are many who accept others' definitions of
their own interest, i.e., philosophically they place others above themselves.

						Mike Sykora