[net.politics.theory] Freedom and ownership, round3

hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) (11/27/85)

In earlier articles, I proposed the following definitions:
OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way
that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of
another.  
A person's PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which the person
exercises ownership.

Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes, claims:

> These two definitions are mutually circular, i.e., they include each
> other in their definitions, and therefore tell us nothing except the
> relation between the two concepts.  If we put the two definitions
> together, we have (condensed):
>   OWNERSHIP is the right to use an entity in any way that does
>   not invade the aggregate of things over which another person
>   exercises OWNERSHIP.

The above definition of ownership is not circular, merely generative,
that is, it is a recursive definition whose first step is subsumed in
its second step. The recursion may be laid out as follows:

1.	When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP
is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade,
or threaten to invade, the person of another.  
2.	Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the
right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade,
or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY
is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership.

The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one
important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned
entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by
any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms
defined in those articles. Hence, if Carnes is to challenge the argument
presented in those articles, he will have to challenge the
reasonableness of my definitions. On the other hand, I would be
surprised by a claim that generative or recursive definitions are
inherently either not valid or impossible to understand.

			Adam Reed (ihnp4!mtuxo!hfavr)

carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (12/01/85)

Adam Reed writes:

>1.	When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP
>is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade,
>or threaten to invade, the person of another.  
>2.	Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the
>right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade,
>or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY
>is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership.
>
>The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one
>important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned
>entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by
>any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms
>defined in those articles. 

I'm still trying to figure out how Adam Reed arrives at his
conclusion; until I do I can neither refute the argument nor agree
with it.  To mention one point, it is apparently pivotal that the
land in question was "unowned" previous to the first use of it.  How
do we know that it was unowned?  I did not postulate this as a
hypothesis of the question.  What is your definition of "owned"?
(Please do not use "ownership" in the definition.)  That is why I
made the very reasonable request that the argument be stated without
the use of own-terms or terms whose definitions contain own-terms,
since they seem to cause confusion.  If Adam Reed can state the
argument so that it is clear what are the premises and how the
conclusions are derived from them, then he has a philosophical
argument; if not, he has an assumed conclusion dressed up with
definitions as an argument.  In the meantime, I will suggest the
following as a statement of the argument:

  When a person comes upon a tract of land that was previously unused
  by humans, he always has a moral right to use the land
  productively, in any way he pleases.  After which, he possesses the
  moral rights of "ownership" over as much land as he has used (these
  rights can be enumerated in various ways but they typically include
  the right to continued use of the land, the right to alienate it, and
  the claim-right that no one else may use it without his permission).

I can at least understand this, but I don't agree with either
sentence.
-- 
Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/06/85)

> In earlier articles, I proposed the following definitions:
> OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way
> that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of
> another.  
> A person's PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which the person
> exercises ownership.
> 
> Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes, claims:
> 
> > These two definitions are mutually circular, i.e., they include each
> > other in their definitions, and therefore tell us nothing except the
> > relation between the two concepts.  If we put the two definitions
> > together, we have (condensed):
> >   OWNERSHIP is the right to use an entity in any way that does
> >   not invade the aggregate of things over which another person
> >   exercises OWNERSHIP.
> 
> The above definition of ownership is not circular, merely generative,
> that is, it is a recursive definition whose first step is subsumed in
> its second step. The recursion may be laid out as follows:
> 
> 1.	When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP
> is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade,
> or threaten to invade, the person of another.  
> 2.	Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the
> right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade,
> or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY
> is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership.
> 
> The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one
> important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned
> entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by
> any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms
> defined in those articles. Hence, if Carnes is to challenge the argument
> presented in those articles, he will have to challenge the
> reasonableness of my definitions. On the other hand, I would be
> surprised by a claim that generative or recursive definitions are
> inherently either not valid or impossible to understand.
> 
> 			Adam Reed (ihnp4!mtuxo!hfavr)

The chalenge to reasonableness of the definition:

WHAT does it mean to "invade a property of another"?

For example, if your neighbor would produce substances which create
a bad smell on your property, is it an invasion?  But what about 
"someones barbeque is sombody else's polution".  I claim that under
a weak definition of "invasion" we all are an easy pray of the
careless ones, under a strong definition no economical activity is
feasible, at least not in a large scale, finally, to find a right 
limit of the definition of "invasion", one needs a complicated web
of rules, not unlike of what we have now.  

Example: eminent domain.  The owner of some land may block the 
use of another, by denying access, power supply etc.  Thus 
to enable some people to use their property we must limit the
scope of ownership rights of another.