[net.politics.theory] Rent-a-Cop

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/13/85)

[Not food]

It has been suggested by various libertarians, on the net and elsewhere, that
it would be desirable to eliminate governmental police forces, in favor of
private law enforcement.  I will here set forth what I think the most likely
result of such a development would be.

Consider what this new industry would be like.  It would be a new business,
in which the use of guns and other instruments of power is at a premium.  It
would also be a business whose domination is a source of considerable power
in itself.  In short, it would be an ideal target for organized crime.

I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
although some areas might manage to remain free of it.

Nor would it be easy to undo the damage.  Even after public police forces are
re-established (which would not be easy when the Mob controls the existing
forces), they will have to recruit most of their members from the disbanded
private forces.  This will give organized crime a much bigger foothold in
those departments than it has now; and that kind of foothold is notoriously
hard to dislodge.

Why should organized crime be more effective at taking over private police
than public police?  Because they have more ways to accomplish it.  The only
method available for taking over a public police force is infiltration.
With private police, one can also set up competing organizations.  Also,
when police forces are run for profit motives, the temptation to resort
to extortion is strong; even those which are not taken over by the Mob are
likely to become centers of organized crime.

Some may object that the manpower for the new industry would come primarily
from existing police forces, which would tend to counter this sort of result.
(This is the inverse of one of my arguments above.)  The key word here is
"tend"; this would slow down these developments, but not prevent them.  That
delay might make the eventual result all the worse; by the time it became
obvious that the experiment had failed, private law enforcement would be
well established, and the traditions of service in our police forces would
be long forgotten.

It is not out of the question that the final result of such an experiment
would be the takeover of government by organized crime.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) (12/15/85)

>/* franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) /  5:08 pm  Dec 12, 1985 */

>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.

It is important to note that in a libertarian society, much of the activity
that organized crime is involved in would not be crime, and, therefore would
not be as profitable.

>It is not out of the question that the final result of such an experiment
>would be the takeover of government by organized crime.

As far as I can tell there is not that much difference between the government
of NYC and organized crime.  Organized crime is more violent some of the time,
but the NYC government extorts more money from the public.

>Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka

Michael Sykora

nrh@inmet.UUCP (12/15/85)

>/* Written  5:08 pm  Dec 12, 1985 by franka@mmintl in inmet:net.politics.t */
>/* ---------- "Rent-a-Cop" ---------- */
>It has been suggested by various libertarians, on the net and elsewhere, that
>it would be desirable to eliminate governmental police forces, in favor of
>private law enforcement.  I will here set forth what I think the most likely
>result of such a development would be.
>
>Consider what this new industry would be like.  It would be a new business,
>in which the use of guns and other instruments of power is at a premium.  It
>would also be a business whose domination is a source of considerable power
>in itself.  In short, it would be an ideal target for organized crime.
>
>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.

For a good example of libertarians having anticipated you (somewhat)
see "The Syndic" by C.M. Kornbluth.  

Were your argument correct, the logical move for the mob to take NOW
would be the domination of politics -- and they would have succeeded:
not just in a relatively few places like the regulation of gambling, but
more on the order of limiting the current round of mob-leader roundups.

Nobody argues that they haven't partially succeeded: there are certainly
mob-connected politicians.  They haven't entirely succeeded in politics
for the same reason they wouldn't entirely succeed in the rent-a-cop
business: people don't regard the Mob as dependable and honest: given
a choice, people choose to deal with others.

The Mob has two choices then, if it wants to succeed in the rent-a-cop
business: it can become honest and dependable enough that people are
willing to deal with it (that's sort of the scenario in The Syndic)
or it can become vicious and tough enough that it kills all the competitors,
which would be very difficult indeed, and wouldn't prevent the 
formation of private police organizations later.

The Mob would certainly have other troubles in a Libertarian society though:
it would be in danger of starving to death.

Consider what I understand to be the three main money sources of the
Mob:
	o Drugs
	o Prostitution
	o Gambling

My understanding is that the rest (leg-breaking, protection, fraud)
are really minor adjuncts to these.

In a libertarian society, you can get the drugs from 7-11, the prostitution
in a clean (if inherently sleazy) bordello down the street, and the 
gambling at any street casino.  

Right now, our government obligingly gives these activities into the hands
of criminals (by keeping them out of the hands of honest folk).  Given a
choice, I'd rather gamble in the "American Express Casino" than in the
"Don Carleone Emporium" -- but I don't have the choice.    In the areas
where gambling is partially legalized it is heavily regulated, and those
regulators are indeed often Mob-dominated.

The "American Express Casino", to defend itself, would of course hire or
form a security force emphatically NOT connected with the Mob.  As would
7-11 and the bordello.  

This is not to say that the Mob wouldn't exist in a libertarian society,
merely that it wouldn't have nearly the chance to grab power that you
seem to think it does.  Only in its least-profitable ventures (leg-breaking
protection) would it be relatively free from competition.  Even these
would become much more risky, given an armed populace.

It's also not to say that Libertaria is safe from internal imposition
of a government -- Libertaria isn't, and neither is the US.

To answer one or two of your points directly:

>Why should organized crime be more effective at taking over private police
>than public police?  Because they have more ways to accomplish it.  The only
>method available for taking over a public police force is infiltration.

(I hope by this you include corruption, both of the police and of their
superiors, otherwise you've missed a bet).

>With private police, one can also set up competing organizations.  Also,
>when police forces are run for profit motives, the temptation to resort
>to extortion is strong; even those which are not taken over by the Mob are
>likely to become centers of organized crime.

The same argument applies to banks and barbershops.  The problem with
the argument is that part of what you'd like to buy from a police
force is trustworthiness.  If "Don Carleone Protections, Inc" refuses
to allow open review of its actions, it will find that folks are a
little queasy about hiring it to protect them.  If it is exposed in the
press, and takes military action against the press, it will find itself
in a small war (the critical press is no more likely to hire 
Mob-connected protection than is American Express).  The Mafia is not
good at war -- they're good at extortion.   They'd lose.  All it would
take would be one large, well-trusted organization, such as 
Pinkerton's, to offer competing protection in the neighborhood to make
folks able to choose trustworthy service over the untrustworthy.

Remember, the Pinks wouldn't be required not to entrap the mob
in Libertaria -- a few aborted attempts at leg-breaking would
probably expose the Mob operation pretty fatally.

Of course, it is possible that the Mob would conduct this aspect of
its business scrupulously, in which case it would suffer from a 
PR problem, nothing more.

>It is not out of the question that the final result of such an experiment
>would be the takeover of government by organized crime.

And again, I suggest "The Syndic", which makes for entertaining reading.

In the end, of course, this is simply counter-speculation to your
speculation.  Neither of us can show it to be correct, but I hope I've
pointed out some of the forces that would counter your scenario.

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/17/85)

In article <4340020@csd2.UUCP> sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) writes:
>>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.
>
>It is important to note that in a libertarian society, much of the activity
>that organized crime is involved in would not be crime, and, therefore would
>not be as profitable.

Which forces it to concentrate on other areas, which still would be illegal.
The most relevant one here is extortion.

>>It is not out of the question that the final result of such an experiment
>>would be the takeover of government by organized crime.
>
>As far as I can tell there is not that much difference between the government
>of NYC and organized crime.  Organized crime is more violent some of the time,
>but the NYC government extorts more money from the public.

Do you really mean this?  A much larger portion of the money collected by
the NYC government benefits the ordinary residents of the city.  It is
much more responsive to the wishes of the residents.  (Don't compare it
to your ideal of what a government should be like in those respects, but
to organized crime.)  As for the amount of money taken, that is only a
matter of opportunity.  Given the opportunity, organized crime would take
much more.  Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
(the minimum you need to live on).

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (12/19/85)

In article <28200391@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>
>>  In short, it would be an ideal target for organized crime.
>>
>>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.
>
>The Mob has two choices then, if it wants to succeed in the rent-a-cop
>business: it can become honest and dependable enough that people are
>willing to deal with it (that's sort of the scenario in The Syndic)
>or it can become vicious and tough enough that it kills all the competitors,

	Or it could use a third policy. It could run a No-Holds-Barred,
results gaurenteed enforcement agency for a very high price. It would
be "reliable" in that if you paid for results you would get them, and
people would buy this service just like they often try to now, but
there would be no public police force to get in thier way. In fact
such enforcement agencies would form *without* Mob intervention, as
has been suggested.
>
>The Mob would certainly have other troubles in a Libertarian society though:
>it would be in danger of starving to death.
>
>Consider what I understand to be the three main money sources of the
>Mob:
>	o Drugs
>	o Prostitution
>	o Gambling
>
>My understanding is that the rest (leg-breaking, protection, fraud)
>are really minor adjuncts to these.

	In Libertaria the Protection Racket becomes *much* more
important, since there is no regular, independent police force to
provide the protection function. Thus they, and thier competetitors,
would simply change specialties.
>
>The "American Express Casino", to defend itself, would of course hire or
>form a security force emphatically NOT connected with the Mob.  As would
>7-11 and the bordello.  

	Actually, many of these places *would* hire hte Mob or an
agency like them, since that would give them powerful protection, and
allow them to control thier income more effectively.
>
>To answer one or two of your points directly:
>
>The same argument applies to banks and barbershops.  The problem with
>the argument is that part of what you'd like to buy from a police
>force is trustworthiness.  If "Don Carleone Protections, Inc" refuses
>to allow open review of its actions, it will find that folks are a
>little queasy about hiring it to protect them.

	Naw, if they say "you pay - you get" and then deliver a lot of
people with a large investment to protect aren't going to care
tiddly-winks for *how* they do it, this is the basis for the "mob"
"takeover" and it would not be limited to the current Mob.

>If it is exposed in the
>press, and takes military action against the press, it will find itself
>in a small war (the critical press is no more likely to hire 
>Mob-connected protection than is American Express).  The Mafia is not
>good at war -- they're good at extortion.   They'd lose.

	Yeah, it would be a small war, and the people hired by the
newspapers and such would not really be that much different than the
Mob itself, just a rival organization. I am not sure I *want* the
newspapers waging a war in *my* neighborhood! And the Mob is better at
war than you might think, they just limit it to *within* the
organization because they know that the *public* police forces and the
military could wipe them up if they were really gaoded into action by
that kind of violence. With a whole bunch of competing, relatively
small "police" forces they might just *win*.

> All it would
>take would be one large, well-trusted organization, such as 
>Pinkerton's, to offer competing protection in the neighborhood to make
>folks able to choose trustworthy service over the untrustworthy.
>
	I am not sure I really trust Pinkerton's all that much, back
when they *were* the law in some places in the West they had quite a
reputation for heavy-handed tactics, again not much different than Mob
tactics. Remember, Pinkerton's was and would be paid for *results* not
methods!

>Of course, it is possible that the Mob would conduct this aspect of
>its business scrupulously, in which case it would suffer from a 
>PR problem, nothing more.
>
	Considering that they conduct much of thier current business
"scrupiously", I don't see anything particularly unlikely about this.
You see it is largely a matter of your definition of "scrupulous",
they generally deliver what they promise, they just don't let anything
stand in thier way - that is they let the ends justify the means.

-- 

				Sarima (Stanley Friesen)

UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen
ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/19/85)

In article <28200391@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>/* Written  5:08 pm  Dec 12, 1985 by franka@mmintl in inmet:net.politics.t */
>>/* ---------- "Rent-a-Cop" ---------- */
>>It has been suggested by various libertarians, on the net and elsewhere, that
>>it would be desirable to eliminate governmental police forces, in favor of
>>private law enforcement.  I will here set forth what I think the most likely
>>result of such a development would be.
>>
>>Consider what this new industry would be like.  It would be a new business,
>>in which the use of guns and other instruments of power is at a premium.  It
>>would also be a business whose domination is a source of considerable power
>>in itself.  In short, it would be an ideal target for organized crime.
>>
>>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.
>
>Were your argument correct, the logical move for the mob to take NOW
>would be the domination of politics -- and they would have succeeded:
>not just in a relatively few places like the regulation of gambling, but
>more on the order of limiting the current round of mob-leader roundups.
>
>Nobody argues that they haven't partially succeeded: there are certainly
>mob-connected politicians.  They haven't entirely succeeded in politics
>for the same reason they wouldn't entirely succeed in the rent-a-cop
>business: people don't regard the Mob as dependable and honest: given
>a choice, people choose to deal with others.

No.  Today, there is an opposing organization which wishes to prevent the
mob from taking over because it wishes to exercize control itself -- the
government.

>The Mob has two choices then, if it wants to succeed in the rent-a-cop
>business: it can become honest and dependable enough that people are
>willing to deal with it (that's sort of the scenario in The Syndic)
>or it can become vicious and tough enough that it kills all the competitors,
>which would be very difficult indeed, and wouldn't prevent the 
>formation of private police organizations later.

They only have to deter all the competitors, which is much easier.  It also
deals with the formation of other organizations later.

>The Mob would certainly have other troubles in a Libertarian society though:
>it would be in danger of starving to death.
>
>Consider what I understand to be the three main money sources of the
>Mob:
>	o Drugs
>	o Prostitution
>	o Gambling
>
>My understanding is that the rest (leg-breaking, protection, fraud)
>are really minor adjuncts to these.

This is true in our society.  I am claiming that in an anarchy, extortion
would move to the top of the list, and more than make up for the loss of
the other revenues.

>>Why should organized crime be more effective at taking over private police
>>than public police?  Because they have more ways to accomplish it.  The only
>>method available for taking over a public police force is infiltration.
>
>(I hope by this you include corruption, both of the police and of their
>superiors, otherwise you've missed a bet).

I do.

>>With private police, one can also set up competing organizations.  Also,
>>when police forces are run for profit motives, the temptation to resort
>>to extortion is strong; even those which are not taken over by the Mob are
>>likely to become centers of organized crime.
>
>The same argument applies to banks and barbershops.  The problem with
>the argument is that part of what you'd like to buy from a police
>force is trustworthiness.  If "Don Carleone Protections, Inc" refuses
>to allow open review of its actions, it will find that folks are a
>little queasy about hiring it to protect them.  If it is exposed in the
>press, and takes military action against the press, it will find itself
>in a small war (the critical press is no more likely to hire 
>Mob-connected protection than is American Express).  The Mafia is not
>good at war -- they're good at extortion.   They'd lose.  All it would
>take would be one large, well-trusted organization, such as 
>Pinkerton's, to offer competing protection in the neighborhood to make
>folks able to choose trustworthy service over the untrustworthy.

And once a large, well-trusted organization (it had better be bigger than
Pinkerton's) wipes out the mob, people will want it to stay around and
make sure it doesn't happen again.  Those in the organization will think
this is a good idea, too.

Either way, you wind up with a new government, and one which is less
responsible to the populace than what we have now.

>In the end, of course, this is simply counter-speculation to your
>speculation.  Neither of us can show it to be correct, but I hope I've
>pointed out some of the forces that would counter your scenario.

Yes, but I hope I have at least given you some idea of what I meant a
while back when I said that social experimentation is dangerous.

Power abhors a vacuum.
Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

janw@inmet.UUCP (12/21/85)

[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
>Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
>computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
>(the minimum you need to live on).

No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. E.g., a king asks
a nearby monastery to send him, as a favor, so  many  barrels  of
their  special  wine,  for  an emergency feast. If the abbot com-
plies, next year the same amount may be requested as a  customary
tribute.  

This is quite different, however, from peremptory  raising  of
tribute, in *violation* of custom. That might lead to dire conse-
quences for the extortioner: starting from appeal  to  *his*
suzerain - to armed resistance, not just by the offended vassal,
but all the other vassals - to change of allegiance. Don't forget
that  the  armed force of the suzerain was that of his vassals;
also that there was a lot of competition in  the  suzerain  busi-
ness.  Feudal society was pluralist. (Also violent, cruel and su-
perstitious - I am not trying to idealize  it.  But  it  was  the
greatest political laboratory that ever existed).

Applying Frank's tax formula (above) became possible much  later,
under an *absolutist state* : in France, starting with Richelieu.
Then, inventing new taxes became an industry much in  demand.  By
the end of Louis XIV rule, it crushed the peasants to a condition
where they looked, to a fresh observer, hardly  human.  Bourgeois
revolutions  provided  a redress, by establishing a cheap govern-
ment, limiting taxation, and separating economic  from  political
power.

Now we observe a gradual erosion of these achievements.

		Jan Wasilewsky

sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) (12/24/85)

>/* franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) /  9:46 am  Dec 17, 1985 */

>Which forces it to concentrate on other areas, which still would be illegal.
>The most relevant one here is extortion.

With lower returns, I believe.

>>As far as I can tell there is not that much difference between the government
>>of NYC and organized crime.  Organized crime is more violent some of the time,
>>but the NYC government extorts more money from the public.

>Do you really mean this?  A much larger portion of the money collected by
>the NYC government benefits the ordinary residents of the city.

You may be right.  In truth, I (nor anyone else on the net, I imagine) knows
how much organized crime collects.  In any event, an extraordinary amount
of the money the city collects not only doesn't help its ordinary citizens
but hurts them.

>It is much more responsive to the wishes of the residents.

It attempts (and, apparently, often succeeds) in giving the majority
of its residents the impression that it is responsive to their wishes to a
much greater extent than it actually is.

>As for the amount of money taken, that is only a
>matter of opportunity.  Given the opportunity, organized crime would take
>much more.

No doubt.  The same is probably true of government bureaucrats.

>Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka

Michael Sykora

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)

In article <28200419@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
>[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
>>Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
>>computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
>>(the minimum you need to live on).
>
>No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
>the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
>*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
>man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
>*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. E.g., a king asks
>a nearby monastery to send him, as a favor, so  many  barrels  of
>their  special  wine,  for  an emergency feast. If the abbot com-
>plies, next year the same amount may be requested as a  customary
>tribute.  

This was the theory.  The practice was that the amount a serf owed his
liege was so large that the relationship (maximum harvest) - (your tax) <
(the minimum you need to live on) held.  The serf would (illegally) withhold
part of the harvest, to give his family enough to live on.  In general,
there was no effective way to withhold more than this amount, because the
serf could not sell the excess.

If some method were found to increase the harvest above this point, a new
tradition would be created.  Since there was no incentive to increase the
harvest, this happened rarely.

Your example with the abbott is not a very good one; the abbott was part of
the ruling class.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

g-rh@cca.UUCP (Richard Harter) (12/30/85)

In article <> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>In article <28200419@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>
>>No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
>>the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
>>*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
>>man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
>>*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. ...
>
>This was the theory.  The practice was that the amount a serf owed his
>liege was so large that the relationship (maximum harvest) - (your tax) <
>(the minimum you need to live on) held.  The serf would (illegally) withhold
>part of the harvest, to give his family enough to live on.  In general,
>there was no effective way to withhold more than this amount, because the
>serf could not sell the excess.
>
>If some method were found to increase the harvest above this point, a new
>tradition would be created.  Since there was no incentive to increase the
>harvest, this happened rarely.
>

This was more or less the case in earlier feudal times when liege lords
collected their due in kind. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there
was a major shift.  Towns had become more common and the cash market for
agricultural products had revived.  There were mass freeings of serfs.
The obligations in kind were replaced by cash obligations which were
definite and fixed.  "Heavy as these obligations might be, he was no
longer subject to the aribtrary will of his lord."  The replacement of
obligations in kind by fixed cash rents had important consequences;
over time prices rose steadily (particularly after the black death in
the fourteenth century) to the profit of the peasants and the loss of
the lords.

Reference: A History of the Middle Ages, Sidney Painter, 1958, Knopf,
pp 240-242.

Richard Harter, SMDS Inc.
decvax!cca!g-rh

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (01/06/86)

> In article <28200419@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
> >[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
> >>Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
> >>computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
> >>(the minimum you need to live on).
> >
> >No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
> >the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
> >*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
> >man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
> >*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. E.g., .........
>
> This was the theory.  The practice was that the amount a serf owed his
>

The practice was more varied than both Franka and janw admit.  There was
no single simple formula for feudal rent.  Basically, there existed three
tendencies:
  a.  feudals wanted to maximize their rent;
  b.  different feudal group fighted for their share;
  c.  rentpayers (or other taxpayers) tried to evade rent.

The third tendency had two possible outlets:
  i.  migration;
  ii. rebelion.
  When the population was relatively sparse (like after Great Plague),
it was relatively easy to move, legally or illegally, to a domain of
more lenient lord.  This lord would increase its rent by increasing
the number of peasants.  In fact, stabilization of rents in monetary
terms was partially a cartel-like response of lords to this situation:
it prevented excesses of downward bidding between lords.

  This tendency was even more important amoung merchants and money-
-lenders.  The richest ones preferred to operate from thosed feudal
domains were the suzerain was in favor of them.  Due to geography
of Western Europe, there was always a "safe haven" for money-people:
Italian city-states, Flanders, etc.

  Rebelion was ultimate responce, invariably expensive for lords.
Thus its treat was valid even if the rebelion itself would be doomed.

  Lastly, there was always a conflict between the Crown and the
"independent" feudals.  The Crown preferred to keep the taxes payable
to the lord small, while increasing the taxes payable to the king.
Lords had reverse preferrence.  Stable feudal rents could mean increase
of the king's share in the global amount of taxes.  This was the
case in so-called absolute monarchies.

  As far as the original question was concerned: the price of police
protection, when mafia=police, the above complications apply.  The
biggest danger is not in the amount of taxes which would be payed,
but in potential escalation of violence (like in Lebanon, or so many
feudal wars).  Conventional police/military is rather expensive, but
at least reliable (in USA, at least).

Piotr Berman

janw@inmet.UUCP (01/08/86)

[berman@psuvax1]
>> In article <28200419@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
>> >[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
>> >>Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
>> >>computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
>> >>(the minimum you need to live on).
>> >
>> >No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
>> >the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
>> >*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
>> >man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
>> >*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. E.g., .........
>>
>> This was the theory.  The practice was that the amount a serf owed his

>The practice was more varied than both Franka and janw admit.  There was
>no single simple formula for feudal rent.  Basically, there existed three
>tendencies:
>  a.  feudals wanted to maximize their rent;
>  b.  different feudal group fighted for their share;
>  c.  rentpayers (or other taxpayers) tried to evade rent.

The epoch was *very* varied. The factors you indicate existed, of
course. That is a different *side* of the question from the one I
summarized: e.g., in USA you could say taxes are determined by  a
democratic  political process; or you could point out various in-
terests involved. In feudal times, *custom*, assumed to be  *per-
manent*,  occupied  the place of the democratic assumption.  See,
e.g., Feudal Society, by Marc Bloch - a classic and delightful
work, highly recommended. But your kind of description produces
the same result: there was no "iron law" driving rent  and  taxes
to  the  bare survival maximum. (The "iron law of wages" - as you
know but someone else may not - asserted that wages fall  to  the
bare survival minimum under free market conditions).

That was the issue, and on it, you agree with me.  Actually,  the
complicated  coalition  game  which you touch upon, led to a very
tolerable level of obligations for *many*, intolerable for some -
in  the  *feudal*  period.  For most peasants, the situation grew
*worse* through 13th and 14th centuries - as  the  dynamic  power
balance  of  the  feudal period fell apart, and as something of a
block of the nobility as a whole against the rest of the popu-
lation  coalesced.  And  then the plague aftermath, the great re-
bellions, and other factors changed things again. And then  abso-
lutism  made the tax system the worst ever. Feudalism proper only
applies till early 13th century - especially in  the  context  of
libertarian  analogy. In terms of taxes & rent, of human rights &
freedom and of economic & technical progress (all connected)  its
record was good.

See my note "Feudal Taxes" .

                Jan Wasilewsky

nrh@inmet.UUCP (01/08/86)

Okay, folks -- if you want to know a major libertarian's view on
private police, find, somewhere, a copy of "The Machinery of Freedom",
by David Friedman, and read the chapter titled something like "Law,
Police, and Courts -- on the Market".

>/* Written  4:44 pm  Dec 18, 1985 by friesen@psivax in inmet:net.politics.t */
>In article <28200391@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>
>>>  In short, it would be an ideal target for organized crime.
>>>
>>>I am quite sure that organized crime would take over the private police
>>>business in many areas.  I suspect it would come to dominate it overall,
>>>although some areas might manage to remain free of it.
>>
>>The Mob has two choices then, if it wants to succeed in the rent-a-cop
>>business: it can become honest and dependable enough that people are
>>willing to deal with it (that's sort of the scenario in The Syndic)
>>or it can become vicious and tough enough that it kills all the competitors,
>
>       Or it could use a third policy. It could run a No-Holds-Barred,
>results gaurenteed enforcement agency for a very high price. It would
>be "reliable" in that if you paid for results you would get them, and
>people would buy this service just like they often try to now, but
>there would be no public police force to get in thier way. In fact
>such enforcement agencies would form *without* Mob intervention, as
>has been suggested.

A very high priced agency would have trouble (given that "results
guaranteed" doesn't really work in law enforcement) keeping all the
low-priced agencies from defending their clients.  The low-priced
agencies would include volunteer organizations, coops, and other
presumably non-Mob agencies -- and COMBINATIONS of these.  I suggest you
read David Friedman on the business choices faced by the Mob agency and
the others.

>>The Mob would certainly have other troubles in a Libertarian society though:
>>it would be in danger of starving to death.
>>
>>Consider what I understand to be the three main money sources of the
>>Mob:
>>      o Drugs
>>      o Prostitution
>>      o Gambling
>>
>>My understanding is that the rest (leg-breaking, protection, fraud)
>>are really minor adjuncts to these.
>
>       In Libertaria the Protection Racket becomes *much* more
>important, since there is no regular, independent police force to
>provide the protection function. Thus they, and thier competetitors,
>would simply change specialties.

Is the Mob in business to advance its members, or just to be a blight?

If the former, it would probably give up on the extortion racket -- very
dangerous indeed in an environment where anyone might be armed, where
a shakedown prospect might have just changed from the "Weak and Corrupt
Law Enforcement Police Agency" to the "Utterly Fanatic and Incorruptible
Avengers Police Agency".  If the Mob has both in its pocket, the Mob wins,
but if it uses the power to win, soon nobody will hire either agency.


>>The "American Express Casino", to defend itself, would of course hire or
>>form a security force emphatically NOT connected with the Mob.  As would
>>7-11 and the bordello.
>
>       Actually, many of these places *would* hire hte Mob or an
>agency like them, since that would give them powerful protection, and
>allow them to control thier income more effectively.

Oh, sure!  Just as they'd PROUDLY display the Black Hand, to drum up
business, right?  Forget it!  Would YOU do business with someone who
CHOSE to work with people on such terms?  Of course not -- not given
any choice.

Do you get a choice?  Ah, there's the question!  If the Mob has already
dominated society, we're not talking about a libertarian society, so
the question  (while important) is not about a libertarian society.  If
the society STARTS OUT libertarian, then people DO have a choice, and will
exercise it.

>>To answer one or two of your points directly:
>>
>>The same argument applies to banks and barbershops.  The problem with
>>the argument is that part of what you'd like to buy from a police
>>force is trustworthiness.  If "Don Carleone Protections, Inc" refuses
>>to allow open review of its actions, it will find that folks are a
>>little queasy about hiring it to protect them.
>
>       Naw, if they say "you pay - you get" and then deliver a lot of
>people with a large investment to protect aren't going to care
>tiddly-winks for *how* they do it, this is the basis for the "mob"
>"takeover" and it would not be limited to the current Mob.

People with a large investment are going to care PLENTY how it's
protected -- the more unreasonable a protection company's tactics, the
less good things will look in court, and yes, there will be court
suits when the nasty folks get out of hand.  The more firmly a given
court is under Mob domination, the less likely it is that it will be
an acceptable adjudication choice for a coalition of uncorrupted
agencies vs. the Mob agency.  And yes, if there's no mutually
acceptable court, there will be fighting, and if even one of the
people killed by the Mob belonged to the "Selective Assassination
Vengeance Society" (or some such) then you can bet your booties that
the officers of the company are going to feel pretty green around the
gills at being unable to demonstrate their good intent to the
stockholders, the board, and worst of all, the SAVS.  Hiring the "you
pay - you get" bunch is not liable to help out, and remember, the Mob
is not good at protection per se, despite all the "protection"
racketeering.

You don't like fighting?  Bless you, neither do I!  But the fighting
remains EVEN IF the government is closing down a Mob stronghold in
OUR society.

>>If it is exposed in the
>>press, and takes military action against the press, it will find itself
>>in a small war (the critical press is no more likely to hire
>>Mob-connected protection than is American Express).  The Mafia is not
>>good at war -- they're good at extortion.   They'd lose.
>
>       Yeah, it would be a small war, and the people hired by the
>newspapers and such would not really be that much different than the
>Mob itself, just a rival organization. I am not sure I *want* the
>newspapers waging a war in *my* neighborhood!

Dead straight!  One reason why, for example, you wouldn't buy products
or deal with folks who hired their protection from indiscriminate types.

>And the Mob is better at
>war than you might think, they just limit it to *within* the
>organization because they know that the *public* police forces and the
>military could wipe them up if they were really gaoded into action by
>that kind of violence. With a whole bunch of competing, relatively
>small "police" forces they might just *win*.

And the boogy man will drop by too?  Document the first sentence of your
paragraph.

>> All it would
>>take would be one large, well-trusted organization, such as
>>Pinkerton's, to offer competing protection in the neighborhood to make
>>folks able to choose trustworthy service over the untrustworthy.
>>
>       I am not sure I really trust Pinkerton's all that much, back
>when they *were* the law in some places in the West they had quite a
>reputation for heavy-handed tactics, again not much different than Mob
>tactics.

So give them competition!  If you're so queasy about the Pinks, wouldn't
you pay a few dollars extra for (pardon me, Laura) the "Toad Terrific
Absolutely Moral Protection Agency", all other things being equal?
(The TTAMPA would offer almost certain freedom from countersuits, and
superior access to folks who'd refuse to talk to the (as you've painted
them) grim, nasty Pinks.

Similar (in kind) decisions are made nowadays -- people refuse to
invest in South Africa, they decline to buy non-union lettuce, they
buy certain mutual funds, the theme of which is avoidance of morally
questionable enterprises.

>Remember, Pinkerton's was and would be paid for *results* not
>methods!

But results in what sense?  Would you hire an agency that
simply grabbed some wino off the street, said "Here's the guy that
killed your daughter", and shoots him?  Would you pay for an agency
that (acting in your name) wounded a bunch of bystanders trying to
get to the correct killer (remember -- you're going to be named in
a suit as co-defendant)?

>>Of course, it is possible that the Mob would conduct this aspect of
>>its business scrupulously, in which case it would suffer from a
>>PR problem, nothing more.
>>
>       Considering that they conduct much of thier current business
>"scrupiously", I don't see anything particularly unlikely about this.
>You see it is largely a matter of your definition of "scrupulous",
>they generally deliver what they promise, they just don't let anything
>stand in thier way - that is they let the ends justify the means.

I think the meaning of the  word as I used it was clear:

        "characterized by careful attention to what is right or
        proper; conscientiously honest".

To make the point even clearer, I was saying that if people now in the
Mob were to open a protection agency on day 1 After Libertaria, and
if they were to conduct their business scrupulously (in the sense above),
gave good value, avoided entangling their clients in suits, and had no
trouble negotiating with other such agencies (again, read Friedman
on the importance of this point) then they'd suffer from some bad
history, but no worse than (say) certain members of the
Philadelphia Police Department in the same situation.

nrh@inmet.UUCP (01/08/86)

>/* Written 10:11 pm  Dec 18, 1985 by franka@mmintl in inmet:net.politics.t */
>>
>>Were your argument correct, the logical move for the mob to take NOW
>>would be the domination of politics -- and they would have succeeded:
>>not just in a relatively few places like the regulation of gambling, but
>>more on the order of limiting the current round of mob-leader roundups.
>>
>>Nobody argues that they haven't partially succeeded: there are certainly
>>mob-connected politicians.  They haven't entirely succeeded in politics
>>for the same reason they wouldn't entirely succeed in the rent-a-cop
>>business: people don't regard the Mob as dependable and honest: given
>>a choice, people choose to deal with others.
>
>No.  Today, there is an opposing organization which wishes to prevent the
>mob from taking over because it wishes to exercize control itself -- the
>government.

But "tomorrow" (in Libertaria) there are dozens or hundreds of police
organizations, some easily permeable (and thus unpopular) some
cooperative (and thus very hard to corrupt) some very paranoid and
on-the-ball.  Each one wants to direct its own destiny, just as much
(perhaps) as our government wants to exercise control In short,
instead of having to deal with 3 or 4 layers of government the Mob
must now deal with contending dozens of agencies, with new ones all
the time, and no way of knowing just which ones will be  important in
advance.  Hardly a gain for the corrupt Mob.

>>The Mob has two choices then, if it wants to succeed in the rent-a-cop
>>business: it can become honest and dependable enough that people are
>>willing to deal with it (that's sort of the scenario in The Syndic)
>>or it can become vicious and tough enough that it kills all the competitors,
>>which would be very difficult indeed, and wouldn't prevent the
>>formation of private police organizations later.
>
>They only have to deter all the competitors, which is much easier.  It also
>deals with the formation of other organizations later.

And how, do you think, would they deter formation of volunteer and co-op
agencies in ghettos, the hiring of agencies by the wealthy and middle
class, and the supply of charitable agencies by religious groups and
civic do-gooders?  Deter away!  It would be like shoveling water with
a pitchfork!  Worse!  The more the mob tried to dominate, the more apparent
the need for such agencies would be!

>>The Mob would certainly have other troubles in a Libertarian society though:
>>it would be in danger of starving to death.
>>
>>Consider what I understand to be the three main money sources of the
>>Mob:
>>      o Drugs
>>      o Prostitution
>>      o Gambling
>>
>>My understanding is that the rest (leg-breaking, protection, fraud)
>>are really minor adjuncts to these.
>
>This is true in our society.  I am claiming that in an anarchy, extortion
>would move to the top of the list, and more than make up for the loss of
>the other revenues.

But on what basis do you make this claim?  Leg-breaking only makes sense
if you aren't going to get caught.  It's one thing if you can watch
the police with one eye, it's another if you can't be sure the person
you're about to extort from hasn't hired the "Secret Ninja Justice Squad"
to protect him, or that the do-gooding equivalent of the ACLU isn't
waiting with videotapes to see you lay just one finger on a person
they've planted in front of you as a prospect.

>....

>
>And once a large, well-trusted organization (it had better be bigger than
>Pinkerton's) wipes out the mob, people will want it to stay around and
>make sure it doesn't happen again.  Those in the organization will think
>this is a good idea, too.

Quite so.  No society is safe from the imposition of tyranny, though --
no doubt there are those who wish Reagan to remain around to run things
for the rest of his life.  Is that evidence that Republicanism is evil?
Of course, people are notoriously ungrateful.  They might or might not
want to re-impose government (assuming here we've got Anarcholibertaria,
and the government doesn't just wake up, threaten to nuke anyone who
tries to take power in an unsanctioned way, and go to sleep again)

By the way, a clear 2/3rds majority in our society would be sufficient
to impose a tyranny (of course, they'd work through representatives,
but my (hazy) understanding is that this would be enough to cause a
Constitutional Convention and command a majority there.

>Either way, you wind up with a new government, and one which is less
>responsible to the populace than what we have now.

As in the Evil Constitutional Convention case in OUR society.  So?


>>In the end, of course, this is simply counter-speculation to your
>>speculation.  Neither of us can show it to be correct, but I hope I've
>>pointed out some of the forces that would counter your scenario.
>
>Yes, but I hope I have at least given you some idea of what I meant a
>while back when I said that social experimentation is dangerous.

You have indeed.  Perhaps not quite so dangerous as being one of the
Social Experimental Animals, though.