laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/15/85)
In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: > >Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate >from certain precepts. Reason does not provide its own precepts. >I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept. >(I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job). I don't value >it in itself. In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to >drive nails. Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify >itself. Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing >necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts. >Everyone has these precepts, whether or not they recognize them as such. >The thing that I find hard to accept is the contention that precepts >are the product of reason itself. The necessity to drive nails is not >derived from a hammer. > I don't know whether you recognise this but the old ``I don't value the hammer in itself'' is the basis of all The Ends Justify the Means arguments. Extreme defenders of this view argue that you cannot make value judgements about *how* you do something, merely about certain things that you will accomplish. Then, if what you want to accomplish is very good you can do anything. Most people do not buy this extreme argument, but seem content to argue over whether or not the ends were very good. I think that the prevailance of such arguments reflects a funny desire in people to forget that their lives are ongoing. There is a real desire to see the things you want in life as ``objectives'' but not consider whether or not the method you use to try to achieve this objectives is appropriate. This is called ``being results-orientated'' many places. I think that this is precisely the wrong attitude which one can take with oneself. On a daily basis, it is not enough to simply want things, you must also want to deserve them when you get them. <Old time readers of this group will probably need reminding that I think that lottery winners deserve what they get, it is only those who use force or deceit or fraud who don't deserve what they get>. But, also on a daily basis, such an attitude requires forgoeing using a wrench to pound in nails when you have a hammer around to use. It may not be that a hammer is valuable in itself, but to use the appropriate tool for the job *is*. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (12/16/85)
A response to Laura Creighton: >>Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate >>from certain precepts. Reason does not provide its own precepts. >>I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept. >>(I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job). I don't value >>it in itself. In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to >>drive nails. Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify >>itself. Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing >>necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts. >>Everyone has these precepts, whether or not they recognize them as such. >>The thing that I find hard to accept is the contention that precepts >>are the product of reason itself. The necessity to drive nails is not >>derived from a hammer. > >I don't know whether you recognise this but the old ``I don't value the >hammer in itself'' is the basis of all The Ends Justify the Means arguments. >Extreme defenders of this view argue that you cannot make value judgements >about *how* you do something, merely about certain things that you will >accomplish. Then, if what you want to accomplish is very good you can >do anything. Most people do not buy this extreme argument, but seem >content to argue over whether or not the ends were very good. I think you are presenting false alternatives. Saying that I don't value a means in itself does not mean that I use ends to justify it. I see no problem with judging the worth of both ends and means with the accepted precepts which I spoke of later in my article. The first parenthetical remark that I make in the paragraph you quote here is and example of my judgement of the means of reason. I don't judge it as being arbitrarily valuable based on the ends it meets. >... It may not be that a hammer is valuable >in itself, but to use the appropriate tool for the job *is*. Exactly. This implies that we judge the means as well as the ends. I hope you didn't think that I was trying to say that a wrench would be as good as a hammer for driving nails (:-)). Of course the ends don't justify the means, but neither do the means justify themselves. -- Paul Dubuc cbsck!pmd \/-\ /\-/