[net.politics.theory] Food for China

janw@inmet.UUCP (11/05/85)

Nutrition in China has recently been a matter of discussion.
Finally, Richard Carnes suggested someone go and get some
facts. He was obviously right (he'll make an educated person
out of me yet).

The picture as I see it, after doing some reading, is:

==============
Take the THIRTIES as a base. Nutrition is at bare subsistence level.
(Meaning, a little lower and people start dying). There are pockets
of desperate poverty and hunger. E.g., one can see a rickshaw in
a big city suddenly drop down and die.

==============
The war-ravaged FORTIES are much WORSE. Famine and disease follow war.

==============
Communist victory in 1949 brings pacification. Land  reform  is
executed  (with  appalling  cruelty,  but  a majority gains).  In
terms of nutrition, the FIFTIES are BETTER,  about  back  to  the
THIRTIES,  with the difference that *the cities are not hungry* :
the communists have built an effective village-to-city food pump.
Though urbanites are a small minority, this makes the picture, to
a foreigner, look much better than it is.  

Encouraged by success, Mao launches in 1958 the Great  Leap  For-
ward  and  herds  the peasants into COMMUNES. Official STATISTICS
record staggering increases in both food and industrial produc-
tion. They LIE. End of the FIFTIES.

==============
The beginning of the SIXTIES is marked by the GREATEST FAMINE  in
recorded history. Later demographic data prove that at least 16.5
million people died of hunger in three years. Actually, this only
shows excess of mortality over "normal" times; and normal,
in China, does not mean famine-free. 

DISTRIBUTION:
Compared to pre-revolutionary times, the famine is  different  in
distribution, as well as scale. The cities (and they  keep  grow-
ing)  are  adequately  fed  (which  helps conceal the famine from
foreigners).  So is the army. And, of course, the  cadres  -  the
officials  - are well fed, both in city and village. But there is
yet another cause of uneven distribution:

Famine is exacerbated  due  to  Mao's  doctrine  of  "self-
reliance"   meaning  self-subsistence  of  each  province.  Trade
between provinces is cut down. Population movement is restricted.
And  no  outside  aid  goes  to  any  province. This means that a
famine-stricken province  cannot  be  relieved  through  aid;  or
trade; or population outflow.

 When the extent of failure (industrial as well as  agricultural)
is realized, Mao is discredited and nudged away from the helm. To
come back, he launches the Cultural Revolution. Its  victims  are
mostly  urban  ;  it is unclear to me how it affects the agricul-
ture. In any case, the whole of the SIXTIES is terribly HUNGRY.

==============
In the SEVENTIES, revolutionary flames gradually die out.  The
ARMY  is  largely  in control.  Communes have become a formality.
Ideologists are busy settling accounts with each other. Food pro-
duction  crawls  up,  but so does population. Distribution is, of
course, uneven, as it was throughout; growing corruption  contri-
butes  to  this.  But  changes in production matter more. By late
SEVENTIES nutrition is back UP TO where it was  in  the  THIRTIES
and  the FIFTIES. This means the level of the poorest Asian coun-
tries, such as BANGLADESH.

==============
Mao's decline and death make way for  important  policy  changes.
One of them is population control ( Mao did not even tolerate its
discussion). Still more important potentially, but hard  to  push
through  in  the  rigidly  controlled  country,  are  free-trade,
CAPITALIST-road EXPERIMENTS. They are of two  kinds:  encouraging
individuals (including farmers) to enrich themselves and allowing
more  autonomy  to  government-owned  enterprises.  In  spite  of
bureaucratic resistance, they are made on a greater scale than in
any Communist country and appear to be, on the whole,  very  SUC-
CESSFUL, especially the first kind. Production grows faster, peo-
ple seem to eat a little better ; and "seem" may  mean  something
*now*  because the country is somewhat more open. If a great fam-
ine happened now it might even make the NY Times pages.

The EIGHTIES look, so far, as the decade of HOPE,
unless a new ideological typhoon strikes China.

		Jan Wasilewsky

myers@uwmacc.UUCP (Latitudinarian Lobster) (11/07/85)

> 
> The EIGHTIES look, so far, as the decade of HOPE,
> unless a new ideological typhoon strikes China.
> 
> 		Jan Wasilewsky

Hi Jan, we meet again.  You said that you did some READING before writing
your article.  WHAT exactly did you read, so that we may all become
ENLIGHTENED?

I really don't expect you to reply, because you've already proven in
net.politics how I am a malicious LIAR.

Por la defensa de la verdad, jeff