torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/13/85)
[Net.philosophy readers, I felt the stuff about screwdriver use would be proper material for the newsgroup; please wade thru to that discussion] In article <28200163@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >Excuse me. You're excused. :-> > Time to open the dictionary: >Empirical adj.... 1. Relying or based solely >on experiment and observation rather than theory (the empirical method) >2. relying or based on practical experience without reference to >scientific principles (an empirical remedy) [NAT HOWARD] My usage may be incorrect, but I meant "empirical" to mean based on obser- vation, however indirectly (thus one *would* be able to appeal to a scientific theory and still have an "empirical" answer). > [...] Without venturing too far into the grounds of net.abortion, >consider: the REASON a pregnant woman would like to know [whether a fetus >has a nervous system] is to avoid killing what she might define as a person. I don't like the word "person" here, it's too slippery. The point to grasp here is that she has to come up with some directly applicable criterion. In mentioning a nervous system I imagined that the woman in question is motivated to avoid killing a living thing that has sensations, and that she knows the empirical evidence linking minds with nervous systems. >One might find out empirically that a fetus has a nervous system, but >finding out whether it is a person must be forever beyond empiricism ... Perhaps, but that just shows that asking "is it a person" is asking the wrong question. (See some of my net.abortion stuff on this point.) >I think you've confused "empirical questions" with "empirical answers". >There pregnant woman cannot learn empirically (that is, by experiment) >if her fetus is a person. She certainly cannot learn empirically >whether (say) the fetus would have been a good person if allowed to >develop UNLESS DEVELOPMENT IS ALLOWED. Catch-22 [...] It's true that there may be catch-22's in such decisions. What can one say -- life's tough. If she worries whether her baby would be a Mozart or a Hitler (a la the silly abortion arguments that go "what if Mozart had been aborted?" "Oh yeah, well what if Hitler had been?" etc.), then I suppose she has to rely on sketchy evidence such as the releative frequencies of heroes and villains in the past. >Because crucial questions (to her) may not be answered by >empirical means. Is this so hard to accept? Taking "empirical" as your dictionary defines it, I'll accept that. >>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. >Excuse me, but are you assigning equal weights to the effects an action >has on others and to yourself? If so, what rational or factual basis >do you have for such an assignment? You're excused. :-> :-> I think you're shifting the burden of argument here -- it's on the one who claims that a set of weightings is contrary to reason. I met that burden regarding the weighting schemes I criticized. >>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion >>is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >Excuse me, You sure your name isn't Steve Martin? :-> :-> (well exCUUUuuuse ME!) > we've agreed that the weightings of things can be non-rationally chosen, > so this point is nothing new -- the libertarian prefers no coercion to > himself or others to the avoidance of the negative effects of the >free-rider situation. Is this rational? It need not be -- [...] I haven't agreed about that. I think such a preference is not just nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on their own account. >>Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already >>converted", so to speak. >Gosh! I'm devastated! :-) Really now. I suppose one might argue for the hell of it, but I for one would rather hold up agreement among participants as an ideal. >>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational". Love is nonrational, >>in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it >>is not *contrary to reason*. >That a Montague should love a Capulet was surely contrary to reason, but >it's also one of the great love stories of all time. That one should >kill oneself WITHOUT CHECKING to see if one's love is dead is scarcely >reasonable, but here we have Paul Torek, ruler in hand, telling us that >"love is not *contrary to reason*". Gimme a break. Obviously love played a role in such errors, but wiser people could have made wiser choices -- even while feeling just as power- ful feelings. To make an analogy, consider the definition of courage not as absence of fear, but as keeping one's head in the face of fear. >Back to you: if your preferences are nonrational, you do not *NEED* any >compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic. To need such a >reason would imply that your basis for preferences *IS* rational, which >contradicts the hypothesis. True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is uncomfortable. So while you may not NEED a reason to have them respond to logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond to logic -- on the (hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are by nature nonrational. >>... your reply would be a good >>one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational >>grounds. That, however, is not the case. Moreover, even if it were the >>case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite. >Okay, Paul. I invite you here to publish the rational justification of >just one of the fundamental rules you live by. Your choice of weights >would not be a bad one. A fair challenge, I must admit. OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy... "coming soon to a theater near you!" --Paul V Torek, evaporating the ideological mist torek@umich