[net.politics.theory] Reason gets no respect from Berman

rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (12/06/85)

			The Degradation of Reason

Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine.
They claim that being a mugger is reasonable.  Apparently, as long as someone
uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no
matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the
long range consequences.  I think that reason requires a lot more effort
and a much better result.

In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence
that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require
the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality
by integrating conceptal knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)--
i.e. of using reason.

There is even a simpler path.  The potential mugger could note that consistency
demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but
this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason.

To see the extent to which criminals are irrational--deny the pain to their
victims, have a fragile inflated opinion of their self-worth, choose to ignore
long range consequences, and treat themselves as an exception to every rule they
believe holds for others--read Stanton Samenow's *Inside the Criminal Mind*.
Samenow also describes the way to help a criminal habilitate himself (and tells
why criminals can not be *re*habilitated):  he has to change his thinking--
especially to think and act on principle.

An ethical principle is a guide to action.  Man needs principles to guide his
actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every
instance nor does he know automatically what to do.  But to recognize that
fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational.

I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is
one ethical principle I share with each of you:  the value of reason; but I am
amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers.  As long as you
treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it
to some momentary desire.

When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot
be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment
conflicts with mine?

FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON.
-- 
Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846

berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/09/85)

> 
> 			The Degradation of Reason
> 
> Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine.
> They claim that being a mugger is reasonable.  Apparently, as long as someone
> uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no
> matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the
> long range consequences.  I think that reason requires a lot more effort
> and a much better result.
> 
> In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence
> that he would be better off by living productively......................
> 
I am not arguing that one should be a mugger, or that becoming a mugger may
be a reasonable did.  I am claiming though that "co-rationality", as
defined by Wasilewsky, may exists, and that application of force, under
some circumstances, may be a rational thing.

Example: you are a citizen of an European state, and a neighbor of 
a large hostile contry with a vast army.  Is it rational to vote for
a conscription, as the only way of a having sufficiently large army?
(put Israel as an example, if you wish).  Consription means that for
at least one year you may be forced to engage in activities not of
your liking. 
Next example: the hostile country attacks.  Is it rational to make
a mobilization, i.e. to force 20% of the population to participate 
in the defence?
Was it rational for European powers to create colonies?
In many cases (like Holland, Britain), colonies were undoubtfully
a source of wealth, or a place for settlement of large segments
of the population (and, consequently, a source of wealth for the
settlers).  From some point of view, it was a collossal mugging.
Still, this was the way this country was created, and the fact that
it was created is not viewed as bad by many (irrational ones?).
> 
> An ethical principle is a guide to action.  Man needs principles to guide his
> actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every
> instance nor does he know automatically what to do.  But to recognize that
> fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational.
> 
> I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is
> one ethical principle I share with each of you:  the value of reason; but I am
> amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers.  As long as you
> treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it
> to some momentary desire.
> 
> When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot
> be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment
> conflicts with mine?
> 
> FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON.
> -- 
> Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846

1.  Ethical principles should have a limited lifespan from the
    historical perspective, but they should be almost invariant
    during a life of a person, the conflict between the need for
    "some fixed rules" and the need to adapt is only apparent.

2.  Reason is of tremendous help in formulating ethics, but 
    feelings are needed to.  Since reason cannot explain 
    everything without additional "first principles", those first 
    principles must be based somewhere.  For example, forcing 
    others to do things they do not want may be viewed with 
    disgust, this may lead to your principle that force is bad.  
    Accidently, it is more efficient to communicate feelings than 
    reasonings, without any doubt this was the reason that you 
    use the mugger metaphore.  One must admit that appealing to 
    feeling is not without its dangers.  However, I claim that you 
    hide the subjective source of your first principles behind the 
    smoke screen of "objective reasoning".  

3.  How shall I deal with others when my final judgment conflicts 
    with theirs?
    Some of the ethical principles must deal with the resolution
    of conflicts.  While in few cases the only solution is the
    destruction of the adversary (self-defence),  usually there
    are better options, like tolerating each other and seeking
    common values. 

    Piotr Berman

lkk@teddy.UUCP (12/09/85)

In article <1538@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes:
>
>In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence
>that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require
>the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality
>by integrating conceptal knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)--
>i.e. of using reason.


The Anguilo brothers, who are now on trial in Boston for Mafia racketeering,
amassed a multi-million dollar fortune using force.  How would you 
indicate to them that they are worse off than if they had become
steveadores or somesuch?


>There is even a simpler path.  The potential mugger could note that consistency
>demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but
>this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason.

I am reasonable, yet I can see instances where (given a certain value
system) inconsistency could be used productively.  Particularly if you
don't care about the well being of those you are being inconsistent with.

I would "reason" as follows.  I want A, but in all likelyhood, I will
never have enough money to get A.  I can however, get A by robbing X,
and I have very little chance of getting caught.  Therefore, it is in
my best self-interest to rob X.  Q.E.D.

>
>An ethical principle is a guide to action.  Man needs principles to guide his
>actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every
>instance nor does he know automatically what to do.  But to recognize that
>fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational.

What if I "rationally" decide that, while I can't do a detailed
analysis in every instance, there is no philosophical system which
adequately explains the world either, therefore I will depend on raw
intuition, which seems to work as well as anything else?

>
>I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is
>one ethical principle I share with each of you:  the value of reason; but I am
>amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers.  As long as you
>treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it
>to some momentary desire.

The reasons I'm not a mugger have much more to do with my
socio-economic status, my socialization during my childhood, and so
forth, than with reason.  Any "rational" reasons I give for not being
a mugger are just that, "rationalizations", after the fact.

If I was starving, and felt that there was no alternative, you can bet
your last dollar that I'd be a mugger.  That is why I try to make a
society in which people don't find themselves in such a situation,
because I can't really blame them if they are.
>
>When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot
>be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment
>conflicts with mine?

The same way people have dealt thru all of history.  Either thru force
(not preferable), or by compromise.


-- 
Sport Death,       (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk
Larry Kolodney     (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa
--------
Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing.
- Helen Keller

pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (12/10/85)

>In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence
>that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require
>the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality
>by integrating conceptual knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)--
>i.e. of using reason.

... "an abundance of evidence"?  From what is the evidence derived?
Sure, muggers don't make it very well in our society, but it can be
argued that that is only because society enforces a moral code that
is against the muggers "reason" for mugging in the first place.  If
you're not careful, you end up assuming your conclusion as a basis by
which to induce that conclusion in the mugger using reason.  If you
start with a blank slate (i.e. presuming that society does not inflict
a bias for or against muggers) can you still maintain that there would be
an "abundance of evidence" that the mugger should give up his trade
and that reason alone could compel him to do so based on that evidence?

>There is even a simpler path.  The potential mugger could note that consistency
>demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but
>this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason.

It would also require, as a more basic value, that he recognize that
others have the same value and rights as he.  If he happens to see
himself as being more valuable than others; his own desires as more
important, then he is not being inconsistent with his own values.  How
does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value?

>I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is
>one ethical principle I share with each of you:  the value of reason; but I am
>amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers.  As long as you
>treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it
>to some momentary desire.

Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate
from certain precepts.  Reason does not provide its own precepts.
I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept.
(I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job).  I don't value
it in itself.  In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to
drive nails.  Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify
itself.  Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing
necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts.
Everyone has these precepts, whether or not they recognize them as such.
The thing that I find hard to accept is the contention that precepts
are the product of reason itself.  The necessity to drive nails is not
derived from a hammer.

>When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot
>be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment
>conflicts with mine?

Maybe we need to consider that we need something more than reason ...
something to which our reason is anchored.  If it's not there, then I
guess we should just be "brave" and face up to it (i.e. just float).  If
we don't want to float then we better find an anchor for reason, because
it doesn't anchor itself.

>Bob Stubblefield 
-- 
Paul Dubuc 	cbsck!pmd 	\/-\
				/\-/

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/11/85)

In article <1538@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes:
>Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine.
>They claim that being a mugger is reasonable.  Apparently, as long as someone
>uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no
>matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the
>long range consequences.  I think that reason requires a lot more effort
>and a much better result.

Don't be quite so quick to throw in the long range result.  It is, at best,
uncertain.  Certainly, there are many people who have committed crimes,
whether in a single instance or throughout their lives, who lived their
whole lives without being the worse for it.  In many of these cases, this
was forseeable as the probable outcome.

>There is even a simpler path.  The potential mugger could note that
>consistency demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be
>treated; but this would require that he value consistency--the specialty
>of reason.

Ah, now this is an important principle.  But I wouldn't call it consistency.
It implies the consideration of the needs and desires of others, for their
own sake, and not just one's own.  This principle I would call altruism.

>To see the extent to which criminals are irrational--deny the pain to their
>victims, have a fragile inflated opinion of their self-worth, choose to ignore
>long range consequences, and treat themselves as an exception to every rule
>they believe holds for others--read Stanton Samenow's *Inside the Criminal
>Mind*.  Samenow also describes the way to help a criminal habilitate himself
>(and tells why criminals can not be *re*habilitated):  he has to change his
>thinking--especially to think and act on principle.

Has Mr. Samenow been especially successful at rehabilitating criminals (or
habilitating, if you prefer)?

>An ethical principle is a guide to action.  Man needs principles to guide his
>actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every
>instance nor does he know automatically what to do.  But to recognize that
>fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational.

Yes; but for any principle so derived there are exceptions.  Because there
are times when one can and should perform a detailed analysis.

>I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is
>one ethical principle I share with each of you:  the value of reason; but I am
>amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers.  As long as you
>treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it
>to some momentary desire.
>
>When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot
>be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final
>judgment conflicts with mine?

With compassion and tolerance, ideally.

>FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON.

As I commented in another posting (which may have gotten lost) it isn't.
There is at least one other mode of influencing people -- through cond-
itioning.  This can be done without any application of either force or
reason (although either can be part of the process).

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/15/85)

In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes:
>How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value?

I don't think that it does.  But, if you value the ability to reason then
it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable.  And you
then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it
is inconsistent with your valuing of reason.

Laura Creighton

ps -- note I am not saying that the reason people value other people is
because they reason, just that anyone who honestly values reason will
be constrained this way.  I don't actually think that muggers value reason,
but I will get to this later...

-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (12/16/85)

> In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes:
> >How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value?
> 
> I don't think that it does.  But, if you value the ability to reason then
> it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable.  And you
> then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it
> is inconsistent with your valuing of reason.
> 
> Laura Creighton
> 
> ps -- note I am not saying that the reason people value other people is
> because they reason, just that anyone who honestly values reason will
> be constrained this way.

I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit
positive value.  I do not see how it follows from this that the
use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent
with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained
by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability
of my victim.  Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything
from the safety of my children to my next fix.


						Baba

janw@inmet.UUCP (12/17/85)

In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes
(as quoted by Laura: I didn't get the article):
>Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate
>from certain precepts.  Reason does not provide its own precepts.
>I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept.
>(I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job).  I don't value
>it in itself.  In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to
>drive nails.  Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify
>itself.  Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing
>necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts.

Would Paul consider a competing point of view:
You *are* your reason  ?
If you reject this, what other components of your psyche are *you*,
and *use* the reason as a tool ?
And in case you think it's your immortal, God-given soul,
does not the reason have the same origin ?

If reason's value is justified by its usefulness, who (other than
reason)  determined  that  it  *is*  useful? If the truth is what
works (a pragmatist view), how do we know pragmatism works ?

My own view is this: reason may have developed as a tool, just as
brain  did  during  evolution. It has *become* a goal, a value in
itself, just as my brain is *me*, much more than is my foot.

Means become goals in the normal course of individual, as well
as philogenetic, development. Also, in the course of the
development of an *idea* in individual or collective consciousness.

The most valuable concepts often developed  as  useful  tools  in
solving  problems  that  are  now far less interesting than these
concepts. Can a 5th degree  equation  be  solved  in  radicals  ?
Doesn't matter much now, but group theory does.

Religious tolerance in Europe was a useful compromise,  a  di-
plomatic  formula  to give competing religious truths a breathing
spell. Then people discovered that  it  is  a  beautiful  ethical
principle in its own right.

The next paragraph is my response to  several  debates  that  have
raged here:

*Basic* values (concepts, principles) are  not  *primitive*  values
(concepts, principles). Being basic is an *emergent* property.
One way a value becomes basic is by being very useful for many
other values.

		Jan Wasilewsky

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/17/85)

In article <334@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes:
>>How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value?
>
>I don't think that it does.  But, if you value the ability to reason then
>it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable.  And you
>then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it
>is inconsistent with your valuing of reason.

Whoa!  None of this follows.

First, what is your starting point?  If you are starting with selfishness,
then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses.

Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which
reasons.  This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can
reason better than others.

Finally, just because you value people doesn't absolutely rule out the use
of force against them.  Given that you value their reason, this is a reason
why use of force is intrinsically a bad thing -- but there may be other
factors, which are more important.  In other words, the use of force may
be justified.  I have yet to hear anyone deny this -- at a minimum,
initiation of force by the other person is taken as adequate justification.
But if there can be one justification, there can be others.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/22/85)

>I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit
>positive value.  I do not see how it follows from this that the
>use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent
>with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained
>by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability
>of my victim.  Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything
>from the safety of my children to my next fix.
>
>
>						Baba

I think that we are not using ``value'' in the same way.  You cannot value
reason and then abandon it when it becomes convenient to do so -- or rather
there is a sense of the word ``value'' that is consistent with this meaning,
but that was not the sense in which I was using the word.  I do not initiate
violence on people because I value them -- and anyone who would initiate
violence upon another and still claim that they valued them would have a lot
of explaining to do, beginning with this inconsistency.

-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/22/85)

In article <906@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>Whoa!  None of this follows.
>
>First, what is your starting point?  If you are starting with selfishness,
>then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses.
>
>Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which
>reasons.  This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can
>reason better than others.
>

Two points here -- *I'm* the one who just said that valuing reason does not
lead to valuing human beings equally. okay?  Also, the starting poing was
whether the initiation of force was compatible with valuing reason.  But I
can go back to selfishness if you like.

I am not an ostrich who can bury my head in the sand whenever it is
convenient.  Therefore, I could not value my ability to reason without
valuing everyone elses, even if I wanted to.  What kind of twisted logic
full of self-serving lies would I have to resort to to maintain this?
Would I have to ignore that other people have the ability to reason?
Would I ascribe a different source for my ability to reason than theirs?
If I valued me, because of my ability to reason I would be compelled to
value others for their ability to reason.  To deny their value, would
be to deny my value and this is inconsistent with selfishness. [Hmm --
this would be inconsistent with rational selfishness, which is what I
am discussing. If you are irrationally selfish then no doubt you could
behave like an ostrich.]  The ability to generalise is fairly basic to
exercising reason.  

-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)

In article <350@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>>I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit
>>positive value.  I do not see how it follows from this that the
>>use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent
>>with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained
>>by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability
>>of my victim.  Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything
>>from the safety of my children to my next fix.
>
>I think that we are not using ``value'' in the same way.  You cannot value
>reason and then abandon it when it becomes convenient to do so -- or rather
>there is a sense of the word ``value'' that is consistent with this meaning,
>but that was not the sense in which I was using the word.  I do not initiate
>violence on people because I value them -- and anyone who would initiate
>violence upon another and still claim that they valued them would have a lot
>of explaining to do, beginning with this inconsistency.

If the sense in which you are using value does not permit you to ever act
against the thing you value, then you can value only that one thing.
Because whatever else you might value, it is possible that you will have
to choose between the two.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)

In article <351@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>In article <906@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>>Whoa!  None of this follows.
>>
>>First, what is your starting point?  If you are starting with selfishness,
>>then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses.
>>
>>Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which
>>reasons.  This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can
>>reason better than others.
>>
>Two points here -- *I'm* the one who just said that valuing reason does not
>lead to valuing human beings equally. okay?  Also, the starting poing was
>whether the initiation of force was compatible with valuing reason.  But I
>can go back to selfishness if you like.

OK, forget the part about "equally"; the first sentence of that paragraph
still stands.

>I am not an ostrich who can bury my head in the sand whenever it is
>convenient.  Therefore, I could not value my ability to reason without
>valuing everyone elses, even if I wanted to.  What kind of twisted logic
>full of self-serving lies would I have to resort to to maintain this?
>Would I have to ignore that other people have the ability to reason?
>Would I ascribe a different source for my ability to reason than theirs?
>If I valued me, because of my ability to reason I would be compelled to
>value others for their ability to reason.  To deny their value, would
>be to deny my value and this is inconsistent with selfishness. [Hmm --
>this would be inconsistent with rational selfishness, which is what I
>am discussing. If you are irrationally selfish then no doubt you could
>behave like an ostrich.]  The ability to generalise is fairly basic to
>exercising reason.  

The ability not to overgeneralize is fairly basic to exercising reason,
too.

First, a question: do you value yourself because of your ability to reason,
or do you value your ability to reason because you value yourself?  If
the answer is the former, then your basic principle is not selfishness;
it is love of reason.  I will assume the latter for the remainder of this.

So you value your reason because it is useful to you.  Generalizing, you
realize that other people's reason is useful to them, and that they
should value their reasons.  But this gives you no reason for you to
value their reason, because your reasons for valuing yours are not applic-
able to theirs.  The source for their ability to reason is quite irrelevant,
because the source of the reason has nothing to do with why you value it.

To reiterate: selfishness means valuing *yourself*; not valuing yourself and
things like yourself.  Rationality means considering the consequences of
your actions and their repurcussions (sp?) (this definition is too narrow;
but it covers the current situation).  Rationality lets you value other
things besides your starting values, but only on a contingent basis: because
they serve your purposes.  It doesn't cause you to value other things in
and of themselves.

You also left off my third point: that even if you do value other people,
that doesn't mean that you can never take action against them.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/30/85)

In article <951@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>
>If the sense in which you are using value does not permit you to ever act
>against the thing you value, then you can value only that one thing.
>Because whatever else you might value, it is possible that you will have
>to choose between the two.
>
This I do not buy.  I think that this is only true if you values certain
very strict ends. Do you value your money more than a new car is a definite
choice.  But if you value a way of being then you have a great deal of
flexibility without the necessity to choose between alternatives.

Part of valuing reason for me is because I can use it to understand why
I sometimes feel that I have to choose between terrible alternatives. I
can often discover that what I want becomes clear because I was not
thinking clearly when i thought that I wanted something.  A common mistake
I make is to think that I want *something* when what I really want is *to
deserve something*.  When I remember this, a lot of disappointment goes away.
Sure, i would like to have had that job, but the person who was hired was
better than I was and deserves the job.  Can I persist in wanting it while
realising that this would mean that I want for someone better qualified than
I to go without...nope.  Aha -- I thought that I wanted a job, and what I
wanted was to deserve a job.  

Reason is wonderful if you consistently apply it.  You get rid of a lot
of frustration through understanding.  And nearly all apparant conflicts
go away under its application.  What I find left is injustice.


-- 
Laura Creighton		
sun!l5!laura		(that is ell-five, not fifteen)
l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

janw@inmet.UUCP (12/31/85)

[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
>First, a question: do you value yourself because of your ability to reason,
>or do you value your ability to reason because you value yourself?  If
>the answer is the former, then your basic principle is not selfishness;
>it is love of reason.  I will assume the latter for the remainder of this.

Now that I re-read several of Laura's responses, I feel that  the
*former*  is  much  nearer to her point of view. The basic motive
*is* love of reason.

This  attitude  may  be rightly called rational *selfishness* for
two reasons: (1) someone who holds it  is  necessarily  rational,
therefore  has  something  to  love in herself; (2) one knows the
operations of one's own reason far more completely and intimately
than anyone else's: hence, a tendency to love oneself first. How-
ever, it would follow that if one gets convinced  someone  else's
reason far exceeds one's own; and if one somehow obtains an inti-
mate knowledge of its workings; then one may (selfish or not) love
another *more* than oneself.

I wonder if Laura agrees with this, and with this  interpretation
of her views in general. I also wonder what she thinks of Spinoza
whose ethical teaching seems to have a lot in common with hers.

                        Jan Wasilewsky

tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) (01/14/86)

In article <382@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>I can often discover that what I want becomes clear because I was not
>thinking clearly when i thought that I wanted something.  A common mistake
>I make is to think that I want *something* when what I really want is *to
>deserve something*.  When I remember this, a lot of disappointment goes away.

>Sure, i would like to have had that job, but the person who was hired was
>better than I was and deserves the job.  Can I persist in wanting it while
>realising that this would mean that I want for someone better qualified than
>I to go without...nope.  Aha -- I thought that I wanted a job, and what I
>wanted was to deserve a job.

A "whiggish" approach to history is to interpret history as the reason
one deserves to be where one is today, as a rational, natural development.

A realist approach to history is to ask how, as a concrete process,
people got to where they are, and how, as concrete processes which
actually took place, events came to be.

Now where jobs are concerned, do whigs make more money and get to
better positions, or do realists?  I don't know, but I'm a realist
at heart.  If I conclude that whigs do better, I may put on the hat
of a whig.

If someone needs someone else for a job, and I'm there, I'm very happy to
say, "I will do the best I can at this job."  I will not stick my reason
out to the point of saying, "and no one better than me happens to be
applying."  I don't know.  Nor will I stick my reason out to say,
"someone better than me is applying."

Nor will I worry that my ability to persuade might bring the interviewer
to an opinion of my competences which might be different from the opinion
I have of myself.  Nor will I worry that the politics of the firm
involved might favor a less-than-best qualified person.  If I see
the job and I like the job and I'm looking, I want it.

Once I've promised that I will do the best I can, and once I've clearly
laid out what I believe I can reasonably offer a firm, the moral
responsibility of choosing is out of my hands.  I believe in carrying
out promises.

I usually assume the person who gets the job is not the most qualified,
because I can see many reasons I would not choose the most qualified
person if I were sitting where the person doing the hiring sits.  For
instance, less qualified people may have more enthusiasm and loyalty.
They may be faster learners.

Laura's belief about "deserving a job" depends on a rational form of
organization which gives out jobs on some sort of merit.  Keynes once
said that most common-sense is the thoughts of some long-dead
economist.  My experience is that most common-sense about merit
is the thoughts of some long-dead rational organizations theory.
I don't believe the evidence supports much at all of that sort of
common sense.

>Reason is wonderful if you consistently apply it.  You get rid of a lot
>of frustration through understanding.  And nearly all apparant conflicts
>go away under its application.  What I find left is injustice.
>
>--
>Laura Creighton
>sun!l5!laura           (that is ell-five, not fifteen)
>l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa

How people want to organize their memories is a deeply personal choice,
which I'd not want to change.  So I'll just state what I think here.

I think most individual conflicts are sad, healthy, short, and worth
remembering.  There are many different reasons which argue with
different positions and voices, they don't add up to harmony, and
wisdom comes from balancing and nurturing the good reasons,
not from suppressing or systematizing them.

Applying reason consistently is a mark of technical skill and
extremism, but not of wisdom.

To get broad, I think most conflicts are conflicts of interests, not
conflicts of reason.  Reason often overextends itself into making
such conflicts appear more adversarial and eternal than they ever
were before reason was applied.  I prefer compassion, respect,
and diplomacy to reason in many cases.  And if life makes less
sense viewed through such lenses, there's no will of God that
life should make sense to us when we view it as a whole.

Some people come up with a division of actions into just or unjust
categories, such that justice and injustice is all around us, the
balance justice, I guess.  I think most actions involving people
have little to do with justice.  The determination of justice or
injustice is a remedy, not a fact.  The most successful society
is probably the one where this remedy needs least be applied.

Tony Wuersch
{amdcad!cae780,amd}!ubvax!tonyw

franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/17/86)

In article <398@ubvax.UUCP> tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) writes:
>I usually assume the person who gets the job is not the most qualified,
>because I can see many reasons I would not choose the most qualified
>person if I were sitting where the person doing the hiring sits.  For
>instance, less qualified people may have more enthusiasm and loyalty.
>They may be faster learners.

While your article was mostly quite reasonable, you are using far too
narrow a definition of qualified here.  Enthusiasm, loyalty, and learning
ability are certainly qualifications.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108