carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/20/85)
Mitch Marks writes: >All the same, I'd like to propose another rationale in favor of the law, one >which isn't respectable enough to make it as an official reason, but which >is ultimately the real reason why I'm fer the law more than agin it. All in >all, I would rather wear a belt and be safe. But (before the law) I would >often feel silly -- like a nerdo wimp, you might say -- or else, when a >passenger, feel like I'm insulting the driver. "I'd better get this belt >on quick, 'cause I know you're gonna crash us." Okay, so with the law >in place all these second thoughts and strange projections can just >evaporate. Actually, this is a nontrivial reason in favor of such laws. A law can help change a collective behavior pattern in which all the individual agents act rationally, yet the total result is far from optimal. For example: everyone slows down to stare at an accident on the freeway, and the result is a traffic jam in which every driver spends ten extra minutes driving just to see an accident that each driver individually would only want to spend ten extra *seconds* to see. Such patterns are common in interactions among people (they are often called Prisoner's Dilemma or Free Rider situations), and in general, individual rationality does not lead to a collectively optimal situation. The free market is a special case: the market "works" (in the sense it may be said to work) because each agent enters the marketplace *voluntarily*. But this is not the general case with social interactions. In the case of a passenger (or driver, for that matter) who feels it is "wimpy" or discourteous to use a seat belt in the absence of a law, a law may change the situation as Mitch describes above, so that for him using a belt is now the rational choice. The result is that at virtually no cost (since he is not being perceived as rude or a wimp, and it takes ?1.5 sec to buckle up), he gets in return an large increase in safety (50% reduction in chances of death or injury). Multiply this by all drivers and passengers so affected, and the net benefit to society would be large. Furthermore, the same result could obtain if a person is largely motivated by *habit* (which I suspect is often the case WRT seat-belt usage) rather than social norms that forbid wimpiness or discourtesy: a law could provide the situation that would change a person's habitual behavior at little cost but great benefit to the individual. But I'm speculating now. An excellent book on this topic is Thomas Schelling's *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/23/85)
In article <160@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >... Such patterns are common in interactions among people (they are >often called Prisoner's Dilemma or Free Rider situations), and in >general, individual rationality does not lead to a collectively >optimal situation. The free market is a special case: the market >"works" (in the sense it may be said to work) because each agent >enters the marketplace *voluntarily*. But this is not the general >case with social interactions. Indeed, Free Rider situations are a systematic problem for libertarianism, which can at best take care of negative impacts inadvertantly inflicted by everyone on others (e.g. pollution), not positive impacts (e.g. the benefits one gives others by contributing to national defense). It cannot even handle all the negative impact situations adequately. Liber- tarian arguments on such issues falter and must ultimately fall back on a fanatic insistence on the non-initiation principle, which, unfortunately, is completely without ground in logic or fact. --Paul V Torek, Iconoclast for all seasons (coming soon to this theater near you: torek%umich-ciprnet@csnet-relay.arpa)
verdeyen@uiucuxc.Uiuc.ARPA (08/25/85)
Your point of view is interesting. I have never considered it from that viewpoint. I have one problem with your argument, if it really mattered to a person what other people thought of him, then that is his fault, and it is not government's responsibility to relieve him of that syndrome. For if government takes that responsibility, we could all be wearing uniforms in a few years. Clothing certainly reflects a person's personality, and someone might be afraid people would consider him "wimpy" if he wore the wrong color of shoes. My biggest problem, however, with the seatbelt law is the reason why it was passed. Here, in Illinois, there were no significant groups lobbying for the law with public safety in mind. The main lobby groups were affiliated with car maufacturers whose sole interest was economic. (If enough states pass such seatbelt laws, auto makers won't have to install airbags in their new line of cars; a costly operation.) So my gripe is this: who exactly is the government? In regard to the seatbelt law, the people of Illinois sure weren't. One of the 'representatives' was quoted as saying, 'I've had a lot of negative response to the proposed law, but I'm not going to let that change my mind'... and she is "representing" her constituents??????? At any rate, the precedent has been set in Illinois. Big business has stepped into government to protect its economic interest. That isn't a democracy, that's a corporation. If big business is allowed to step in the legislative process on a whim, what's next? A law that requires participation in a physical fitness program would benefit those in that industry, and it sure would make America healthy. So the next time the governor signs a bill, and passes it off on the pretense that he's doing it for the good of the public, you can bet it won't be a ban on alcohol or tobacco. Mike Verdeyen
josh@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU (J Storrs Hall) (08/27/85)
In article <160@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: > ... A law >can help change a collective behavior pattern in which all the >individual agents act rationally, yet the total result is far from >optimal. ... Such patterns are common in interactions among people (they are >often called Prisoner's Dilemma or Free Rider situations), and in >general, individual rationality does not lead to a collectively >optimal situation. The free market is a special case: the market >"works" (in the sense it may be said to work) because each agent >enters the marketplace *voluntarily*. But this is not the general >case with social interactions. >Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes Richard is teetering dangerously close to a valuable insight. Namely, that there are some systems in which the rational behavior of all the participants "sums" to the good of all (as in the market) but that many systems work the opposite way. In particular, political systems work the opposite way: it is impossible for everybody to get rich by stealing from everybody else. --JoSH
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (08/28/85)
> In article <160@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: > > ... A law > >can help change a collective behavior pattern in which all the > >individual agents act rationally, yet the total result is far from > >optimal. ... Such patterns are common in interactions among people (they are > >often called Prisoner's Dilemma or Free Rider situations), and in > >general, individual rationality does not lead to a collectively > >optimal situation. The free market is a special case: the market > >"works" (in the sense it may be said to work) because each agent > >enters the marketplace *voluntarily*. But this is not the general > >case with social interactions. > >Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes > > Richard is teetering dangerously close to a valuable insight. > Namely, that there are some systems in which the rational behavior > of all the participants "sums" to the good of all (as in the market) > but that many systems work the opposite way. In particular, political > systems work the opposite way: it is impossible for everybody to > get rich by stealing from everybody else. > > --JoSH JoSH, what do you want to have in the absence of a political system? When I deduced that a dictatorship, you were offended. I am still guessing. My second guess: a theocracy, with the priests educated in the Chicago shool of economy. Perhaps I am offending you, but I want you to be more specific. Piotr Berman