rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) (02/02/86)
This is a response to Paul Torek's reply (441@umich.UUCP) to my proof that reason and force are opposites in the only sense in which these concepts are commensurate--social interaction (1596@hound.UUCP). I originally stated as a principle--i.e., a broad generalization that integrates many observations of reality--"that initiating force to gain values is detrimental to the faculty of reason--both to that of the victim *and* the initiator." Paul Torek argues that "is only *sometimes* so." When someone says a generalization holds for some cases and not for others, he is implying there are some different contexts where other factors are ruling. For example, when the generalization that Type A blood from different people is compatible was found not to hold in some contexts, it had to be augmented by the new information that the Rh factor should also match. I argued that when men can survive by reason, (the initiation of) force (to gain values) is irrational. Either Paul is saying: 1) that our context is that men cannot survive by reason or 2) that it is not a mistake, in principle, to try to gain values from others by force--even when you can survive by using reason. I don't believe the first; nor, I think, does Paul. If there are no principles, then of course it cannot be a mistake in principle to do anything--including using force. But, I am sure, both Paul and I believe that there are principles. Thus, Paul's position must be that even though force is generally a mistake (when initiated to gain values), there are some contexts where a different principle exerts itself and makes it rational to use force. I would like to see his formulation of such a principle. Notice that even if it were sometimes rational to use force to gain values (in a context where you could live without initiating force), that does not change the fact that dealing with someone by reason (interacting with a mutually consenting adult) is essentially the opposite of using force (an interaction where one party uses his willingness to resort to physical means to get the other to obey). Paul confuses the matter by imagining "symmetric cases where the initiators and recipients of force are the same people." This notion is a rationalistic equivocation on the meaning of "initiating force" that implies (if you attempt to tie it to reality) that people are not individuals but a collective entity. Force in self-defense is rational and initiating force to preserve values is rational (if you leave yourself open to objective review). Initiating force to gain values in a context where it is impossible survive without using force (i.e., by reasoned transactions) cannot be judged as either rational or irrational because the context is one where it is impossible to formulate and live by principles. In Paul's words, I have "conceded that it is sometimes rational to initiate force. And in that case, why isn't it rational to support certain laws (say, laws that authorize taxation to pay for national defense, for example)?" National defense is rational. Taxation to pay for it in a *free* society is irrational. In today's welfare state (as bad as today's level of taxation is) the issue of taxes is not the most devastating restriction on freedom. I realize I have not supported these assertions yet in any postings. To do so, would require a presentation of ethics and politics. And I have gotten responses from only a few who have agreed with my simple factual statement that force and reason are opposites. Paul asks, "In general--why is it more rational to support the sort of political system you favor than something closer to the sort the USA has now? Is it that the political system you favor gives me the best chance of a long and happy life (I would dispute such a claim)?" Yes, a political system that restricted itself to protecting individual rights would give me, any other productive (i.e., non-looting and non-mooching) individual, and everyone dependent on voluntary charity a much better chance of a long and happy life. The economic fact behind this is that interactions of reason tend towards a net benefit while interactions based on force lead to a net loss. There are literally thousands of examples to illustrate this principle, but none of them will be convincing until you integrate that what is in common with the failed programs is the initiation of force. Just to take one example, I suggest reading "Medicine: The Death of a Profession," by Leonard Peikoff in the April and June 1985 issues of *The Objectivist Forum*. Paul asks: "What if one justifies one's initiation of force NOT by pointing to a desire --an automatic emotion--but by pointing to a reasoned analysis which shows that initiating force is necessary for oneself and one's fellow citizens to live as long and happy lives as possible?" That cannot be shown because a long and happy life requires the creation of values (a product of reason), not their destruction (the result of initiating force). The following citation from Paul is another rationalistic equivocation. Pointing out that force does not proceed by reasoned argument does not distinguish force from market transactions. This is a point which I made, and you did not respond to, the last time these issues were discussed. Market transactions make no more and no less appeal to reason than threats do: in the former case, Jones says to Smith, "give me $20 and I'll let you have this tool"; in the latter case, Jones says to Smith "give me $20 and I'll let you keep your arms unbroken". In neither case does Jones deal purely in abstractions and pointing out contradictions in Smith's reasoning. In both cases, Jones must rely on physical means (the tool in the market transaction; his strength in the threat) to get Smith to do what Jones seeks. Rather than focusing on reality, Paul's analysis just plays games with words. If this is a valid technique for proving a point, then anything can be proved or disproved. If you were to ask a child to sort out the reality behind examples like this, he could tell you which ones were force and which ones were trade. When an adult cannot tell the difference, you can guarantee he's had a college education. The following is from an answer I posted last November that Paul must have missed. Consider the difference between a threat and an argument. The threatener says, "My wishes--products of my consciousness which need have no tie to reality--will guide your action." The arguer says, "Guide your actions by reality. Here are the facts of reality that lead to the actions I recommend. None of these reasons are based on non-objective products of my consciousness. It is true that I desire you to act this way; but my desire should be irrelevant to your decision." It should be clear that the threatener--someone who proposes to use force to have his way with others--is the opposite of the arguer--someone who proposes to deal with others with reason. It is true that the person threatened can continue to use reason to guide his actions just as he would use reason to decide what to do if a grizzly challenged him for his lunch. But we are no longer talking of *human* interactions in either case. To the extent that someone chooses to use force rather than reason, he abandons his claim to be treated as man--the rational animal. What is the epistemological status of the whim of the threatener? Where is its tie to reality? Are all products of consciousness equivalent? Are whims the same as reason? Can the threatener survive on whims without you? You know that your own emotions do not give you truth. Why should someone else's emotions do so? The sense in which force cuts off your tie to reality--your reason--is that it attempts to elevate the arbitrary, subjective contents of someone's mind to the same status as metaphysical facts of reality. How can anyone hope to use reason to identify and integrate the material provided by his senses if any arbitrary desire is to be treated as being as real as existents? -- Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846