nrh@inmet.UUCP (09/24/85)
>/* Written 3:49 pm Sep 17, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Logic, fact, preference, and social" ---------- */ > >Nat Howard (nrh@inmet.UUCP) writes: >>>... you might personally experience coercion as so galling as to >>>negate in your own mind any positive result it might bring about, but there >>>is no *logic* in such a perspective. Just preference. >>> Baba > >>Agreed. ... >>... I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact. > >>As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you >>prefer. I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any >>social order that has a basis in "logic or fact". > >Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can. Facts about >what's good for you can be a basis for non-moral preferences ("moral" used >here in the narrow sense of evaluations of ways of treating others). More >generally (it gets fun now): whether a particular, conrete action is right >or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and >how many calories it expends. For example (an example very much to the point), >whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to >whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of >relevant information. The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it takes strikes me as suspect. The idea that such a thing could be empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately. For example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort a particular fetus? Suppose it were the fetus of a new Einstein? A new Hitler? In one case the abortion may be (according to some irrationally-chosen metric) a bad idea. In the other case, by the same metric, it was a good idea. But one doesn't know how a particular fetus would turn out, so one cannot experience empirical rightness or wrongness to such an act (because one doesn't have the information available to evaluate it against the metric). [PRO/ANTI ABORTIONISTS: SEE NOTE BELOW BEFORE RESPONDING] >Relevant information includes (and as far as I can tell only includes) facts >about benefits/harms to myself and others flowing from the social system >under consideration. Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects >on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or >differently. Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible; >for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself. Bingo! You've agreed with me. So long as the assignments of weights are indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating a social system -- any such basis itself depends on what weights you choose, which in turn (at least partially, according to your statement) depends upon irrational criteria. >(Either assignment would be self-defeating, given that caring about others >improves one's own life and vice versa. Furthermore, neither position could >be agreed on by a rational community, for reasons which I hope are not hard >to see.) > >A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills >both of the following conditions: it has no basis in logic or fact; a >principle that does have such basis can conflict with it. "Prisoners- >Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different >objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off. Since it is >compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits >everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in >all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect. UNLESS of course, >it has some independent basis in logic or fact -- and if you think so, >then dammit, SUPPLY IT! Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem. By adding the element of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the ostensible payoff. Instead of "years in prison" being the only basis for choosing a particular cell in the payoff matrix, one must now choose "years in prison AND accept/deny coercive input". In other words, some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it. Is this rational? Why certainly NOT, but the point is that ALL such weighting decisions are at base, irrational. In short, your assumption is that the years spent in prison are absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside. That's YOUR rationally-indefensible weighting. If people acted rationally in such situations, why aren't Clarke taxes widespread? If they DON'T act rationally, is it right to seize power (violently) and impose Clarke taxes? Why not? >One more point and then I'll rest. If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down >to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline) >my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored >social order? You've mistaken my purpose in posting. I'm not trying to convince you and you alone. I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to listen. >Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending >that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on? I'm pointing out holes in your logic where I see them -- if Daniel McK. can convince you of the wrongness of public schools, perhaps I can convince you of the danger of imposing "rational" weightings on people who must choose their own weightings on irrational grounds. Besides, that preferences are irrational does not imply that they cannot be changed by logic. Irrational preferences may RESPOND to logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them. For example, I prefer the evolutionist argument to the creationist. Why? Because I believe one to be more closely corresponding to reality than the other. Why should I prefer evolution? Because the irrational opinion-generator in my head says that while neither one can be absolutely verified or discounted, one of them is nicely-formed and the other is full of kludges. Either one MIGHT be correct, but I prefer the well-formed to the poorly-formed. That is an irrational preference, so far as I know. >When >someone says there is no rational support for one set of values or another, >yet expects me to accept his thesis for reasons, why should I take the trouble >of concentrating on the issue and testing my opinions? Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason. My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds, and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles, and therefore the statement was nugatory. Why should I bother to point this out? For irrational reasons of my own, I prefer that pointless criticisms of ANY viewpoint be exposed as such. >Why should I not >say, "I don't feel like thinking very hard, and I don't like the noises this >two-legged animal is making -- I think I'll walk away"?! Feel free! I doubt one can discover a rational reason for participating in net.politics.* -- for my part, I do it because I enjoy it. [NOTE: I'm using abortion here merely as an illustration of a situation in which it is impossible to evaluate the rightness of something against a certain set of rules. This is an ENTIRELY theoretical exercise, and any comment on this article from the pro/anti abortion stance (it would never be right to abort a fetus/it's always up to the mother no matter if a child would turn out to be Einstein) should be directed to net.abortion, or better yet, not posted at all -- NRH]
nrh@inmet.UUCP (09/24/85)
Oops! Spoke too soon..... >/* Written 3:07 am Sep 24, 1985 by nrh@inmet.UUCP in inmet:net.politics.t */ >>/* Written 3:49 pm Sep 17, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >>/* ---------- "Logic, fact, preference, and social" ---------- */ >>.... Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects >>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or >>differently. Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible; >>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself. > >Bingo! You've agreed with me. So long as the assignments of weights are >indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have >some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating >a social system -- any such basis itself depends on what weights you >choose, which in turn (at least partially, according to your statement) >depends upon irrational criteria. Paul was clearly talking about "some systems of assigning weights", and I was clearly off-base in taking that to mean "some assignments of weights", especially as he gives examples. My mistake. Paul has not implicitly agreed with me at this point. He's still making irrational assumptions, though, most importantly that the degree of caring about others may be turned into some rational assignment of weights.
janw@inmet.UUCP (09/25/85)
[Nat Howard] > >... I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact. > >As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you > >prefer. I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any > >social order that has a basis in "logic or fact". [Paul Torek] > Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can. *Both* logic and fact can. Either can *falsify* one choice, and by so doing, dictate another. Consider two persons, Alpha and Beta. Alpha favors social order (a), based on (irrationally chosen) criterion A. Beta favors so- cial order (b), based on criterion B. Now suppose Beta has been able to show Alpha an unknown fact F, or an unexpected logical connection L between known facts, that proves, to Alpha's satisfac- tion, that A is better served by (b) than by (a). Alpha is now a convert; his new preferred social order is (b), and the basis for his preference is *both A and L, or both A and F*. E.g., a creationist is shown that evolution is really in the Bible. Now you might say: Alpha and Beta have become allies, but that is superficial. Their basic postulates are still A and B, respec- tively: *they* can't be changed by logic or fact. In a way, effectively, they can: by *reduction*. Suppose I max- imize health, while you maximize wealth. Now suppose you show me that the more wealth, the more health. Then I can effectively substitute your criterion for mine everywhere: I can *forget* all about health and concentrate on making money. Consider a less implausible example: our biblical creationist is persuaded to make science his criterion of truth. The argument runs thus: according to the Bible (his original criterion), God made all of nature directly, while for the Bible human co-authors were used. Nature is therefore his (OK, His, to be con- sistent) great book, greater than the Bible. (Galileo, I recol- lect, said something to this effect). Whatever you read in this book - by observation, experiment and other scientific methods - is true. Now our ex-creationist is more than a casual ally of the evolutionist - not for one occasion only. They go hand in hand indefinitely, except for such disagreements as arise between scientists. The basic postulate is effectively changed. The same scheme can be followed in a libertarian-statist argument. If the statist demonstrates that individual freedom (in the li- bertarian sense) is maximized by meeting so-called "social goals", *and* that these can only be achieved by a strong government; while a weak government inevitably leads to a stronger and more tyrannical one - he meets the libertarian on his own ground and wins. "Liberty through taxes" becomes the libertarian battle-cry. Conversely, if the libertarian proves, by facts or logic, that "social goals" can best be obtained by individuals free from government coercion - he wins, by converting his opponent. At least he should. (I've just noticed that I keep using 'he' as a generic pronoun. Please don't be distracted by it. I'm a feminist in many ways, but newspeak doubleplus ungood). Jan Wasilewsky
nrh@inmet.UUCP (09/25/85)
>/* Written 6:07 pm Sep 24, 1985 by janw@inmet.UUCP in inmet:net.politics.t */ >[Nat Howard] >> >... I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact. > > >> >As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you >> >prefer. I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any >> >social order that has a basis in "logic or fact". > >[Paul Torek] >> Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can. > >*Both* logic and fact can. Either can *falsify* one choice, and by >so doing, dictate another. > >Consider two persons, Alpha and Beta. Alpha favors social order >(a), based on (irrationally chosen) criterion A. Beta favors so- >cial order (b), based on criterion B. Now suppose Beta has been >able to show Alpha an unknown fact F, or an unexpected logical >connection L between known facts, that proves, to Alpha's satisfac- >tion, that A is better served by (b) than by (a). Alpha is now a >convert; his new preferred social order is (b), and the basis >for his preference is *both A and L, or both A and F*. > > E.g., a creationist is shown that evolution is really in the Bible. > > Now you might say: Alpha and Beta have become allies, but that is >superficial. Their basic postulates are still A and B, respec- >tively: *they* can't be changed by logic or fact. > > In a way, effectively, they can: by *reduction*. Suppose I max- >imize health, while you maximize wealth. Now suppose you show me >that the more wealth, the more health. Then I can effectively >substitute your criterion for mine everywhere: I can *forget* all >about health and concentrate on making money. But the REASON the health-maximizer is after money is to make himself more healthy. Agreed that their actions would be (as in your later example of the scientific creationist) very similar -- their motives would not. In particular, a refutation of the notion that wealth leads to health would cause one person to change his behavior but not the other. At this point, the logic is pretty far removed from behavior, but I point out that the preferences of the health-maximizer have not changed, that his preference for health has simply found a new outlet that leads him to actions similar to someone whose goal is wealth. Convincing the health-maximizer to become wealthy IN ORDER THAT HE BE HEALTHY doesn't change how he chooses his goals, nor what goals are pursued -- merely how he pursues them. > Consider a less implausible example: our biblical creationist is >persuaded to make science his criterion of truth. The argument >runs thus: according to the Bible (his original criterion), God >made all of nature directly, while for the Bible human >co-authors were used. Nature is therefore his (OK, His, to be con- >sistent) great book, greater than the Bible. (Galileo, I recol- >lect, said something to this effect). Whatever you read in this >book - by observation, experiment and other scientific methods - >is true. Now our ex-creationist is more than a casual ally of the >evolutionist - not for one occasion only. They go hand in hand >indefinitely, except for such disagreements as arise between >scientists. The basic postulate is effectively changed. The postulate is changed, and changed by the presence of "logic", but as I've pointed out, this doesn't mean the choice of postulate is rational. That a rational argument may cause one's position to shift merely means that a person has chosen new postulates in the light of the facts or logic you've given him. Why does this not mean that the preferences are logical? Because an irrational argument might accomplish the same thing (for example, if the person is shown a chapter of the bible that says "believe whatever people with the initials "NRH" tell you), or a beautifully phrased (but not rigorous) speech convinces him to re-evaluate (irrationally, of course) his postulates. In other words, arguments need not make SENSE to cause a shift -- they need merely have impact. I do agree with you though that a flaw in the logic of a position can lead someone to drop that position, but consider what that implies -- that the person believes in logic to the extent that it influences his other positions. Why believe in logic? I do because I think it gives me a good lever on things, but that doesn't mean that I could defend the proposition that "the universe is logical" in a rigorous sense -- I believe the universe is logical, and therefore logic worth following, but I can't PROVE it by logic, nor (given the limits of our knowledge) marshall anything on the fact side but a list of the successes of the application of logic. Not rigorous at all. Why all this in net.politics.theory? Because *WHY* people believe what they believe, and how to change their beliefs are probably the most interesting political questions, with profound implications for practicing politicians. I'm about done with this topic (I hope). As Bastiat said: Good Lord! What a lot of trouble to prove in political economy that two and two make four; and if you succeed in doing so, people cry, "It is so clear that it is boring." Then they vote as if you had never proved anything at all.
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/28/85)
In article <28200105@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >>[...] (it gets fun now): whether a particular, conrete action is right >>or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and >>how many calories it expends. For example ([one] very much to the point), >>whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to >>whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of >>relevant information. [TOREK] > >The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to >some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it >takes strikes me as suspect. The idea that such a thing could be >empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to >discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately. For >example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort >a particular fetus? [NAT HOWARD] If the person would have aborted it had she considered it rationally and with relevant information, then her act was right. We know what rational consider- ation of an issue means, namely consideration free of irrational mistakes. "Relevant information" is that information which tends to motivate the woman in question -- and the question of what information tends to motivate her is an *empirical* question. Finally, though we (and she) might not know the facts on some of the relevant issues -- for example, suppose that whether the fetus has a nervous system is relevant information for her, but due to insufficient scientific investigation we don't know whether it has one -- still, the information is *empircally discoverable in principle*. I conclude that whether a particular act is right or wrong turns on several questions, each one of which is empirical. Therefore, whether the act is right is also an empirical question. >>[...] Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects >>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or >>differently. Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible; >>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself. > >Bingo! You've agreed with me. So long as the assignments of weights are >indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have >some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating >a social system [...] I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. >>A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills >>both of the following conditions: it has no basis in logic or fact; a >>principle that does have such basis can conflict with it. "Prisoners- >>Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different >>objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off. Since it is >>compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits >>everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in >>all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect. [...] > >Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem. By adding the element >of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the >ostensible payoff. Yes, that's exactly why coercion should be used. >[... but] some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison >rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it. [...] > your assumption is that the years spent in prison are >absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside. No. You misunderstand my point. My point is that libertarianism is unacceptable to any rational person. The reason for this is that sometimes libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>One more point and then I'll rest. If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down >>to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline) >>my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored >>social order? > >You've mistaken my purpose in posting. I'm not trying to convince you >and you alone. I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to >listen. Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already converted", so to speak. >>Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending >>that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on? > >[...] that preferences are irrational does not imply that they >cannot be changed by logic. Irrational preferences may RESPOND to >logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them. You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational". Love is nonrational, in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it is not *contrary to reason*. When I argue that libertarianism is irrational, I am arguing that it is *contrary to* reason. I take the above to mean that nonrational preferences may respond to logic. Thus, in arguing with me, Huybensz, etc., you hope to get us to "respond" to logic. I'm sorry, but this is still ideological mystification: if our preferences are nonrational, then we have no compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic; and it is uncomfortable to change one's preferences, especially one's politics. >Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about >the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason. >My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds, >and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from >reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles, >and therefore the statement was nugatory. That is indeed what one of my points was, and your reply would be a good one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational grounds. That, however, is not the case. Moreover, even if it were the case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite. --Paul V Torek, trying to cure my habit of "dense-pack" arguments
walker@oberon.UUCP (Mike Walker) (10/05/85)
> > [Nat Howard] > > >... I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact. > > > > >As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you > > >prefer. I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any > > >social order that has a basis in "logic or fact". > > [Paul Torek] > > Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can. > > *Both* logic and fact can. Either can *falsify* one choice, and by > so doing, dictate another. > > Consider two persons, Alpha and Beta. Alpha favors social order > (a), based on (irrationally chosen) criterion A. Beta favors so- > cial order (b), based on criterion B. Now suppose Beta has been > able to show Alpha an unknown fact F, or an unexpected logical > connection L between known facts, that proves, to Alpha's satisfac- > tion, that A is better served by (b) than by (a). Alpha is now a > convert; his new preferred social order is (b), and the basis > for his preference is *both A and L, or both A and F*. > > E.g., a creationist is shown that evolution is really in the Bible. > > Jan Wasilewsky Jan has just explained how the free market place of ideas operates. An excellent explanation. But a prerequisite to this is free speech (and hopefully free from external control thought). If the government is so powerful as to control a man's life (food etc) then free speech is dead. The idea that a weak government leads to tyranny is not correct. There must be a power vacuum. If other private social institutions took up where government left off then no such vacumm would exist. For a good example look at the USSR. Lenin and (at the time) associates took over while the royalty was in decline. The was no modern market place or even a weak parliment (sic?) to expand into the gap. They were gonna build an anarchist society but they were gonna have to have an all powerfull government to do it :-) uhuh! -- Michael D. Walker (Mike) Arpa: walker@oberon.ARPA Uucp: {the (mostly unknown) world}!ihnp4!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker {several select chunks}!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker
janw@inmet.UUCP (10/09/85)
> [torek@umich] > ... My point is that libertarianism is > unacceptable to any rational person. The reason for this is that sometimes > libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's > dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when > everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion > is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. No, given the premise, conclusion does not follow. The fact that following a principle (in this case non-coercion) sometimes yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not* make that principle unacceptable to any rational person. A ra- tional person would consider the alternatives: (1) following another principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu- tions or (2) calculating benefits case by case - which is uneconomical, and also (very important) makes one susceptible to irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle em- bodied in habit is a safeguard. E.g., an alcoholic forgoes a sip of wine that could do him good, sticking to a larger determination to stop drinking. His principle is momentarily suboptimal but not irrational. Now substitute coercion for alcohol and society for the alcoholic. In particular, some rational people support the First Amendment, which could not stand your kind of test. Jan Wasilewsky
nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/09/85)
>/* Written 3:33 pm Sep 28, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >In article <28200105@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >>>[...] (it gets fun now): whether a particular, conrete action is right >>>or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and >>>how many calories it expends. For example ([one] very much to the point), >>>whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to >>>whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of >>>relevant information. [TOREK] >> >>The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to >>some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it >>takes strikes me as suspect. The idea that such a thing could be >>empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to >>discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately. For >>example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort >>a particular fetus? [NAT HOWARD] > >If the person would have aborted it had she considered it rationally and with >relevant information, then her act was right. We know what rational consider- >ation of an issue means, namely consideration free of irrational mistakes. >"Relevant information" is that information which tends to motivate the woman >in question -- and the question of what information tends to motivate her >is an *empirical* question. Finally, though we (and she) might not know >the facts on some of the relevant issues -- for example, suppose that whether >the fetus has a nervous system is relevant information for her, but due to >insufficient scientific investigation we don't know whether it has one -- >still, the information is *empircally discoverable in principle*. Excuse me. Time to open the dictionary: Empirical adj.... 1. Relying or based solely on experiment and observation rather than theory (the empirical method) 2. relying or based on practical experience without reference to scientific principles (an empirical remedy) I'm assuming that the reason you cite (for example) the idea that a fetus might have a nervous system as important is because it determines something of how human a fetus is. Without venturing too far into the grounds of net.abortion, consider: the REASON a pregnant woman would like to know that is to avoid killing what she might define as a person. One might find out empirically that a fetus has a nervous system, but finding out whether it is a person must be forever beyond empiricism (just like finding out whether a person is good must be forever beyond physics). >I conclude that whether a particular act is right or wrong turns on several >questions, each one of which is empirical. Therefore, whether the act is >right is also an empirical question. I think you've confused "empirical questions" with "empirical answers". There pregnant woman cannot learn empirically (that is, by experiment) if her fetus is a person. She certainly cannot learn empirically whether (say) the fetus would have been a good person if allowed to develop UNLESS DEVELOPMENT IS ALLOWED. Hence there is NO empirical ANSWER to her question (should she abort) possible unless she does not abort. Catch-22, and thus there is (assuming that she wishes to have the baby only if it would be a good person) NO empirical basis for judgement. Why? Because crucial questions (to her) may not be answered by empirical means. Is this so hard to accept? I do not argue that there are no grounds for wrestling with her conscience here, merely that no experiment she can perform will give answers to the questions I have put in this (hypothetical) woman's head. > >>>[...] Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects >>>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or >>>differently. Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible; >>>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself. >> >>Bingo! You've agreed with me. So long as the assignments of weights are >>indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have >>some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating >>a social system [...] > >I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. Excuse me, but are you assigning equal weights to the effects an action has on others and to yourself? If so, what rational or factual basis do you have for such an assignment? (In short, defend your assignment of equal weights on rational grounds, particularly in light of your (presumed) inability to know the impacts on others as well as you know the impacts on yourself). Come to think of it, you might post that to net.philosophy with a pointer here. >>>A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills >>>both of the following conditions: it has no basis in logic or fact; a >>>principle that does have such basis can conflict with it. "Prisoners- >>>Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different >>>objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off. Since it is >>>compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits >>>everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in >>>all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect. [...] >> >>Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem. By adding the element >>of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the >>ostensible payoff. > >Yes, that's exactly why coercion should be used. > >>[... but] some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison >>rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it. [...] >> your assumption is that the years spent in prison are >>absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside. > >No. You misunderstand my point. My point is that libertarianism is >unacceptable to any rational person. The reason for this is that sometimes >libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion >is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. Excuse me, we've agreed that the weightings of things can be non-rationally chosen, so this point is nothing new -- the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others to the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation. Is this rational? It need not be -- it is an expression of HIS choice of weightings, which, like yours, need have no rational basis to be valid. >>>One more point and then I'll rest. If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down >>>to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline) >>>my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored >>>social order? >> >>You've mistaken my purpose in posting. I'm not trying to convince you >>and you alone. I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to >>listen. > >Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already >converted", so to speak. Gosh! I'm devastated! :-) >>>Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending >>>that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on? >> >>[...] that preferences are irrational does not imply that they >>cannot be changed by logic. Irrational preferences may RESPOND to >>logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them. > >You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational". Love is nonrational, >in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it >is not *contrary to reason*. That a Montague should love a Capulet was surely contrary to reason, but it's also one of the great love stories of all time. That one should kill oneself WITHOUT CHECKING to see if one's love is dead is scarcely reasonable, but here we have Paul Torek, ruler in hand, telling us that "love is not *contrary to reason*". >When I argue that libertarianism is >irrational, I am arguing that it is *contrary to* reason. > >I take the above to mean that nonrational preferences may respond to >logic. Thus, in arguing with me, Huybensz, etc., you hope to get us >to "respond" to logic. I'm sorry, but this is still ideological >mystification: if our preferences are nonrational, then we have no >compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic; and it is uncomfortable >to change one's preferences, especially one's politics. Back to you: if your preferences are nonrational, you do not *NEED* any compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic. To need such a reason would imply that your basis for preferences *IS* rational, which contradicts the hypothesis. There may be ideological mist around here, but little mystification (at least at my end). On the other hand, if your preferences ARE rational, then rational arguments should suffice to change them regardless of your irrational choices, and again, there is a point to my posting. >>Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about >>the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason. >>My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds, >>and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from >>reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles, >>and therefore the statement was nugatory. > >That is indeed what one of my points was, and your reply would be a good >one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational >grounds. That, however, is not the case. Moreover, even if it were the >case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite. Okay, Paul. I invite you here to publish the rational justification of just one of the fundamental rules you live by. Your choice of weights would not be a bad one.
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/11/85)
In article <28200162@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >...The fact that >following a principle (in this case non-coercion) sometimes >yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not* >make that principle unacceptable to any rational person. A ra- >tional person would consider the alternatives: (1) following >another principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu- >tions or (2) calculating benefits case by case - which is >uneconomical, and also (very important) makes one susceptible to >irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle em- >bodied in habit is a safeguard. That's a fair point, but it only applies to "low-level" principles, the criteria directly used in acting, and not to "high-level" ones like SOME libertarians say the principle of non-coercion is. Some libertarians would argue that (2) should not even be considered, and it was them I was concerned to argue against. In any case, (2) is the superior choice in this case because the benefits to be gotten by abandoning the non-coercion principle in free rider situations are enormous. But also, on a more abstract level, the problems that libertarian principles generate in free-rider situations are *symptomatic* of a deeper flaw, namely that they are divorced from considerations of human benefit and harm in an unhealthy way. (I know that's vague, but I think anyone not firmly in the grip of an ideology will see what I'm getting at.) --Iconbusters, Inc. "We make flames the old-fashioned way -- we EARN it"
nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/16/85)
> >> Time to open the dictionary: >>Empirical adj.... 1. Relying or based solely >>on experiment and observation rather than theory (the empirical method) >>2. relying or based on practical experience without reference to >>scientific principles (an empirical remedy) [NAT HOWARD] > >My usage may be incorrect, but I meant "empirical" to mean based on obser- >vation, however indirectly (thus one *would* be able to appeal to a >scientific theory and still have an "empirical" answer). Shall I take it that we agree that your choice of words was wrong? > >> [...] Without venturing too far into the grounds of net.abortion, >>consider: the REASON a pregnant woman would like to know [whether a fetus >>has a nervous system] is to avoid killing what she might define as a person. > >I don't like the word "person" here, it's too slippery. The point to grasp >here is that she has to come up with some directly applicable criterion. In >mentioning a nervous system I imagined that the woman in question is motivated >to avoid killing a living thing that has sensations, and that she knows the >empirical evidence linking minds with nervous systems. > >>One might find out empirically that a fetus has a nervous system, but >>finding out whether it is a person must be forever beyond empiricism ... > >Perhaps, but that just shows that asking "is it a person" is asking the >wrong question. (See some of my net.abortion stuff on this point.) My point was that it's silly to talk about empirical answers to questions beyond empiricism. Such questions INCLUDE but are not limited to considerations of the potential goodness or badness of a choice of action, or adoption of a principle, such as reason, for the judgement of principles. >>I think you've confused "empirical questions" with "empirical answers". >>There pregnant woman cannot learn empirically (that is, by experiment) >>if her fetus is a person. She certainly cannot learn empirically >>whether (say) the fetus would have been a good person if allowed to >>develop UNLESS DEVELOPMENT IS ALLOWED. Catch-22 [...] > >It's true that there may be catch-22's in such decisions. What can one >say -- life's tough. If she worries whether her baby would be a Mozart >or a Hitler (a la the silly abortion arguments that go "what if Mozart >had been aborted?" "Oh yeah, well what if Hitler had been?" etc.), then >I suppose she has to rely on sketchy evidence such as the releative >frequencies of heroes and villains in the past. Right! But these only give her theoretical grounds for making HER decision, not empirical ones. >>Because crucial questions (to her) may not be answered by >>empirical means. Is this so hard to accept? > >Taking "empirical" as your dictionary defines it, I'll accept that. > >>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. > >>Excuse me, but are you assigning equal weights to the effects an action >>has on others and to yourself? If so, what rational or factual basis >>do you have for such an assignment? > >You're excused. :-> :-> >I think you're shifting the burden of argument here -- it's on the one who >claims that a set of weightings is contrary to reason. I met that burden >regarding the weighting schemes I criticized. I didn't claim that it was "contrary to reason", or, if I did, I did so wrongly and here apologize: what I meant was that no such set of weightings can have a basis in reason, because they precede reason. Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to be reasonable (as opposed to being guided by emotion or by zen-like inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason. I make no claim that libertarianism, or any other "ism" has a "basis" in fact or reason, merely that no other set of fundamental beliefs did, so that criticizing libertarianism on this ground is uninteresting, as any position my be criticized on this grounds. Let me add, however, that I find libertarianism quite appealing to reason (but acknowledge that many do not). As for shifting the burden of proof: you've made the claim that libertarianism has no basis in fact or reason. I've agreed, pointing out that NO philosophy can have a "basis" in such things. If you argue that YOUR philosophy DOES have a basis in such things, let's hear it, but I'd rather not attempt to prove negatives, except by counterexample. Let's have no wriggling here: you state above: >>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. Well? Defend it! I would argue that you are not allowed to use such concepts as "other people's lives have importance" without establishing them BY REASON. >>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion >>>is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >... >> we've agreed that the weightings of things can be non-rationally chosen, >> so this point is nothing new -- the libertarian prefers no coercion to >> himself or others to the avoidance of the negative effects of the >>free-rider situation. Is this rational? It need not be -- [...] > >I haven't agreed about that. I think such a preference is not just >nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! Certainly they may pale, they may react violently, but no wounds are in evidence and no force is applied. You might ask such a person: Would you prefer prison (for say) a day to being (gently) forced to see such a thing? Some folks would answer "yes". Is this contrary to reason? No. Why? Because the postulates behind their lives, their not-rationally-chosen postulates determine that they would rather be confined for a day under one set of circumstances than for a minute under another. To argue that their choice is "contrary to reason" misses the point: among their *POSTULATES* are elements which make them prefer the "non-rational" choice, and for you to dismiss their right to their preference as irrational (as in "and nobody's preference is irrational") is to ignore half the game -- the set of preferences which are irrational but inescapable, which are as firmly rooted as reason itself in someone's mind. >Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone >prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the >free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the >means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove >of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that >involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? > Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with meat, instead of screwdrivers. Does it make sense for some people to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews). It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there is no obvious material benefit to them? And perhaps a loss, due to the higher prices of other meats with respect to (another non-kosher thing) pork? >If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any >reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." >I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of >screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of >the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in >contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some >preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other >preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on >their own account. So should Jews eat pork? Is the eschewing of pork "not a genuinely good thing"? In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork, (say that everyone were starving and it were the only high-energy food available, and their strength was desirable), should they be forced to eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be weak? >>>Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already >>>converted", so to speak. > >>Gosh! I'm devastated! :-) > >Really now. I suppose one might argue for the hell of it, but I for one >would rather hold up agreement among participants as an ideal. I was "devastated" because I don't believe you, and because of what sounded to me like a "Oh yeah?" tone to your sentence. I like the idea of ultimate agreement, but it's not the ultimate good. By participants, do you count the people who do NOT speak as well? >>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational". Love is nonrational, >>>in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it >>>is not *contrary to reason*. > >>That a Montague should love a Capulet was surely contrary to reason, but >>it's also one of the great love stories of all time. That one should >>kill oneself WITHOUT CHECKING to see if one's love is dead is scarcely >>reasonable, but here we have Paul Torek, ruler in hand, telling us that >>"love is not *contrary to reason*". > >Gimme a break. Obviously love played a role in such errors, but wiser >people could have made wiser choices -- even while feeling just as power- >ful feelings. To make an analogy, consider the definition of courage not >as absence of fear, but as keeping one's head in the face of fear. Let's consider Romeo and Juliet as being strangers (with but mild good intentions towards each other). Can you imagine Romeo taking any important step that was predicated on Juliet being dead without examining the "corpse"? Possible I suppose, but so unlikely..... Take it one level up. It was surely contrary to reason for Romeo and Juliet to love one another. Their families were enemies. The situation was not practical, and thus for them to love each other was surely not in their best (material, obvious, "empirical") interest. >>Back to you: if your preferences are nonrational, you do not *NEED* any >>compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic. To need such a >>reason would imply that your basis for preferences *IS* rational, which >>contradicts the hypothesis. > >True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is >uncomfortable. So while you may not NEED a reason to have them respond to >logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond to logic -- on the >(hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are by nature nonrational. My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic. Especially if you BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact. If I wish, (for reasons of my own) to convince you of something, I may employ reason fruitfully to do this. That your irrational preference for your own beliefs (if your beliefs are truly irrational) will work against me doesn't mean that some other force (perhaps a desire to have an open mind and to stick with reason where possible) will more than overcome it. >>>... your reply would be a good >>>one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational >>>grounds. That, however, is not the case. Moreover, even if it were the >>>case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite. > >>Okay, Paul. I invite you here to publish the rational justification of >>just one of the fundamental rules you live by. Your choice of weights >>would not be a bad one. > >A fair challenge, I must admit. OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy... >"coming soon to a theater near you!"
tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) (10/18/85)
In article <28200162@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >The fact that >following a principle (in this case non-coercion) sometimes >yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not* >make that principle unacceptable to any rational person. A ra- >tional person would consider the alternatives: (1) following >another principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu- >tions or (2) calculating benefits case by case - which is >uneconomical, and also (very important) makes one susceptible to >irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle em- >bodied in habit is a safeguard. What is this -- the two options of rationality are blind adherence to principle or paranoiac treat-everything-as-a-special-case? So choose blind adherence to principle? I'd accept neither. A "common-sense" approach is to establish principles of normal behavior (such as non-coercion), and perception of situations to discriminate normal from exceptional situations, for instance by setting up thresholds within which normality is perceived to be operating and outside of which normality has disappeared and new rules should come into play. Coming up with practical boundaries for normality and unusualness is consistent with rational behavior. >E.g., an alcoholic forgoes a sip of wine that could do him >good, sticking to a larger determination to stop drinking. >His principle is momentarily suboptimal but not irrational. > >Now substitute coercion for alcohol and society for the >alcoholic. But a particular condition distinguishes the alcoholic from the regular mass of humanity -- the irrational inability to refuse a second drink. Unless we share this inability to set up degrees of judgment, we need not avoid pragmatic judgments by hard-coding principles. >In particular, some rational people support the First Amendment, >which could not stand your kind of test. > > Jan Wasilewsky This matches the alcoholic case: the state has too many bureaucrats who find it rational to censor expression, even though censorship is destructive to the public sphere. So the inability of the state to refuse an opportunity to censor when it comes around requires that it restrict its freedom via the First Amendment or similar statutes. But there are many cases not like First Amendment questions, where what the bureaucrats find to be rational is also what citizens and the public see to be rational, for instance, social welfare to keep beggars off the street, or certification-regulation of medical degrees. Tony Wuersch {amd,amdcad}!cae780!ubvax!tonyw
janw@inmet.UUCP (10/22/85)
[Tony Wuersch : tonyw@ubvax] > In article <28200162@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > >The fact that > >following a principle (in this case non-coercion) sometimes > >yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not* > >make that principle unacceptable to any rational person. A ra- > >tional person would consider the alternatives: (1) following > >another principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu- > >tions or (2) calculating benefits case by case - which is > >uneconomical, and also (very important) makes one susceptible to > >irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle em- > >bodied in habit is a safeguard. > > What is this -- the two options of rationality are blind adherence > to principle or paranoiac treat-everything-as-a-special-case? So > choose blind adherence to principle? I'd accept neither. Why blind ? > A "common-sense" approach is to establish principles of normal > behavior (such as non-coercion), and perception of situations to > discriminate normal from exceptional situations, for instance by > setting up thresholds within which normality is perceived to > be operating and outside of which normality has disappeared and > new rules should come into play. > I agree that every constraint has its threshold. E.g., someone who normally doesn't steal, passes that threshold when starvation is the alternative. Or one initiates violence under unbearable provocation. I wouldn't necessarily attempt, however, to make rules for outside the threshold, a *norm* for a situation where "normality has disappeared". What about the threshold for this new norm, any norms for para-para-normality ? A system cannot predict, and needn't try, what happens when you jump out of the system. One tries to stick to the rules, one fails, one shrugs and tries again. > >E.g., an alcoholic forgoes a sip of wine that could do him > >good, sticking to a larger determination to stop drinking. > >His principle is momentarily suboptimal but not irrational. > > > >Now substitute coercion for alcohol and society for the > >alcoholic. > > But a particular condition distinguishes the alcoholic from the > regular mass of humanity -- the irrational inability to refuse a > second drink. You summed up the whole point of this example. Human societies *are* addicted to coercion. Just look at history, almost any page. The irrational inability to refuse a second drink of blood. Cold turkey may be our best chance, > Unless we share this inability to set up degrees > of judgment, we need not avoid pragmatic judgments by hard-coding > principles. Individually, we may or may not share it, collectively we do. > >In particular, some rational people support the First Amendment, > >which could not stand your kind of test. > > > > Jan Wasilewsky > > This matches the alcoholic case: the state has too many bureaucrats > who find it rational to censor expression, even though censorship is > destructive to the public sphere. So the inability of the state > to refuse an opportunity to censor when it comes around requires > that it restrict its freedom via the First Amendment or similar > statutes. You must see that the *logical* parallel with coercion in general is exact. The bureaucrats appetite for control does not stop with verbal expression. And exactly the same arguments apply pro and con. If only safe medicines should be allowed, why not only safe opinions? Therefore, if they licence doctors, why not teachers, too ? (Oh, I forgot, they do licence teachers... OK, now for the journalists and writers). Coercion, in the nature of things, is destructive whereever it is applied (in proportion: absolute control is absolutely destructive, limited control is damaging). So the whole question is: are there overriding considerations? > But there are many cases not like First Amendment questions, where > what the bureaucrats find to be rational is also what citizens and > the public see to be rational, for instance, social welfare to keep > beggars off the street, or certification-regulation of medical degrees. > As long as citizens and public see these things to be rational, and don't see a better alternative, they will continue. No one is trying to take their coercion from them by force. But histor- ically, citizens and public saw many kinds of coercion as neces- sary and rational until they tried doing without them. It works both ways: status quo exists because it is seen as rational and it is rationalized because it exists. Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (10/22/85)
Correction: in my response to Tony Wuersch I overstated my position: > You summed up the whole point of this example. Human societies > *are* addicted to coercion. Just look at history, almost any page. > The irrational inability to refuse a second drink of blood. > Cold turkey may be our best chance. "Cold turkey" is a bad expression here. I meant *complete abstinence*, but not *abrupt transition*. Even though intermediate phases are unstable and backsliding is possible, I believe the dangers of social revolution - in any direction - to be far greater. But a non-coercive change - such as a change to non-coercion - is unlikely to be abrupt. Jan Wasilewsky