[net.politics.theory] values as primaries

tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (01/17/86)

(I have chosen not to cross-post this into any other
newsgroups.  This newsgroup has had previous ethical
postings.  Perhaps we can avoid the religious backwash that
is currently polluting net.philosophy .)

>     When I say you are not reasoning if you justify your initiation of 
> force by pointing to your desire--an emotion, I am alluding to the fact 
> that the first criteria of reasoning is violated.  An emotion is not a 
> primary as is the evidence of your senses.  Emotions are products of 
> consciousness with somatic consequences.  In brief, an emotion is your 
> lightning fast, automatic response to something you have identified as 
> having a particular relationship to you and your values.  You feel fear of 
> things that threaten you, anger at things you consider unfair, sadness at 
> values you lose, pleasure when you gain values, etc.  Note that values are 
> also states of consciousness and abstractions.  As such they may be 
> correct or incorrect identifications of facts of reality.  A method of 
> reaching conclusions by treating as a primary whatever you happen to value
> is not reason.

The use of value as an epistemological or metaphysical
primary is not rational, although value drives the
development of both epistemology and metaphysics.  The use
of value as an ethical primary, with the obvious restriction
that it not violate knowledge, is both necessary and
rational; ethics must start with the given.  That use of a
particular value, in isolation from all others, is not
rational.  A failure to objectify values, and thereby to
miss the commonality of values among people, is not
rational.

Happiness cannot be the aim of ethics without also being the
primary value.

				David Hudson