janw@inmet.UUCP (01/04/86)
[Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa] [criticising Radford Neal's solution for Free Rider problem] >How many people do you know who are rational? This is a major flaw in >libertarian thinking, assuming rational agents. ... >The biggest flaw in libertarian thinking is, however, the notion that >people are independent free agents. ... >In practice, it doesn't come close to modeling real societies >(except perhaps the "society" of net.land, which might explain >the high number of libertarians around.) The assumptions are indeed made, and they are indeed less than factually true. But this does not necessarily make them flawed. Very similar (perhaps identical) assumptions are needed to justi- fy *democracy*. And this led its critics (e.g., Sorel, Shaw, Mussolini, Lenin ) to make much the same points and to proceed to denounce democracy as a sham. According to Lenin, freedom of the press is a sham because "one cannot live in society and be free from society". Quite true, too - yet the consistent applica- tion of this turns out to yield much worse results than the application of the "flawed" assumptions of a person as a free, rational, independent agent, of press freedom being possible etc. The assumptions are not factual. But they retain at least two other kinds of value. First, as imperfect *idealizations* of reality. Atoms are not elastic balls, water does not *really* consist of individual H2-O molecules, yet for many applications this is good enough. And even when it is not - the time to dis- card a model is when you have a better one (which, to do Lenin justice, he thought he had). Class model, race model, nation as super-organism model - are all alternatives to the rational atom model - but *are they better* ? The second value the assumptions have is as a *normative*, ethi- cal principle. The Declaration of Independence says: "We hold those truths to be self-evident" - and proceeds to list highly controversial (at the time) and quite unprovable statements. The statements were *normative*, not descriptive. The assumptions that *ought* to be made. One defense of these assumptions in this second sense consists in pointing out the *results* of accepting them compared to the *results* of alternative assumptions. Assuming people are ra- tional, you give them a chance to exercise that quality - a chance many of them botch. That's tough. But if you decide to treat them as sheep - their best chance to get along in your society is to *be* sheep. The success of the first approach *does* depend on the initial level of rationality; but if there is enough, it *grows*. The second approach works only for the *shepherds* who quickly discover the proper use of sheep: fleece them and butcher them. The problem is not just: are people really rational enough to de- cide their own destiny? The problem is, also, who is super- rational and super-benevolent enough to decide it for them? And even *that* would only guarantee a society of happy sheep under a Good Shepherd. Frankly, I'd prefer a bad shepherd, more chance of a change. >(except perhaps the "society" of net.land, which might explain >the high number of libertarians around.) A nice conjecture, for all I know it may be true. If all humankind needs is to become as rational and independent as the marginal netter, can things be quite hopeless ? Jan Wasilewsky
lkk@teddy.UUCP (01/06/86)
In article <28200505@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > >[Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa] >[criticising Radford Neal's solution for Free Rider problem] >>How many people do you know who are rational? This is a major flaw in >>libertarian thinking, assuming rational agents. ... > >>The biggest flaw in libertarian thinking is, however, the notion that >>people are independent free agents. ... >>In practice, it doesn't come close to modeling real societies >>(except perhaps the "society" of net.land, which might explain >>the high number of libertarians around.) > >The assumptions are indeed made, and they are indeed less than >factually true. But this does not necessarily make them flawed. >Very similar (perhaps identical) assumptions are needed to justi- >fy *democracy*. The assumption of rational actors works (to some extent) in the case of elections because: 1. They only occur once a year or so, they don't require too much effort. 2. They (generally) involve a determination of the general direction of government, rather than decisions about specific complex issues. Thus, elections generally don't involve rational decisions, the involve emotional decisions. They tell the government (via the candidates elected), what the electorate FEELS it wants. This provides good negative feedback. If a government is not making the electoral feel good, the electorate votes it out. Thus, we have a safeguard against tyranny and (theoretically) bad administration. But ask anyone who has worked on an electoral campaign, (or even better, campaign commercials) if they think the electorate is rational, and they'll laugh in your face. Now the case of deciding on specific courses of action, like building a dam, is quite a different thing. Dams affect many people, some positively, some negatively. They also affect the environment, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively. Deciding whether to build the dam or not is a very complex issue. Most people have a lot better things to do with their time than study environmental impact statements and the like. So they pay people to do it for them. These are called government administrators and legislators. BUT, once they have accepted the realization that other people are in a better position to make the decision (by way of training and depth of involvement) , it behooves them to accept the decision (or vote out the bastard...), otherwise, the decisionmaker is wasting his time. Think of government as binding arbitration. > >>(except perhaps the "society" of net.land, which might explain >>the high number of libertarians around.) > >A nice conjecture, for all I know it may be true. If all >humankind needs is to become as rational and independent as >the marginal netter, can things be quite hopeless ? God forbid. What humankind needs has little to do with rationality (in the sense that you mean it). Rationality only works with the correct premises. The current state of affairs (at least in the USA) is that people start out with the premise that they are independant free agents (i.e. they can somehow exist and live a happy life independently from any arbitrary part of the rest of the world, that they are distinct from the world), whose place in the world is to maximize their utility by making as much *money* as possible, the rest of the world be damned. This attitude survives easily on USENET because it is (more) acceptable in the artificial world of electronic communication, where, for the most part, the inhabitants of this "world" are not "of it" (i.e. aren't administrators so don't actual have to worry about the future of the "world", don't suffer any serious consequences if problems occur). This "world" really does seem to exist apart from each of us, its "out there somewhere". But if you check out recent discussions in net.news, you see that even here in netland, people's self-centered just-try-and-stop-me attitude threatens the very existence of the net. > Jan Wasilewsky -- Sport Death, (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa -------- Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing. - Helen Keller
janw@inmet.UUCP (01/11/86)
[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs}!qantel!gabor]
>The 'rational actors' assumption may indeed be used to justify democracy
>but I don't think it is one of the stronger arguments for the democratic
>process. The cult of rationality is more likely to lead one to favor the
>rule of philosopher kings or a mandarin class. A decision obtained through
>the democratic process need not be any more rational than decisions by fiat
>or augury. The democratic process is preferred because (1) through the free
>exchange of ideas it provides short feedback loops permitting incremental
>corrections and adjustments; (2) it cloaks decisions with a (mythical) veil
>of legitimacy so people are willing to accept political authority that is
>not based on religious belief or raw coercion.
There is a lot of truth in it, *but*:
*Every* political system needs a cloak of legitimacy; the difference
is in what kind of cloak. Divine right of kings works fine; when
faith weakens, a cult of the king himself, or a dictator, serves
quite well. Will of the people justifies plebiscitary bonapartism
etc. But for liberal democracy, a necessary assumption is that people
either vote their interest, or public interest and that they
can discern it. This is rationality. More than that, any system
of division of powers assumes people who can negotiate their
differences - and that demands even greater rationality.
The objections that were made at each stage of expanding suffrage
are characteristic : they usually consisted in the assertion that
the group of people in question are insufficiently rational (wom-
en, blacks), insufficiently informed (uneducated classes) or in-
sufficiently independent (employees). Another objection would
be that though the group in question would vote their interest,
that interest is naturally antagonistic to that of society at
large (the poor who supposedly don't have enough stake in the
system). All the above arguments have in fact been made, and
though spurious, they illustrate the basic assumption.
The assumption of *independence* is best demonstrated by the
institution of *secret ballot*. An opposite assumption of
*consensus* would call for quite different procedures.
>The democratic process is preferred because (1) through the free
>exchange of ideas it provides short feedback loops permitting incremental
>corrections and adjustments ...
Very true, and it shows that the rationality assumption is not
*merely* a useful fiction: free exchange of ideas and experimental
feedback make *democratic process* to some limited degree a
*rational process*.
Be that as it may, my basic point was *not* that *the same* as-
sumptions made in support of democracy should be made elsewhere.
This, to my argument, was coincidental. Rather it was that *some*
assumptions about individual behaviour in society can be rea-
sonably and usefully made without being true in all, or even
most, individual cases.
Jan Wasilewskyrab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) (01/11/86)
Freedom is *not* freedom _from_ but freedom _to_.
Those who pretend otherwise (such as Lenin) aren't using the
same concept as the rest of us.
Robert Bickford (rab@well.uucp)
================================================
I doubt if these are even my own opinions.
================================================janw@inmet.UUCP (01/12/86)
[Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa] >>If all humankind needs is to become as rational and independent >>as the marginal netter, can things be quite hopeless ? >God forbid. What humankind needs has little to do with rationality >(in the sense that you mean it). You probably misunderstand me. Let me describe in what sense I mean it. Rationality is the desire and the ability to *get at the truth*. At the core is the *desire*, an *urge to understand*, to make sense of things. As it works, it accumulates skills and habits of concentration, observation, induction, sampling, deduction, generalization, specification, abstraction, concretization, analogy, imagination, invention, testing, self-criticism, and many others. The concept of rationality is close to those of intelligence, of sanity, and of objectivity. We can never have enough of it. >Rationality only works with the correct premises. I disagree. Rationality *discovers* the correct premises. >The current state >of affairs (at least in the USA) is that people start out with the >premise that they are independant free agents (i.e. they can somehow >exist and live a happy life independently from any arbitrary part of >the rest of the world, that they are distinct from the world), whose >place in the world is to maximize their utility by making as much >*money* as possible, the rest of the world be damned. >This attitude survives easily on USENET because it [...] Does it ? I'd be surprised. If the netters maximize *money*, why are they wasting so much of their time and brains on unpaid dis- cussions ? Surely you must be misjudging them. The people who *do* maximize their money-making potential are very useful, however, and we should all be grateful to them. If, by some mass hypnosis, you eliminated this engine of achievement, half the world would starve very soon; the rest would stagnate and probably perish a little later. Not that these are the *only* productive people, but they are irreplaceable. You may say, there's got to be a better reason to do these useful things. Possibly, but make it *better*. Fear sup- plemented with fanaticism is infinitely worse. And that, so far, has been the only attempted alternative. Jan Wasilewsky
janw@inmet.UUCP (01/12/86)
[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs}!qantel!gabor]
>The cult of rationality is more likely to lead one to favor the
>rule of philosopher kings or a mandarin class.
Not a thoroughgoing cult of rationality. If you are satisfied
with just a few rational decisions to be made for the whole dumb
society, a philosopher king will do (but succession remains an
unsolved problem). If you need a massive rational input, democra-
cy is better (or would be with people less stultified by mass
media and standard education). An extreme cult of rationality re-
jects all authority but that of reason, and spells anarchy.franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/13/86)
In article <471@well.UUCP> rab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) writes: > Freedom is *not* freedom _from_ but freedom _to_. > > Those who pretend otherwise (such as Lenin) aren't using the >same concept as the rest of us. I think Franklin Rooseveldt provides a better character reference for this concept than Lenin does. Freedom includes *both* freedom from and freedom to. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108