rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (12/06/85)
The Degradation of Reason Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine. They claim that being a mugger is reasonable. Apparently, as long as someone uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the long range consequences. I think that reason requires a lot more effort and a much better result. In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality by integrating conceptal knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)-- i.e. of using reason. There is even a simpler path. The potential mugger could note that consistency demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason. To see the extent to which criminals are irrational--deny the pain to their victims, have a fragile inflated opinion of their self-worth, choose to ignore long range consequences, and treat themselves as an exception to every rule they believe holds for others--read Stanton Samenow's *Inside the Criminal Mind*. Samenow also describes the way to help a criminal habilitate himself (and tells why criminals can not be *re*habilitated): he has to change his thinking-- especially to think and act on principle. An ethical principle is a guide to action. Man needs principles to guide his actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every instance nor does he know automatically what to do. But to recognize that fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational. I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it to some momentary desire. When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment conflicts with mine? FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON. -- Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (12/09/85)
> > The Degradation of Reason > > Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine. > They claim that being a mugger is reasonable. Apparently, as long as someone > uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no > matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the > long range consequences. I think that reason requires a lot more effort > and a much better result. > > In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence > that he would be better off by living productively...................... > I am not arguing that one should be a mugger, or that becoming a mugger may be a reasonable did. I am claiming though that "co-rationality", as defined by Wasilewsky, may exists, and that application of force, under some circumstances, may be a rational thing. Example: you are a citizen of an European state, and a neighbor of a large hostile contry with a vast army. Is it rational to vote for a conscription, as the only way of a having sufficiently large army? (put Israel as an example, if you wish). Consription means that for at least one year you may be forced to engage in activities not of your liking. Next example: the hostile country attacks. Is it rational to make a mobilization, i.e. to force 20% of the population to participate in the defence? Was it rational for European powers to create colonies? In many cases (like Holland, Britain), colonies were undoubtfully a source of wealth, or a place for settlement of large segments of the population (and, consequently, a source of wealth for the settlers). From some point of view, it was a collossal mugging. Still, this was the way this country was created, and the fact that it was created is not viewed as bad by many (irrational ones?). > > An ethical principle is a guide to action. Man needs principles to guide his > actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every > instance nor does he know automatically what to do. But to recognize that > fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational. > > I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is > one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am > amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you > treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it > to some momentary desire. > > When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot > be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment > conflicts with mine? > > FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON. > -- > Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846 1. Ethical principles should have a limited lifespan from the historical perspective, but they should be almost invariant during a life of a person, the conflict between the need for "some fixed rules" and the need to adapt is only apparent. 2. Reason is of tremendous help in formulating ethics, but feelings are needed to. Since reason cannot explain everything without additional "first principles", those first principles must be based somewhere. For example, forcing others to do things they do not want may be viewed with disgust, this may lead to your principle that force is bad. Accidently, it is more efficient to communicate feelings than reasonings, without any doubt this was the reason that you use the mugger metaphore. One must admit that appealing to feeling is not without its dangers. However, I claim that you hide the subjective source of your first principles behind the smoke screen of "objective reasoning". 3. How shall I deal with others when my final judgment conflicts with theirs? Some of the ethical principles must deal with the resolution of conflicts. While in few cases the only solution is the destruction of the adversary (self-defence), usually there are better options, like tolerating each other and seeking common values. Piotr Berman
lkk@teddy.UUCP (12/09/85)
In article <1538@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes: > >In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence >that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require >the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality >by integrating conceptal knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)-- >i.e. of using reason. The Anguilo brothers, who are now on trial in Boston for Mafia racketeering, amassed a multi-million dollar fortune using force. How would you indicate to them that they are worse off than if they had become steveadores or somesuch? >There is even a simpler path. The potential mugger could note that consistency >demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but >this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason. I am reasonable, yet I can see instances where (given a certain value system) inconsistency could be used productively. Particularly if you don't care about the well being of those you are being inconsistent with. I would "reason" as follows. I want A, but in all likelyhood, I will never have enough money to get A. I can however, get A by robbing X, and I have very little chance of getting caught. Therefore, it is in my best self-interest to rob X. Q.E.D. > >An ethical principle is a guide to action. Man needs principles to guide his >actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every >instance nor does he know automatically what to do. But to recognize that >fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational. What if I "rationally" decide that, while I can't do a detailed analysis in every instance, there is no philosophical system which adequately explains the world either, therefore I will depend on raw intuition, which seems to work as well as anything else? > >I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is >one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am >amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you >treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it >to some momentary desire. The reasons I'm not a mugger have much more to do with my socio-economic status, my socialization during my childhood, and so forth, than with reason. Any "rational" reasons I give for not being a mugger are just that, "rationalizations", after the fact. If I was starving, and felt that there was no alternative, you can bet your last dollar that I'd be a mugger. That is why I try to make a society in which people don't find themselves in such a situation, because I can't really blame them if they are. > >When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot >be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment >conflicts with mine? The same way people have dealt thru all of history. Either thru force (not preferable), or by compromise. -- Sport Death, (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa -------- Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing. - Helen Keller
pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (12/10/85)
>In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence >that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require >the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality >by integrating conceptual knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)-- >i.e. of using reason. ... "an abundance of evidence"? From what is the evidence derived? Sure, muggers don't make it very well in our society, but it can be argued that that is only because society enforces a moral code that is against the muggers "reason" for mugging in the first place. If you're not careful, you end up assuming your conclusion as a basis by which to induce that conclusion in the mugger using reason. If you start with a blank slate (i.e. presuming that society does not inflict a bias for or against muggers) can you still maintain that there would be an "abundance of evidence" that the mugger should give up his trade and that reason alone could compel him to do so based on that evidence? >There is even a simpler path. The potential mugger could note that consistency >demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but >this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason. It would also require, as a more basic value, that he recognize that others have the same value and rights as he. If he happens to see himself as being more valuable than others; his own desires as more important, then he is not being inconsistent with his own values. How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value? >I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is >one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am >amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you >treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it >to some momentary desire. Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate from certain precepts. Reason does not provide its own precepts. I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept. (I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job). I don't value it in itself. In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to drive nails. Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify itself. Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts. Everyone has these precepts, whether or not they recognize them as such. The thing that I find hard to accept is the contention that precepts are the product of reason itself. The necessity to drive nails is not derived from a hammer. >When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot >be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment >conflicts with mine? Maybe we need to consider that we need something more than reason ... something to which our reason is anchored. If it's not there, then I guess we should just be "brave" and face up to it (i.e. just float). If we don't want to float then we better find an anchor for reason, because it doesn't anchor itself. >Bob Stubblefield -- Paul Dubuc cbsck!pmd \/-\ /\-/
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/11/85)
In article <1538@hound.UUCP> rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) writes: >Piotr Berman and others hold a vastly different concept of reason from mine. >They claim that being a mugger is reasonable. Apparently, as long as someone >uses his mental faculty to arrive at a decision, they call it rational--no >matter what knowledge the actor evaded and no matter what the >long range consequences. I think that reason requires a lot more effort >and a much better result. Don't be quite so quick to throw in the long range result. It is, at best, uncertain. Certainly, there are many people who have committed crimes, whether in a single instance or throughout their lives, who lived their whole lives without being the worse for it. In many of these cases, this was forseeable as the probable outcome. >There is even a simpler path. The potential mugger could note that >consistency demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be >treated; but this would require that he value consistency--the specialty >of reason. Ah, now this is an important principle. But I wouldn't call it consistency. It implies the consideration of the needs and desires of others, for their own sake, and not just one's own. This principle I would call altruism. >To see the extent to which criminals are irrational--deny the pain to their >victims, have a fragile inflated opinion of their self-worth, choose to ignore >long range consequences, and treat themselves as an exception to every rule >they believe holds for others--read Stanton Samenow's *Inside the Criminal >Mind*. Samenow also describes the way to help a criminal habilitate himself >(and tells why criminals can not be *re*habilitated): he has to change his >thinking--especially to think and act on principle. Has Mr. Samenow been especially successful at rehabilitating criminals (or habilitating, if you prefer)? >An ethical principle is a guide to action. Man needs principles to guide his >actions because he does not have time to perform a detailed analysis in every >instance nor does he know automatically what to do. But to recognize that >fact and to choose to live by it is reasonable; to do otherwise is irrational. Yes; but for any principle so derived there are exceptions. Because there are times when one can and should perform a detailed analysis. >I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is >one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am >amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you >treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it >to some momentary desire. > >When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot >be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final >judgment conflicts with mine? With compassion and tolerance, ideally. >FORCE IS THE OPPOSITE OF REASON. As I commented in another posting (which may have gotten lost) it isn't. There is at least one other mode of influencing people -- through cond- itioning. This can be done without any application of either force or reason (although either can be part of the process). Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/15/85)
In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value? I don't think that it does. But, if you value the ability to reason then it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable. And you then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it is inconsistent with your valuing of reason. Laura Creighton ps -- note I am not saying that the reason people value other people is because they reason, just that anyone who honestly values reason will be constrained this way. I don't actually think that muggers value reason, but I will get to this later... -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (12/16/85)
> In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: > >How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value? > > I don't think that it does. But, if you value the ability to reason then > it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable. And you > then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it > is inconsistent with your valuing of reason. > > Laura Creighton > > ps -- note I am not saying that the reason people value other people is > because they reason, just that anyone who honestly values reason will > be constrained this way. I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit positive value. I do not see how it follows from this that the use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability of my victim. Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything from the safety of my children to my next fix. Baba
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/17/85)
In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes (as quoted by Laura: I didn't get the article): >Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate >from certain precepts. Reason does not provide its own precepts. >I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept. >(I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job). I don't value >it in itself. In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to >drive nails. Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify >itself. Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing >necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts. Would Paul consider a competing point of view: You *are* your reason ? If you reject this, what other components of your psyche are *you*, and *use* the reason as a tool ? And in case you think it's your immortal, God-given soul, does not the reason have the same origin ? If reason's value is justified by its usefulness, who (other than reason) determined that it *is* useful? If the truth is what works (a pragmatist view), how do we know pragmatism works ? My own view is this: reason may have developed as a tool, just as brain did during evolution. It has *become* a goal, a value in itself, just as my brain is *me*, much more than is my foot. Means become goals in the normal course of individual, as well as philogenetic, development. Also, in the course of the development of an *idea* in individual or collective consciousness. The most valuable concepts often developed as useful tools in solving problems that are now far less interesting than these concepts. Can a 5th degree equation be solved in radicals ? Doesn't matter much now, but group theory does. Religious tolerance in Europe was a useful compromise, a di- plomatic formula to give competing religious truths a breathing spell. Then people discovered that it is a beautiful ethical principle in its own right. The next paragraph is my response to several debates that have raged here: *Basic* values (concepts, principles) are not *primitive* values (concepts, principles). Being basic is an *emergent* property. One way a value becomes basic is by being very useful for many other values. Jan Wasilewsky
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/17/85)
In article <334@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <1671@cbsck.UUCP> pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >>How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value? > >I don't think that it does. But, if you value the ability to reason then >it will be very clear that those who can reason are valuable. And you >then cannot use violence against people because they are valuable and it >is inconsistent with your valuing of reason. Whoa! None of this follows. First, what is your starting point? If you are starting with selfishness, then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses. Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which reasons. This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can reason better than others. Finally, just because you value people doesn't absolutely rule out the use of force against them. Given that you value their reason, this is a reason why use of force is intrinsically a bad thing -- but there may be other factors, which are more important. In other words, the use of force may be justified. I have yet to hear anyone deny this -- at a minimum, initiation of force by the other person is taken as adequate justification. But if there can be one justification, there can be others. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/22/85)
>I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit >positive value. I do not see how it follows from this that the >use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent >with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained >by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability >of my victim. Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything >from the safety of my children to my next fix. > > > Baba I think that we are not using ``value'' in the same way. You cannot value reason and then abandon it when it becomes convenient to do so -- or rather there is a sense of the word ``value'' that is consistent with this meaning, but that was not the sense in which I was using the word. I do not initiate violence on people because I value them -- and anyone who would initiate violence upon another and still claim that they valued them would have a lot of explaining to do, beginning with this inconsistency. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/22/85)
In article <906@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Whoa! None of this follows. > >First, what is your starting point? If you are starting with selfishness, >then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses. > >Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which >reasons. This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can >reason better than others. > Two points here -- *I'm* the one who just said that valuing reason does not lead to valuing human beings equally. okay? Also, the starting poing was whether the initiation of force was compatible with valuing reason. But I can go back to selfishness if you like. I am not an ostrich who can bury my head in the sand whenever it is convenient. Therefore, I could not value my ability to reason without valuing everyone elses, even if I wanted to. What kind of twisted logic full of self-serving lies would I have to resort to to maintain this? Would I have to ignore that other people have the ability to reason? Would I ascribe a different source for my ability to reason than theirs? If I valued me, because of my ability to reason I would be compelled to value others for their ability to reason. To deny their value, would be to deny my value and this is inconsistent with selfishness. [Hmm -- this would be inconsistent with rational selfishness, which is what I am discussing. If you are irrationally selfish then no doubt you could behave like an ostrich.] The ability to generalise is fairly basic to exercising reason. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)
In article <350@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >>I can accept the idea that those who can reason have some implicit >>positive value. I do not see how it follows from this that the >>use of violence against such beings is *necessarily* inconsistent >>with my valuing of reason, since there may be things to be gained >>by the use of violence that I value *more* than the reasoning ability >>of my victim. Of course, depending on who I am, that might be anything >>from the safety of my children to my next fix. > >I think that we are not using ``value'' in the same way. You cannot value >reason and then abandon it when it becomes convenient to do so -- or rather >there is a sense of the word ``value'' that is consistent with this meaning, >but that was not the sense in which I was using the word. I do not initiate >violence on people because I value them -- and anyone who would initiate >violence upon another and still claim that they valued them would have a lot >of explaining to do, beginning with this inconsistency. If the sense in which you are using value does not permit you to ever act against the thing you value, then you can value only that one thing. Because whatever else you might value, it is possible that you will have to choose between the two. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (12/27/85)
In article <351@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <906@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >>Whoa! None of this follows. >> >>First, what is your starting point? If you are starting with selfishness, >>then you value your ability to reason, but not necessarily anyone elses. >> >>Even if you do value reason, it is a bit of a jump to value anything which >>reasons. This certainly doesn't lead to valuing humans equally; some can >>reason better than others. >> >Two points here -- *I'm* the one who just said that valuing reason does not >lead to valuing human beings equally. okay? Also, the starting poing was >whether the initiation of force was compatible with valuing reason. But I >can go back to selfishness if you like. OK, forget the part about "equally"; the first sentence of that paragraph still stands. >I am not an ostrich who can bury my head in the sand whenever it is >convenient. Therefore, I could not value my ability to reason without >valuing everyone elses, even if I wanted to. What kind of twisted logic >full of self-serving lies would I have to resort to to maintain this? >Would I have to ignore that other people have the ability to reason? >Would I ascribe a different source for my ability to reason than theirs? >If I valued me, because of my ability to reason I would be compelled to >value others for their ability to reason. To deny their value, would >be to deny my value and this is inconsistent with selfishness. [Hmm -- >this would be inconsistent with rational selfishness, which is what I >am discussing. If you are irrationally selfish then no doubt you could >behave like an ostrich.] The ability to generalise is fairly basic to >exercising reason. The ability not to overgeneralize is fairly basic to exercising reason, too. First, a question: do you value yourself because of your ability to reason, or do you value your ability to reason because you value yourself? If the answer is the former, then your basic principle is not selfishness; it is love of reason. I will assume the latter for the remainder of this. So you value your reason because it is useful to you. Generalizing, you realize that other people's reason is useful to them, and that they should value their reasons. But this gives you no reason for you to value their reason, because your reasons for valuing yours are not applic- able to theirs. The source for their ability to reason is quite irrelevant, because the source of the reason has nothing to do with why you value it. To reiterate: selfishness means valuing *yourself*; not valuing yourself and things like yourself. Rationality means considering the consequences of your actions and their repurcussions (sp?) (this definition is too narrow; but it covers the current situation). Rationality lets you value other things besides your starting values, but only on a contingent basis: because they serve your purposes. It doesn't cause you to value other things in and of themselves. You also left off my third point: that even if you do value other people, that doesn't mean that you can never take action against them. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (12/30/85)
In article <951@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > >If the sense in which you are using value does not permit you to ever act >against the thing you value, then you can value only that one thing. >Because whatever else you might value, it is possible that you will have >to choose between the two. > This I do not buy. I think that this is only true if you values certain very strict ends. Do you value your money more than a new car is a definite choice. But if you value a way of being then you have a great deal of flexibility without the necessity to choose between alternatives. Part of valuing reason for me is because I can use it to understand why I sometimes feel that I have to choose between terrible alternatives. I can often discover that what I want becomes clear because I was not thinking clearly when i thought that I wanted something. A common mistake I make is to think that I want *something* when what I really want is *to deserve something*. When I remember this, a lot of disappointment goes away. Sure, i would like to have had that job, but the person who was hired was better than I was and deserves the job. Can I persist in wanting it while realising that this would mean that I want for someone better qualified than I to go without...nope. Aha -- I thought that I wanted a job, and what I wanted was to deserve a job. Reason is wonderful if you consistently apply it. You get rid of a lot of frustration through understanding. And nearly all apparant conflicts go away under its application. What I find left is injustice. -- Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
janw@inmet.UUCP (12/31/85)
[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka] >First, a question: do you value yourself because of your ability to reason, >or do you value your ability to reason because you value yourself? If >the answer is the former, then your basic principle is not selfishness; >it is love of reason. I will assume the latter for the remainder of this. Now that I re-read several of Laura's responses, I feel that the *former* is much nearer to her point of view. The basic motive *is* love of reason. This attitude may be rightly called rational *selfishness* for two reasons: (1) someone who holds it is necessarily rational, therefore has something to love in herself; (2) one knows the operations of one's own reason far more completely and intimately than anyone else's: hence, a tendency to love oneself first. How- ever, it would follow that if one gets convinced someone else's reason far exceeds one's own; and if one somehow obtains an inti- mate knowledge of its workings; then one may (selfish or not) love another *more* than oneself. I wonder if Laura agrees with this, and with this interpretation of her views in general. I also wonder what she thinks of Spinoza whose ethical teaching seems to have a lot in common with hers. Jan Wasilewsky
tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) (01/14/86)
In article <382@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >I can often discover that what I want becomes clear because I was not >thinking clearly when i thought that I wanted something. A common mistake >I make is to think that I want *something* when what I really want is *to >deserve something*. When I remember this, a lot of disappointment goes away. >Sure, i would like to have had that job, but the person who was hired was >better than I was and deserves the job. Can I persist in wanting it while >realising that this would mean that I want for someone better qualified than >I to go without...nope. Aha -- I thought that I wanted a job, and what I >wanted was to deserve a job. A "whiggish" approach to history is to interpret history as the reason one deserves to be where one is today, as a rational, natural development. A realist approach to history is to ask how, as a concrete process, people got to where they are, and how, as concrete processes which actually took place, events came to be. Now where jobs are concerned, do whigs make more money and get to better positions, or do realists? I don't know, but I'm a realist at heart. If I conclude that whigs do better, I may put on the hat of a whig. If someone needs someone else for a job, and I'm there, I'm very happy to say, "I will do the best I can at this job." I will not stick my reason out to the point of saying, "and no one better than me happens to be applying." I don't know. Nor will I stick my reason out to say, "someone better than me is applying." Nor will I worry that my ability to persuade might bring the interviewer to an opinion of my competences which might be different from the opinion I have of myself. Nor will I worry that the politics of the firm involved might favor a less-than-best qualified person. If I see the job and I like the job and I'm looking, I want it. Once I've promised that I will do the best I can, and once I've clearly laid out what I believe I can reasonably offer a firm, the moral responsibility of choosing is out of my hands. I believe in carrying out promises. I usually assume the person who gets the job is not the most qualified, because I can see many reasons I would not choose the most qualified person if I were sitting where the person doing the hiring sits. For instance, less qualified people may have more enthusiasm and loyalty. They may be faster learners. Laura's belief about "deserving a job" depends on a rational form of organization which gives out jobs on some sort of merit. Keynes once said that most common-sense is the thoughts of some long-dead economist. My experience is that most common-sense about merit is the thoughts of some long-dead rational organizations theory. I don't believe the evidence supports much at all of that sort of common sense. >Reason is wonderful if you consistently apply it. You get rid of a lot >of frustration through understanding. And nearly all apparant conflicts >go away under its application. What I find left is injustice. > >-- >Laura Creighton >sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) >l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa How people want to organize their memories is a deeply personal choice, which I'd not want to change. So I'll just state what I think here. I think most individual conflicts are sad, healthy, short, and worth remembering. There are many different reasons which argue with different positions and voices, they don't add up to harmony, and wisdom comes from balancing and nurturing the good reasons, not from suppressing or systematizing them. Applying reason consistently is a mark of technical skill and extremism, but not of wisdom. To get broad, I think most conflicts are conflicts of interests, not conflicts of reason. Reason often overextends itself into making such conflicts appear more adversarial and eternal than they ever were before reason was applied. I prefer compassion, respect, and diplomacy to reason in many cases. And if life makes less sense viewed through such lenses, there's no will of God that life should make sense to us when we view it as a whole. Some people come up with a division of actions into just or unjust categories, such that justice and injustice is all around us, the balance justice, I guess. I think most actions involving people have little to do with justice. The determination of justice or injustice is a remedy, not a fact. The most successful society is probably the one where this remedy needs least be applied. Tony Wuersch {amdcad!cae780,amd}!ubvax!tonyw
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/17/86)
In article <398@ubvax.UUCP> tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch) writes: >I usually assume the person who gets the job is not the most qualified, >because I can see many reasons I would not choose the most qualified >person if I were sitting where the person doing the hiring sits. For >instance, less qualified people may have more enthusiasm and loyalty. >They may be faster learners. While your article was mostly quite reasonable, you are using far too narrow a definition of qualified here. Enthusiasm, loyalty, and learning ability are certainly qualifications. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108