berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/02/85)
Bob Stubblefield objected to the use of force in a society (or human relationship in general. He presented several interesting quotes of Ayn Rand. In my opinion, Ayn Rand introduced interesting, but quite flawed philosophy. I will first quote Bob and Ayn Rand, and then I will write my comment. > > Force has been recommended for financing public education and > street sweeping, enforcing standards against pollution, licensing > physicians, and making wearing of hockey helmets mandatory. > Anti-force answers used protection of property rights (for the > pollution cases), individual responsibility (public education), > and voluntary contractual arrangements (licensing and street > sweeping). But as long as people do not understand that force is > wrong in principle, someone will be making up a problem he would > "solve" with force that nobody has yet solved without force. And > since force *is* wrong in principle, there will always be a > voluntary alternative. > > Arguments go on and on because the anti-force side does not > defend their position in principle. As long as non-coercion is > treated as a starting point--just some rule that has an equal > status with any other, there will always be alleged > counterexamples to argue about. > > What is wrong with force in principle is that it is incompatible > with reason. > > Ayn Rand's definition, "the faculty that identifies and > integrates the material provided by man's senses," captures what > I mean by reason. It is my faculty of reason that allows me to > identify, for example, the door to my room as a door. It is > reason that allows me to integrate what I know about doors with > the fact that I want to leave the room and guides me to open the > door first. Reason is my means of acquiring knowledge and my > guide to action. In contrast, I might wish that the door were a > curtain and try to walk through it. If I did, I would bang > against reality. It is reason, not wishes, that keeps me tied to > reality in what I know and do. > > The concept of force does not arise in any relationship between > my mind and reality as long as no other person is involved. The > fact that I must open the door if I want to go through is not > because of force. It is because of a metaphysical fact; i.e., > that's the way it is--no one's wishes will change it. > > Force is when someone uses physical means to get you to obey his > wishes. Force is grasped by distinguishing it from values or > arguments that someone might use to get you to change your mind. > For example, it is force when a thief says, "Your money or your > life." It is not force when the sales clerk says, "Ten dollars, > please." It is force when you are not allowed to make up your own > mind how to act. > > Force is a gun aimed at your mind. Force cuts off your tie to > reality--your reason. Reason tells you to do this. Force-- > someone else's wishes--tells you to do that. He wants to put his > wishes between your mind and reality. If he had more than his > emotions to offer you--if he had an argument or a value, he could > use reason instead of a gun. If *your* emotions do not > automatically guide you to the right actions, why should his? > > Force is anti-mind in a still deeper sense than its divorcing > reason from action. Imagine that in addition to wanting you to > change your action, a mugger wanted you to change your mind. > "Don't just give me your wallet; but believe it is the right > thing to do. Don't just obey. Believe!" Force cannot > accomplish what a logical argument can. Force can destroy a > mind--it cannot change it. > > There are two ways of dealing with people--reason or force. When > someone recommends force, he is subordinating reason to something > he holds higher. When he says "It does not matter if you agree > with my reasons," he is telling you his wishes are more important > than your mind. Such a person is no defender of reason. > -- > Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846 The dychotomy of Ayn Rand is false. She puts reason on one side, force on the other. She presents an example of a passerby and a mugger. The mugger, instead of appealing to the reason of the passerby, applies force, hereby he is an opponent to reason. This parable presumes that there are two kinds of motivation for a human being: rational and irrational. The mugger has an irrational urge to have money, so he achieves it not by "reasonable" means, but through application of force. Another point of view is the following. Both the mugger and the passerby have their hierarchies of material needs. Mugger figures that the most efficient way he can get material goods is to take them by sheer force. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that he can actually convince the passerby to give him more than a dolar, and even that is not quite likely. Using the same capabilities of mind which tells him how to open a door, he figures a way to get his loot. The most specific feature of the mugger's way of thinking is not lack of reason, but treating the other person as a thing, which of course points to the absence of ethical principles. Agreed, ethical principles may be deduced with reason. What is wrong in the approach of Ayn Rand is her belief in the determinism of reason. In her view, prepositions are either true or false. Thus if two ethical principles contradict, at least one is false. However, ethics is not absolute but relative to a group of people to which it appeals. I agree that one of the good measures of progress in human thinking is the breadth of the scope of ethical systems. Ultimately, there should be a system which would encompass equally all human race. Practically, we treat people differently, dependend whether their are in the same family, ethnic group, nation, group of nations, religion, philosophy etc. The best example is the principle "do not kill". Originally, it applied only to the members of the same group. Decision not to kill members of other group was subject of circumstances like probability of gain or loss. It is widely discussed now whether this principle should be applicable to some cathegories of felons, or to unborn, or even to animals. To me it is clear that the final judgemnts cannot be justified by reason alone. Ultimately, we must agree on a common denominator of various ethical systems as the basis for the law, and let different groups cultivate their principles within legal limits. The dangerous side of Rand's objectivism is the way it may be aplied. Practically, there are always groups with disagreeing values. It is usually the case that one of them is in the position of power, or in the position of great influence. This group claims that its point of view, unlike the others, is supported by reason. In the case of Rand, this would be the group of people which feel that they a. can afford to pay for all necessary services; b. have sufficient knowledge to purchase all services in an unregulated market, and still do it right (purchasing right kind of expertise if necessary). These people feel that any distribution of incomes and services other than the "outcome of the free market" is wrong, i.e. that they would do better in such a system. In my opinion, this would serve very well the very wealthy, moderatedly well the educated ones and possibly very badly the less wealthy or less educated. The corrosive effect of the latter would ultimately serve bad things to almost everybody. Since the income redistribution by state (or by force, as some call it) does not work very well, and at times the quality of the outcome deteriorates, the scope, character, methods etc. of regulation and redistribution by the means of state is a point of valid argument. However, the Rand's argument by the first principle is dangerous, because is inherently unpluralistic. Ultimately, it leads to the Plato's republic governed by philosophers (how otherwise eliminate the influence of the majority, prone to demagogical appeals to "un-reason"). Rand presents the view point of the well-to-do as the only correct outcome of "reason". Her followers scorn everyone else as not thinking correctly. The modern art, modern literature, modern music, modern politics, all of them defy reason as defined by Rand. Humanity is ethernally on the slippery slope, only selected Anglo-Saxon enclaves preserved the noble tradition of reason. The philosophy of Ayn Rand is narrow-mindedness dressed as an ultimate virtue. Piotr Berman
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/04/85)
Piotr is right is noticing that the common denomination of robber actions is to view other people as things. Rand's claim is that this is unreasonable. It is unreasonable because it does not acknowledge that there is something about a human being which makes one unworthy of treatment as a thing. If the robber is persuing Ethical Egoism as a basis for his actions then he has already accepted that there is something about himself which makes him his own standard of value, and by not understanding that everyone else is as well, the robber is acting unreasonably, not only by Rand's standard, but also by his own. Admitedly, Erich Mach makes this point a lot better than Rand did. From there Piotr falls quickly into a rejection of reason. I don't see how this can be justified. The argument that the rich will claim to be reasonable in order to put the squeeze on the poor is rather weak -- people rationalise all the time but it this is the first time that I have been told that I should give up reason on their behalf. Rather there is all the more reason to work harrd at being reasonable, in order that you may refute the claims of the apparantly rational who are in fact irrational. And, if it is the case that the poor and less well educated would be worse off in a more liberatarian society than in the one we have now, then those libertarians, (including me) who deny this are being fundamentally irrational since they have some how lost touch with reality. You had better keep your reason, because I for one don't see why I should listen to anything other than reasoned argument designed to demonstrate that I have made a mistake. What else is there? Ethics by general consensus? Historically, there have been far too many instances when the general consensus was that it was moral to treat some subset of humanity as things for me to be comfortable with this one. Ethics by divine insight? And how are we going to get the Ayatollah to admit that his insight is not the only correcct one, and that all others are heresy? Looking at all other ethical systems is a great idea. After all, wise men have been investigating the problem for centuries. And I would expect to find a lot in common in all theories of ethics, because of the common power of reason used by these men and the common problem they have of determining what behaviour is in keeping with human nature and the common desire to live well. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/06/85)
> .................................... > What else is there? Ethics by general consensus? Historically, there have > been far too many instances when the general consensus was that it was > moral to treat some subset of humanity as things for me to be comfortable > with this one. Ethics by divine insight? And how are we going to get the > Ayatollah to admit that his insight is not the only correcct one, and that > all others are heresy? > > Looking at all other ethical systems is a great idea. After all, wise men > have been investigating the problem for centuries. And I would expect to > find a lot in common in all theories of ethics, because of the common power > of reason used by these men and the common problem they have of determining > what behaviour is in keeping with human nature and the common desire to live > well. > > -- > Laura Creighton My point, if this was unclear, is the following: Ethics cannot be derived by reasoning alone. Laura asks: What else is there? Ethics by general consensus? [not so good] Ethics by divine insight? [not so good] My answer is: Yes, it is a difficult problem. General consensus may provide a lousy ethics, "divine inspiration" may provide a lousy ethics, and "reason" alone is insufficient. Some people resolve this problem by claiming the existence of divine authority, which must exists, since otherwise the morality is not possible. I am not convinced though that some being appears solely to solve our proble. Similarly, I am not convinced that the new rules of inference appear to solve our problem. Thus creating an ethic is not a problem which may be solved once for all, like a mathematical theorem. It is rather a problem which for ever will chalenge the human mind. I am not saying that nihilism is a solution, or that the reason is useless in looking for an ethic. I am saying that to achieve this goal, one must make intoduce axioms (ethical postulates) and examine the consequences, using reason. With some postulates many people will agree, with some other, a few. Still, you cannot escape the following reality: to convince anyone, you must appeal not only to reason, but also to feelings. One of the goals is to achieve the harmony between the two. Piotr Berman
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/14/85)
What i don't understand is why Piotr Berman thinks that feelings and reason are not related to each other in the form ``your feelings are caused by your beliefs about reality''. (I suspect that it us because he has other beliefs about reality!) Considering that this is one of the current hot theories about depression is psychiatry today, I suppose I should not be surprised. If my belief is correct then there is no problem whatsoever in deciding ethics by reason (at least in theory -- at a practical level it is a tough problem). When you deal with people who have a commitment to reason, then through rational argument you will get emotional responses which are not in conflict with rational belief. And whenever you do you will understand that somebody has some examining of their beliefs to do... Of course, these days it is hard to find that many people who are actually trying to be rational -- whatever they may say. Between the Mr. Spock clones who think that it is rational to have no emotions at all and the Raving Technophobes who claim that logic gave us the atomic bomb and therefore should be rejected there is a strong tendancy to view logic and emotions as independent. But I think that both views are equally false, and that the common belief that reason and emotions are opposites is to blame. Clearly there are a few principles which one uses in trying to create an ethic, but I do not believe that they are emotionally based. For instance, while the use of force on human beings disgusts me, I do not believe that the disgust is what lead me to believe that you should not do this -- rather it is my belief that human beings are valuable which causes me to be disgusted. (If I were not disgusted, I would realise that for all I claim to believe that human beings are valuable, in some fundamental way I deny this and would try to find and change this problem.) It is reasonable to ask the question ``why do I think that human beings are valuable'' but, although I could demark certain qualities which I value which are posessed by human beings, you could back this up again and ask and at some point I would say ``because this is self-evident''. Here is as good a place to stop for the purpose of argument as any. Some philosophers have claimed that all self-evident truths are emotional ones. I believe that they are way off the mark here. Self-evident truths are rational truths, because to deny them is to abandon rationality altogether. Of course, ti si still possible to argue whether or not something is self-evident, but I think that if you lose sight of the fact that what your are arguing about is rational you will end up believing that it is impossible to be rational at all. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/17/85)
In article <332@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >Clearly there are a few principles which one uses in trying to create an >ethic, but I do not believe that they are emotionally based. For >instance, while the use of force on human beings disgusts me, I do not >believe that the disgust is what lead me to believe that you should not >do this -- rather it is my belief that human beings are valuable which >causes me to be disgusted. (If I were not disgusted, I would realise that >for all I claim to believe that human beings are valuable, in some >fundamental way I deny this and would try to find and change this problem.) > >It is reasonable to ask the question ``why do I think that human beings are >valuable'' but, although I could demark certain qualities which I value >which are posessed by human beings, you could back this up again and ask >and at some point I would say ``because this is self-evident''. Here is >as good a place to stop for the purpose of argument as any. Some >philosophers have claimed that all self-evident truths are emotional ones. >I believe that they are way off the mark here. Self-evident truths are >rational truths, because to deny them is to abandon rationality altogether. Your argument is similar to one I have been propounding in net.philosophy, but there are some points of disagreement. It is not clear to me that moral decisions ultimately come down to self-evident truths. I think at the bottom one comes down to a question of belief. I will agree that emotional misses the mark, but I don't think rational is right, either. >Of course, ti si still possible to argue whether or not something is >self-evident, but I think that if you lose sight of the fact that what >your are arguing about is rational you will end up believing that it is >impossible to be rational at all. How can something be self-evident if it is possible to argue that it is not? Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/18/85)
> What I don't understand is why Piotr Berman thinks that feelings and reason > are not related to each other in the form ``your feelings are caused by your > beliefs about reality''. (I suspect that it us because he has other > beliefs about reality!) Considering that this is one of the current hot > theories about depression is psychiatry today, I suppose I should not be > surprised. > > If my belief is correct then there is no problem whatsoever in deciding > ethics by reason (at least in theory -- at a practical level it is a > tough problem). I did not say that feelings and reason are not related. What I said is that feelings cannot be reduced to reason. Consider the following example: one person (say, Euclides) claims that given a point A on a plane P and a stright line s1 on P, there exists exactly one stright line s2 such that s2 contains A and s1 and s2 do not intersects in one point only. Another person (say, Lobachevsky) claims that there may be many such lines s2. The logic shows that if one claim is consistent, so is the other. In my views the connection of beliefs and reason should be similar to the connection between axioms of say, geometry, and logic. To claim that logic is sufficient and axioms unnecessary is just false. > ....................... > Clearly there are a few principles which one uses in trying to create an > ethic, but I do not believe that they are emotionally based. For > instance, while the use of force on human beings disgusts me, I do not > believe that the disgust is what lead me to believe that you should not > do this -- rather it is my belief that human beings are valuable which > causes me to be disgusted. (If I were not disgusted, I would realise that > for all I claim to believe that human beings are valuable, in some > fundamental way I deny this and would try to find and change this problem.) OK, you believe that humans are valuable. I do not see any reason why this is the case, nor do I see a possibility to find a reason. "Valuable" is not an actual characteristic, based on observation. It is a value judgment. Reason should enlighten us about the consequences of our value judgments, to avoid nasty conclusions and/or contradictions. Still, what does it mean 'valuable'? Having a market value (like in a statement 'people are earning as much as they are worth')? As you see, it is difficult to state your primary beliefs in a precise fashion. > It is reasonable to ask the question ``why do I think that human beings are > valuable'' but, although I could demark certain qualities which I value > which are posessed by human beings, you could back this up again and ask > and at some point I would say ``because this is self-evident''. Here is > as good a place to stop for the purpose of argument as any. Some > philosophers have claimed that all self-evident truths are emotional ones. > I believe that they are way off the mark here. Self-evident truths are > rational truths, because to deny them is to abandon rationality altogether. > Only observations are self-evident. Newton laws were generalizations, by now we know that they are only approximating the current laws of mechanics. When you say 'self-evident' you should say 'I assume so'. > Of course, it is still possible to argue whether or not something is > self-evident, but I think that if you lose sight of the fact that what > your are arguing about is rational you will end up believing that it is > impossible to be rational at all. > I say that it is impossible to be an objectivist, nevertheless it is possible to reason. However, it is not reasonable to make asumptions (some of them questionable to me), draw conclusions and then announce that to deny those conclusions is to deny 'rationality' or 'reality'. > > Laura Creighton > sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) > l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa Piotr Berman
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/24/85)
In article <902@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > >Your argument is similar to one I have been propounding in net.philosophy, >but there are some points of disagreement. It is not clear to me that >moral decisions ultimately come down to self-evident truths. I think at >the bottom one comes down to a question of belief. I will agree that >emotional misses the mark, but I don't think rational is right, either. We may be using more than one definition of rational here; I hope not. If we go round and round in circles then I think that this is where the problem will lie. Okay -- beliefs. We all have them. But why should you have any that you think are not either *self-evident* or *logically derived from self-evident truths*? (I am including empirical evidence here as being ``self-evident''.) As a practical matter, everyone is bound to have beliefs that they have because they believed something that somebody else told them, or that they read somewhere, but these beliefs can all be questioned and disgarded if it becomes likely that they are false. So, forgetting these for a moment, what other beliefs should you have? > >How can something be self-evident if it is possible to argue that it >is not? > Lots of reasons. To begin with, we may use language differently and thus not actually be talking about the same thing. (See my first paragraph above, on ``rational''). Secondly, even if we are using language the same way to mean the same thing, one or both of us may not be systemetically following through the consequences of our beliefs, and thus not finding the crucial inconsistency which makes one conclude ``no, I cannot doubt this and still be rational''. Since this is hard work, this is even likely to occur. Thirdly, one can allow intellectual dishonesty to creep in. You may close your mind to arguments because you wish that they were not so, or the reverse. I run into this a lot, because I ask people to be compassionate and rational. I do not deny that it is hard work to be both, though, and I have watched a good many people do their best to misunderstand what I am saying. Very rarely have I managed to punch my argument home to them, and had them admit that they didn't *really* want to hear what I was saying, because if I was correct then they would have to radically change their lives and they didn't want to go to that trouble. I believe that this goes on to a greater or lesser extent all the time. Finally, there is always the possibility that the self-evident truth cannot be grasped by a damaged mind. Here I am talking about real morons, not the sometimes moronic posters to usenet! ;-) What to do with people who cannot (as opposed to will not) reason is an interesting question for all philosophies of ethics, though. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)
In article <355@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <902@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >> >>Your argument is similar to one I have been propounding in net.philosophy, >>but there are some points of disagreement. It is not clear to me that >>moral decisions ultimately come down to self-evident truths. I think at >>the bottom one comes down to a question of belief. I will agree that >>emotional misses the mark, but I don't think rational is right, either. > >We may be using more than one definition of rational here; I hope not. >If we go round and round in circles then I think that this is where the >problem will lie. Actually, from what you say below, I think it is more likely we are using "self-evident" differently. >Okay -- beliefs. We all have them. But why should you have any that >you think are not either *self-evident* or *logically derived from >self-evident truths*? (I am including empirical evidence here as being >``self-evident''.) As a practical matter, everyone is bound to have >beliefs that they have because they believed something that somebody >else told them, or that they read somewhere, but these beliefs can all >be questioned and disgarded if it becomes likely that they are false. >So, forgetting these for a moment, what other beliefs should you have? In saying "these beliefs can be questioned and discarded", I think you are making a false dichotomy. ALL beliefs can be questioned and discarded. This is true of empirical evidence, especially. "I see a cloud on the horizon." "That's not a cloud, that's a mirage." "Oh." Likewise, if you believe something is self-evident because complicated analysis led you to conclude that it had to be true, you must recognize that you might have made a mistake in your analysis. So I only call "self-evident" those things where is the analysis is so simple that there is no chance of error worth considering. "One plus one is two" is self-evident. "I am sitting on a chair" is also self- evident -- I would have to be far more confused or deluded to be wrong than is worth taking into consideration. For more complicated cases, there is more doubt; ranging up to when I believe my analysis is probably wrong. The important point here is that there is always an element of doubt and a bit of analysis in any belief. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
jens@moscom.UUCP (Jens Fiederer) (12/30/85)
Dear Laura: You may get emotional about conflicts between different rationalities. Occassionally, I do, too. More commonly the reason/emotion relationship runs in the other direction -- my emotions are fired by operational imperatives (food, Coca-Cola(original formula), sex, activity), whereupon reason steps in to formulate a strategy to maximize the positive emotions. Azhrarn