[net.politics.theory] Logic, fact, preference Part 2

torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/19/85)

Even number of >'s = me, torek, Odd number = Nat Howard (nrh@inmet):

>>>>Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already
>>>>converted", so to speak.
>>
>I was "devastated" because I don't believe you...

They aren't going to listen for the reasons I gave (>>) below.

>By participants, do you count the people who do NOT speak as well?

Yes.

>>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  Love is nonrational
>>
>>>[Romeo and Juliet example]
>>
>>Gimme a break.  Obviously love played a role in such errors, but wiser
>>people could have made wiser choices -- even while feeling just as power-
>>ful feelings.  To make an analogy, consider the definition of courage not
>>as absence of fear, but as keeping one's head in the face of fear.
>
>Let's consider Romeo and Juliet as being strangers (with but mild good
>intentions towards each other).  Can you imagine Romeo taking any
>important step that was predicated on Juliet being dead without
>examining the "corpse"?  Possible I suppose, but so unlikely.....

The point being, love can crowd out rationality?  True, it *can* (but not:
it *must*), and so *can* fear -- now see above on courage.

>Take it one level up.  It was surely contrary to reason for Romeo and
>Juliet to love one another.

Perhaps.  Not so obvious.  If so, it would be rational to try to stop being
in love, which is presumably possible though definitely not easy.  This
just shows my point -- that love is NONrational -- not yours -- that it is
IRrational.

[The discussion on love isn't very related to the rest, considering that I
just offered love as an example of something that is nonrational but not
irrational, thus illustrating my distinction.  Since the example was
controversial, it wasn't a very good illustration.  If you want to continue
the discussion on love, can we break it off into a separate set of postings?
Also, that way we could post it to (say) .philosophy and .singles?]

>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is 
>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them respond to
>>logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond to logic -- on the
>>(hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are by nature nonrational.
>
>My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
>your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
>BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.

In other words, you'll use this belief against me, pretending when it's
convenient that you share it?  Ideological mystification!

>That your irrational preference for your own beliefs (if your beliefs
>are truly irrational) will work against me doesn't mean that some other
>force (perhaps a desire to have an open mind and to stick with reason
>where possible) will more than overcome it.

I think it does, given that I'll take any reasoning you offer with a HUGE
grain of salt!  (And, I think, any not-already-converted reader who has
read the above will also.)

--Paul V Torek, upping the ante				torek@umich

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (10/22/85)

Nat, Paul please post a short definition of non-rational and irrational.
I think you are fighting paper tigers.

-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/22/85)

>/* Written  1:17 am  Oct 19, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */
>/* ---------- "Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 2" ---------- */
>Even number of >'s = me, torek, Odd number = Nat Howard (nrh@inmet):
>
>>>>>Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already
>>>>>converted", so to speak.
>>>
>>I was "devastated" because I don't believe you...
>
>They aren't going to listen for the reasons I gave (>>) below.
>
I assume you mean this:

>>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is
>>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them
>>>respond to logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond
>>>to logic -- on the (hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are
>>>by nature nonrational.

As I've pointed out, the fact that there's a reason NOT to change
your preferences doesn't mean that there is ONLY that reason in someone's
mind.  (If you were right, nobody would EVER change his mind).  

>>>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  Love is nonrational
>>>
>>>>[Romeo and Juliet example]
>>>
>>>Gimme a break.  Obviously love played a role in such errors, but wiser
>>>people could have made wiser choices -- even while feeling just as power-
>>>ful feelings.  To make an analogy, consider the definition of courage not
>>>as absence of fear, but as keeping one's head in the face of fear.
>>
>>Let's consider Romeo and Juliet as being strangers (with but mild good
>>intentions towards each other).  Can you imagine Romeo taking any
>>important step that was predicated on Juliet being dead without
>>examining the "corpse"?  Possible I suppose, but so unlikely.....
>
>The point being, love can crowd out rationality?  True, it *can* (but not:
>it *must*), and so *can* fear -- now see above on courage.

If love makes one act contrary to what one's reasoned actions would be
in the absence of love, love makes one irrational.  If love does not
follow reason, love is irrational.  Don't like it?  Tough:

	ir-ra-tio-nal .. adj: ... a(1): not endowed with reason or
understanding a(2): lacking usual or normal mental clarity or
coherence b : not governed by or according to reason (~ fears) c:
(Greek and Latin Prosody (1) of a syllable): having a quantity other
than that required by the meter c(2) (of a foot): containing such a
syllable d(1): being an irrational number (an ~ root of an equation)
d(2): having a numerical value that is an irrational number (a length
that is ~) ....

Forgive me, folks, for posting all the text of Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary, pp 606, but I wanted to avoid any wiggling.

You will note in particular, that the things you're calling 
"nonrational" are irrational.

>>Take it one level up.  It was surely contrary to reason for Romeo and
>>Juliet to love one another.
>
>Perhaps.  Not so obvious.  If so, it would be rational to try to stop being
>in love, which is presumably possible though definitely not easy.  This
>just shows my point -- that love is NONrational -- not yours -- that it is
>IRrational.
>
>[The discussion on love isn't very related to the rest, considering that I
>just offered love as an example of something that is nonrational but not
>irrational, thus illustrating my distinction.  Since the example was
>controversial, it wasn't a very good illustration.  If you want to continue
>the discussion on love, can we break it off into a separate set of postings?
>Also, that way we could post it to (say) .philosophy and .singles?]

Since the distinction may not exist (at least, not using dictionary 
definitions of the word "irrational"), let's drop it

>>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is 
>>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them respond to
>>>logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond to logic -- on the
>>>(hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are by nature nonrational.
>>
>>My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
>>your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
>>BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.
>
>In other words, you'll use this belief against me, pretending when it's
>convenient that you share it?  Ideological mystification!

Paul, if you maintain your beliefs are rational and I can show a contradiction
in them, or a flaw in your reasoning, it hardly matters what *I*
believe about them, does it?  I'm hardly trying to be mystifying, but
I don't need to SHARE your beliefs to apply them and maybe show you
some new things about them (including that they may be incorrect).

If you're saying: "A person must agree with me about reason before
I would be willing to change my beliefs because of something he said",
you're being rather pig-headed.  It means that you have discovered
a set of beliefs incapable of being shaken by reason, unless the
reason is given you by a fellow-believer.  Now who's engaging in
mystification?  After all, I don't insist that people talking to me
share my beliefs before I'll listen to them, and perhaps change my
beliefs, but aren't you doing this?

>>That your irrational preference for your own beliefs (if your beliefs
>>are truly irrational) will work against me doesn't mean that some other
>>force (perhaps a desire to have an open mind and to stick with reason
>>where possible) will more than overcome it.
>
>I think it does, given that I'll take any reasoning you offer with a HUGE
>grain of salt!  (And, I think, any not-already-converted reader who has
>read the above will also.)

Feel free!  Feel free!  But take what reasoning I offer as just that,
reasoning.  It doesn't matter who said the Earth is round: such things
can be checked.  It doesn't matter WHO advances an argument, or WHY he
did it -- what matters (insofar as changing your beliefs) is whether
that person is right.  If my reasoning is correct, it's hardly right
to fault it because I believe reason is not the fundamental principle
upon which I base my beliefs.  It would be like saying that because
somebody doesn't subscribe to your notions about plotting, you
wouldn't read a story by him.  You can CHECK the story, you can tell
if you're entertained, and it doesn't matter if the person at the
other end of the publishing cycle is someone you agree with or not.  What
matters is what he wrote.  Naturally, you may wish he agreed with you,
naturally, you may be worried that his controversial plot ideas may
weaken the story, but that DOESN'T affect how good the story before
you is. Read it and see.

torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/23/85)

In article <204@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>Nat, Paul please post a short definition of non-rational and irrational.
>I think you are fighting paper tigers.

I already did.  Go grep for it in net.politics.theory.  If you can't find
it, if the article has expired, I'll send you a copy, if you ask for it
within a few weeks (the typical amount of time I keep my old articles).

--Paul V "I only laugh when it hurts" Torek			torek@umich

torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/23/85)

In article <28200184@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is
>>>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them
>>>>respond to logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond
>>>>to logic -- on the (hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are
>>>>by nature nonrational. [TOREK]
>
>As I've pointed out, the fact that there's a reason NOT to change
>your preferences doesn't mean that there is ONLY that reason in someone's
>mind.  (If you were right, nobody would EVER change his mind).  [NRH]

But, on your hypothesis, the other reasons in that person's mind are
illusory.  Therefore, when you try to convince him to change his preferences
(note, not his beliefs, his preferences), there is something weird going on.
You are asking him to do something which, if he accepted something else you
believe and have argued for (about reason and preference), he would not do.
It is as if the person were a creationist, and you were trying to get him to
believe in evolution on the basis that God, in which you did not believe,
is such that He likes to see things evolve.

>>>>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  [TOREK]
>
>If love makes one act contrary to what one's reasoned actions would be
>in the absence of love, love makes one irrational.  If love does not
>follow reason, love is irrational.  Don't like it?  Tough:
>
>	ir-ra-tio-nal .. adj: ... a(1): not endowed with reason or
>understanding a(2): lacking usual or normal mental clarity or
>coherence b : not governed by or according to reason (~ fears) 

OK, love is irrational under definition (b), and SOME people in love are
irrational under definition a(2).  But not ALL people.  Therefore, there is
still a distinction here, even though, contrary to what I thought, 
"nonrational" counts as a species of "irrational".  "Nonrational" refers
to whatever satisfies definition (b).  Let's use "contrary to reason" to
replace what I thought "irrational" meant.  Now, an emotion would be
"contrary to reason" if ALL people all the time satisfied a(2) when they
had that emotion.

>Since the distinction may not exist (at least, not using dictionary 
>definitions of the word "irrational"), let's drop it

Since the distinction does exist (I was just wrong about the words), let's
not.

>>>My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
>>>your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
>>>BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.
>>
>>In other words, you'll use this belief against me, pretending when it's
>>convenient that you share it?  Ideological mystification!
>
>Paul, if you maintain your beliefs are rational and I can show a contradiction
>in them, or a flaw in your reasoning, it hardly matters what *I*
>believe about them, does it?  

It doesn't matter to the way I'll make up my mind.  But it does matter to
the attitude I'll take toward my interlocutor.  Again, I think other people
will feel similarly (if they are aware of your stance).

>If you're saying: "A person must agree with me about reason before
>I would be willing to change my beliefs because of something he said",
>you're being rather pig-headed.

Try: "a person must agree with me about reason before I would be willing
to accept any argument WHICH HE PUTS FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF HIS VIEWS
ABOUT REASON."

>It means that you have discovered
>a set of beliefs incapable of being shaken by reason, unless the
>reason is given you by a fellow-believer.

Yup, something like that.

>>I'll take any reasoning you offer with a HUGE grain of salt!  (And, I 
>>think, any not-already-converted reader who has read the above will also.)
>
>Feel free!  Feel free!  But take what reasoning I offer as just that,
>reasoning. ... It doesn't matter WHO advances an argument...

Fair enough.  (But subject to the caveats above.)

--Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief			torek@umich

nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/27/85)

>/* Written  3:32 pm  Oct 23, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */
>In article <28200184@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>>>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is
>>>>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them
>>>>>respond to logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond
>>>>>to logic -- on the (hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are
>>>>>by nature nonrational. [TOREK]
>>
>>As I've pointed out, the fact that there's a reason NOT to change
>>your preferences doesn't mean that there is ONLY that reason in someone's
>>mind.  (If you were right, nobody would EVER change his mind).  [NRH]
>
>But, on your hypothesis, the other reasons in that person's mind are
>illusory.  

	Il-lu-so-ry ... adj producing, based on, or having the nature
	of, illusion; deceptive; unreal; illusive.

My hypothesis is that there are things in a persons mind that make
him prefer reason over other ways of making decisions.  These 
"things" are irrational.  I don't recall using the word illusory to
describe them, and you are on dangerous ground indeed to describe 
everything that is irrational as illusory.  Madmen are irrational, but
none the less real for all that.  Things in your head that help you
have preferences are irrational (I contend) but only "unreal" in the
sense of not being amenable to outside testing (your reason is only
somewhat more amenable to outside testing, by the way).

It doesn't MATTER what degree of reasonableness that the preference
making mechanisms have (except insofar as a preference to be reasonable
will make you ignore some and not others).  That they are irrational
doesn't make them illusory, and I suspect you're attacking the
wrong hypothesis.

>Therefore, when you try to convince him to change his preferences
>(note, not his beliefs, his preferences), there is something weird going on.
>You are asking him to do something which, if he accepted something else you
>believe and have argued for (about reason and preference), he would not do.

People do this all the time.  It's called "putting it in terms the other
person can understand".  It's about as mundane an activity as one
could imagine.  

That people disagree upon certain values is the basis of all commerce,
by the way.  If EVERYBODY wanted food (absolutely) more than they wanted
money, no food would be sold (because no person would accept food for money).

>It is as if the person were a creationist, and you were trying to get him to
>believe in evolution on the basis that God, in which you did not believe,
>is such that He likes to see things evolve.

If I could find scripture that would support this notion, I would probably
quote it.  Why not?  *I* don't know if someone's religion is right or
a bunch of hogwash, but if a religious person could be convinced to
agree with me in a way that made sense in his terms (even if it didn't
make a great deal of sense in mine) what's the harm?  In fact, I find
that people appreciate the effort to accept them as they are, without
trying to change all their conceptual framework to match mine.

I don't DISBELIEVE in the value of logic (in the case of our
conflict).  I simply believe that logical values don't form the basis
for postulates.  This is practically a definition of postulate.

>>>>>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  [TOREK]
>>
>>If love makes one act contrary to what one's reasoned actions would be
>>in the absence of love, love makes one irrational.  If love does not
>>follow reason, love is irrational.  Don't like it?  Tough:
>>
>>	ir-ra-tio-nal .. adj: ... a(1): not endowed with reason or
>>understanding a(2): lacking usual or normal mental clarity or
>>coherence b : not governed by or according to reason (~ fears) 
>
>OK, love is irrational under definition (b), and SOME people in love are
>irrational under definition a(2).  But not ALL people.  Therefore, there is
>still a distinction here, even though, contrary to what I thought, 
>"nonrational" counts as a species of "irrational".  "Nonrational" refers
>to whatever satisfies definition (b).  Let's use "contrary to reason" to
>replace what I thought "irrational" meant.  Now, an emotion would be
>"contrary to reason" if ALL people all the time satisfied a(2) when they
>had that emotion.

I think you overstate the case.  Any sensation whatever makes one
less reasonable in the sense that they must now respond to sensation
instead of whatever might be the dictates of reason at that moment.
In short, fear, hate, love, itching, sudden noises, and being told in 
high-sounding ways that there IS a free lunch, are all contrary to reason.

You're emphasizing the sensation of emotion (that is, how it feels
to be in love) rather than the consequence of emotion (how one's goals shift to
meet the contingency of feeling an emotion.  If Romeo kills himself from
despair, because he cannot live without Juliet, then his act may be logical
in the framework of what he feels, but what he feels (despair, love) 
is not itself based upon reason but upon emotion.

>...

>>>>My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
>>>>your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
>>>>BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.
>>>
>>>In other words, you'll use this belief against me, pretending when it's
>>>convenient that you share it?  Ideological mystification!
>>
>>Paul, if you maintain your beliefs are rational and I can show a contradiction
>>in them, or a flaw in your reasoning, it hardly matters what *I*
>>believe about them, does it?  
>
>It doesn't matter to the way I'll make up my mind.  But it does matter to
>the attitude I'll take toward my interlocutor.  Again, I think other people
>will feel similarly (if they are aware of your stance).

I value your goodwill, and hope you value mine.  But the earth moves,
regardless of how the people Galileo told felt about it.  The logic
holds (and sometimes does not hold), regardless of how YOU feel about
me, and I'm glad to hear we agree on this point.  While I naturally
hope that people agree with me AND like me, I find it more pleasing
to be right than to be popular.  Anyone who's run a medium-sized 
computer should know this feeling: you have to tell someone
that he can't put all those users on the machine AND have it be fast.
It would be fun to tell him otherwise, but no kindness, in the end.

Likewise, I'm sorry if it disturbs you that my personal beliefs disturb
you to the point that I might sacrifice your goodwill, but I'm hardly
willing to lie about them, or abandon them for that reason alone.

>>If you're saying: "A person must agree with me about reason before
>>I would be willing to change my beliefs because of something he said",
>>you're being rather pig-headed.
>
>Try: "a person must agree with me about reason before I would be willing
>to accept any argument WHICH HE PUTS FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF HIS VIEWS
>ABOUT REASON."

But I'm *NOT* putting forward anything on the basis of my views about
reason: I'm putting something forward on the basis of YOUR views about
reason.  Just in case someone has forgotten, I'm arguing that it makes
sense for us to argue reasonably about the basis for preferences, even
though I don't believe reason is the ultimate basis of preference.
The  basis of my argument is that YOU believe it makes sense to choose
preferences consistent with logic, and therefore YOU may be convinced
by reason that in fact not all of your postulates were chosen this way.

>>It means that you have discovered
>>a set of beliefs incapable of being shaken by reason, unless the
>>reason is given you by a fellow-believer.
>
>Yup, something like that.

Tsk.  If you ask me what time it is, and I tell you something like
the correct time as you estimate it, does it matter that I'm known 
to believe that time should be in some sort of metric measure rather
than hours?  I've clearly responded (in this example) in the
familiar hour notation of the correct time, so why be suspicious?

>>>I'll take any reasoning you offer with a HUGE grain of salt!  (And, I 
>>>think, any not-already-converted reader who has read the above will also.)
>>
>>Feel free!  Feel free!  But take what reasoning I offer as just that,
>>reasoning. ... It doesn't matter WHO advances an argument...
>
>Fair enough.  (But subject to the caveats above.)
>
>--Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief			torek@umich
>/* End of text from inmet:net.politics.t */

Paul, should I take anything you say as needlessly iconoclastic because
you make iconoclasm a trademark?