[net.politics.theory] Strange Bedfellows: and a new to

janw@inmet.UUCP (11/29/85)

[radford@calgary]
>But is it really necessary to argue about whether the  last  ves-
>tiges  of  conventional  government  can  be eliminated, when the
>present government is at least an order of magnitude larger  than
>a "minimal state"?

>So I propose an incremental approach.

Hear, hear, HEAR !

Shoe quotas are a good subject except I know  less  than  nothing
(is  that  an exaggeration ? I mean, exaggeration means more, not
less...) about them.

Why not also consider deregulations actually made in the  past  -
did any of them fail ? Not the ones I remember off-hand: Prohibi-
tion, Corn Laws, NEP in USSR. The French  Revolution  swept  away
*oodles* of regulations (added a few, too, like bread price ceil-
ings).  This might be a good challenge for statists. And if  they
come up with a good one, the ball will be in the other court.

		Jan Wasilewsky

nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/30/85)

>/* Written  3:09 am  Nov 29, 1985 by tedrick@ucbvax in inmet:net.politics.t */
>/* ---------- "Re: Strange Bedfellows: and a new t" ---------- */
>>So do any "socialists" out there want to defend shoe quotas against the
>>libertarians (me included)? If not, perhaps you'd like to give a list of
>>what current state interventions you oppose also. Then we'd have something
>>to agree on...
>
>I can conceive of a situation where shoe quotas might be desirable.
>Suppose one country plans to flood the shoe market in the other
>country with cheaper shoes until all shoe producers in the other
>country are driven out of business. 

I'd just like to make a few points that seem to me to be left out of
many discussions of this sort of question.  Let us call these two
countries Flood and Drain.  (Flood wishes to flood the shoe market in
Drain).

	1. If Flood subsidizes the Floodian shoemakers, then at least in
	the short term (until Flood gives up, or until Drain shoemakers
	go under from matching impossible-to-match prices), Flood taxes 
	go up ("No such thing as a Free Subsidy").

	2. Flood shoemakers are liable to grow steadily less efficient, and
	rely more and more on the subsidy.

	3. In the meantime, Drain citizens are buying shoes at the expense
	of Flood taxpayers, meaning that:
		a) The cost of living has gone down for Drainians, and
		   up for Floodians.
		b) Drainian Industry as a whole will experience lower
		   labor costs, at the same time as Floodian industry
		   is experiencing (because of the tax) higher ones.
		c) Labor-intensive Drain exports will go 
		   down in price compared to "all-other-things-equal" 
		   Flood exports.  

	4. Flood must offer the low price to all comers; failure to do
	   so will result in a boost in the Drain economy (particularly
	   shoe-wise) as Drainians buy shoes from Flood outlets and 
	   re-sell them to (say) New Yorkers.  This is particularly likely
	   to occur to Drainian shoe-marketers.

	5. Assuming an unusual fortitude on the part of the Floodian
	   government, and assuming that the Drain shoe industry shuts
	   down its (least-efficient first) shoemaking plants, then as
	   soon as any sign that the Floodian policy will change, the
	   MOST efficient (or most apparently efficient)  Drainian
	   operation will re-open.  In the meantime, the Floodian shoe
	   industry will probably have become *very* inefficient, as it
	   has had no true market feedback for some time.


If Flood is NOT "sponsoring" its shoemakers in this way -- if it simply
is true that Flood shoemakers fairly put out a cheaper shoe at the same level
of quality, even after shipping, then surely Drain citizens should have
the right to buy these?  After all, the Drain citizens shouldn't have to
subsidize THEIR shoemakers, should they?

I'm not saying that nobody gets hurt in a trade war of this sort -- the
Drain shoemakers have had to become shoe-marketers, shoe-repairers,
makers of specialty or luxury shoes, and in other ways shift themselves
to somewhat different (and sometimes entirely different) market niches.

I'm just saying that there's a fair amount not obvious (even after all
this stuff is pointed out) going on here, and missing even one of these
things could result in a '"stupid"' decision.

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/04/85)

> 
> >/* Written  3:09 am  Nov 29, 1985 by tedrick@ucbvax in inmet:net.politics.t */
> >/* ---------- "Re: Strange Bedfellows: and a new t" ---------- */
> >>So do any "socialists" out there want to defend shoe quotas against the
> >>libertarians (me included)? If not, perhaps you'd like to give a list of
> >>what current state interventions you oppose also. Then we'd have something
> >>to agree on...
> >
> >I can conceive of a situation where shoe quotas might be desirable.
> >Suppose one country plans to flood the shoe market in the other
> >country with cheaper shoes until all shoe producers in the other
> >country are driven out of business. 
> 
> I'd just like to make a few points that seem to me to be left out of
> many discussions of this sort of question.  Let us call these two
> countries Flood and Drain.  (Flood wishes to flood the shoe market in
> Drain).
> 
> 	1. If Flood subsidizes the Floodian shoemakers, then at least in
> 	the short term (until Flood gives up, or until Drain shoemakers
> 	go under from matching impossible-to-match prices), Flood taxes 
> 	go up ("No such thing as a Free Subsidy").
> 
> 	2. Flood shoemakers are liable to grow steadily less efficient, and
> 	rely more and more on the subsidy.

	May happen, but it does not always happen.
> 
> 	3. In the meantime, Drain citizens are buying shoes at the expense
> 	of Flood taxpayers, meaning that:
> 		a) The cost of living has gone down for Drainians, and
> 		   up for Floodians.
> 		b) Drainian Industry as a whole will experience lower
> 		   labor costs, at the same time as Floodian industry
> 		   is experiencing (because of the tax) higher ones.

		Labor costs in Flood may actually go down, if the tax
		has the form of diminished wages and outlawed free
		collective bargaining (like in South Korea).

> 		c) Labor-intensive Drain exports will go 
> 		   down in price compared to "all-other-things-equal" 
> 		   Flood exports.  

		As pointed above, not true.
> 
> 	4. Flood must offer the low price to all comers; failure to do
> 	   so will result in a boost in the Drain economy (particularly
> 	   shoe-wise) as Drainians buy shoes from Flood outlets and 
> 	   re-sell them to (say) New Yorkers.  This is particularly likely
> 	   to occur to Drainian shoe-marketers.
> 
                Flood may keep prices profitable in the domestic market
		and/or impose import dutes and/or quotas.

> 	5. Assuming an unusual fortitude on the part of the Floodian
> 	   government, and assuming that the Drain shoe industry shuts
> 	   down its (least-efficient first) shoemaking plants, then as
> 	   soon as any sign that the Floodian policy will change, the
> 	   MOST efficient (or most apparently efficient)  Drainian
> 	   operation will re-open.  In the meantime, the Floodian shoe
> 	   industry will probably have become *very* inefficient, as it
> 	   has had no true market feedback for some time.
> 
>               If the subsidy in Flood has the form of low wages, with
		an authoritarian mechanism which keeps them low, there 
		is no strong reason that Flood will ever change its
		policy.

> If Flood is NOT "sponsoring" its shoemakers in this way -- if it simply
> is true that Flood shoemakers fairly put out a cheaper shoe at the same level
> of quality, even after shipping, then surely Drain citizens should have
> the right to buy these?  After all, the Drain citizens shouldn't have to
> subsidize THEIR shoemakers, should they?
> 
> I'm not saying that nobody gets hurt in a trade war of this sort -- the
> Drain shoemakers have had to become shoe-marketers, shoe-repairers,
> makers of specialty or luxury shoes, and in other ways shift themselves
> to somewhat different (and sometimes entirely different) market niches.
> 
                The assumption here is that Drain had an insufficient
		number of marketers, repairers, specialty producers etc.

> I'm just saying that there's a fair amount not obvious (even after all
> this stuff is pointed out) going on here, and missing even one of these
> things could result in a '"stupid"' decision.

                This posting ignores the most frequent "subsidy" which
		is a low wage.  To compete with low wages Drain must
		ultimately to diminish its wages.  But the wealth of
		a nation consists to a large extend of the sum of the
		wages.  Drain may keep shifting its industry to Flood
		until the wages achieve parity.  This however may be
		very bad to the population of Drain (although it may
		be very good for the companies in Drain).  The 
		advantage that the population of Drain may have over
		the population of Flood may consists of much higher
		level of capital per person.  Pure free market would
		change it, by increasing the investments in Flood
		and decreasing them in Drain.  This is a mechanism
		which made the South of USA as "rich" as the North.
		Because of the relative small size of the South in
		relation to the North, and because of the free 
		movement of labor, the bad consequences to the North
		were small, if there were any.  However, if the 
		competition involves countries with populations
		(jointly) larger than the population of USA, the
		picture changes.

		Piotr Berman

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/08/85)

In article <28200343@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
>Why not also consider deregulations actually made in the  past  -
>did any of them fail ? Not the ones I remember off-hand: Prohibi-
>tion, Corn Laws, NEP in USSR. The French  Revolution  swept  away
>*oodles* of regulations (added a few, too, like bread price ceil-
>ings).  This might be a good challenge for statists. And if  they
>come up with a good one, the ball will be in the other court.

I'm not sure I can come up with any.  I would support the proposition
that the government should regulate less than it does now; governments
are rather conservative about deregulating, and rarely do so unless
they are fairly certain of success.

On the other hand, I can give examples where regulation has been
successful.  The U.S. securities industry is perhaps the best example.
This regulation should in fact be extended: to dealers in gems,
precious metals, and similar investments.  A lot of innocent people
have lost a lot of money in scams in these areas recently.

(I don't want to see any flames about how such things would be for-
bidden in Libertaria; we are talking pragmatics here.  They are illegal
*now*, but this hasn't prevented them.  Regulation of the securities
industry *has* greatly reduced this kind of fraud in that area.)

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

janw@inmet.UUCP (12/10/85)

[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor]
>In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes:
>> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and  Marxists,
>> respectively.
>>
>> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a  source
>> >of  legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo-
>> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'.
>>
>> >Marx's ... assertion that 'human essence is the totality  of  so-
>> >cial  relations'  is,  as far as I can see, incompatible with any
>> >notion of inalienable rights.
>>
>> There seems to be an implicit contradiction here. Can  the  demo-
>> cratic  process,  in  your  view,  legitimize  alienation  of all
>> rights, or only of some rights; and if so, which ?
>
>The democratic process legitimizes the making of public policy.
>Taxation is an adjunct and precondition of public policy. Saying
>'Taxation is Theft' is an attack on the legitimacy of political power
>whether or not such legitimacy flows from the democratic process.
>This is the line of thought implicit in the first paragraph you quoted.
>Nothing was said about rights there, unless 'freedom from taxation' is
>regarded as a fundamental right or, alternatively, legitimacy is understood
>to mean 'a licence to abrogate rights'. But of course it means nothing of the
>sort. The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create
>new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children
>to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from
>mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the
>Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years
>or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward
>inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may
>think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of  your  ques-
>tion  without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are
>hinting at.

My fault entirely.
Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe,
central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and
return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised.
You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as
well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be
quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft;
(2) in post-WWII Britain several million people were attached to
their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in
post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and
the right to own land.

Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set
a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate-
ly go. Adherents of the "taxation  is  theft"  principle  believe
that  here  is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert
that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA  violates
fundamental  rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was
at least fundamental enough to call for a  constitutional  amend-
ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual
rights.

If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi-
timacy  for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob-
lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable
rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises
the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem  to
hint  that  what  is  *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to
public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall  on
the  side  of  alienable  rights.  *Now*  there apparently are
*three* sources of legitimacy: will of the  people  (democratic
process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this
is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction  here,  if
the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is.

My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no
contradiction arises ?

                Jan Wasilewsky

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/13/85)

>
> [Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor]
> >In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes:
> >> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and  Marxists,
> >> respectively.
> >>
> >> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a  source
> >> >of  legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo-
> >> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'.
> >>
> > The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create
> >new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children
> >to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from
> >mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the
> >Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years
> >or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward
> >inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may
> >think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of  your  ques-
> >tion  without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are
> >hinting at.
>
> My fault entirely.
> Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe,
> central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and
> return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised.
> You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as
> well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be
> quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft;
> (2) in post-WWII Britain several million people were attached to
> their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in
> post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and
> the right to own land.
>
> Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set
> a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate-
> ly go. Adherents of the "taxation  is  theft"  principle  believe
> that  here  is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert
> that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA  violates
> fundamental  rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was
> at least fundamental enough to call for a  constitutional  amend-
> ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual
> rights.
>
> If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi-
> timacy  for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob-
> lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable
> rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises
> the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem  to
> hint  that  what  is  *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to
> public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall  on
> the  side  of  alienable  rights.  *Now*  there apparently are
> *three* sources of legitimacy: will of the  people  (democratic
> process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this
> is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction  here,  if
> the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is.
>
> My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no
> contradiction arises ?
>
>               Jan Wasilewsky

An quote : "somebody's barbeque is somebody else's polution".
A right of somebody is a restriction of the rights of others.
Objectivists do not see any conflict.  Consider however the
following example: in Sweden there is a law that an owner of
a forest cannot prohibit the public to walk in his forest or
to pick berries and mushroom.  In essence, the ownership of
a forest is the right to grow and sell woods.  This limits
the rights of forest owners and enhances the rights of others.
Similarly, to create a "right" to education, protection,
defence etc., some rights concerning free disposition of the
income must be limited.  I think that there exists rights
which are inalienable (habeas corpus, free expression, fair
trial) and other rights, which although not inalienable, do
contribute to the quality of life, and as such are desirable.

I do not see the rights to invest, own means of production,
dispose freely with property etc. as inalienable, but rather
as desirable most of the time.

Piotr Berman