[net.politics.theory] Roads And Telephony

janw@inmet.UUCP (01/02/86)

[   Karl Dahlke ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad]
[an extremely lucid and informative piece on natural monopolies
in roads and communications by Karl Dahlke]

Some statements, however, are made or implied but not substantiated.

>Some have demanded a controlled experiment, but I could not accept
>the costs and risks associated with such an experiment,

Why do you think there are any costs - and costs to  whom  ?  The
experiment  would  consist in *changing the rules* over a certain
area (like a state) - obviously on a  voluntary  basis.  The  im-
mediate  result  would  be *gain* - less taxes - to the local ci-
tizens; and *no loss* to the government (it would  save  on  road
building). The long term result would be loss (bad roads) - or gain
to the state, depending on success or failure.. Thus, there  is
a  *risk*,  but  also  a  chance  of gain, i.e. a *gamble*, but a
voluntary one (well, at least on the part of local *majority*).

>while there are no theoretical arguments favoring private control of roads.

There are *some*.
First, government intervention *in itself* is a social evil,  ir-
respective  of  economic  results. Thus, even somewhat *inferior*
economic performance might not be too great a cost to get rid  of
the Big Brother.

Second, it usually costs the government twice as much to do  any-
thing. Why doesn't that include road building and maintenance ?

Then again, toll roads can be exploited  more  rationally -  e.g.
lower toll off peak hours, thus encouraging better traffic condi-
tions.  A private company - even a monopoly - would have a market
incentive to find such cost-saving solutions.

>Why should this monopoly be handled privately while others are not?
                                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This begs the question: why shouldn't *all* natural monopolies
be private and *unregulated* ? In your own  excellent expose,
you described how a phone company would keep its monopolistic
position - through *low rates*. Well, let it !

Finally, in a surge of intellectual honesty, let me throw  in  an
argument  for  the other side: historically, good road systems do
correlate with centralized governments. (E.g., Roman and Inca Em-
pires). European feudalism, though highly progressive economical-
ly, had a dismal record on roads. (On bridges, not bad  at  all).

The reasons, however, seem  obvious:  such  road  systems  helped
maintain centralized control and were built by those who wanted
such control, opposed by those  who  didn't.  These  reasons  are
hardly valid now.

			Jan Wasilewsky

sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) (01/02/86)

>/* eklhad@ihnet.UUCP (K. A. Dahlke) / 12:32 pm  Dec 30, 1985 */

>Like roads, telephony possesses economic characteristics that make
>competition impractical and inefficient, at the local level.

New technologies seem to be challenging this notion.  Many firms are bypassing
the local telephone company when hooking up to a long-distance carrier, for
example.

>An interesting difference between roads and telephony is the 
>solution adopted.  The government was always a bit afraid of
>telephony, since it is a high tech thing, and (sometimes)
>the government recognizes its own technical incompetence.

How do you know that this was the reason?

>For now, can we dispense with the "private roads would work" articles?

No.

Mike Sykora

kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) (01/12/86)

A further argument in favor of single-server industries (e.g.
monopolies) is economy of scale.  In the telephone industry,
as in the airline industry, the unit cost per message-mile or
passenger-mile goes down with the volume of traffic.  Competing
companies have trouble serving small-town America, because unit
costs are high in sparsely populated areas.  Airline dereglation
drove fares down between big cities, but smaller communities are
now much more expensive to fly to.  About a hundred years ago,
the British Post Office charged according to weight*distance.
Then a Minister of Posts introduced a flat rate independent of
distance.  People were then able to affix stamps to their mail,
and fewer postal clerks were needed.  The average cost of sending
a letter dropped.  The system worked because the Post Office was
a monopoly.  If competition were permitted, the competitor would
elect to serve only the short-distance inner city mail, at a cost
below the nationwide average.  Similar logic applies to competition
in the telephone industry.  --Barry Kort