nrh@inmet.UUCP (12/17/85)
>/* Written 4:13 pm Dec 14, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Re: Pollution: no libertarian solut" ---------- */ >In article <618@calgary.UUCP> radford@calgary.UUCP (Radford Neal) writes: >>This isn't particularly surprising. All political philosophies have >>similar "weak points", arising because they are social approximations >>to more base moral principles. I don't think it is a valid argument against >>libertarianism to point this out. > >It depends. If you regard your libertarianism as logically derived from >certain moral "axioms" (whether or not you regard the "axioms" as provable), >then it IS a valid argument. If you fudge your logical derivation at any >point in such a system, you ruin the whole system. > >If you regard your libertarianism as merely an attempt to systematize some >conflicting intuitions, then you shouldn't be worried by the pollution >argument. However, first, I wonder how anyone could admit that this is the >only foundation of his ethical views, and still be a libertarian -- after >all, libertarians seem to be pretty dogmatic about exceptionless rules. Perhaps some libertarians are. In our discussion regarding suicide, though, I pointed out a case where a principled libertarian would violate another person's property rights, (he's willing to pay the reasonable penalty for assault rather than let his (temporarily insane) friend kill himself), so you've at least some experience of non-dogmatic exception-prone libertarianism. Also, to be able to derive the answers to every single social problem, particularly one as thorny as pollution, would render libertarianism utopian -- a fate it does not deserve. I offer one hopefully interesting observation about questions such as pollution and prisoner's dilemma problems. Both of these can, in fact, be solved in principle (pollution by a nightmarishly complete enumeration and enforcement of property rights by impartial judges, and prisoners dilemma by stepping outside the "one-transaction-only" scenario and allowing repeated and enforceable contractual relationships). That these things are soluble in principle doesn't mean that they can be solved in practice, but that no practical solutions are known doesn't imply that none will be found. Thus one can be a democrat and agree that people will vote wrongly now and then, a socialist and agree that the government will badly misallocate funds due to the calculation problem, and a libertarian and agree that the ecosphere may be somewhat abused. Any one of these positions is reasonable so long as solutions remain possible, the problems not fatal, and the alternatives no better. In short, one can be a principled libertarian without knowing just exactly how much use constitutes enough when claiming land, or just how little constitutes giving it up. (Just as one can be for the income tax without being able to quote the IRS manuals at length). I believe that there's lots of middle ground between the idea of libertarianism as a sort of social geometry -- invalid if any grey areas or conflicts can be shown to exist, and libertarianism as a sort of vague response to intuition. One can be reasonable while admitting one doesn't know everything, and one can advocate a course without knowing just exactly how many steps one must take to complete it. >Second, I tend to agree with Stubblefield that one's ethical views should >have a better foundation (note that this assumes they CAN have a better >foundation!). Paul -- if you've posted (as planned) the reasoned basis for your own value-weightings, I've missed the posting. By the way, I should make it clear that I'm speaking for myself, but believe that (some) other libertarians would agree with me.
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/20/85)
I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the possibility of it - work for pollution ? I *can* see some objections but none that convinces me, so far. One thing that seems necessary is that compensation be allowed for *statistical risk* of damage, as well as actual damage. E.g., if A, by her smoking, gives B one chance of cancer in a million, and if B's health is worth 10 million, B should be able to collect 10 bucks immediately (forgoing, in all fairness, her right to sue for actual damage). Since statistical correla- tions are much easier to prove than who caused what to whom, this would tilt the balance against the polluters. As for the great number of claimants, this is not a strong objection, since a lawyer corporation could buy up millions of potential claims and then collect. The actual victims would get less (but save on legal fees); but the deterrent effect on polluters would be large. Jan Wasilewsky
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (12/20/85)
In article <28200403@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >I offer one hopefully interesting observation about questions such >as pollution and prisoner's dilemma problems. Both of these can, >in fact, be solved in principle (pollution by a nightmarishly complete >enumeration and enforcement of property rights by impartial judges, >and prisoners dilemma by stepping outside the "one-transaction-only" >scenario and allowing repeated and enforceable contractual relationships). The pollution "solution" wouldn't allow me to piss in the toilet. As for Prisoner's Dilemma, you're right about *2-person* PD, but things change when the number of persons increases. >In short, one can be a principled libertarian without knowing just >exactly how much use constitutes enough when claiming land, or just >how little constitutes giving it up. (Just as one can be for >the income tax without being able to quote the IRS manuals at length). Yes, as long as those "how much" questions are matters of *applying* your principles, not questions that must be addressed by the principles themselves. I'm awful curious how that could possibly be. >I believe that there's lots of middle ground between the idea of >libertarianism as a sort of social geometry -- invalid if any grey >areas or conflicts can be shown to exist, and libertarianism as a sort >of vague response to intuition. Well, maybe. But if the grey areas are greynesses of principles rather than empirical gray areas about how to apply them, I think you slide down the slippery slope to the "vague response to intuition" position. >Paul -- if you've posted (as planned) the reasoned basis for your own >value-weightings, I've missed the posting. Not yet; it's going to be a many-part series of enormous size, which I'll have time for soon, but not now. --Paul V. Torek, knee-jerk ethical cognitivist torek@umich
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (12/23/85)
In article <28200417@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default >libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the >possibility of it - work for pollution ? >I *can* see some objections but none that convinces me, so far. > >One thing that seems necessary is that compensation be allowed >for *statistical risk* of damage, as well as actual damage. >E.g., if A, by her smoking, gives B one chance of cancer in a >million, and if B's health is worth 10 million, B should be >able to collect 10 bucks immediately (forgoing, in all fairness, >her right to sue for actual damage). Since statistical correla- >tions are much easier to prove than who caused what to whom, this >would tilt the balance against the polluters. I can think of a few problems offhand. First, a significant number of people sincerely feel that the value of their lives is INFINITE. If you don't believe me, ask around. Second, it's going to be hard to determine who is put at risk by how much, and the likely solution will be to overestimate the risk in most cases -- i.e. compensate most people by much larger amounts than is really required, just to be on the safe side and avoid hassles. This wouldn't be a total disaster, but it would lead to quite severe restrictions on pollution, I think; such that the cost of living goes up considerably. Third, and worst, what about the ETHICAL problem for libertarians -- do I have a right to impose ANY risks on anyone without their consent? It would seem that the only principled libertarian answer is NO!, and that this prohibits me from pissing in the toilet, because SOMEONE somewhere would be unwilling to accept compensation only for *statistical risk*. --Paul V. Torek (temporarily) flink@umcp-cs
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/26/85)
[--Paul V. Torek (temporarily) flink@umcp-cs] >In article <28200417@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default >>libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the >>possibility of it - work for pollution ? >>I *can* see some objections but none that convinces me, so far. >>One thing that seems necessary is that compensation be allowed >>for *statistical risk* of damage, as well as actual damage. >>E.g., if A, by her smoking, gives B one chance of cancer in a >>million, and if B's health is worth 10 million, B should be >>able to collect 10 bucks immediately (forgoing, in all fairness, >>her right to sue for actual damage). Since statistical correla- >>tions are much easier to prove than who caused what to whom, this >>would tilt the balance against the polluters. >I can think of a few problems offhand. Good! This idea is new to me, and a critique would help. >First, a significant number of people sincerely feel that the value >of their lives is INFINITE. If you don't believe me, ask around. Oh, *I* agree - the *courts* don't, though (at least, I've never heard of an aleph-0 settlement ...). Neither do insurers or pol- lution regulators - they all use some kind of cost-benefit analysis, with human life attached (implicitly at least) a finite value. Its metaphysical or existential value is neither here nor there. The idea above does not change that at all - it just pro- rates an existing estimate to a statistical expectation. >Second, it's going to be hard to determine who is put at risk by >how much, and the likely solution will be to overestimate the >risk in most cases -- i.e. compensate most people by much larger >amounts than is really required, just to be on the safe side and >avoid hassles. This wouldn't be a total disaster, but it would >lead to quite severe restrictions on pollution, I think; such >that the cost of living goes up considerably. Wonderful! The proposal seems ready to be sponsored by Sierra Club. What you're saying is that it overshoots the mark. However the exis- ting regulatory and legal mechanisms are subject to the same emotio- nal pressures (human life vs. profits) - and, on the other hand, counter-pressures by industries. Is it obvious to you which comes nearer to hitting the mark, and by how much ? Mind you, I don't need to prove this one works *better*: just that it *works*. >Third, and worst, what about the ETHICAL problem for libertarians -- do I >have a right to impose ANY risks on anyone without their consent? It would >seem that the only principled libertarian answer is NO!, and that this >prohibits me from pissing in the toilet, because SOMEONE somewhere would be >unwilling to accept compensation only for *statistical risk*. You seem to attribute to all libertarians the unity of principle for the lack of which Bob Stubblefield recently criticised them. Probably the only way for you to convict libertarianism on an inconsistency charge is to concentrate on one person - someone you think is representative. If you succeed, others will either have to share the guilt or to show how they are different. As I see it, for most libertarians, your right to metabolize with your own body and on your own premises would be among the most indubitable. What you are really saying is that their principles are contradictory because every act of one person affects every other person in some infinitesimal way. That my right to wave my hands stops well short of your nose because all noses and all arms are, in some QM sense, of indeterminate length. Note that this argument applies equally well (or badly) to *any* concept of inalienable rights. There is nothing specifically anti- libertarian in it. All I can add is that *my* minarchist principles or anarchist preferences are not at all disturbed by your bathroom habits. Why should a libertarian ethic be more strict about your harming someone indirectly than a non-libertarian one ? The difference lies in restricting the *state* as well as individuals, not in restricting individuals *more*. It lies in refusal to let the state (even democratic state) identify itself with "all of us" or "public policy", or "general welfare", thus sanctioning what would be a crime in individuals. E.g., I *might* admit the neces- sity of government for *defense* - but never of a government *monopoly* on defense. And as competing systems develop, the necessity might disappear. The state is a *crutch*; it shouldn't be made a *fetish*. Jan Wasilewsky
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (12/31/85)
In article <28200442@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>First, a significant number of people sincerely feel that the value >>of their lives is INFINITE. If you don't believe me, ask around. >Oh, *I* agree - the *courts* don't, though [...] >. The idea above does not change that at all - it just pro- >rates an existing estimate to a statistical expectation. Yes, but it seems to me that the current practice of the courts in this respect is very un-libertarian. That is, I would think that a libertarian regards an individual as the best authority on the value of his own life. >>Second, it's going to be hard to determine who is put at risk by >>how much, and the likely solution will be to overestimate the >>risk in most cases -- i.e. compensate most people by much larger >>amounts than is really required, just to be on the safe side [...] >Wonderful! The proposal seems ready to be sponsored by Sierra Club. >What you're saying is that it overshoots the mark. However the exis- >ting regulatory and legal mechanisms are subject to the same emotio- >nal pressures (human life vs. profits) - and, on the other hand, >counter-pressures by industries. Is it obvious to you which comes >nearer to hitting the mark, and by how much ? Good point. Not obvious, but if I had to bet I'd put my money on the current system. > I don't need to prove this one works *better*: just that it *works*. Well, I still think the question of which works better is important. >>Third, and worst, what about the ETHICAL problem for libertarians -- do I >>have a right to impose ANY risks on anyone without their consent? It would >>seem that the only principled libertarian answer is NO!, and that this >>prohibits me from pissing in the toilet, because SOMEONE somewhere would be >>unwilling to accept compensation only for *statistical risk*. > >You seem to attribute to all libertarians the unity of principle >for the lack of which Bob Stubblefield recently criticised them. >Probably the only way for you to convict libertarianism on an >inconsistency charge is to concentrate on one person - someone >you think is representative. If you succeed, others will either >have to share the guilt or to show how they are different. Indeed. Well, the only libertarians I know of with well-developed ethical positions are Nozick and Rand, and I don't know Rand's very well. I do think I could convict Nozick of inconsistency, if anyone's interested. >As I see it, for most libertarians, your right to metabolize with >your own body and on your own premises would be among the most >indubitable. What you are really saying is that their principles >are contradictory because every act of one person affects every >other person in some infinitesimal way. That my right to wave my >hands stops well short of your nose because all noses and all >arms are, in some QM sense, of indeterminate length. :-> Not just QM indeterminacy, but yes, that's the general thrust of my point. >Note that this argument applies equally well (or badly) to *any* concept of >inalienable rights. There is nothing specifically anti- >libertarian in it. True, if you mean what I think you mean by "inalienable rights". I would argue that rights in such a strong sense are not credible, for precisely this reason. >Why should a libertarian ethic be more strict about your harming >someone indirectly than a non-libertarian one ? Maybe what we need is a definition (or exposition) of "libertarianism". > Jan Wasilewsky --Paul V. Torek, soon at umich!torek, now at umcp-cs!flink
janw@inmet.UUCP (01/02/86)
[--Paul V. Torek, soon at umich!torek, now at umcp-cs!flink] >In article <28200442@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>>First, a significant number of people sincerely feel that the value >>>of their lives is INFINITE. >>Oh, *I* agree - the *courts* don't, though [...] >>. The idea above does not change that at all - it just pro- >>rates an existing estimate to a statistical expectation. >Yes, but it seems to me that the current practice of the courts in this >respect is very un-libertarian. That is, I would think that a libertarian >regards an individual as the best authority on the value of his own life. There are *two* individuals involved. For each of them, some part of their infinitely-valuable life is at stake (one can prolong or expand one's life with money). A finite estimate is the only practical thing to do, not libertarian or unlibertarian. Substi- tute, for court, a regulatory agency or vendetta justice or some bargaining method - anything at all - a finite estimate will be implicitly present. Courts cannot deal with infinities any more than markets or governments: so render to Caesar what is Caesar's. >>>Second, it's going to be hard to determine who is put at risk by >>>how much, and the likely solution will be to overestimate the >>>risk in most cases -- i.e. compensate most people by much larger >>>amounts than is really required, just to be on the safe side [...] >>Wonderful! The proposal seems ready to be sponsored by Sierra Club. >>What you're saying is that it overshoots the mark. However the exis- >>ting regulatory and legal mechanisms are subject to the same emotio- >>nal pressures (human life vs. profits) - and, on the other hand, >>counter-pressures by industries. Is it obvious to you which comes >>nearer to hitting the mark, and by how much ? >Good point. Not obvious, but if I had to bet I'd put my money on the >current system. Allow some margin for improvement and fine-tuning of my raw proposal by better informed people. >> I don't need to prove this one works *better*: just that it *works*. >Well, I still think the question of which works better is important. Very important. But not for a *theorem of existence*. >>>Third, and worst, what about the ETHICAL problem for libertarians -- do I >>>have a right to impose ANY risks on anyone without their consent? It would >>>seem that the only principled libertarian answer is NO!, and that this >>>prohibits me from pissing in the toilet, because SOMEONE somewhere would be >>>unwilling to accept compensation only for *statistical risk*. >>You seem to attribute to all libertarians the unity of principle >>for the lack of which Bob Stubblefield recently criticised them. >>Probably the only way for you to convict libertarianism on an >>inconsistency charge is to concentrate on one person - someone >>you think is representative. If you succeed, others will either >>have to share the guilt or to show how they are different. >Indeed. Well, the only libertarians I know of with well-developed ethical >positions are Nozick and Rand, and I don't know Rand's very well. I do >think I could convict Nozick of inconsistency, if anyone's interested. I am just reading Nozick; probably he would do, though he seems over-complicated to me (but he does invent some useful con- cepts). Perhaps you would simplify him in the process. Rand's books I've read (all of them) but only half-agree (she would have resented that; but I like her). They are very readable. But you seem to insist on seeing libertarianism as a theory where a com- plete social order is deduced from a few ethical axioms. I would distrust any theory like that, whatever the axioms. Like it says in Faust, theory is gray, but the tree of life is evergreen. Which is not to argue against ethical principles, just against rampant deductivism. Leave room for empirical data and common sense. >>What you are really saying is that their principles >>are contradictory because every act of one person affects every >>other person in some infinitesimal way. [...] >>Note that this argument applies equally well (or badly) to *any* concept of >>inalienable rights. There is nothing specifically anti- >>libertarian in it. >True, if you mean what I think you mean by "inalienable rights". I would >argue that rights in such a strong sense are not credible, for precisely >this reason. So, weaken the sense by using common-sense approximations. *Don't* weaken it (if you are libertarian) by making exceptions for *public good* and its delegates. Also, take cognizance of *intention*. When your neighbor barbecues, his intention is prob- ably not to smoke you out. If it *is*, the situation changes. When the government exercises eminent domain, it *is*. >>Why should a libertarian ethic be more strict about your harming >>someone indirectly than a non-libertarian one ? >Maybe what we need is a definition (or exposition) of "libertarianism". Amen. Meanwhile, it helps to think of it as an extension of old- fashioned liberalism and individualism. It is very much in the mainstream of Western tradition. Somewhere near the middle of the 19th century, the British government was deciding which language to teach in Indian schools. English finally won, but there were strong objections, and the strongest was that *you cannot raise a caste of adminis- trators on a literature of revolt*. There is the rub: not an *ethical theory* is at the core, but an *ethical position*, a world-view. It can be expanded into theories that will be as logical or illogical as their authors. You are looking for a libertarian ethicist ? Try Thoreau ! Jan Wasilewsky