flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/10/85)
I still haven't gotten (and would like) a copy of the article that asked me what I found wrong with Rand's argument. I also don't have my copy of *Atlas Shrugged* with me (I seem to have left it in my future residence at U of MI), but here goes anyway. Rand's arguments seemed to me to have more holes than swiss cheese, but since an argument is only as strong as its weakest step, I'll concentrate on one point. Rand states (not an exact quote) that her ethics follows from the law of non-contradiction plus a choice: the choice of life over death. Apparently she thinks that the rest, including the non-initiation of force/fraud principle (NIFFP for short), follows logically from the choice of life. The problem right away is that this represents as binary a choice that in truth is multiple: there are many ways to live and many ways to die. It is true that AT ANY ONE TIME one is either alive or not, but there are many possible futures open to a person. Unless we are given some reason to suppose that one should always strive to stay alive no matter what, there is no reason to take staying alive as the be-all and end-all. Indeed, the fact that one must be alive to enjoy any benefits whatsoever says NOTHING about the relative merits of, for example, living by force or fraud. A person could reply, without logical error, to Rand's argument: "I choose to live for now, but only as long as it takes to kill 743 people at random, because I like the number 743, so much so that any other goal is meaningless to me." I am not saying that such a person would be rational -- he wouldn't -- or that he is in touch with reality -- he isn't -- BUT NOTHING IN RAND'S ARGUMENT shows what is wrong with such logic. The only argument against his screwed up values is experience, which shows that life is or can be worth very much and that killing people deprives them of that as well as inspiring them to deprive you... More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist" ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would forgo all future benefits to myself". Call it altruism (def.?) or humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand et. al. a great deal. (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand represents as binary a choice that is multiple.) Rand gives no solid reason for following the non-initiation of force/ fraud principle. She claims that initiating force will cause others to retaliate, but that's not always true, nor is it always impossible to tell when one could "get away with it". Nor does she demonstrate that people have an absolute right to be free from such initiation of force or fraud, since this is just the other side of the coin of an obligation not to initiate force/fraud, and from whence comes this obligation? Not from an agreement, because such an agreement binds only if there is ALREADY an obligation not to initiate fraud. And if the word "obligation" is DEFINED by fiat to be implied by agreements, then it remains to be shown that people have a REASON TO CARE about their obligations. By the way, I don't disagree with Rand's contention that there is an objective fact of the matter about ethical questions; it's just that she hasn't demonstrated the correctness of HER views. Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) (07/11/85)
> More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist" > ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is > worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there > is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would > forgo all future benefits to myself". Call it altruism (def.?) or > humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied > to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand > et. al. a great deal. (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care > ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers > the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand > represents as binary a choice that is multiple.) I do not think Rand had any desire to prevent individuals from believing they are the least important people in the world. I expect she would hold that belief to be mistaken. What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence of that belief: people who say "I believe that everyone else's life is more important to me than my own. Therefore, YOU should believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than your own." THAT is the view of her villains. In several places, she said that it is entirely rational that you might value another person so much that you would be willing to do anything for that other person. But to so value people you have never met? That you don't even know exist? Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a sacrifice. Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/12/85)
>>More to the point of arguing against so-called "Objectivist" >>ethics, a person might rationally say "my brother's life is >>worth enhancing independently of the effect on myself, and there >>is some level of benefit for him such that, to achieve it, I would >>forgo all future benefits to myself". Call it altruism (def.?) or >>humanitarianism or whatever, when this kind of thinking is applied >>to all people (not just one's relations) it seems to bother Rand >>et. al. a great deal. (Actually, Rand's villains (try to?) care >>ONLY about others and NOT about themselves; she never considers >>the possibility that one might care about both -- again Rand >>represents as binary a choice that is multiple.) > I do not think Rand had any desire to prevent individuals from > believing they are the least important people in the world. > I expect she would hold that belief to be mistaken. > What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence > of that belief: people who say "I believe that everyone else's > life is more important to me than my own. Therefore, YOU should > believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than > your own." THAT is the view of her villains. What irks me here is the seeming black-and-white dichotomy I seem to hear here. Either you're the least important person in the world or the most important. How about JUST as important as anybody else? Granted, you want your own self-interests to be taken care of, but do you define your self-interest to be so much more important than that of someone else that you take care of it at the other person's expense? One thing seemingly forgotten is the fact that no matter how much you claim to be self-sufficient, you still live in a world with other human beings, and that only through cooperation can real long term survival be ensured and maximized. (Hofstadter is supposed to have shown empirically that such cooperation is best in one of the articles he reprinted in Metamagical Themas, but I've yet to read that.) > In several places, she said that it is entirely rational that you > might value another person so much that you would be willing to > do anything for that other person. But to so value people you have > never met? That you don't even know exist? > Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a > sacrifice. Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is. Again, it's not as simple as "do anything" or "do nothing". Who says it's not a sacrifice? It sure as hell is! But one you willingly choose to make because you want to. Most people seem to forget that love is that sort of investment in another person: you trust them or care for them enough that you put in that investment or sacrifice, knowing that you'll get it back (maybe even tenfold!) in return, either through similar investment and sacrifice on the other person's part, or just through the sheer force of pleasure you receive from their company/existence. Of course, some people make such sacrifices with no hope of a "return" on their investment. Who is any of us to say that that's wrong? (Unless of course it's emotionally damaging.) By that same token, who is any of us to claim that it's wrong or misguided when one does the same thing for someone who's just a fellow human being, not expecting a return? Again, in the case of the bum, it may be a bad investment, a case of poor judgment (the bum may spend it all on booze or some other such horrible thing); but just as often it may be a case of good judgment. The recognition of interdependence among human beings may certainly lead one to do such things, and to gain positive results from them. If you get something emotionally, spiritually, or (perhaps in the long term) economically from performing an altruistic, then you gain from it, and thus you are being selfish! Tell THAT to Ayn Rand... (I know, I know.) -- Like a bourbon? (HIC!) Drunk for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/13/85)
In article <3978@alice.UUCP> ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) writes: >In several places, [Rand] said that it is entirely rational that you >might value another person so much that you would be willing to >do anything for that other person. But to so value people you have >never met? That you don't even know exist? I value people I've never met -- not THAT much. But some. It's not irrational; it comes from acknowledging their similarity as human subjects with benefit and harm at stake. Valuing others to the exclusion of oneself is indeed irrational, but "selfishness" (even Rand's mild variety of it) is not the only alternative. --Paul V Torek
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (07/21/85)
In article <3978@alice.UUCP> ark@alice.UUCP (Andrew Koenig) writes: >What she unfailingly denounced as evil is the common consequence >of that belief: people who say "I believe that everyone else's >life is more important to me than my own. Therefore, YOU should >believe that everyone else's life is more important to you than >your own." THAT is the view of her villains. Is this belief really common? I can't say that I've heard of anyone (when I properly understood them) who advocated such a position, much less lived by it. >Scrimping and saving to put your kids through college is not a >sacrifice. Giving everything you own to a bum on the street is. This is a strange use of the word "sacrifice" which I have not heard of before. Whether or not saving to send your kids through college is a sacrifice depends on your priorities. It also depends on your means. Giving 1% of your income to charity is, I submit, not a sacrifice if you make over a million dollars a year. Charley Wingate
mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (07/25/85)
>/* mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) / 4:25 pm Jul 21, 1985 */ >Is this belief really common? I can't say that I've heard of anyone (when I >properly understood them) who advocated such a position, much less lived by >it. I believe you are right that there aren't many people (at least in the U.S.) who advocate such a position with regard to what they consider their own interests, but I believe there are many who accept others' definitions of their own interest, i.e., philosophically they place others above themselves. Mike Sykora