[net.politics.theory] Military Preparedness

mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/18/85)

In article <3677@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU> josh@topaz.UUCP (J Storrs Hall) writes:

>> Now here comes a large army pouring over the borders from
>>next door.

>Which one, the glorious forces of Canadian hegemony, or the invincible
>fury of the Mexican War Machine?

Ah yes, if we don't have an answer, say something stupid.  We have two ocean
borders too, you know.  THere's a large, rather agressive People's
Dictatorship on the other side, you know.

>> Just what market forces are going to recruit, train, equip,
>>and organize an effective resistance force before the country is
>>essentiallty completely overrun? Under these cicumstances it is
>>*preparedness*, not size and wealth that determine victory.

>Neither market nor government can "recruit, train, equip,
>and organize" an army (or a set of retaliatory nuclear missles)
>while an invasion is in progress.  You've assumed your conclusion,
>namely that the market would be unprepared.  

>Let's consider the Blitzkreig invasion of France in WWII.  France
>was *not* unprepared; she had spent enormous sums on the Maginot
>Line.  The French had put all their eggs in one basket.  A market
>for defense would not do that:  it would have the country under
>a wide variety of schemes, some of which might work.  I'd personally
>favor an assassination defense:  permeate the other country with agents 
>and assassinate its political leaders, instead of slaughtering thousands
>of luckless doughfoots, who were probably drafted anyway.  Anyway,
>you can come up with your own scheme--and sell it *concurrently*
>with mine.

Oh really?  Isn't it much more likely that market forces would make one
particular Defense Inc. strategy become dominant at a given time?  And if
you have five competing defense systems, what about cooperation?  When four
of them collapse, what's the fifth to do?  What if three of them turn
traitor?  Who is to stop them?

Charley Wingate

josh@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU (J Storrs Hall) (09/18/85)

>...  Isn't it much more likely that market forces would make one
>particular Defense Inc. strategy become dominant at a given time?  

If so, you would just have a conventional military, so what's the problem?
However, I don't think it would happen like that.

>And if
>you have five competing defense systems, what about cooperation?  When four
>of them collapse, what's the fifth to do?  

Everybody who took up this argument, (not just Charley) omitted the 
reference to Luttwak.  Let me reccomend him again:  He makes a good 
case for the aphorism, "Great military victories happen when a force that's
3% efficient beats one which is 2% efficient."  My major point is that
the vaunted efficiency, coordination, and so forth of a centralized
government military system generally just don't exist, and that forces
organized along market lines would likely be just as efficient.

"Hello, Amalgamated Artillery."

"This is Sgt. Foobar of Infantry, Inc.  I'd like to order a barrage on
the west slope of Humongous Hill at 3:45 this afternoon."

"Thank you for your order, sir, will that be all?"

"For the moment--and bill me!"

>What if three of them turn traitor?  Who is to stop them?
>Charley Wingate

What if the Army, Navy, and Air Force turn traitor?   *Who would
stop them?*  Why do you think the other is any more likely?  You've
completely disregarded the question of individual motivations--
I believe people love, and will die for, their society, not their 
State.  And would love it more if it were just and non-coercive.

--JoSH

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (09/19/85)

> >...  Isn't it much more likely that market forces would make one
> >particular Defense Inc. strategy become dominant at a given time?  
> 
> If so, you would just have a conventional military, so what's the problem?
> However, I don't think it would happen like that.
> 
> >And if
> >you have five competing defense systems, what about cooperation?  When four
> >of them collapse, what's the fifth to do?  
> 
> Everybody who took up this argument, (not just Charley) omitted the 
> reference to Luttwak.  Let me reccomend him again:  He makes a good 
> case for the aphorism, "Great military victories happen when a force that's
> 3% efficient beats one which is 2% efficient."  My major point is that
> the vaunted efficiency, coordination, and so forth of a centralized
> government military system generally just don't exist, and that forces
> organized along market lines would likely be just as efficient.
> 
> "Hello, Amalgamated Artillery."
> 
> "This is Sgt. Foobar of Infantry, Inc.  I'd like to order a barrage on
> the west slope of Humongous Hill at 3:45 this afternoon."
> 
> "Thank you for your order, sir, will that be all?"
> 
> "For the moment--and bill me!"

What about "Sorry, due to uncertain outcome of the war, we decided to
accept only cash, 50% in our currency, 50% in enemy's currency".

> --JoSH

The basic flaw of JoSH is the following: how a market may operate for
goods which are not used, like military services in the peace time?
There are not clear criteria to select.  This is already a problem
with military, but I do not see any reason that market would do it
better.
Also, who would pay to develop weapons and train soldiers in the 
peace time?  JoSH wrote that the patriotic citizens may purchase
the necessary wapons themselves.  Of course, not everybody may
now afford a nuclear-powered submarine or a fighter plane, but
in Libertaria we would have enough of the wealthy individuals
fiercely devoted to the system which allows them to prosper so
well.
Hm.  Where is the argument that private companies would not wage
wars of aggresion, since they are noneconomical?  All of the
American aggresive wars were much cheaper than the necessary
expences to keep Ruskies at bay.

Piotr Berman

eklhad@ihnet.UUCP (K. A. Dahlke) (09/23/85)

> ... "Great military victories happen when a force that's
> 3% efficient beats one which is 2% efficient."
> --JoSH

Many have discussed factors leading to an effective defense,
in order to evaluate the viability of a libertarian military.
Among these factors, certainly wealth and military efficiency (two that
were mentioned) are important, as history shows.
If these were the only factors, a libertarian military
might be invincible.  However (there is always a however),
there is a fundamental aspect of military success,
that almost everyone understands at some level,
but libertarians continually ignore it.
Indeed, it is one of the *most* important factors.
This concept, in a word, is "secrecy";
the element of surprise.
Read up on military strategies, and see how "surprise"
correlates with victory (at the battle level).
Although specific details are classified,
I'm sure some statistics are public knowledge;
part of any good military text book.
The results are startling.

Yet secrecy is antithetic to one of the basic axioms of Libertaria,
namely free information.  If military companies
compete effectively by selling their services to an informed
citizenry, enemy forces could easily acquire the brochures,
and establish countermeasures making each company's strategy impotent.

When i first subscribed to this news group, I didn't really expect to find
myself arguing *against* libertarians, but we must remember the axioms
upon which Libertaria rests.  When an axiom (e.g. free information)
*cannot* possibly apply, it is time to bring in the government.
Effective defense cannot spring from the free market.
-- 
	This .signature file intentionally left blank.
		Karl Dahlke    ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad

walker@oberon.UUCP (Mike Walker) (09/27/85)

> When i first subscribed to this news group, I didn't really expect to find
> myself arguing *against* libertarians, but we must remember the axioms
> upon which Libertaria rests.  When an axiom (e.g. free information)
> *cannot* possibly apply, it is time to bring in the government.
> Effective defense cannot spring from the free market.
> -- 
> 	This .signature file intentionally left blank.
> 		Karl Dahlke    ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad

Karl,

Free information is not a libertarian axiom.  Information is a commodity
that is bought and sold.  If I don't want to talk, freely or for money,
the only way to get me to talk is to coerce me.  Coersion is antithema
to most libertatians other than in self defense.  A person or company
can, though, contractually arrange not to reveal information.  Such a
contract could then be enforced since that contract would represent a
property right to the signing parties.  Thus military contractors, like
Amalgamated Artillary or Infantry Supply Co., could be bound to secrecy.

-- 
Michael D. Walker (Mike)
Arpa: walker@oberon.ARPA
Uucp: {the (mostly unknown) world}!ihnp4!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker
                 {several select chunks}!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker

friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (09/30/85)

In article <3690@topaz.RUTGERS.EDU> josh@topaz.UUCP (J Storrs Hall) writes:
>
>What if the Army, Navy, and Air Force turn traitor?   *Who would
>stop them?*  Why do you think the other is any more likely?  You've
>completely disregarded the question of individual motivations--
>I believe people love, and will die for, their society, not their 
>State.  And would love it more if it were just and non-coercive.
>

	Well, there is nothing to stop *individual* members of the
armed forces from going over, but I do not believe that it is nearly
as likely that the whole organization will change sides as it is with
a "private" military. It is a matter of precieved primary loyalty and
motivation. The armed forces were *created* by the nation for the
purpose of defending the nation, and the authority of its leadership
comes from the natonal government, which has a vested interest in
successful defense. Also the hiring(recruitment) policy is oriented
towards loyalty to the nation. With a private organisation the origin
and reason for its existence would(under your system) be *profit*, and
the executive leadership would be responsible to the Board of
Directors, so the organizations principle loyalty would be to money,
not the nation and it could be bought out. Furthermore the hiring
policy would *Strongly* emphasize loyalty to the *organization* not to
Libertaria, so the rank and file would follow thier bosses and obey
orders even to betray allied organizations. This is basically a
variation on the reason why the police must be a public rather than a
private organization - it is called "conflict of interest".
-- 

				Sarima (Stanley Friesen)

UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen
ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa