[net.politics.theory] Proof That Reason And Force Are Opposites

rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (01/27/86)

		Anatomy of a Socialist's Defense of Force

I have mixed emotions about Tim Sevener's response to my essay showing that
reason is the opposite of force.  On the one hand, it's nice to know that
someone took the time to read it and reply; but on the other hand, it is not
pleasant to sort out irrelevant insults from substantive objections.
The hostile tone he exhibited in his note is not conducive to
intellectual discourse and is uncalled for in a public discussion.
Although he deserves no reply, I feel compelled to correct the misstatements
in his response.

	"Mr. Stubblefield has certainly presented an elaborate opus of the
	foundations of his moral philosophy."

The whole point of my essay was not a moral point but a factual one:  that
the aspects of reality identified by the concepts of reason and force (in the
aspect of reality where those two concepts are commensurate--social interaction)
are opposites.  It was not until I reread his response that I associated
condescension with his use of "Mr." and "certainly."  But "elaborate opus" is
a rather obvious term of derision for a 213-line article.

[I refer any reader interested in the foundations of an objective moral
philosophy to a 110-page essay on a theory of concepts in *Introduction to
Objectivist Epistemology* and a 21-page essay in *The Virtue of Selfishness*--
both by Ayn Rand.  Both books should be available in most libraries and
bookstores.  They can also be ordered from Palo Alto Book Service,
200 California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94306 (415) 327-7781 or Second Renaissance
Book Service, 8608 Old Dominion Court, Indianapolis, Ind 46251 (317) 243-8048.]

	"He and other Libertarians would certainly be enlightened by a study
	of philosophy, economics and society beyond the narrow circle of
	Ayn Rand and her cohorts."

This statement is insulting on at least five counts.

1.  I am not a Libertarian.  I care too much for the precision of language
to want anyone to identify me as such.

[Libertarianism is anti-philosophical.  In terms of fundamentals, Libertarianism
has much more in common with socialism than it does with my political views--
capitalism.  Why this is so would be yet another "elaborate opus."  I refer
anyone who cannot wait until I get around to giving my explanation to
"Libertarianism:  The Perversion of Liberty," by Peter Schwartz, now available
as a 64-page pamphlet for $4.95 from The Intellectual Activist,
131 Fifth Avenue, Suite 101, New York, NY 10003.]

2.  The implication that I am not widely read is irrelevant and false.  His
easy assertion of a statement so obviously false to anyone who knows me makes
me wonder how much he values his own credibility.

3.  Someone who associates Ayn Rand with Libertarians is either trying to smear
her or has little understanding of either.  Someone who speaks down to others
for not being widely read should demonstrate having some understanding of those
people he implies he has read.

4.  There is an implication that Ayn Rand's knowledge of philosophy, economics,
and society was narrow.  He has as much justification for this claim
as his claim about me.  Since Rand's books have sold tens of millions, my
estimate of the value he places on his own credibility approaches zero.
(Does he want only the gullible to read him a second time?)

5.  His use of the term "cohorts" is consistent with his insulting tone
and message.
 
	"Mr. Stubblefield makes a number of basic confusions which were pointed
	out by other philosophers a long time ago."

This generalization would not bother me if it were backed up by concretes.
If he were able to clarify my confusions (without insults and misrepresen-
tations), I would be quite happy to read his comments.

	"For one thing his whole *moral* philosophy (and Ayn Rand's) is based
	on a number of assumptions which make no sense in reality."

Except for the fact that my essay did not present any of my moral
philosophy (nor Ayn Rand's--nor any way for him to tell if these are the
same or different)  and except for the fact that the validity of neither my
essay nor Ayn Rand's philosophy is based on assumptions, this last sentence
holds out hope that discussion is possible.  It implies that a standard of
agreement is that things should make "sense in reality."  I am for reason and
reality.  If he were too, we could communicate.

	"The deification of Individualistic `Reason' is merely a variation of
	Hegel's grand theories of Zeitgeist and the progress of the Ideal
	in history with which Hegel made such grand apologies for the social
	order of aristocratic rule by the few in his own day."

Any hope for a common base for discussion was false.  What is "Individualistic
`reason'" and how does it differ from reason as the faculty that identifies and
integrates sensory material?  If the charge is that I think reason is a faculty
of an individual human consciousness, I confess that I cannot see any
evidence in reality for an alternative view.

And what does it mean to deify reason?  If the charge is that my reason is my
highest value, that is true--but irrelevant to the question of fact about
reason and force.  His charge does lead me to wonder what values he
places above his own means of being in contact with reality.

The association of my (or Ayn Rand's) views with those of Hegel is a monumental
distortion.  To name the most fundamental difference, I believe in an objective
reality, the existence of which is not dependent on consciousness--neither mine,
society's, nor God's.  Hegel is one of the most explicit advocates of the
primacy of consciousness--incidentally, of the collectivist variety.

	"Marx said then that he would `turn Hegel on his head' and he did."

This statement implies that there is a vast difference in the the ideas of
Marx and Hegel.  It is true that they took opposite sides of a false
alternative.  (Hegel's Idealism dispenses with existence and Marx's economic
determinism dispenses with consciousness.)  But what is the difference in
practice of the totalitarian state of the Hegelians (Nazi Germany) and the
totalitarian states of the Marxists?

	"Let us now see how we can do so for this argument.
	Very late in his elaborate exposition Mr. Stubblefield admits:
 
	>     All the aspects of reason discussed thus far apply in society or
	> in a desert island environment--i.e., for a single human in isolation.
 
	In the first place we must recognize that `reason' is not some dis-
	embodied innate ability but something culturally learned and intimately
	connected with language.  We have no evidence whatsoever that an infant
	left on a desert island will learn language - indeed it will not survive
	at all without human care."

There is a confusion here in the mind of the one who wanted to straighten out
my "confusions."  In particular he confuses the process of reason with results
of reason.  Reason is the process that an individual human mind must carry out
to maintain its contact with reality.  Language is a particular creation of acts
of reason by many individuals over generations.  It is reason that makes
language possible--not the other way around.  The fact that my powers of reason
can be greatly expanded by using concepts others teach me says that society is
valuable to me; but society does not do my reasoning for me.

	"Moreover as Piaget has shown even learning
	such elementary principles as conservation of mass requires activity
	*within* the world."

The misleading and insulting implication is that I believe otherwise.

	"This was what Marx meant when he spoke of `turning
	Hegel on his head.'  Not to speak of some abstract supernatural `Reason'
	independent of our material and social existence but to realize that
	ideology itself is transmitted through physical means - the electrons 
	on this terminal for example, printing in books, vocal expression,etc."

I disagree with Hegel, who thought existence was unreal, and Marx, who thought
consciousness was irrelevant.  There was nothing in my essay to justify the
insulting implication that I think reason is supernatural.

	"Even our most basic perception, sight, is to some extent *learned* -
	people who have been blind and suddenly gain their sight must learn
	how to focus, how to distinguish objects, etc.
	Piaget's studies show how children must physically interact with the
	world to learn the most reasonable physical principles."

I don't know which of my formulations could have given anyone the false
impression that I think people gain knowledge passively or are born with it.
I am offended by someone who misrepresents an article by me as holding
views I disagree with.

	"Vygotsky's studies in `Mind and Society' go further and show how
	conceptual thinking is intimately connected with language via
	`inner speech.'  And that such `inner speech' is socially learned.
 				...
	So `reason' itself is no socially isolated absolute."

Since I believe words are used in reasoning and most words someone uses
are learned from others, what is it that he objects to?  I think an individual
on a desert island must and can use reason.  The only principle I can see
consistent with Sevener's views is that reason is an attribute of society and
would be impossible for an isolated individual.  If he believes that people
cannot think except in the society of others, he should state that as a 
principle and check it out by applying to himself.

	"But this same problem plagues another part of Mr. Stubblefield's
	argument when he says:
	 
	>Reason is the only process of consciousness that produces abstractions 
	> consistent with reality.  To do this, it must meet two essential 
	> criteria.  First, to qualify as reasoning, a process must deal in 
	> abstractions ultimately based on the evidence of the senses.  Second,
	> it must integrate new conclusions non-contradictorily with all
	> previous knowledge of the reasoner.
 
	Does scientific knowledge really depend upon my own personal evidence
	of the senses?"

The formulation of this question is vague.  Why does he introduce the adjective
"scientific" when the issue is how does one know anything at all?  Does the
question imply that scientific knowledge exists in society apart from its
existence in the minds of individuals in the society?  The examples he uses
seem to mean that the actual question in his mind is:  "Does everything I
know depend on evidence from my own senses?"

	"Of course not, it cannot be so dependent or else we
	would spend all our lives trying to discover *anything*.  I have
	never seen Betelguese and yet I have every confidence that it is there.
	I have never seen the Galapagos turtles or finches with my own eyes
	and yet I believe they are there as well as the mountains of evidence
	supporting the theory of evolution.  I have gained this `knowledge'
	not directly through my own senses, for that would be impossible,
	but through the reports of others in books, articles, etc.  In other
	words through *social communication* and through trust that others
	will accurately report what they have seen, heard, or perceived.

	Again, then we find that even scientific knowledge, which strives to
	be as objective as possible, is still based upon social interaction."

I stated an epistemological principle that knowledge starts with sensory
evidence.  He gives some examples where I agree that people can learn some
identifications of reality from others.  The epistemological issues involved
in what your individual mind needs in order to classify something someone else
tells you as knowledge are complex.  Before you can know what to believe on
indirect evidence, you should grasp how to form conceptual knowledge from
direct sensory evidence.  But Sevener jumps to a conclusion that is
ridiculous when stated as a principle:  the base of knowledge is what others
tell you.  How do you know what they tell you is true?  Which others
do you believe?  Instead of basing what he claims as knowledge on reason
and reality, such a mentality will take the word of whoever's ideas he feels
are right.
 
	"If reason and scientific knowledge cannot be divorced from social
	interaction then *how* can the problems of ethics?"

Ethics gives a guide for human action.  There is an implicit premise in this
question that a man on a desert island needs no guide for his actions.

	"this will be continued later .......
     	tim sevener   whuxn!orb"

Notice that Sevener's opposition to my proof that force and reason are
opposites reduces to the notion that reason is an attribute of a collective
rather than of the individual.  Your guess is as good as mine as to whether
this is done out of respect for reason or from a desire to have force used
to get his way.

What kind of political system is consistent with reason?

One that initiates force against individuals to accomplish what those in
power deem to be for the "good of society"--i.e., collectivism?

Or one that protects individual rights by preventing members of society from
initiating force--i.e., capitalism?

-- 
Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846

orb@whuts.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/29/86)

> from Bob Stubblefield:
> 
> 		Anatomy of a Socialist's Defense of Force
 
I never defended force, what I was criticizing in this particular
article referred to is Bob's individualizing of the whole process
of reason.  Contrary to Bob's comments that such individualization
is not important, such an assumption is profoundly important in
affecting the whole of one's later conclusions.
If you do not wish to call yourself a libertarian or an objectivist
but some other species of the same genera is not important.
The point of your elaborate but confused argument was the conclusion
stated in both your original article and your reply:

> Or one that protects individual rights by preventing members of society from
> initiating force--i.e., capitalism?
> 
 
I have pointed out in previous articles in this newsgroup, as has
Richard Carnes and others, that it is quite simply *false* to
contend that capitalism and private property involve no force.
To claim a piece of property in capitalism means that one can
force others off it and prevent their use.  Thus in the fabled
desert island example (which one notes could never last as a *society*
because there are no women and no family to reproduce such a society)
as soon as somebody else comes onto Robinson Crusoe's island than
s/he may be summarily forced to leave under the rights of private
property.  To do so *requires the use of force*!!
It was exactly such force which led to expansion of feudal fiefs
in the Middle Ages, it was such force which led to the white settlement
of Indian lands (which had previously suffered under no exploitation or
from the exclusions and restrictions and control of private property)
in which whole Indian tribes were practically wiped out to make room
for private property, it was exactly such force which led to
the slaughter of workers trying to start a union so they could have
redress from exploitative bosses and foremen.
 
How are you to maintain your right of private property on your
desert island?  Kindly ask the intruder (who may see no reason
whatsoever why this work of nature should be *controlled* by
anyone) to leave? And what then?
 
What then is the force which has been applied in the interests
of private property throughout the ages.
 
  tim sevener   whuxn!orb