[net.politics.theory] Free Riders

wjr@x.UUCP (Bill Richard) (10/12/85)

Note:  This is STella again.  I'm still not wjr.

In article <257@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes:
>Libertaria spreads benefits thinly to many Libertaria-ns, only one of whom
>is myself.

I don't quite see it that way!  I am not dying for other people's rights.  I
am risking my life to punish defection from the game "Non-Aggression."  

>>...  It's in my interest to protect them, because a threat against one 
>>of us is a threat against us all.  
>
>Yes if you count altruistic concern among your "interests" (the sense of 
>"interest" being "things you're interested in" rather than "self-interest").
>A narrowly selfish person would think, however, that it was in his interest
>to be a free rider: the small chance that *his* support would make the diff-
>erence of which side won being outweighed by the sizable chance that
>he'd get his ass blown off.

In my version of libertaria, a free rider will run little risk of getting
killed defending the turf, but a consistent pattern of refusing to pull
phagocyte duty will be noticed.  I wouldn't try to harm him, I hope my kids 
would play with his kids, I would talk with his wife, but I wouldn't let 
_him_ cut my hair, shovel my sidewalk, or charge dinner at my restaurant.  
He had reneged on one of the conditions I put on my voluntary association, 
and I therefore will not make another contract with him and provide him 
with the opportunity to defect.  (BTW, yes of course I'd let his wife buy
clothing in his size from my store -- she'll love the extra chore, I'm sure.
And yes, that assumes that she was nursing, sniping, or otherwise assisting
herself.  But the kids would always be welcome at my table.)

>>I've discussed this in another article, but the nut is this. I will not live
>>in a libertaria unless I succeed in selling the idea that coercion must be
>>resisted.  That it is both stupid and dangerous to surrender to blackmail.
>>Unless individual responsibility for safety becomes a widely distributed 
>>value, there will not be a libertaria to resist nuclear blackmail.  

>You assert: 1) Libertaria will not arrive unless people come to have these
>attitudes you describe.  2) If people have these attitudes nuclear blackmail
>will not work, so it won't be used.  You hint: 3) these attitudes make 
>perfect sense

Now where did I do that! 8-)  Even on the net, perfect people are scarce.  I
don't think these ideas are perfect.  If I did, I'd be writing best-selling
propaganda and not trying a walkthrough here!  These ideas make sense to me,
and I keep on trying to make more sense out of them.  But I don't expect to be
perfect till sometime next week at the soonest! 8-)

>3) is far from obvious; I think many people would have to become a lot
>less selfish before they could ever accept 3).  2) I'll grant you, though
>I wonder if aggressive states will *realize* the futility of nuclear
>blackmail even if it *is* futile.  1) is false:  I would accept Libertaria
>if I thought that govt was as dangerous and inefficient as most libertarians
>think, even though I would never accept the irrational base values most
>libertarians take as axioms.

(How dangerous and inefficient DO you think government is?  Mail, please!)

OK.  On 1, sure.  And if you were willing to protect your interests by
punishing aggressors, you're welcome.  I'm attempting to think out a set of 
minimal sufficient common values, and yeah, now that you mention it, I 
don't care what your motivations are, as long as you refrain from 
aggression, fraud, and whatever other primitives are defined before we build.
Thank you for pointing out that willingness to punish defectors from
non-aggression has to be a primitive.  To me, with MY blindspots, it was
axiomatic to the point of invisibility.  Thank you sir!  So let me restate.  I
will not form a libertaria with people who do not agree that any instance of
coercion  is a threat against their personal right to be free of coercion, nor
will I continue to contract with people who renege on this minimal
requirement.  If that is a condition you dislike, we simply won't live in the
same anarchia or move to the same libertaria.  If you have some other way of
handling the free rider issue, let me hear it.

BTW, since I'm fairly new to this group, if you would prefer to send mail, OK,
but I want to hear a bit more about "irrational base values".  Don't lets
carry on a two-person conversation on the net if I missed this whole
discussion by "n"ing past a misleading subject title.

For 2, well, we might have to lose a couple cities the size of Ann Arbor or 
Ypsi.  Or LA.  I'd love a bugfix for that one.  _I_ _believe_ that 
negatively reinforcing terrorists and coercers is worth 
spending the only life I am willing (or able) to control, mine.  I'm not sure
that it's the only possible decision for that hypothetical reasonable wo/man,
but it's the best I've got yet.

And let me repeat!  On 3, I don't think these ideas make _perfect_ sense, but
I'm not trying to build heaven.  Just get by with a little help from people
who don't even have to be friends as long as they don't try to kill or control
me.

				STella Calvert
				(guest on ...!decvax!frog!wjr)

		Every man and every woman is a star.

torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/18/85)

In article <800@x.UUCP> wjr@x.UUCP (STella Calvert) writes:
>I don't quite see it that way!  I am not dying for other people's rights.  I
>am risking my life to punish defection from the game "Non-Aggression."  

OK. (Though I'd be more inclined to see it as dying for others.)

>In my version of libertaria, a free rider will run little risk of getting
>killed defending the turf, but a consistent pattern of refusing to pull
>phagocyte duty will be noticed.  I wouldn't try to harm him, I hope my kids 
>would play with his kids, I would talk with his wife, but I wouldn't let 
>_him_ cut my hair, shovel my sidewalk, or charge dinner at my restaurant.  
>He had reneged on one of the conditions I put on my voluntary association, 
>and I therefore will not make another contract with him and provide him 
>with the opportunity to defect.  (BTW, yes of course I'd let his wife buy
>clothing in his size from my store -- she'll love the extra chore, I'm sure.
>And yes, that assumes that she was nursing, sniping, or otherwise assisting
>herself.  But the kids would always be welcome at my table.)

Interesting, and it does hold some promise.  Of course, you will need other
members of the community to treat free-riders similarly.  But that just
might be feasible!  It probably could work on some scale.  Maybe even a
large scale, after some attitudes change -- which, I must admit, is a
realistic hope, Murphy's Lawyers to the contrary notwithstanding.

>>You assert: 1) Libertaria will not arrive unless people come to have these
>>attitudes you describe.  2) If people have these attitudes nuclear blackmail
>>will not work, so it won't be used.  You hint: 3) these attitudes make 
>>perfect sense 

[STella objects to "perfect".  OK, revise that to "plenty of sense"]

>>3) is far from obvious; I think many people would have to become a lot
>>less selfish before they could ever accept 3).  2) I'll grant you, though
>>I wonder if aggressive states will *realize* the futility of nuclear
>>blackmail even if it *is* futile.  1) is false:  I would accept Libertaria
>>if I thought that govt was as dangerous and inefficient as most libertarians
>>think, even though I would never accept the irrational base values most
>>libertarians take as axioms.
>
>(How dangerous and inefficient DO you think government is?  Mail, please!)

News, sorry!  (How else do you expect me to make the Top 25 News Submitters
list?)

It depends on the government.  Ours:  remarkably non-dangerous, but serious-
ly inefficient, but probably NOT so inefficient that it is worse than nothing
in its effect on externality problems (cf. the debate between L. Kolodney,
me, and Nat Howard).

>OK.  On 1, sure.  And if you were willing to protect your interests by
>punishing aggressors, you're welcome.  I'm attempting to think out a set of 
>minimal sufficient common values, and yeah, now that you mention it, I 
>don't care what your motivations are, as long as you refrain from 
>aggression, fraud, and whatever other primitives are defined before we build.

Good idea -- I've been thinking about minimal sufficient common values myself;
but not for a system of (non-?)government, but rather an open-ended network
of people working on worldwide problems in general, but allowing for wide
(but not total) disagreement (to some extent, such a thing already exists).

>Thank you for pointing out that willingness to punish defectors from
>non-aggression has to be a primitive.  To me, with MY blindspots, it was
>axiomatic to the point of invisibility.  Thank you sir!  So let me restate.  I
>will not form a libertaria with people who do not agree that any instance of
>coercion  is a threat against their personal right to be free of coercion, nor
>will I continue to contract with people who renege on this minimal
>requirement.

I would heartily agree to such a requirement myself.  In fact, I think lots
of people would, and would take it seriously.

>  If that is a condition you dislike, we simply won't live in the
>same anarchia or move to the same libertaria.  If you have some other 
>way of handling the free rider issue, let me hear it.

I certainly do:  force.  (I didn't say you'd like it!)  Of course, the
instrument of force (i.e. non-minarchist government) creates externality
problems of its own -- no question about that.  Whether these are worse
is a tough empirical question, but I think not -- that is, given most
people's present attitudes toward free-riding.  On the other hand, maybe
we can get people to take the kind of attitude you suggest, in which
case maybe government will no longer be a bargain.

>BTW, since I'm fairly new to this group, if you would prefer to send mail, 
>OK, but I want to hear a bit more about "irrational base values".  

Don't worry.  I was just being a bit iconoclastic, and I was making my
point about 1):  namely, that one doesn't have to be an Ayn Rand fan or
a Robert Nozick fan to be willing to try your kind of society.  

>For 2, well, we might have to lose a couple cities the size of Ann Arbor or 
>Ypsi.  Or LA.  I'd love a bugfix for that one.  _I_ _believe_ that 
>negatively reinforcing terrorists and coercers is worth 
>spending the only life I am willing (or able) to control, mine.  

I agree; if the terrorists would lose interest after nuking Ann Arbor, and
a population the size of the U.S.'s would be safe thereafter, I think it'd
be worth it -- even though I'd be one of the unlucky few.

>And let me repeat!  On 3, I don't think these ideas make _perfect_ sense, but
>I'm not trying to build heaven.  Just get by with a little help from people
>who don't even have to be friends as long as they don't try to kill or control
>me.

Granted.  (But though they needn't be friends, they still have to do things
that have the effect, roughly, of sticking up for each other.)

--Paul V Torek, the curious iconoclast				torek@umich

wjr@x.UUCP (Bill Richard) (10/23/85)

In article <300@umich.UUCP> torek@eecs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes:
>In article <800@x.UUCP> wjr@x.UUCP (STella Calvert) writes:
>>(How dangerous and inefficient DO you think government is?  Mail, please!)
>
>News, sorry!  (How else do you expect me to make the Top 25 News Submitters
>list?)
>
>It depends on the government.  Ours:  remarkably non-dangerous, but serious-
>ly inefficient, but probably NOT so inefficient that it is worse than nothing
>in its effect on externality problems (cf. the debate between L. Kolodney,
>me, and Nat Howard).

OK, here's a place we still disagree.  I still maintain that the lack of a
centralized government that can be terrorized into submission would be an
improvement over the present situation.  That allowing _any_ individual to
coerce is a threat to my security.  And that a government is a collection of
_individuals_ engaged in a coercive conspiracy to monopolize the use of 
force.  

>I've been thinking about minimal sufficient common values myself;
>but not for a system of (non-?)government, but rather an open-ended network
>of people working on worldwide problems in general, but allowing for wide
>(but not total) disagreement (to some extent, such a thing already exists).

OK -- since you want to be a top 25 poster, how about starting a set of
subjects, one for each value you think necessary for a society in which you
would be comfortable.  I already know we won't agree on all of them. 8-)

>>Thank you for pointing out that willingness to punish defectors from
>>non-aggression has to be a primitive.  To me, with MY blindspots, it was
>>axiomatic to the point of invisibility. Thank you sir! So let me restate.  I
>>will not form a libertaria with people who do not agree that any instance of
>>coercion  is a threat against their personal right to be free of coercion, nor
>>will I continue to contract with people who renege on this minimal
>>requirement.

Is this why you say my version of libertaria doesn't sound very libertarian?
If so, why?  I grant you the freedom to associate with people on whatever
basis you choose, I tell you the conditions under which I will associate with
you, and I will do my damnedest not to interfere with your associations so
long as they do not (as do the UStatists) attempt to coerce me.

>I would heartily agree to such a requirement myself.  In fact, I think lots
>of people would, and would take it seriously.
>
>>  If that is a condition you dislike, we simply won't live in the
>>same anarchia or move to the same libertaria.  If you have some other 
>>way of handling the free rider issue, let me hear it.
>
>I certainly do:  force.  (I didn't say you'd like it!)  Of course, the
>instrument of force (i.e. non-minarchist government) creates externality
>problems of its own -- no question about that.  Whether these are worse
>is a tough empirical question, but I think not -- that is, given most
>people's present attitudes toward free-riding.  On the other hand, maybe
>we can get people to take the kind of attitude you suggest, in which
>case maybe government will no longer be a bargain.

That's why I'm here -- government isn't a bargain, by my lights, but the only
way I can get rid of it is through persuasion.  I don't expect to succeed 
in my lifetime unless there are major advances in life extension, but I might.

>>BTW, since I'm fairly new to this group, if you would prefer to send mail, 
>>OK, but I want to hear a bit more about "irrational base values".  
>
>Don't worry.  I was just being a bit iconoclastic, and I was making my
>point about 1):  namely, that one doesn't have to be an Ayn Rand fan or
>a Robert Nozick fan to be willing to try your kind of society.  

>>For 2, well, we might have to lose a couple cities the size of Ann Arbor or 
>>Ypsi.  Or LA.  I'd love a bugfix for that one.  _I_ _believe_ that 
>>negatively reinforcing terrorists and coercers is worth 
>>spending the only life I am willing (or able) to control, mine.  
>
>I agree; if the terrorists would lose interest after nuking Ann Arbor, and
>a population the size of the U.S.'s would be safe thereafter, I think it'd
>be worth it -- even though I'd be one of the unlucky few.

One reason I chose Ann Arbor/Ypsi is that many of my closest friends live 
there.  And I was in a mood where nuking Boston just wouldn't have disturbed 
me.  8-)  If you took it personally, I'm sorry.  But I lived in Ann Arbor for
several happy years, and will do it again as soon as they fix the goddam
climate and economy!

				STella Calvert

		Every man and every woman is a star.

Guest on:	...!decvax!frog!wjr
Life:		Baltimore!AnnArbor!Smyrna!<LotsOfHitchhikingAndShortVisits>
			!SantaCruz!Berkeley!AnnArbor!Taxachussetts
Future:			...	(!L5!TheBelt!InterstellarSpace)

carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/03/85)

STella Calvert writes:

>Thank you for pointing out that willingness to punish defectors from
>non-aggression has to be a primitive.  To me, with MY blindspots, it
>was axiomatic to the point of invisibility. Thank you sir! So let me
>restate.  I will not form a libertaria with people who do not agree
>that any instance of coercion  is a threat against their personal
>right to be free of coercion, nor will I continue to contract with
>people who renege on this minimal requirement.
>....
>I am not dying for other people's rights.  I
>am risking my life to punish defection from the game "Non-Aggression."  

STella Calvert states that in her hypothetical Anarchia she would
punish defectors in the game "Non-Aggression", including those who
prefer to free-ride rather than fight to defend Anarchia from
aggressors, by ostracism, boycotts, and other noncoercive means.
I'll accept STella's word that she would do so, but why does she
believe that anyone else would?  Punishment of noncooperators
provides a public good, spread evenly over the population, but such
means as boycotts impose private costs on the boycotters.  So it
seems we have a second-order free-rider problem, if the marginal
private cost of becoming a boycotter outweighs the marginal private
benefit.  

Secondly, why does STella expect that such punishment would be a
sufficient deterrent?  If the choice for me was between risking my
life to provide a public good, and enjoying a free ride while facing
an unknown amount of ostracism, boycotting, and disapproval from an
unknown number of survivors, I think I would choose the latter.  

Further, I'm not sure I understand what type of society STella
envisages.  Does she really mean that no one would coerce X if X
decided to "borrow" her car for a few years, or pick the apples in
her orchard?  If the only punishment for theft is ostracism and
boycotting, I think theft would be an attractive option, if X could
take whatever he wanted and sleep in anyone's living room or back
yard.  Or would theft be punished coercively (assuming that property
rights, and hence theft, are specified)?  In that case, Anarchia does
not sound particularly "noncoercive," if the threat of coercion must
be omnipresent in order to safeguard property rights.  

Would the founding compact of Anarchia include a specification of
property rights?  If so, what would be the enforcement mechanism?

It may be that STella has already answered these questions implicitly
or explicitly, and I have missed them.  In any case I would
appreciate some clear answers to these questions.  But if STella
cannot explain how Anarchia would plausibly work, then we have a case
of handwaving:  "People would do this, people would do that, you'll
just have to believe me."
-- 
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes