[net.politics.theory] Reason and Force--Still Opposites

rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (02/02/86)

This is a response to Paul Torek's reply (441@umich.UUCP) to my proof that
reason and force are opposites in the only sense in which these concepts
are commensurate--social interaction (1596@hound.UUCP).

I originally stated as a principle--i.e., a broad generalization that integrates
many observations of reality--"that initiating force to gain values is
detrimental to the faculty of reason--both to that of the victim *and* the
initiator."

Paul Torek argues that "is only *sometimes* so."
When someone says a generalization holds for some cases and not for others, he
is implying there are some different contexts where other factors are ruling.
For example, when the generalization that Type A blood from different people is
compatible was found not to hold in some contexts, it had to be augmented by
the new information that the Rh factor should also match.  I argued that when
men can survive by reason, (the initiation of) force (to gain values) is
irrational.  Either Paul is saying: 1) that our context is that men cannot
survive by reason or 2) that it is not a mistake, in principle, to try to gain
values from others by force--even when you can survive by using reason.  I
don't believe the first; nor, I think, does Paul.  If there are no principles,
then of course it cannot be a mistake in principle to do anything--including
using force.  But, I am sure, both Paul and I believe that there are principles.

Thus, Paul's position must be that even though force is generally a mistake
(when initiated to gain values), there are some contexts where a different
principle exerts itself and makes it rational to use force.  I would like to
see his formulation of such a principle.

Notice that even if it were sometimes rational to use force to gain values (in
a context where you could live without initiating force),
that does not change the fact that dealing with someone by reason (interacting
with a mutually consenting adult) is essentially the opposite of using force (an
interaction where one party uses his willingness to resort to physical means
to get the other to obey).  Paul confuses the matter by imagining "symmetric
cases where the initiators and recipients of force are the same people."  This
notion is a rationalistic equivocation on the meaning of "initiating force"
that implies (if you attempt to tie it to reality) that people are not
individuals but a collective entity.

Force in self-defense is rational and initiating force to preserve values is
rational (if you leave yourself open to objective review).  Initiating force
to gain values in a context where it is impossible survive without using force
(i.e., by reasoned transactions) cannot be judged as either rational or
irrational because the context is one where it is impossible to formulate and
live by principles.

In Paul's words, I have "conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate
force.  And in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say,
laws that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)?"

National defense is rational.  Taxation to pay for it in a *free* society is
irrational.  In today's welfare state (as bad as today's level of taxation is)
the issue of taxes is not the most devastating restriction on freedom.
I realize I have not supported these assertions yet in any postings.  To do so,
would require a presentation of ethics and politics.  And I have gotten
responses from only a few who have agreed with my simple factual statement
that force and reason are opposites.

Paul asks, "In general--why is it more rational to support the sort of political
system you favor than something closer to the sort the USA has now?  Is
it that the political system you favor gives me the best chance of a
long and happy life (I would dispute such a claim)?"

Yes, a political system that restricted itself to protecting individual rights
would give me, any other productive (i.e., non-looting and non-mooching)
individual, and everyone dependent on voluntary charity a much better chance of
a long and happy life.  The economic fact behind this is that interactions of
reason tend towards a net benefit while interactions based on force lead to a
net loss.  There are literally thousands of examples to illustrate this
principle, but none of them will be convincing until you integrate that what
is in common with the failed programs is the initiation of force.  Just to take
one example, I suggest reading "Medicine: The Death of a Profession," by
Leonard Peikoff in the April and June 1985 issues of *The Objectivist Forum*.

Paul asks:
"What if one justifies one's initiation of force NOT by pointing to a desire
--an automatic emotion--but by pointing to a reasoned analysis which
shows that initiating force is necessary for oneself and one's fellow
citizens to live as long and happy lives as possible?"

That cannot be shown because a long and happy life requires the creation of
values (a product of reason), not their destruction (the result of initiating
force).

The following citation from Paul is another rationalistic equivocation.

   Pointing out that force does not proceed by reasoned argument does not
   distinguish force from market transactions.  This is a point which I made,
   and you did not respond to, the last time these issues were discussed.
   Market transactions make no more and no less appeal to reason than threats
   do:  in the former case, Jones says to Smith, "give me $20 and I'll let
   you have this tool"; in the latter case, Jones says to Smith "give
   me $20 and I'll let you keep your arms unbroken".  In neither case does
   Jones deal purely in abstractions and pointing out contradictions in
   Smith's reasoning.  In both cases, Jones must rely on physical means
   (the tool in the market transaction; his strength in the threat) to get
   Smith to do what Jones seeks.

Rather than focusing on reality, Paul's analysis just plays games with words.
If this is a valid technique for proving a point, then anything can be proved
or disproved.  If you were to ask a child to sort out the reality behind
examples like this, he could tell you which ones were force and which ones were
trade.  When an adult cannot tell the difference, you can guarantee he's had
a college education.

The following is from an answer I posted last November that Paul must have
missed.

Consider the difference between a threat and an argument.

The threatener says, "My wishes--products of my consciousness
which need have no tie to reality--will guide your action."

The arguer says, "Guide your actions by reality.  Here are the
facts of reality that lead to the actions I recommend.  None of
these reasons are based on non-objective products of my consciousness.
It is true that I desire you to act this way; but my desire should be
irrelevant to your decision."

It should be clear that the threatener--someone who proposes to use
force to have his way with others--is the opposite of the arguer--someone
who proposes to deal with others with reason.

It is true that the person threatened can continue to use reason to guide
his actions just as he would use reason to decide what to do if a grizzly
challenged him for his lunch.  But we are no longer talking of *human*
interactions in either case.  To the extent that someone chooses to use force
rather than reason, he abandons his claim to be treated as man--the rational
animal.

What is the epistemological status of the whim of the threatener?  Where is its
tie to reality?  Are all products of consciousness equivalent?  Are whims
the same as reason?  Can the threatener survive on whims without you?
You know that your own emotions do not give you truth.  Why should someone
else's emotions do so?

The sense in which force cuts off your tie to reality--your reason--is that
it attempts to elevate the arbitrary, subjective contents of someone's mind
to the same status as metaphysical facts of reality.  How can anyone hope
to use reason to identify and integrate the material provided by his senses
if any arbitrary desire is to be treated as being as real as existents?
-- 
Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846