hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) (11/07/85)
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: > Self-ownership, the view that each human being is the morally > rightful owner of his own person and powers, is a highly debatable > thesis. I haven't time to discuss it now; I will simply note that > one of the battle lines is drawn here. > .... > My argument is that (laissez-faire capitalism) > permits systematic distributive injustice, i.e., it is *based on > theft* (unjust appropriation). It is not a question of random > imperfection, but of systematic blindness to questions about the > moral legitimacy of certain kinds of private property. > .... > (Libertarians) permit the private ownership of WHAT NO ONE HAS A NATURAL > RIGHT TO OWN PRIVATELY, namely the productive resources that we need to > live. The ownership of these resources was originally acquired unjustly, > by the theft of what was jointly owned (or perhaps owned by no one). I take exception to the assertion that advocates of Capitalism suffer from "a systematic blindness to questions about the moral legitimacy of certain kinds of private property". I, for one, am as certain of the (moral) proposition that "each human being is morally the rightful owner of his own person and powers" as it is possible for a human being to be. One of the battle lines is indeed drawn here, since it is one the basis of this proposition that I am opposed to government as an agent of re-distribution of property, except when adjudicating specific disputes about the rightful ownership of specific goods. If I understand him correctly, Carnes objects to two libertarian positions in particular: (1) In cases in which no individual living today can prove the validity of his personal claim to a property (as in cases of property stolen a very long time ago), and in which current ownership is not the result of a specific, proven felony, Libertarians tend to oppose redistribution (even though the current owner's title may not be beyond question). (2) Libertarians hold that the conversion into individual property (through use or trade) of things not previously owned by anyone is an instance of productive creation of wealth (rather than "theft"). The manner in which the first of these positions follows from self-ownership is fairly straightforward. For if one is the rightful owner of one's own person and powers, than one is also the rightful owner of anything produced by one's person and powers, or obtained in voluntary exchange for the services or products of one's person. But if such ownership is rightful, then it is wrong to deny anyone the ownership of what he or she has produced, or obtained directly or indirectly through voluntary transactions with the producer(s). Thus one should not be able to terminate a person's ownership of anything in the absence of PROOF that such ownership is NOT the result of production and voluntary exchange. Position (1) above is a special case of this principle. A possible objection to position (1) is that if the current owner can continue ownership without being required to prove that his ownership is legitimate, some people will enjoy things they have not earned, and this is unjust. Note, however, that justice (dealing with each person as he or she deserves to be dealt with) and freedom (maximizing the individual's control, or effective ownership, over his or her own person and powers) are two different moral values. The Libertarian's preference for maximizing freedom rather than justice is hardly "blindness to moral questions". Position (2) above hinges on the nature of value, and on the specific process through which things acquire value, i.e. become wealth. This is a more complex question, and I will deal with it in a separate posting. Adam Reed (ihnp4!npois!adam)
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/08/85)
Some quick comments on Adam Reed's recent posting: >I take exception to the assertion that advocates of Capitalism suffer >from "a systematic blindness to questions about the moral legitimacy of >certain kinds of private property". I, for one, am as certain of the >(moral) proposition that "each human being is morally the rightful owner >of his own person and powers" as it is possible for a human being to be. Why are you so certain? >(2) Libertarians hold that the conversion into individual property (through >use or trade) of things not previously owned by anyone is an instance of >productive creation of wealth (rather than "theft"). (i) Conversion into private property is (by definition) private appropriation, which may be justified or not, but cannot itself be regarded as production of wealth. Production and appropriation are two different things, however closely related. (ii) What about the case of the private appropriation of things which were previously owned jointly by everyone? In any case in which this is unjustified, we have a case of theft. It is in this sense (primarily) I claim that Libertaria and capitalism are based on theft. > ... if one is the rightful >owner of one's own person and powers, then one is also the rightful >owner of anything produced by one's person and powers, or obtained in >voluntary exchange for the services or products of one's person. But what about land and other natural productive resources, which no one has produced? (No human being, that is.) The primary question is what justifies the private ownership of these resources. > Note, however, that justice (dealing with each person as >he or she deserves to be dealt with) and freedom (maximizing the >individual's control, or effective ownership, over his or her own person >and powers) are two different moral values. The Libertarian's preference >for maximizing freedom rather than justice is hardly "blindness to >moral questions". (i) The definition of freedom offered above is too vague or too restricted. Does it include, for example, the individual's power to do as he wishes with external objects, areas of land, etc.? (ii) Libertarians do not advocate maximizing freedom. First, libertarians have no objection to the employer-employee relationship, and some even permit voluntary enslavement contracts. But an employer obviously has power, in some relevant sense, over his employee, (and a fortiori a slaveowner over his slave), if the employee has no other way of making a living, or if the alternatives are less attractive to the employee. This seems to be a diminution of the employee's freedom in an important sense. A person who is subject to another's commands is thereby less free, it would seem. Second, libertarians advocate the private ownership of just about everything. This is just as much a distribution of unfreedom as freedom; it means BOTH that A can do what he wants with his private property, AND that no one else is free to use it. In Libertaria you would be forcibly prevented from driving someone else's car without his or her permission. I will accept the statement that libertarians advocate maximizing the freedom of property-owners to do as they wish with their own property. But this is not the same thing as freedom per se, any more than freedom of speech, freedom to emigrate, etc., are identical with freedom. It is a particular kind of freedom. A society (such as our own) in which many people are subject to the power of others in the worker-employer relationship, and in which most people can freely use only a extremely small fraction of existing objects, land, and so on (namely what they own privately), is hardly a society in which freedom is maximized -- on the contrary. -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (11/08/85)
In article <1099@mtuxo.UUCP> hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed) writes: >If I understand him correctly, Carnes objects to two libertarian >positions in particular: > >(1) In cases in which no individual living today can prove the validity >of his personal claim to a property (as in cases of property stolen a >very long time ago), and in which current ownership is not the result of >a specific, proven felony, Libertarians tend to oppose redistribution >(even though the current owner's title may not be beyond question). >[...] >The manner in which the first of these positions follows from >self-ownership is fairly straightforward. For if one is the rightful >owner of one's own person and powers, than one is also the rightful >owner of anything produced by one's person and powers, or obtained in >voluntary exchange for the services or products of one's person. But if >such ownership is rightful, then it is wrong to deny anyone the ownership >of what he or she has produced, or obtained directly or indirectly >through voluntary transactions with the producer(s). Thus one should not >be able to terminate a person's ownership of anything in the absence of >PROOF that such ownership is NOT the result of production and voluntary >exchange. Position (1) above is a special case of this principle. The second-to-last sentence doesn't follow. A preponderance of the evidence, not PROOF, should be sufficient. You emphasize that the current owner is wronged by termination of possession if he got the goods legitimately; but you ignore the other side of the coin, namely that the non-current-owner is wronged if the current owner keeps the goods and *didn't* get them legitimately. >(2) Libertarians hold that the conversion into individual property (through >use or trade) of things not previously owned by anyone is an instance of >productive creation of wealth (rather than "theft"). >[...] I will deal with (2) in a separate posting. I can't wait -- I anticipate that that argument will be even less cogent. --Paul V. Torek "turn up those flames -- I hate cold weather!"
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/10/85)
In article <238@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >In Libertaria you would be forcibly prevented from driving someone >else's car without his or her permission. I neglected to add that you would not be free to drive on the streets without the permission of the owner of the streets or payment of his fee, at least in some versions of Libertaria. When libertarians figure out how air and sunlight (or the sun itself) can be privately owned, you will have to pay for these too (if the owners wish to sell). So much for the claim of libertarians to be defenders of freedom. "Libertaria," in fact, is a gross misnomer -- the concept of Libertaria (in its various versions) has no particularly close relation to liberty. But "liberty" is one of those doubleplusfeelgood words. The signs on the barbed-wire fences surrounding the hypothetical libertarian society should read something like: "Private Propertaria -- Keep Out." Turning from a hypothetical to a historical example, in the various enclosure movements in England, the ownership of the "commons" (the tracts of land that were available to all for the grazing of sheep, growing of crops, habitation, etc.) was transferred from joint ownership to private ownership. This was a significant diminution of the freedom of the commonfolk (as of course it still is), and was perceived as such. As a Norfolk laborer said: "You do as you like, you rob the poor of the Commons right, plough the grass up that God sends to grow, that a poor man may feed a Cow, Pig, Horse, or Ass; lay muck and stones on the road to prevent the grass growing." (Quoted in E.P. Thompson's great study, *The Making of the English Working Class* [pp. 230-231], which should be force-fed to libertarians; or alternatively they should be forced to read it.) "Libertarian" principles also diminish such civil liberties as freedom of speech and assembly, in that quote-unquote libertarians (let's call them "entitlement theorists") hold these freedoms to derive entirely from the rights of private property. Without a "public space" in which to speak or assemble, the proponents of views unpopular with large property-owners (like the abolition of capitalist private property) will find it difficult to publicize their views. If the owners of Usenet decide that Marxist ideas are a little too much to tolerate on their network, then it's hasta la vista for some of us. -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/11/85)
A party of libertarians en route to a tour of Hong Kong was shipwrecked on an uninhabited island. After a certain time had elapsed, they had each appropriated an area of land according to the principles of just appropriation on which they were all agreed. Each person had enough land to provide a subsistence, and the entire island was now under private ownership. Each person, as was her right, now built a fence around her property and guarded the borders with dogs, traps, etc. Now the people who had plots of land in the interior of the island found that they could not travel outside of their own tract of land without cutting deals with the owners of the contiguous areas. They were in effect imprisoned unless they could meet the price of the adjacent landowners. A few of them who were comparatively unproductive found that they were de facto prisoners, or that certain parts of the island were inaccessible to them. Now our libertarian friends, those champions of freedom, would say that no one has suffered any loss of freedom in the above scenario. Indeed they would say that they live in a paradise of freedom. But I suggest that this is far too narrow a conception of freedom: a prisoner is still a prisoner even if his jailer is susceptible to a bribe. After a while a ship came along, and those living along the coast went home, in their excitement forgetting to unlock the gates to their property and leaving those in the interior imprisoned. As they had every right to do. Here is a question for libertarians: Since libertarians believe that one may have just ownership of land, under what circumstances and by what means may one obtain ownership of all or part of the sea? The atmosphere? The sun (the star itself, not sunlight)? -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/13/85)
>/* Written 5:10 pm Nov 9, 1985 by carnes@gargoyle in inmet:net.politics.t */ >In article <238@gargoyle.UUCP> carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: > >>In Libertaria you would be forcibly prevented from driving someone >>else's car without his or her permission. > >I neglected to add that you would not be free to drive on the streets >without the permission of the owner of the streets or payment of his >fee, at least in some versions of Libertaria. When libertarians >figure out how air and sunlight (or the sun itself) can be privately >owned, you will have to pay for these too (if the owners wish to >sell). How amusing! My article on private property from which it is obvious that one cannot claim the sun unless there are no other users of it no sooner comes out than Richard spouts this line! No, Richard, ownership of the Sun (like ownership of the whole earth) is NOT in the picture (at least not for Rothbardian Libertarians, and, I suspect, for many others). Suggest you apologize for straw man-ism. Ownership of sunlight and air, of course, are interesting cases. Do I have the right to block your light by building on my own property? Do I have the right to mix my exhaust into the air shared by all of us? A clear system of property rights to things like photons and clean air would no doubt go far towards resolving questions like these, and you will notice that any government regulation of such things involves the government's claiming at least partial ownership of them. Do you really care to trust your right to breathe to James Watt? Or a committee of James Watts? Or, better yet, a committee of workers somewhere, who are well-connected with party machinery? >So much for the claim of libertarians to be defenders of >freedom. "Libertaria," in fact, is a gross misnomer -- the concept >of Libertaria (in its various versions) has no particularly close >relation to liberty. But "liberty" is one of those >doubleplusfeelgood words. The signs on the barbed-wire fences >surrounding the hypothetical libertarian society should read >something like: "Private Propertaria -- Keep Out." Richard, Libertarians have consistently stood for freedom of immigration into the US. I think you should apologize for straw man #2. >Turning from a hypothetical to a historical example, in the various >enclosure movements in England, the ownership of the "commons" (the >tracts of land that were available to all for the grazing of sheep, >growing of crops, habitation, etc.) was transferred from joint >ownership to private ownership. This was a significant diminution of >the freedom of the commonfolk (as of course it still is), and was >perceived as such. As a Norfolk laborer said: "You do as you like, >you rob the poor of the Commons right, plough the grass up that God >sends to grow, that a poor man may feed a Cow, Pig, Horse, or Ass; >lay muck and stones on the road to prevent the grass growing." >(Quoted in E.P. Thompson's great study, *The Making of the English >Working Class* [pp. 230-231], which should be force-fed to >libertarians; or alternatively they should be forced to read it.) How delightful! Richard, there's nothing more pleasing to me than the fact that nobody is in a position to FORCE me to read a given book (except, perhaps, the IRS). Are these "commons", perhaps the classic ones used in the phrase "tragedy of the commons" to refer to the pitfalls of joint ownership? I am of course, not proud of my ignorance. I've placed Thompson's book on my "try to read this" list. May I suggest to you "Capitalism and the Historians" (I forget the author)? >"Libertarian" principles also diminish such civil liberties as >freedom of speech and assembly, in that quote-unquote libertarians >(let's call them "entitlement theorists") hold these freedoms to >derive entirely from the rights of private property. Without a >"public space" in which to speak or assemble, the proponents of views >unpopular with large property-owners (like the abolition of >capitalist private property) will find it difficult to publicize >their views. Ah, but much freer than in Mexico, say, where there is supposedly a free press, but the Government controls the supply of newsprint; or in the Soviet Union, where it controls newsprint AND printing presses, AND xerox machines, and operates the KGB, supposedly for the benefit of a collectivist society. Gentle (and not so gentle) readers: Richard is once again trying to befuddle you with rhetoric. Implicit, but unsupported in his statement is the notion that all people who own property would tend towards some grand uniformity of opinion (and thus squeeze out unpopular ideas). This is manifestly false: one can rent halls, even if one doesn't own them, and while it might be difficult to get assembly space if you're a member, say, of the "Don Black Admiration Society", it's unlikely that NONE of the people subscribing to your (unpopular) idea will own property or be well connected. In a command society of any sort, socialist or fascist, you must get government approval of assembly. In a free society (like the US, in this respect) or in libertaria, you need only find one or two crazy millionaires, or a bunch of people who share some land, or some unclaimed land, and you may hold all the meetings you like. The difference is important: in a command society you must get CERTAIN other people to agree with you. In the relatively free society, you need have only SOME people agreeing with you. (You may own property yourself, of course, and require no additional space -- much more likely than finding your ideas are unpopular BUT you are in the power elite of a command society). If Richard is REALLY for unlimited right to assembly, he won't be able to protest on any principled ground when I convene the "Libertarians for Loud Van Halen :-)" meeting in his living room, but I suspect that he isn't. Richard, you will note, refers to views unpopular with "large property-owners". In Libertaria, it *doesn't matter* if the plantation next door is owned by someone who dislikes your ideas -- all you need to have is a backyard, or a theater. In Socialista, unless you find government approval for your cause (or at least not government condemnation) you are simply out of luck -- the backyards and theaters will be barred to you. >If the owners of Usenet decide that Marxist ideas are a >little too much to tolerate on their network, then it's hasta la >vista for some of us. It's remarkable that Richard should flaunt such a statement as if it meant something. I would think it quite remarkable if any large percentage (20%, say) of the "owners of Usenet" agreed enough on such a proposition to do anything about it. I concede that they may well kill "net.politics.*", but I would be very, very, surprised if they simply said "no more socialism" (and if they did say it, how would they enforce it? Remember, "gargoyle" could talk directly to "inmet" without any help from "fascist-property-system").
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/15/85)
Richard, You make the silly mistake of basing your fable on something that technically COULD happen in a libertarian society, but wouldn't. To explain a little more: if people really acted against their own interests (by imprisoning the people in the interior of the island, and the interior folks by not taking care to use regularly a path to the shore, (so as to deny complete ownership acquisition to the "outsiders")) then there would indeed be unfortunate circumstances. Why stop there, though? Why not simply posit that the libertarians (all of them) decided not to eat or drink anything? This would be JUST as consistent with their principles (as libertarians, anyhow), and just as likely to happen. For that matter, let's save time: let's assume that the libertarians immediately kill themselves (being free to do so). Does this point up any danger in libertarianism? Sure! That free men may kill themselves, or act stupidly, if they wish. Is it likely that the "barbed-wire" society Richard talks about would evolve? No -- it depends upon people acting contrary to their own interests. Libertarianism is a philosophy that depends on people pursuing their own interests. If you wish to make up fables in which people DON'T pursue their own interests, fine, but it's silly to post such drivel to the net. (I am, of course, very interested in any *historical* evidence of reasonably free people pursuing someone ELSE's interests -- but remember it's necessary to show that they weren't (for example) serving an ideal that THEY held dear). As for how one would establish ownership of the Sun, good luck! You'd have a hard time showing that other people weren't already using it productively. On the other hand, it might not be that hard to get ownership of the Andromeda Galaxy, provided you could think of some way to USE it all..... and assuming that it was unused by anyone else..... I make no claim, here, of course, but I suggest that the Andromeda Galaxy would be a good place for Richard to store his straw men.....
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/21/85)
Nat Howard: >To explain a little more: if people really acted against their own >interests (by imprisoning the people in the interior of the island, and >the interior folks by not taking care to use regularly a path to the shore, >(so as to deny complete ownership acquisition to the "outsiders")) then >there would indeed be unfortunate circumstances. Why stop there, though? >Why not simply posit that the libertarians (all of them) decided not to >eat or drink anything? This would be JUST as consistent with their >principles (as libertarians, anyhow), and just as likely to happen. The point of my example has nothing to do with the fact that the result is an undesirable state of affairs. Those in the interior are *imprisoned* and would have to have the permission of their neighbors to move about the island freely. Yet according to "libertarians," their liberty has not been reduced a whit, since no "libertarian" principles have been violated, and "libertarians" proclaim that they are opposed, on basic principle, to any social or legal constraints on individual liberty. If so then there is something wrong with the way "libertarians" conceive liberty (= freedom), and I claim that they consistently abuse the concept. The point may be clearer with another example. A and B discover Planet X and establish ownership claims on various areas of land through the appropriate processes. Now A fences in an arbitrary area that she owns privately. B is now imprisoned, since the land area of the planet is finite. Why is it a constraint on B's freedom to fence her in but not to fence her out? And why should the proportion of the total land area that A encloses make any difference? If A puts an electrified fence around 99% of the total land area, leaving B with 1% (but still enough to live on), could one plausibly say that B is not imprisoned on her 1% ? So here is a new definition of a "libertarian": A "libertarian" is a person who believes that East Berliners are now imprisoned by the Communist government that erected the Berlin Wall, but that they would be free if an Arabian sheik purchased West Berlin and the Wall and refused to let them enter his private property. Or if not perfectly free (since they would still live under Communism), at least freer than at present. >On the other hand, it might not be that hard to get ownership of the >Andromeda Galaxy, provided you could think of some way to USE it all..... >and assuming that it was unused by anyone else..... I'll repeat the question I posed to Adam Reed. In my planet X example, why does A have the natural right to privately appropriate *any* of the land area or other natural resources of the planet, unilaterally and without consulting with anyone else? (Perhaps we should stick to terrestrial examples.) As far as I can tell, it is a fundamental tenet of all variants of "libertarianism" that she does have this right, but I haven't seen a reasoned defense of this position. I grant that I haven't refuted it either. But you can't just assume without argument that individuals have the right to own privately the means of production. -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/25/85)
>/* Written 3:37 pm Nov 21, 1985 by carnes@gargoyle in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Re: Property,justice,freedom" ---------- */ >Nat Howard: > >>To explain a little more: if people really acted against their own >>interests (by imprisoning the people in the interior of the island, and >>the interior folks by not taking care to use regularly a path to the shore, >>(so as to deny complete ownership acquisition to the "outsiders")) then >>there would indeed be unfortunate circumstances. Why stop there, though? >>Why not simply posit that the libertarians (all of them) decided not to >>eat or drink anything? This would be JUST as consistent with their >>principles (as libertarians, anyhow), and just as likely to happen. > >The point of my example has nothing to do with the fact that the >result is an undesirable state of affairs. Au Contraire. Your example assumes that the libertarians on the island would *NOT* act according to their own interests consistent with libertarian principles (avoiding an undesirable state of affairs is a pretty standard definition of pursuing one's own interests). In particular, I point out above that they could KEEP from being imprisoned simply by regularly taking certain paths from the land they own to the ocean. The point of MY article was that it's fine and good to come up with examples of libertarian conduct that result in sad outcomes (part of freedom is having the chance of sad outcomes) but not monumentally silly things that involve large groups of people acting uniformly against their interests as they perceive them. GIVEN that people would not do this, your example, depending as it does on people acting very stupidly, becomes pretty stupid. It's as if you had suggested that libertarians might all commit suicide and what about that? >Those in the interior are >*imprisoned* and would have to have the permission of their neighbors >to move about the island freely. Yet according to "libertarians," >their liberty has not been reduced a whit, since no "libertarian" >principles have been violated, and "libertarians" proclaim that they >are opposed, on basic principle, to any social or legal constraints >on individual liberty. AND ONE MORE TIME: the libertarians who commit suicide all at once have not had THEIR freedom lessened, either right? Wrong. They've had their freedom lessened (they are dead) consistent with their actions. Similarly for the incredibly stupid libertarians in your trumped-up example: they've LOST freedom, BY THEIR OWN CHOICE. In ANY society, one could do this by the simple expedient of jumping off a building, or bricking oneself into a doorless, windowless room, and if this is the worst criticism you can find of libertarianism, I'm surprised you haven't joined the Party. >If so then there is something wrong with the >way "libertarians" conceive liberty (= freedom), and I claim that >they consistently abuse the concept. Ho-hum. Not a very impressive claim, I think. Libertarian society includes obligations and prohibitions having to do with your relationships with other people. It is *possible* in a libertarian society to put yourself in a situation in which you've ceded a dangerous amount of your freedom of movement to others, just as it's possible for people in any society to open their own veins and bleed to death. It's hardly likely, it's certainly not something that any large number of people are going to do. Examples depending on the notion that a large number of people DO voluntarily screw themselves up when it's easy to avoid it are, in my opinion, time-wasters. >The point may be clearer with another example. A and B discover >Planet X and establish ownership claims on various areas of land >through the appropriate processes. Now A fences in an arbitrary area >that she owns privately. B is now imprisoned, since the land area of >the planet is finite. Why is it a constraint on B's freedom to fence >her in but not to fence her out? And why should the proportion of >the total land area that A encloses make any difference? If A puts >an electrified fence around 99% of the total land area, leaving B >with 1% (but still enough to live on), could one plausibly say that >B is not imprisoned on her 1% ? I am, of course, delighted to hear that B has somehow established claim and use of different areas WITHOUT HAVING TO VISIT THEM REGULARLY, and thus either preventing A from achieving ownership of her route, or finding himself OBVIOUSLY dependent on A for her access, doesn't realize that she should treat with A in this matter. Do you intend to tell us just how this was done? Or are you once again depending on B to fall on her sword in order to make your example plausible? >So here is a new definition of a "libertarian": A "libertarian" is a >person who believes that East Berliners are now imprisoned by the >Communist government that erected the Berlin Wall, but that they >would be free if an Arabian sheik purchased West Berlin and the Wall >and refused to let them enter his private property. Or if not >perfectly free (since they would still live under Communism), at >least freer than at present. Tsk! Not quite as bad as the usual flamage, but poorly constructed, and bound to backfire: It was not Libertarians, Propertarians, Randians, or private-property types who built the Berlin wall, but Socialists. In that flamingly Libertarian book, the "Information Please Almanac", I find the following interesting notes: 1. On page 120, in "Headline History", I find: 1961 East Germans erect Berlin between East and West Berlin to halt flood of refugees (Aug 13) Well, Richard, do you suppose they did it to keep the Westerners from availing themselves of the great benefits of Socialism? 2. On page 192, in the country entry for East Germany, subheading Government, we find this: The major political party is the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party..... Let's avoid any squirming: That the current party membership in power did not build the Wall is obvious to me, as is the fact that they DO maintain the wall. Need more be said on the relative propensity for wall-building and area-imprisonment of Socialists and Libertarians? Were some libertarian, private investor to buy the Berlin wall, and assuming that for some reason the Socialists didn't simply build a new one BEHIND the old one, it would seem to me most unlikely that he would simply leave the wall in place, continuing to staff it with soldiers. He'd do much better (and remember, these are the sort of libertarians, who, unlike socialists, ruthlessly exploit their fellow man) to sell passes through to West Berlin, probably on the basis of some low fare plus a percentage of wealth. The folks in the "worker's paradise" would probably be glad to do it, and their first exposure to (rather raw) capitalism would be much more pleasant than the alternative their state had left them. Their state said to them: "Nein". The (worst-case) capitalist says: "For a fee....". In short, Richard, they'd go for the deal, glad to have it. Oh, would our Wall-owning type ONLY allow the wealthy across? No, Richard. Not if he's trying to maximize his gains. It is unclear to me how legal (in a libertarian sense) it would be for the Wall-owner to shoot at people who were merely crossing the wall. On one hand, the wall IS private property. On the other hand, violation of one's property cannot be an unlimited license for retaliation. Believe it or not....
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (12/03/85)
Excerpted from Nat Howard's characteristically brief response to my claim that libertarians misuse the concept of liberty, and thus that one of the central philosophical positions of libertarianism is untenable: >Ho-hum. Not a very impressive claim, I think. Libertarian >society includes obligations and prohibitions having to do with >your relationships with other people. It is *possible* in a >libertarian society to put yourself in a situation in which you've >ceded a dangerous amount of your freedom of movement to others, >just as it's possible for people in any society to >open their own veins and bleed to death. Libertarians rightly believe that the liberty (= freedom) of East Berliners is diminished by the fact that they are not permitted to cross the Wall. So libertarians owe us an answer to the following question: Why is it a restriction on liberty to wall people in, but not a restriction on liberty to wall people out? (And how do you tell the difference between walling in and walling out, on a round planet?) The point of my island story is to show that if, as libertarians believe, walling out does not diminish liberty, then someone who would ordinarily be considered imprisoned has not had his liberty diminished, and since this is absurd, libertarians misuse the concept of liberty. Lest anyone think I am setting up a straw man, let me quote the distinguished libertarian philosopher Antony Flew, certainly not a Brain-Damaged Libertarian, in the Fontana *Dictionary of Philosophy*. He defines libertarianism as "wholehearted political and economic liberalism, opposed to any social and legal constraints on individual freedom." But if this is true, and if private property is a basic principle of libertarianism, it follows that libertarians believe that the existence of private property does not entail any social or legal constraints on individual liberty. This is clearly absurd: in Libertaria, if I tried to "borrow" Nat Howard's car without his permission, the state or the local Rent-A-Cop would intervene to prevent me. If the roads were privately owned, I could not use them except by cutting a deal with the owners. (I should mention that my considerable freedom of movement in the city of Chicago is mostly due to the existence of publicly owned thoroughfares, as well as public transit.) I would not be free to sleep in someone's backyard, even if I had nowhere else to go -- the cops would come and get me. The only objects I could freely use would be that tiny fraction that I owned privately. This isn't a legal constraint on my freedom?? Get serious. The quote from Flew isn't just a momentary lapse, as is shown by the term "libertarianism" itself, which seems to imply that this political philosophy has an especially close relation to liberty. It does not, and the term is a gross misnomer. In addition, "liberty," "freedom," and "free" are staples of libertarian rhetoric, as one may see from a casual glance at the 1984 LP platform. In fact, a term often used by libertarians to denote their ideal is a "Free Economy" or "Free Society," which again seems to imply that this type of society is characterized by an absence of "any social or legal constraints on individual liberty." But this is blatantly false, as I have shown. It is also false that Libertaria necessarily offers *more* freedom than any socialist society, contrary to standard libertarian claims. Libertarians can make this claim only because they have not thought carefully enough about the concept of freedom. -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
nrh@inmet.UUCP (12/08/85)
/* Written 6:52 pm Dec 2, 1985 by carnes@gargoyle in inmet:net.politics.t */ >[Carnes treats us to another helping of the notion that a libertarian society involves ownership, that ownership permits exclusion, that exclusion limits liberty. This, together with a great deal of private land ownership in Libertaria means that a given individual could be excluded from the great majority of the land.] Carnes seems to think that "Brain Damaged" libertarians on the Net have not noticed this little possibility, and to jog our creaky noggins hands us a real noggin-jogger about an island where an extreme case of this has evolved. Confronted with explanations that everyone on the island has clearly acted in their own worst interests and that that isn't plausible, Richard fires off another article. It seems to me that Richard is equating Libertarianism with Anarchy (mistake #1), equating the possibility of absolute ownership with the likelihood that people could be fenced in by such ownerships (mistake #2), and wondering how libertarianism could possibly work in a society in which people follow their own worst interests (mistake #3). To handle them in turn.... 1) About half of all libertarians are Anarchists, and thus see no proper role for state ownership or existence, so to attack the libertarian position on this ground is only half right. There are minimal-state societies that I would term rather libertarian that would resolve this dilemma in the ways states usually do. 2) You can't get fenced into a place unless you enter, or, having been born there, you must be in a region that nobody else has regularly left from (such movement would prevent absolute ownership from obtaining on the route used to leave). Once "fenced in", you typically could leave (I assume I need not explain to Richard that Libertarians, like everyone else, disagree with folks who imprison them regardless of who owns the prison walls). Further, the establishment of absolute property rights requires a pretty clear title. It would be difficult, were the US to become a libertarian society, to establish ownership of Broadway until, say, it became impassable from lack of maintenance and nobody used it for some time (Rendering it impassable yourself "doesn't count"), or you bought off the claim of all regular users of that road. Once you OWNED the road, you'd have every interest in allowing people to use it in non-destructive ways (so you can charge them admission). By the way, this case was brought up some time ago in regard to buying a house without making sure of access. It's not all that interesting an issue, but feel free to bring it up as often as you can bear to. 3) Richard seems fond of postulating little libertarian enclaves in which people act very stupidly indeed. On Libertaria Island, the shipwrecked libertarians spent all their time building walls and assiduously avoiding acquiring partial-property rights to the paths to the sea. The challenge in net.politics.theory is to come up with societies that work where people act like people, that is, they pursue their own goals (whether they perceive them collectively or individually), and tend to act in their own best interests, and the basic interests change rather slowly. I propose that Richard give up the (if accomplished, useless) task of showing that Libertarian rules would also give Masochists just what THEY wanted (i.e. lots of pain and trouble) and wouldn't that be terrible? Why a restriction on walling in, but not out? Simple, Richard -- you can't get IN without using land (and either establishing rights to use it again, or (presumably) implicitly gaining the consent of the owner to use it again to leave. If it were a cul-de-sac, the owner would not have the right to imprison you, even if you couldn't pay the toll outwards. As for this little gem: >The >only objects I could freely use would be that tiny fraction that I >owned privately. This isn't a legal constraint on my freedom?? Get >serious. You seem to have missed the point entirely -- objects you use freely as a result of ownership or permission from owners. Owners typically get benefits from such use, so would have a big interest not in hoarding, but in sharing (most often for a fee, to be sure, but not always). One may be opposed to any societal or legal restraints on freedom, but there is the usual question of where your freedom ends and mine begins. That you can't punch me in the nose (or rather, that you're not allowed to) is a limit on your freedom that violates SOME dictionary definitions of freedom but not others. In particular, MY freedom's intactness may depend on not being punched in the nose as a matter of someone else's right. So we have the notion (surely not new to you?) that freedoms may conflict but still be called freedoms. (Not the sticky points where they conflict, but in the broader sense of freedom as the ability to choose). Your "freedom" needn't include the right to do what you wanted with my property, and perhaps mine includes the right to NOT let you use my property. They remain "freedom", not license. I find no necessary conflict between the quote from Flew (whom I've not encountered) and my own beliefs. Of course, if you WANT to do something worthwhile about this "conflict", why not track down Flew (if he's still alive) and ask him what he thinks of it?