torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (11/19/85)
In article <1482@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes: >"It might be nice if reason never called for force, but sometimes >in the real world it does--free-rider situations being a notable >example." This statement is wrong in content and in the method >of thinking used to arrive at it. It is wrong in content because >force and reason are opposites. It is wrong in method because it >is anti-hierarchical--it takes a concrete from the realm of >political-economics (free-rider situations) as being simpler to >grasp and analyze than the more fundamental concepts of reason >and force. No, my method does not take a concrete as being simpler to grasp than the more fundamental concepts. I have illustrated my arguments about free-rider situations with concrete examples -- such as national defense -- but my argument depends on the fundamental concepts of values, actions, and force. >Arguments go on and on because the anti-force side does not >defend their position in principle. As long as non-coercion is >treated as a starting point--just some rule that has an equal >status with any other, there will always be alleged >counterexamples to argue about. Here you are absolutely right. The no-exceptions anti-force side has not (until yourself) argued their position in principle, and that's exactly what is called for. If I thought your argument in principle worked, I would join the no-exceptions anti-force side in a split second. >What is wrong with force in principle is that it is incompatible >with reason. > >Ayn Rand's definition, "the faculty that identifies and >integrates the material provided by man's senses," captures what >I mean by reason. Sounds like an excellent definition of reason. If you can prove that force is incompatible with reason in this sense, that clinches it. >Force is when someone uses physical means to get you to obey his >wishes. Force is grasped by distinguishing it from values or >arguments that someone might use to get you to change your mind. This definition needs to be spelled out more. By "values .. that someone might use to change your mind", do you mean *positive* values? That is, things that you value positively; regard as good? If that's what you mean, then the definition sounds right. >Force is a gun aimed at your mind. Force cuts off your tie to >reality--your reason. Reason tells you to do this. Force-- >someone else's wishes--tells you to do that. He wants to put his >wishes between your mind and reality. Aren't his wishes *part of* reality, however -- along with the fact that he's got a gun? Let me put it this way: when someone points a gun at you and says "your money or your life", what is the *reasonable* thing to do -- comply, or resist? I think the answer is clear: reason tells you to comply (at least if talking him out of it is not a realistic option). >If he had more than his >emotions to offer you--if he had an argument or a value, he could >use reason instead of a gun. If he had a value, he would need to use reason *and* the reality that constituted the value (the item in the department store you are encouraged to buy, for example). The thief is using your reason *and* the gun (a "negative value" as I (implicitly) defined that term). If your reason were nonexistent, pointing a gun at you wouldn't work -- you'd ignore that part of reality. Now let's consider free-rider situations for a moment. I don't deny that reason could in principle be used to solve them -- I think it could; if everyone thought through the issues of fairness involved. But I also think that that is about as likely as everyone coming to realize that belief in God is unreasonable. I.e., not a chance -- at least not in our lifetime. And the only other way to get people to choose the mutually beneficial outcome is by force. Well, this is getting long; I hope you'll point out (and elaborate on) the parts of your argument you think I'm missing. --Paul V Torek torek@umich