franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)
In article <28200417@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default >libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the >possibility of it - work for pollution ? This is a complete change subject (so I changed the subject line). This quote got me to wondering -- is there any connection between the libertarian fondness for litigation, and the current mushrooming of litigation in the United States? The most obvious connection would be that libertarian thought has made people more likely to sue. I doubt this; the ideas don't seem to be that widespread, and the people doing the suing don't seem to be the libertarians. Alternatively, the libertarian ideas might have been encouraged by the increased respectability of taking someone to court. The time scales don't seem to me to be right for this; libertarianism emerged first. (Although maybe not before the trend started.) Perhaps it's just a coincidence. I would be interested if anyone has any ideas on the subject, however. ---------------------------------------------------------------- I have directed followups to net.politics.theory, since I think this discussion mostly belongs there, not net.legal. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/31/85)
[Frank Adams writes] >In article <28200417@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default >>libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the >>possibility of it - work for pollution ? >This is a complete change subject (so I changed the subject line). ??? The subject was : Pollution: No Libertarian solution. I suggested that laws allowing potential pollution victims to sue for damages would constitute *a* libertarian solution. If someone can shoot this down, fine, if not, this is a *theorem of existence*. >This quote got me to wondering -- is there any connection between the >libertarian fondness for litigation, and the current mushrooming of >litigation in the United States? Hardly - not enough libertarians to affect statistics. Is there such a fondness ? I have not polled enough libertarians to know. I myself loathe litigation. >Perhaps it's just a coincidence. I would be interested if anyone has >any ideas on the subject, however. Coincidence between litigation and what ? *Existence* of a few libertarians ? >I have directed followups to net.politics.theory, since I think this >discussion mostly belongs there, not net.legal. How did it get to net.legal in the first place ? Addendum: Though libertarianism has not *caused* the excess of litigation, it has a *solution*. The problem is mostly created by a legal caste that has a vested interest in it. Therefore it keeps the legal system and the legal process complex, obscure, slow, erratic and hard to avoid. A matter of job security . Abolish their privileged status - let anyone who wants plead, judge and legislate, and free market will do the rest. Jan Wasilewsky
gadfly@ihuxn.UUCP (Gadfly) (12/31/85)
-- > This is a complete change subject (so I changed the subject line). > This quote got me to wondering -- is there any connection between the > libertarian fondness for litigation, and the current mushrooming of > litigation in the United States? > > The most obvious connection would be that libertarian thought has made > people more likely to sue. I doubt this; the ideas don't seem to be > that widespread, and the people doing the suing don't seem to be the > libertarians... > > Frank Adams Most of the stuff on the net by people who identify themselves as libertarians has been strongly against "frivolous" lawsuits. The principal argument has been that a sue-happy society is eroding our basic notions about personal responsibility, a value which is crucial for libertarianism to have any hope of working. If the citizenry does not feel itself to be responsible for its actions (individually, of course), whole cities would have to be converted into courtrooms to hold the vast population of litigants. As any anarchist will tell you, anarchy is not chaos. The discipline not imposed from outside must come from inside. -- *** *** JE MAINTIENDRAI ***** ***** ****** ****** 31 Dec 85 [11 Nivose An CXCIV] ken perlow ***** ***** (312)979-7753 ** ** ** ** ..ihnp4!iwsl8!ken *** ***
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (01/02/86)
In article <28200453@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > I suggested that laws allowing potential pollution victims to sue for > damages would constitute *a* libertarian solution. If someone can > shoot this down, fine, if not, this is a *theorem of existence*. How do "laws" get passed in a libertarian society? What coerces someone into responding to a lawsuit or paying judgements aginst him? > Abolish their [lawyers] privileged status - let anyone who wants plead, > judge and legislate, and free market will do the rest. With the exception of criminal cases, we already have that. Any pair of litigants can select an arbiter (or any other system they want) and work out their differences under any system of rules they want. This doesn't happen much because usually one party is incapable of compelling the other's notice. Not because of "lawyers privileged status." Arbitrartion between unions and employers is one example of where both sides can compel attention; polluters and sufferers don't fit that criterion. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/03/86)
In article <28200453@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>I have directed followups to net.politics.theory, since I think this >>discussion mostly belongs there, not net.legal. > >How did it get to net.legal in the first place ? There has been occasional discussion of the mushrooming of litigation in net.legal, so I cross-posted it there to see if it attracted any attention from people who read net.legal and not net.politics.theory. I restricted the followup to keep any resulting discussion from contributing to net.clutter. If the article had been longer, I would have posted only a pointer to it to net.legal, but it was quite short. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) (01/03/86)
>/* mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) / 1:21 am Jan 2, 1986 */ >With the exception of criminal cases, we already have that. Any pair of >litigants can select an arbiter (or any other system they want) and work >out their differences under any system of rules they want. > >This doesn't happen much because usually one party is incapable of >compelling the other's notice. Not because of "lawyers privileged status." >Arbitrartion between unions and employers is one example of where both sides >can compel attention; polluters and sufferers don't fit that criterion. >Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh What does "compelling the other's notice" mean? Is this legal jargon?
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (01/05/86)
In article <4340042@csd2.UUCP> sykora@csd2.UUCP (Michael Sykora) writes: > >/* mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) / 1:21 am Jan 2, 1986 */ > > >With the exception of criminal cases, we already have that. Any pair of > >litigants can select an arbiter (or any other system they want) and work > >out their differences under any system of rules they want. > > > >This doesn't happen much because usually one party is incapable of > >compelling the other's notice. Not because of "lawyers privileged status." > >Arbitrartion between unions and employers is one example of where both sides > >can compel attention; polluters and sufferers don't fit that criterion. > > What does "compelling the other's notice" mean? Is this legal jargon? No, it's not legal jargon, it's English. :-) Very simply, if one doesn't force people to listen to you, you're not going to have any attention paid to your complaints. For example, if I'm a big, bad libertarian polluter, why should I listen to your whining complaints, courts, etc.? Why can't I just ignore you and save myself money? Whereas if I'm an employer, and my employees have a right to strike, then they can force my notice by threatening economic damage to my interests due to work stoppage. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
janw@inmet.UUCP (01/06/86)
[Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh] >How do "laws" get passed in a libertarian society? What coerces >someone into responding to a lawsuit or paying judgements aginst him? A very good question. There is an extensive literature on that. Defining one scheme as *the* libertarian solution would be wrong. The way I see it, laws would be contractual obligations. Enforcement would be private. >> Abolish their [lawyers] privileged status - let anyone who wants plead, >> judge and legislate, and free market will do the rest. >With the exception of criminal cases, we already have that. Any pair of >litigants can select an arbiter (or any other system they want) and work >out their differences under any system of rules they want. >This doesn't happen much because usually one party is incapable of >compelling the other's notice. Not because of "lawyers privileged status." Well, actually it *does* happen much, and is called out-of-court settlement. And in *criminal* cases, there is plea-bargaining. The basis for negotiation, in both cases, is an *anticipated* court decision. Because, under the present system, *that* is what defines the correlation of forces between the parties - the State being the force majeure. Naturally, the people conducting these negotiations, and often, in effect, sitting as an arbitration committee, are the legal councels for the parties. Because they, the lawyers, are the experts on predicting the (still unpredictable) court behavior. Also because they would have to plead the case if negotiations broke down. It is *not* to their interest to settle fast, or, as judges or legislators, to simplify the rules. So, effectively, the rules created by lawyers-as-councel, lawyers-as-judges and lawyers-as-legislators, define what occurs out of court, as well as in. Even the very moderate reform of abolishing lawyer licencing would probably simplify and speed up justice. With more competi- tion, lawyers and paralegals would be eager to please clients; unafraid of being disbarred, they would find short-cuts. And new people would bring in unlawyerly language and habits. But of course the most harm is done not by attorneys but by legislators and regulators. The sheer amount and complexity of rules breeds litigation. Privileges of lawyers are relevant be- cause all this stuff is written to be understood and used by them only. It is a web, safe for spiders, fatal to flies. The latest bill about farmer aid has over 1300 pages. A farmer and a banker are quite free to settle their loan default problems with the local barber as arbitrator. With that bill as the basis for negotiation, not a real possibility. >Arbitrartion between unions and employers is one example of where both sides >can compel attention; polluters and sufferers don't fit that criterion. You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made. Other relevant points are: - Moral power is a kind of power too, and often proves decisive. - No large group of people is powerless. In particular, pollution victims, if numerous, have both numbers and moral high ground. They have *many* ways to compel attention. Jan Wasilewsky
mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) (01/08/86)
In article <28200515@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > [Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh] > >How do "laws" get passed in a libertarian society? What coerces > >someone into responding to a lawsuit or paying judgements aginst him? > > A very good question. There is an extensive literature on that. > Defining one scheme as *the* libertarian solution would be wrong. > The way I see it, laws would be contractual obligations. > Enforcement would be private. Please tell us more about the way you see it. Who do you contract with for laws? Everybody you meet? A private law maker/judge/enforcer? Why do you contract for laws? Are you fair game for anyone otherwise? What happens to someone who cannot afford to contract for laws? > >> Abolish their [lawyers] privileged status - let anyone who wants plead, > >> judge and legislate, and free market will do the rest. > > >With the exception of criminal cases, we already have that. Any pair of > >litigants can select an arbiter (or any other system they want) and work > >out their differences under any system of rules they want. > > >This doesn't happen much because usually one party is incapable of > >compelling the other's notice. Not because of "lawyers privileged status." > > Well, actually it *does* happen much, and is called out-of-court > settlement. And in *criminal* cases, there is plea-bargaining. > > The basis for negotiation, in both cases, is an *anticipated* > court decision. Because, under the present system, *that* is what > defines the correlation of forces between the parties - the State > being the force majeure. From this I can draw two points: 1) That we already have MORE of the system you want than I had considered. So what more do you get from your changes? 2) Our state performs the function of compelling notice. What would perform the comparable function in a non-coercive fashion in your idea of a libertarian "court"? Not just of individuals, but of powerful organizations? [30 or so lines on lawyers' and legislators' effects on complexity of law ommitted. I disagree, but want to argue something else.] > >Arbitrartion between unions and employers is one example of where both sides > >can compel attention; polluters and sufferers don't fit that criterion. > > You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of > the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made. Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one particular time is all that is necessary. So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfaction in your libertaria? > Other relevant points are: > - Moral power is a kind of power too, and often proves decisive. > - No large group of people is powerless. > In particular, pollution victims, if numerous, have both numbers and > moral high ground. They have *many* ways to compel attention. Fine. I'm Joe Miner And Smelter Owner, the major polluter of your valley. My products are sold primarily outside the range I pollute. Go ahead, how are you gonna compell me? I laugh at your "moral high ground", and if you try to coerce me, I'll righteously set my rent-a-cops on you. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh
radford@calgary.UUCP (Radford Neal) (01/13/86)
> WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE. (passed by referendum) > > Effective <insert date here> , all legislation submitted for consideration > by Congress shall be no more than 10,000 words in length. No bill shall be > enacted that is over 10,000 words in length. > > -the venn buddhist Here! Here! For starters, I'd say we need a constitutional amendment saying that the entire criminal law must fit in a book of 100 pages, written in language understandable by 90% of the citizens. After all, "ignorance is no excuse". We're all expected to understand this law... Maybe 1000 pages could be allowed for civil law. Something anyone could master with a bit of effort. I think a limit on the aggregate is essential, not just on individual bills. This would force obsolete laws off the books, *and* encourage the legislature to see their task as the maintainance of a *body* of law, not the passage of ad hoc special-case bills. Radford Neal