rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (11/20/85)
Consider the difference between a threat and an argument. The threatener says, "My wishes--products of my consciousness which need have no tie to reality--will guide your action." The arguer says, "Guide your actions by reality. Here are the facts of reality that lead to the actions I recommend. None of these reasons are based on non-objective products of my consciousness. It is true that I desire you to act this way; but my desire should be irrelevant to your decision." It should be clear that the threatener--someone who proposes to use force to have his way with others--is the opposite of the arguer--someone who proposes to deal with others with reason. It is true that the person threatened can continue to use reason to guide his actions just as he would use reason to decide what to do if a grizzly challenged him for his lunch. But we are no longer talking of *human* interactions in either case. To the extent that someone chooses to use force rather than reason, he abandons his claim to be treated as man--the rational animal. What is the epistemological status of the whim of the threatener? Where is its tie to reality? Are all products of consciousness equivalent? Are whims the same as reason? Can the threatener survive on whims without you? You know that your own emotions do not give you truth. Why should someone else's emotions do so? The sense in which force cuts off your tie to reality--your reason--is that it attempts to elevate the arbitrary, subjective contents of someone's mind to the same status as metaphysical facts of reality. How can anyone hope to use reason to identify and integrate the material provided by his senses if any arbitrary desire is to be treated as being as real as existents? -- Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/21/85)
Bob Stubblefield writes: >What is wrong with force in principle is that it is incompatible >with reason. I don't understand this statement. Consider the story of Ulysses and the Sirens. Ulysses, anticipating that he would be too weak-willed to do the rational thing and steer past the Sirens, told his men to bind him to the mast, and if he should make signs for them to release him, they were to bind him even more tightly. The men had their ears stopped with wax so they could not hear the Sirens, and they kept rowing on course. And that is how Ulysses saved his ship from being smashed on the rocks. In this story, force is not only compatible with reason, it is used in the *service* of reason. Another example is Torek's favorite, free-rider situations. If each one of a group of people would prefer living in the US to living in Canada, but all are agreed that each would be better off when all live in Canada than when all live in the US, then it would be rational for them to place guards at the border to prevent any individual from crossing into the US. Note that I am not claiming that this is the only possible solution to this collective action problem; I am only claiming that in this case force is used in the service of reason, and thus is not essentially incompatible with reason. Suppose that it were possible, by the threat of the use of conventional arms, to prevent anyone from building or possessing nuclear weapons, and suppose further that everyone would be better off if no one possessed nuclear weapons (surely a reasonable supposition), and that everyone agrees that this is the case. Would you claim that it is contrary to reason to use conventional force to forestall anyone from building nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves from a hostile neighboring country? If so I submit that your conception of what is reasonable or rational is unintelligible or at least contrary to our intuitive notions of rationality. (This goes back at least to Thomas Hobbes. The Leviathan-state is a creature of man's reason, in order that life may not be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." It is not based on the principle of "might makes right.") >Given the common usage of the language, a more precise formulation of >the principle is, "the *initiation* of force is the opposite of >reason." If I pitch my tent in your backyard while you are on vacation, and you come back and drive me off your property with a shotgun, or get the police to take me away, you are initiating the use of force. Is this what you are claiming is illegitimate and contrary to reason? -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
janw@inmet.UUCP (11/24/85)
[rwsh@hound] I agree with your ethical attitude: that a threat is dehumaniz- ing, corrosive to rational faculty, and, as far as possible, to be eliminated from social interaction. Moreover, I am optimistic enough to hope it *is* possible, sooner or later. But the logical and epistemological scaffolding baffles me (as it did in Ayn Rand's writings). >To the extent that someone chooses to use force rather than rea- >son, he abandons his claim to be treated as man--the rational animal. He may abandon some ethical status; but rationality is not a matter of how he is *treated*; it is a matter of fact; he may be a rational predator - say, a pirate or slave-trader, - treating other people as a natural resource. That does not give him any *claim* on their sympathy or respect; but why is he any less rational than a hunter or a herder because his prey is human ? E.g., the slavers who built the wealth of Liverpool or Boston were probably cool-headed businessmen; they would have put their money in whaling had that paid more. How would their rationality have changed ? >What is the epistemological status of the whim of the threatener? >Where is its tie to reality? Are all products of consciousness >equivalent? Are whims the same as reason? Can the threatener sur- >vive on whims without you? Again, why do you assume that the threatener acts on whim ? His desire is tied to reality if he knows what he wants and where to get it. Isn't it ? The threatener, without the victim, might be able to switch to honest work, and so survive. All this is awfully trite, so I must be missing something. What ? I would agree to the extent that power tends to corrupt, and may corrupt rational faculties as well. (Submission is no less cor- rupting). But this is a long-run tendency, not a precondition to wielding power ... Wait! I've just had an idea of a possible interpretation of your words. Try this : the threatener may have a reason for his wish; *to him* it is not a whim, but based on reality. But he does not give his reasons to the victim. To the latter, the former's wish is a whim, and also a piece of primary reality on which to act - again, rationally. Thus, each has his own reality to which he adapts; but it is not the same. So, they are each rational but not *co-rational*. Does that make any sense to you ? Jan Wasilewsky
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/05/85)
In article <1497@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes: >What is the epistemological status of the whim of the threatener? Where is >its tie to reality? Are all products of consciousness equivalent? Are whims >the same as reason? Can the threatener survive on whims without you? >You know that your own emotions do not give you truth. Why should someone >else's emotions do so? Why do you assume that another person's resort to force is based on whim? It may equally be based on his exercize of reason. Why, then, cannot he use argument to convince you instead of force? Because his reasons are based on his objective desires (such as his desire to continue living), which you do not necessarily share. You give reasons for not wanting others to use force against you, but none whatsoever for not using force against others. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108