janw@inmet.UUCP (11/29/85)
[radford@calgary] >But is it really necessary to argue about whether the last ves- >tiges of conventional government can be eliminated, when the >present government is at least an order of magnitude larger than >a "minimal state"? >So I propose an incremental approach. Hear, hear, HEAR ! Shoe quotas are a good subject except I know less than nothing (is that an exaggeration ? I mean, exaggeration means more, not less...) about them. Why not also consider deregulations actually made in the past - did any of them fail ? Not the ones I remember off-hand: Prohibi- tion, Corn Laws, NEP in USSR. The French Revolution swept away *oodles* of regulations (added a few, too, like bread price ceil- ings). This might be a good challenge for statists. And if they come up with a good one, the ball will be in the other court. Jan Wasilewsky
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/30/85)
>/* Written 3:09 am Nov 29, 1985 by tedrick@ucbvax in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Re: Strange Bedfellows: and a new t" ---------- */ >>So do any "socialists" out there want to defend shoe quotas against the >>libertarians (me included)? If not, perhaps you'd like to give a list of >>what current state interventions you oppose also. Then we'd have something >>to agree on... > >I can conceive of a situation where shoe quotas might be desirable. >Suppose one country plans to flood the shoe market in the other >country with cheaper shoes until all shoe producers in the other >country are driven out of business. I'd just like to make a few points that seem to me to be left out of many discussions of this sort of question. Let us call these two countries Flood and Drain. (Flood wishes to flood the shoe market in Drain). 1. If Flood subsidizes the Floodian shoemakers, then at least in the short term (until Flood gives up, or until Drain shoemakers go under from matching impossible-to-match prices), Flood taxes go up ("No such thing as a Free Subsidy"). 2. Flood shoemakers are liable to grow steadily less efficient, and rely more and more on the subsidy. 3. In the meantime, Drain citizens are buying shoes at the expense of Flood taxpayers, meaning that: a) The cost of living has gone down for Drainians, and up for Floodians. b) Drainian Industry as a whole will experience lower labor costs, at the same time as Floodian industry is experiencing (because of the tax) higher ones. c) Labor-intensive Drain exports will go down in price compared to "all-other-things-equal" Flood exports. 4. Flood must offer the low price to all comers; failure to do so will result in a boost in the Drain economy (particularly shoe-wise) as Drainians buy shoes from Flood outlets and re-sell them to (say) New Yorkers. This is particularly likely to occur to Drainian shoe-marketers. 5. Assuming an unusual fortitude on the part of the Floodian government, and assuming that the Drain shoe industry shuts down its (least-efficient first) shoemaking plants, then as soon as any sign that the Floodian policy will change, the MOST efficient (or most apparently efficient) Drainian operation will re-open. In the meantime, the Floodian shoe industry will probably have become *very* inefficient, as it has had no true market feedback for some time. If Flood is NOT "sponsoring" its shoemakers in this way -- if it simply is true that Flood shoemakers fairly put out a cheaper shoe at the same level of quality, even after shipping, then surely Drain citizens should have the right to buy these? After all, the Drain citizens shouldn't have to subsidize THEIR shoemakers, should they? I'm not saying that nobody gets hurt in a trade war of this sort -- the Drain shoemakers have had to become shoe-marketers, shoe-repairers, makers of specialty or luxury shoes, and in other ways shift themselves to somewhat different (and sometimes entirely different) market niches. I'm just saying that there's a fair amount not obvious (even after all this stuff is pointed out) going on here, and missing even one of these things could result in a '"stupid"' decision.
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/04/85)
> > >/* Written 3:09 am Nov 29, 1985 by tedrick@ucbvax in inmet:net.politics.t */ > >/* ---------- "Re: Strange Bedfellows: and a new t" ---------- */ > >>So do any "socialists" out there want to defend shoe quotas against the > >>libertarians (me included)? If not, perhaps you'd like to give a list of > >>what current state interventions you oppose also. Then we'd have something > >>to agree on... > > > >I can conceive of a situation where shoe quotas might be desirable. > >Suppose one country plans to flood the shoe market in the other > >country with cheaper shoes until all shoe producers in the other > >country are driven out of business. > > I'd just like to make a few points that seem to me to be left out of > many discussions of this sort of question. Let us call these two > countries Flood and Drain. (Flood wishes to flood the shoe market in > Drain). > > 1. If Flood subsidizes the Floodian shoemakers, then at least in > the short term (until Flood gives up, or until Drain shoemakers > go under from matching impossible-to-match prices), Flood taxes > go up ("No such thing as a Free Subsidy"). > > 2. Flood shoemakers are liable to grow steadily less efficient, and > rely more and more on the subsidy. May happen, but it does not always happen. > > 3. In the meantime, Drain citizens are buying shoes at the expense > of Flood taxpayers, meaning that: > a) The cost of living has gone down for Drainians, and > up for Floodians. > b) Drainian Industry as a whole will experience lower > labor costs, at the same time as Floodian industry > is experiencing (because of the tax) higher ones. Labor costs in Flood may actually go down, if the tax has the form of diminished wages and outlawed free collective bargaining (like in South Korea). > c) Labor-intensive Drain exports will go > down in price compared to "all-other-things-equal" > Flood exports. As pointed above, not true. > > 4. Flood must offer the low price to all comers; failure to do > so will result in a boost in the Drain economy (particularly > shoe-wise) as Drainians buy shoes from Flood outlets and > re-sell them to (say) New Yorkers. This is particularly likely > to occur to Drainian shoe-marketers. > Flood may keep prices profitable in the domestic market and/or impose import dutes and/or quotas. > 5. Assuming an unusual fortitude on the part of the Floodian > government, and assuming that the Drain shoe industry shuts > down its (least-efficient first) shoemaking plants, then as > soon as any sign that the Floodian policy will change, the > MOST efficient (or most apparently efficient) Drainian > operation will re-open. In the meantime, the Floodian shoe > industry will probably have become *very* inefficient, as it > has had no true market feedback for some time. > > If the subsidy in Flood has the form of low wages, with an authoritarian mechanism which keeps them low, there is no strong reason that Flood will ever change its policy. > If Flood is NOT "sponsoring" its shoemakers in this way -- if it simply > is true that Flood shoemakers fairly put out a cheaper shoe at the same level > of quality, even after shipping, then surely Drain citizens should have > the right to buy these? After all, the Drain citizens shouldn't have to > subsidize THEIR shoemakers, should they? > > I'm not saying that nobody gets hurt in a trade war of this sort -- the > Drain shoemakers have had to become shoe-marketers, shoe-repairers, > makers of specialty or luxury shoes, and in other ways shift themselves > to somewhat different (and sometimes entirely different) market niches. > The assumption here is that Drain had an insufficient number of marketers, repairers, specialty producers etc. > I'm just saying that there's a fair amount not obvious (even after all > this stuff is pointed out) going on here, and missing even one of these > things could result in a '"stupid"' decision. This posting ignores the most frequent "subsidy" which is a low wage. To compete with low wages Drain must ultimately to diminish its wages. But the wealth of a nation consists to a large extend of the sum of the wages. Drain may keep shifting its industry to Flood until the wages achieve parity. This however may be very bad to the population of Drain (although it may be very good for the companies in Drain). The advantage that the population of Drain may have over the population of Flood may consists of much higher level of capital per person. Pure free market would change it, by increasing the investments in Flood and decreasing them in Drain. This is a mechanism which made the South of USA as "rich" as the North. Because of the relative small size of the South in relation to the North, and because of the free movement of labor, the bad consequences to the North were small, if there were any. However, if the competition involves countries with populations (jointly) larger than the population of USA, the picture changes. Piotr Berman
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/08/85)
In article <28200343@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >Why not also consider deregulations actually made in the past - >did any of them fail ? Not the ones I remember off-hand: Prohibi- >tion, Corn Laws, NEP in USSR. The French Revolution swept away >*oodles* of regulations (added a few, too, like bread price ceil- >ings). This might be a good challenge for statists. And if they >come up with a good one, the ball will be in the other court. I'm not sure I can come up with any. I would support the proposition that the government should regulate less than it does now; governments are rather conservative about deregulating, and rarely do so unless they are fairly certain of success. On the other hand, I can give examples where regulation has been successful. The U.S. securities industry is perhaps the best example. This regulation should in fact be extended: to dealers in gems, precious metals, and similar investments. A lot of innocent people have lost a lot of money in scams in these areas recently. (I don't want to see any flames about how such things would be for- bidden in Libertaria; we are talking pragmatics here. They are illegal *now*, but this hasn't prevented them. Regulation of the securities industry *has* greatly reduced this kind of fraud in that area.) Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/10/85)
[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor] >In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes: >> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and Marxists, >> respectively. >> >> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a source >> >of legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo- >> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'. >> >> >Marx's ... assertion that 'human essence is the totality of so- >> >cial relations' is, as far as I can see, incompatible with any >> >notion of inalienable rights. >> >> There seems to be an implicit contradiction here. Can the demo- >> cratic process, in your view, legitimize alienation of all >> rights, or only of some rights; and if so, which ? > >The democratic process legitimizes the making of public policy. >Taxation is an adjunct and precondition of public policy. Saying >'Taxation is Theft' is an attack on the legitimacy of political power >whether or not such legitimacy flows from the democratic process. >This is the line of thought implicit in the first paragraph you quoted. >Nothing was said about rights there, unless 'freedom from taxation' is >regarded as a fundamental right or, alternatively, legitimacy is understood >to mean 'a licence to abrogate rights'. But of course it means nothing of the >sort. The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create >new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children >to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from >mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the >Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years >or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward >inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may >think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of your ques- >tion without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are >hinting at. My fault entirely. Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe, central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised. You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft; (2) in post-WWII Britain several million people were attached to their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and the right to own land. Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate- ly go. Adherents of the "taxation is theft" principle believe that here is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA violates fundamental rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was at least fundamental enough to call for a constitutional amend- ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual rights. If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi- timacy for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob- lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem to hint that what is *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall on the side of alienable rights. *Now* there apparently are *three* sources of legitimacy: will of the people (democratic process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction here, if the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is. My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no contradiction arises ? Jan Wasilewsky
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/13/85)
> > [Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor] > >In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes: > >> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and Marxists, > >> respectively. > >> > >> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a source > >> >of legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo- > >> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'. > >> > > The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create > >new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children > >to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from > >mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the > >Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years > >or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward > >inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may > >think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of your ques- > >tion without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are > >hinting at. > > My fault entirely. > Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe, > central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and > return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised. > You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as > well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be > quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft; > (2) in post-WWII Britain several million people were attached to > their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in > post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and > the right to own land. > > Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set > a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate- > ly go. Adherents of the "taxation is theft" principle believe > that here is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert > that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA violates > fundamental rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was > at least fundamental enough to call for a constitutional amend- > ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual > rights. > > If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi- > timacy for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob- > lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable > rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises > the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem to > hint that what is *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to > public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall on > the side of alienable rights. *Now* there apparently are > *three* sources of legitimacy: will of the people (democratic > process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this > is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction here, if > the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is. > > My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no > contradiction arises ? > > Jan Wasilewsky An quote : "somebody's barbeque is somebody else's polution". A right of somebody is a restriction of the rights of others. Objectivists do not see any conflict. Consider however the following example: in Sweden there is a law that an owner of a forest cannot prohibit the public to walk in his forest or to pick berries and mushroom. In essence, the ownership of a forest is the right to grow and sell woods. This limits the rights of forest owners and enhances the rights of others. Similarly, to create a "right" to education, protection, defence etc., some rights concerning free disposition of the income must be limited. I think that there exists rights which are inalienable (habeas corpus, free expression, fair trial) and other rights, which although not inalienable, do contribute to the quality of life, and as such are desirable. I do not see the rights to invest, own means of production, dispose freely with property etc. as inalienable, but rather as desirable most of the time. Piotr Berman