torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/19/85)
Even number of >'s = me, torek, Odd number = Nat Howard (nrh@inmet): >Shall I take it that we agree that your choice of words was wrong? Provisionally -- until I check *my* dictionary. [lots of quotes omitted -- I can't help it -- why am I so concise? I'll *never* make the top 25 at his rate. Why can't I be more like Rich Rosen? :->] >Right! But these only give her theoretical grounds for making HER >decision, not empirical ones. To quote myself: >>Taking "empirical" as your dictionary defines it, I'll accept that. [on a different issue -- again, some quoted stuff omitted] >I didn't claim that it was "contrary to reason", or, if I did, I did >so wrongly and here apologize: what I meant was that no such set of >weightings can have a basis in reason, because they precede reason. Sorry, I misinterpreted you. I still disagree though: >Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER >weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to >be reasonable (as opposed to being guided by emotion or by zen-like >inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason. This is one for net.philosophy, but: being reasonable is the only CHOICE that can be made! In other, less flip, words: if one "chooses" the other "alternatives" one has not made a CHOICE. The very representation of unreason and reason as alternatives is itself a rational act governed by the norms of reason; reason will be represented as the correct choice. It is therefore incorrect to say, as norm-nihilists like Sartre say, that it is possible and necessary to make a pre-rational arbitrary choice of reason or unreason. >I make no claim that libertarianism, or any other "ism" has a "basis" >in fact or reason, merely that no other set of fundamental beliefs >did, so that criticizing libertarianism on this ground is uninteresting, >as any position my be criticized on this grounds. Yes, I understand your position quite well (which is not to say I agree, however). >Let's have no wriggling here: you state above: >>>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>>>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. > >Well? Defend it! I would argue that you are not allowed to use such >concepts as "other people's lives have importance" without establishing >them BY REASON. Again, let me quote myself: >>A fair challenge, I must admit. OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy... >>"coming soon to a theater near you!" [By the way, I don't quote myself to make you look bad for not reading what I wrote -- really, I should have emphasized it more. I just want to show I haven't "wriggled". Stay tuned! (there will be a delay however)] >>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>... >>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >> >>... I think such a preference is not just >>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. > >What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. Not only that, but the bad feelings associated with being coerced to do one's share in the free-rider problem will disappear once one sees that the coercion is not wrong. In a clear sense, the negative reaction one has there is "extrinsic" -- not part of human nature. Whereas, even though the mere existence of a mutilated body is not wrong either, one's negative reaction to it MAY be "intrinsic" -- i.e., hardwired. >>Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone >>prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the >>free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the >>means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove >>of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that >>involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? > >Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with >meat, instead of screwdrivers. Let's not. Let's have you answer the screwdrivers example -- NO WRIGGLING! I'll answer the "kosher" example -- but not INSTEAD of the screwdrivers one, rather, IN ADDITION to it. >Does it make sense for some people >to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination >is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews). No, it does not. (How's that for a straightforward answer! Flame away, religious people -- not just people who keep kosher, but anyone who follows any comparable religious rule, be it Islamic, Christian, or Ubizmatist.) Turn up those flames -- I hate cold weather! >It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these >people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there >is no obvious material benefit to them? YES, it must -- BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE. The issue is does it make sense. Even though it does not, it must be respected, DUE TO THE CONSEQUENCES that would follow if it were not respected. "Aha", you are thinking, "but if preferences for kosher must be respected, then so must preferences for non-coercion -- after all, how can Torek separate the two cases?" Straightforward answer: simple -- the consequences of disrespecting the libertarian preference are overwhelmingly good, whereas the consequences of disrespecting kosher preferences are overwhelmingly bad. [Notable exception: when religious rules would prevent saving a child's life, they may be overruled -- cf. the court case that was in the news a while back.] >>If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any >>reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." >>I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of >>screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of >>the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in >>contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some >>preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other >>preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on >>their own account. > > In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork, (say >that everyone were starving and it were the only high-energy food >available, and their strength was desirable), should they be forced to >eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be weak? No, because this *isn't* a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork -- unless they could be *convinced* that it was OK to eat. (And if we care about them, we should certainly make some effort to convince.) Now, Nat, no wriggling -- what do you say about screwdrivers? --Paul V Torek, upping the ante torek@umich
nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/22/85)
>/* Written 1:23 am Oct 19, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 1" ---------- */ >... >>Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER >>weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to >>be reasonable (as opposed to being guided by emotion or by zen-like >>inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason. > >This is one for net.philosophy, but: being reasonable is the only CHOICE >that can be made! In other, less flip, words: if one "chooses" the >other "alternatives" one has not made a CHOICE. The very representation >of unreason and reason as alternatives is itself a rational act governed >by the norms of reason; reason will be represented as the correct choice. A nearby Merriam-Webster defines "choice" as the "act of choosing", and "choose" as "1a: to select freely and after consideration", but (hold those cheers) ALSO as "2b: to have a preference for". I suggest to you that not all preferences are rational, (certainly NONE of those which precede a preference for reason) and therefore one is quite right to say that one may "choose" without making a rational determination. Thus a choice may be either reasoned, or simply perceived without reason. >It is therefore incorrect to say, as norm-nihilists like Sartre say, that >it is possible and necessary to make a pre-rational arbitrary choice of >reason or unreason. That's nice: I don't know how Sartre put it, but it's clear that the word "choice" may refer to a preference. Must a preference be rational? (Dictionary again: preference is the act of preferring, preferring may be choosing OR esteeming, and esteem as "regard highly". (this is ignoring circular paths)). Regard, in turn is to "recognize the worth of a person or thing", and "worth" is the "value of something measured by its qualities" and "value" as "something (as a principle or quality) intrinsically valuable or desirable". So you see, the meaning of "choice" may not be used to determine that a choice is always rational, because a (tortuous) path exists that comes down to desire. Need we go into how rational "desires" need to be, or will you accept that THEY may be wired in (and thus not reasoned)? >... >>>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>>... >>>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >>> >>>... I think such a preference is not just >>>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. >> >>What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >>parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >>his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! > >Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person >in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, >you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to >himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be >right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness >may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. >So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. Quite possible. It MAY happen, but you've opened the door, certainly things MAY happen the other way, and if Baba admits that *I* may be so affected by a coercion as to make it a net loss WHATEVER good is likely to be accomplished, you certainly must admit that the possibility exists for things happening the other way, and that therefore it does NOT follow that the "bad feelings" may be ignored. >Not only that, but the bad feelings associated with being coerced to do >one's share in the free-rider problem will disappear once one sees that >the coercion is not wrong. In a clear sense, the negative reaction one >has there is "extrinsic" -- not part of human nature. >Whereas, even though >the mere existence of a mutilated body is not wrong either, one's negative >reaction to it MAY be "intrinsic" -- i.e., hardwired. Not at ALL. The resentment of authority is a pretty deep part of human nature, although you could perhaps raise someone in a skinner box who didn't know about such things and thus couldn't fear or hate them. On the other hand, you could do the same with mutilated corpses et. al.. >>>Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone >>>prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the >>>free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the >>>means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove >>>of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that >>>involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? >> >>Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with >>meat, instead of screwdrivers. > >Let's not. Let's have you answer the screwdrivers example -- NO WRIGGLING! >I'll answer the "kosher" example -- but not INSTEAD of the screwdrivers >one, rather, IN ADDITION to it. Okay, let's talk about screwdrivers. I've no personal objection to using them. I wouldn't get mad if someone suggested, politely, that they be used to solve a problem. I wouldn't eschew their use. Were you to suggest their use in some problem, I wouldn't fight about it. On the other hand, were you to insist on their use to someone traumatized by screwdrivers (say some folks who had been tortured using screwdrivers) I'd say you were crazy. If you were to say, "but wait! what rational basis can these people have for their objection?" I'd say you were insensitive, that even if there were trivial gains for me were I to put screwdrivers in their toolboxes, I wouldn't do it, knowing what I know of them." Would you be right to insist? Even if their trauma is not the result of the RATIONAL side of human existence? I suggest that the fact that their fear and pain has its basis in the irrational side of their nature has nothing to do with how important it is, how much pain it would cause, or how correct it is to ignore that pain. Now let's talk buzz-saws. You see, the power of a state to coerce more nearly resembles a buzz-saw than a screwdriver. Why? Because the element of danger is largely absent with a screwdriver, but the buzz-saw fairly reeks of it. I suggest to you that it a preference NOT to use a buzz-saw if it can be sanely avoided is a Good Thing. Why? Because there is DANGER here. Because the buzz-saw is (in use) capable of VERY dangerous things. Now let us say that we understand the principles of operation of buzz-saws as little as we understand the operation of history and of politics. Perhaps you see my point already, but to make it clear, you would be a fool to use a buzz-saw without understanding (for example) which end is dangerous, what it would do if you were to push THAT button, or if the buzz-saw YOU were using was invisible, so that you couldn't tell how long it was. My own feeling is that we understand the state very little, and while great things could be accomplished (perhaps) if we understood it well, WE DO NOT! So we are fools, less than children, playing with buzz-saws. We understand that a force is available to us, but not how strong it is, how to turn it off, whether it can be safely used to cut (say) steel girders, concrete, wood, or vials of nitro. We do understand enough about it to know how (relatively, sometimes) how intense the force is, and we know (in limited ways) how to turn it off. The interesting thing is that the buzz-saw could make our lives better in theory, were we to understand its nature, so we have people who would have us cut anything with it. We also have people, like me, who say: "For goodness sake! Until you know what's going on, don't play with it! Sure, you managed to cut down that tree in ten minutes by blindly swinging it around, but you don't know if the same thing will happen if try to do the same things, and you don't know what will happen when you put it down. Turn it off and leave it alone". Were a similar danger to exist with screwdrivers (that is, were they very good at killing folks if used with poor understanding), I suspect it would be obvious that one shouldn't use them. Were everyone to use chainsaws KNOWING WHAT THEY'RE DOING, I'd have no objection (assuming they weren't out to kill me or something), but that IS NOT the situation. Until we aren't surprised by inflations and stagflations, until we know how to prevent war and corruption, until we can limit government to its place, it's a *VERY* dangerous thing to use, and to demand that it *NOT* be used without enough knowledge is only rational. >>Does it make sense for some people >>to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination >>is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews). > >No, it does not. (How's that for a straightforward answer! Flame away, >religious people -- not just people who keep kosher, but anyone who follows >any comparable religious rule, be it Islamic, Christian, or Ubizmatist.) > >Turn up those flames -- I hate cold weather! > >>It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these >>people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there >>is no obvious material benefit to them? > >YES, it must -- BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE. The issue is does it make sense. >Even though it does not, it must be respected, DUE TO THE CONSEQUENCES that >would follow if it were not respected. > >"Aha", you are thinking, "but if preferences for kosher must be respected, >then so must preferences for non-coercion -- after all, how can Torek >separate the two cases?" Straightforward answer: simple -- the consequences >of disrespecting the libertarian preference are overwhelmingly good, whereas >the consequences of disrespecting kosher preferences are overwhelmingly bad. >[Notable exception: when religious rules would prevent saving a child's >life, they may be overruled -- cf. the court case that was in the news a >while back.] Tsk! So that one is permitted to say that if people object strongly enough to your imposition of "reason", then you should not impose reason? Fair enough! *I* object that strongly. You don't KNOW enough about government to keep the "positive" effects maximized and the negative effects minimized. In essence, your line is the same as everyone who wishes government to rule "for the good of the people". You've simply come up with somewhat better mechanisms for discovering the will of the people (not perfect ones -- else you wouldn't need to resort to the pragmatic concession above) but and wish to argue that they justify the use of force. This is like discovering where some trees are and being willing to use the invisible buzz-saw of unknown configuration. Dangerous. If it were just your limbs at stake, I certainly wouldn't kick, but you're proposing to involve ME in your little scheme, and ..... >>>If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any >>>reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." >>>I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of >>>screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of >>>the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in >>>contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some >>>preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other >>>preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on >>>their own account. >> >> In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork, (say >>that everyone were starving and it were the only high-energy food >>available, and their strength was desirable), should they be forced to >>eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be weak? > >No, because this *isn't* a situation in which everyone would benefit if >they ate pork -- unless they could be *convinced* that it was OK to eat. >(And if we care about them, we should certainly make some effort to convince.) It's a *GIVEN* that everyone would benefit if they ate pork (read my paragraph again). You're wriggling by trying to argue that they would protest enough to negate the advantage of their strength, but I've given you no grounds for such a supposition. It is their strength, not their agreement to use it, that is desirable in the (deliberately left unclarified) situation given. >Now, Nat, no wriggling -- what do you say about screwdrivers? I say that no finer drink ever existed :-). >
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/25/85)
>>>>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>>>... >>>>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>>>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >>>> >>>>... I think such a preference is not just >>>>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>>>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. >>> >>>What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >>>parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >>>his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! >> >>Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person >>in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, >>you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to >>himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be >>right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness >>may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. >>So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. > > Quite possible. It MAY happen, but you've opened the door, certainly > things MAY happen the other way, and if Baba admits that *I* may be so > affected by a coercion as to make it a net loss WHATEVER good is likely > to be accomplished, you certainly must admit that the possibility > exists for things happening the other way, and that therefore > it does NOT follow that the "bad feelings" may be ignored. You rang? What I "admitted" (an interesting choice of words) was that you might subjectively experience coercion as so odious as to negate in your mind any benefits that you might receive from being coerced. I am pleased that you concede that such an attitude on your part has no rational basis, any more than anyone else's "religion" does. But the free practice of your religion can impact others of different "faiths". If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? Baba
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (10/26/85)
[Not food] This was a rather long article, but I am only going to respond to one bit of it here. This should not be interpreted as meaning I agree with the rest of it. In article <28200185@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >Now let's talk buzz-saws. You see, the power of a state to coerce more >nearly resembles a buzz-saw than a screwdriver. Why? Because the element >of danger is largely absent with a screwdriver, but the buzz-saw fairly reeks >of it. I suggest to you that it a preference NOT to use a buzz-saw if it >can be sanely avoided is a Good Thing. Why? Because there is DANGER here. >Because the buzz-saw is (in use) capable of VERY dangerous things. > >Now let us say that we understand the principles of operation of buzz-saws >as little as we understand the operation of history and of politics. > >Perhaps you see my point already, but to make it clear, you would be a fool >to use a buzz-saw without understanding (for example) which end is dangerous, >what it would do if you were to push THAT button, or if the buzz-saw YOU >were using was invisible, so that you couldn't tell how long it was. > >My own feeling is that we understand the state very little, and while >great things could be accomplished (perhaps) if we understood it well, >WE DO NOT! So we are fools, less than children, playing with buzz-saws. >We understand that a force is available to us, but not how strong it is, >how to turn it off, whether it can be safely used to cut (say) steel >girders, concrete, wood, or vials of nitro. We do understand enough >about it to know how (relatively, sometimes) how intense the force >is, and we know (in limited ways) how to turn it off. > >The interesting thing is that the buzz-saw could make our lives better in >theory, were we to understand its nature, so we have people who would have >us cut anything with it. We also have people, like me, who say: >"For goodness sake! Until you know what's going on, don't play with it! >Sure, you managed to cut down that tree in ten minutes by blindly swinging >it around, but you don't know if the same thing will happen if try to do the >same things, and you don't know what will happen when you put it down. >Turn it off and leave it alone". This argument would be much stronger if the analogy were more exact. First of all, we do NOT know, even in limited ways, how to turn off government. If a government even becomes weak, other coercive structures spring up to take its place. Look at the Mafia, for example, both in the U.S. and in Italy. Trying to "turn off" the coercive powers of the state is NOT SAFE AT ALL, because the ALMOST CERTAIN result is the substitution of a bad government for our present, good, government. (Bad and good are relative terms.) Secondly, I believe the net benefit from, to be specific, the U.S. government, is large. I submitted an article arguing that point recently; since I have seen no response to it, unless I hear otherwise, I will assume it was lost and try to reconstruct it. (Our news service has been flakey lately.) I think a more accurate analogy would be a group of cave men sitting around a fire on a cold night, proposing to put out the fire and freeze to death, because the fire is dangerous. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108 P.S. If this makes it out to the net, could someone send me mail to that effect? Thanks in advance.
nrh@inmet.UUCP (10/27/85)
>/* Written 10:12 pm Oct 24, 1985 by baba@spar in inmet:net.politics.t */ >>>>>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>>>>... >>>>>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>>>>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >>>>> >>>>>... I think such a preference is not just >>>>>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>>>>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. >>>> >>>>What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >>>>parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >>>>his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! >>> >>>Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person >>>in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, >>>you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to >>>himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be >>>right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness >>>may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. >>>So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. >> >> Quite possible. It MAY happen, but you've opened the door, certainly >> things MAY happen the other way, and if Baba admits that *I* may be so >> affected by a coercion as to make it a net loss WHATEVER good is likely >> to be accomplished, you certainly must admit that the possibility >> exists for things happening the other way, and that therefore >> it does NOT follow that the "bad feelings" may be ignored. > >You rang? > >What I "admitted" (an interesting choice of words) was that you might >subjectively experience coercion as so odious as to negate in your >mind any benefits that you might receive from being coerced. I am >pleased that you concede that such an attitude on your part has no >rational basis, any more than anyone else's "religion" does. But the >free practice of your religion can impact others of different "faiths". >If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom >the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits >accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those >others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. >Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system >that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? Indeed, Baba, I should indeed have used "agree" rather than "admit". I certainly didn't mean to imply that you were conceding anything: I meant to use the term "admit" in the other sense of "grant". And now to your point about the injustice of not introducing coercion. There's a rough problem here. How to weigh my dislike of being coerced against other peoples dislike of losing a public good? A similar situation exists with respect to socialism. If it is clear that socialism leads to poorer economic performance, is the US justified in invading socialist regimes and putting in laissez-faire ones? If not, why not? *IF* the discomfort of imposition of laissez-faire is less than that of (say) famine, then it is an injustice to the people under the socialist regime not to invade, but WHO IS TO JUDGE? And how? Because of the existence of NON-free-rider situations (ones where the person producing the wealth may deny use of it to anyone he chooses) socialist regimes typically must employ force (tax collectors, threat of jail) to impose a progressive income tax. Does this mean that socialism must always intrude greatly upon individual actions? In other words, that socialism, to be viable, must be implemented with a police state? With all this focus upon the free-rider aspects of the marketplace, few seem to have remarked that a similar situation exists (on a much more massive scale) with command-economy regimes. In particular, people who are politically well-connected may live at the expense of everyone else, regardless of what they contribute to everyone else. The fact that a command economy suffers from free rider problems that are no doubt as large as (though a little subtler than) those suffered by a hypothetical libertarian society is something that must be considered when comparing the two.
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/31/85)
>>If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom >>the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits >>accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those >>others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. >>Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system >>that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? [Baba] > > There's a rough problem here. How to weigh my dislike of being > coerced against other peoples dislike of losing a public good? > [Nat Howard] The other people in the above scenario are not losing a "public good", but a personal material benefit. Your railings against Stalinism are, I suppose, commendable, but they hardly answer the question. Baba
gabor@qantel.UUCP (Gabor Fencsik@ex2642) (11/01/85)
In article <617@spar.UUCP> Baba offers us the following riddle: > If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom > the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits > accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those > others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. > Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system > that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? Baba's move is to take a meta-rule in the game for trading preferences (the non-coercion principle) and turn it into just another chip in the game, arriving at a standard self-reference paradox. I thought our libertarian friends would smother this one with their usual alacrity but all I have seen so far is a pathetic 'socialism is no better, so there'. So as a non-libertarian puzzle addict I can offer the following countermoves: 1) Attack the static character of the free-rider paradigm and counter with the principle of unconstrained secession. In most instantiations of this paradigm one can escape the free-rider problem by changing the rules of the game or opting out. If, by voluntary agreement, everyone on my street is obligated to sweep the whole street once a year (there are 365 of us) then a few free-riders can't ruin the scheme. Better, abolish the arrangement altogether: let everyone sweep in front of their own house (the technological solution). 2) Your paradox only shows that the failure to coerce leads to a result that is suboptimal and unjust but I (with my libertarian hat on) refuse to be impressed. In order to cause my edifice to cave in you have to show that my refusal to be coerced can itself be coercive. This is the case if our pig-headed free-rider has actual veto power over everyone else, i.e., nothing can happen if he opts out. It is now Baba's turn to construct such a free-rider veto paradigm and make it stick. 3) The last refuge is to challenge your original move of turning a meta-rule into a chip in the trading game. The assertion is that the non-coercion principle itself is not subject to trade-offs. You have already shown that this is essentially a religious argument. I think a libertarian in possession of his critical faculties will have to accept the revelatory nature of the core of his beliefs but first you have to cut off escape routes 1) and 2). Your move. ----- Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/02/85)
>/* Written 12:09 am Oct 31, 1985 by baba@spar in inmet:net.politics.t */ >>>If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom >>>the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits >>>accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those >>>others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. >>>Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system >>>that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? [Baba] >> >> There's a rough problem here. How to weigh my dislike of being >> coerced against other peoples dislike of losing a public good? >> [Nat Howard] > >The other people in the above scenario are not losing a "public >good", but a personal material benefit. Your railings against >Stalinism are, I suppose, commendable, but they hardly answer >the question. > > Baba >/* End of text from inmet:net.politics.t */ > Odd. In the article Baba seems to be replying to, I didn't mention the word "Stalin". I was referring to the lower personal material benefits that obtain in a SOCIALIST system. As I see it, the other people in the above scenario are losing BOTH a public good (the public good will be undersupplied because of a free-rider situation) and the personal material benefits that would result from the correct supply of public goods. Am I missing something, here?
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (11/04/85)
In article <545@qantel.UUCP> gabor@qantel.UUCP (Gabor Fencsik@ex2642) writes: >In article <617@spar.UUCP> Baba offers us the following riddle: >> If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom >> the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits >> accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those >> others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you. >> Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system >> that can only be practiced in a closed religious community? > >Baba's move is to take a meta-rule in the game for trading preferences >(the non-coercion principle) and turn it into just another chip in the >game, arriving at a standard self-reference paradox. No, we are debating whether to adopt the non-coercion principle. The meta- meta-principle forming the basis for that debate is "under what circumstances are people better off" -- leaving lots of vagueness about who and in what sense. As a minimum, if everyone agrees that outcome A is better than outcome B, then outcome A is better than outcome B. If you accept the non-coercion principle as a primary axiom, the discussion is irrelevant. >1) Attack the static character of the free-rider paradigm and counter with > the principle of unconstrained secession. In most instantiations of > this paradigm one can escape the free-rider problem by changing the > rules of the game or opting out. If, by voluntary agreement, everyone > on my street is obligated to sweep the whole street once a year (there > are 365 of us) then a few free-riders can't ruin the scheme. Better, > abolish the arrangement altogether: let everyone sweep in front of their > own house (the technological solution). This doesn't always work. Consider street maintenance (very similar to your example, but more realistic). Let us assume that there is a voluntary organisation to maintain the streets of a city. Each individual is better of if he opts out of the organization -- the remaining members will still maintain the streets, and he doesn't have to pay for it. Now, a few free riders won't ruin this scheme. But there is no reason why it should stop with a few. As more people opt out, the service becomes more expensive, which encourages yet more people to opt out. Eventually, the whole thing collapses. As for everyone maintaining their own section of the street. First, some people will fail to, and everyone who drives by will suffer as a result. This doesn't quite meet the conditions above, but it is an example of widespread inconvenience for the relatively minor gain of a small minority. But even if everyone does maintain their own own section of the street, they all lose. There are real economies of scale in having it done centrally. (Yes, they can all hire the same company to repair the street. But even if they can all agree on when it needs repair, they have to spend time to coordinate hiring them. The cost of doing so is not trivial.) >2) Your paradox only shows that the failure to coerce leads to a result that > is suboptimal and unjust but I (with my libertarian hat on) refuse to be > impressed. In order to cause my edifice to cave in you have to show > that my refusal to be coerced can itself be coercive. [...] > >3) The last refuge is to challenge your original move of turning a meta-rule > into a chip in the trading game. The assertion is that the non-coercion > principle itself is not subject to trade-offs. [...] As noted above, those who fall back on non-coercion as an a priori principle will reject this arguement. But they are trying to get the rest of us to adopt libertarianism. "No, we would all be worse off" is a perfectly valid counter-argument. (It may even convince some who thought they accepted the non-coercion principle a priori.) Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (11/05/85)
In article <28200255@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >>> There's a rough problem here. How to weigh my dislike of being >>> coerced against other peoples dislike of losing a public good? >>> [Nat Howard] >> >>The other people in the above scenario are not losing a "public >>good", but a personal material benefit. >> Baba > >As I see it, the other people in the above scenario are losing BOTH a >public good (the public good will be undersupplied because >of a free-rider situation) and the personal material benefits >that would result from the correct supply of public goods. > >Am I missing something, here? No, Baba is. A "public good" *is* a personal material benefit. What makes it a public good is the nature of its distribution. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108